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Preface 
This study represents an attempt to present a survey of one of the 
most important periods in recent Finnish history as set against its 
wider international context. Chronologically, it covers the early 
decades of independence, the period stretching from the declar-
ation of independence in the latter stages of the First World War to 
the eve of the Second World War. 
In surveying Finnish foreign policy and more generally 
Finland's international relations over that period, attention has not 
been restricted solely to political relations, as in more 
conventionally-orientated studies. Various other aspects of 
external relations, such as trade, cultural and sporting links are 
also examined. The parallel study of these component areas of 
international relations serves to provide a more comprehensive 
overview of Finland's development over the period in question 
than would have been possible had a more traditional approach 
been followed. 
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The author has attempted to identify the background factors 
shaping the country's international relations as seen from this 
wider perspective, in terms of both Finland's external and internal 
development. In the case of the latter, the focus of analysis 
concentrates on trends in the evolution of political and social 
opinion as represented by political parties and other interest 
groups. The press, as a central and highly visible forum for the 
exchange of views and opinions, naturally features largely here. 
Coverage has also been given to the institutions functioning in the 
conventional foreign policy field and in the general area of 
international relations. 
An attempt has also been made to chart how Finland's 
neighbours and the great powers, primarily Sweden, Britain, 
France, Germany and Russia/the Soviet Union, looked upon 
Finland's position during the period under consideration, 
interpreted the country's policies and internal developments, and 
how their overall level of interest in Finland as a whole matured. 
The author's close contacts with fellow historians at the 
Department of Political History at the University of Turku played 
an important part in shaping the work on this study. In this 
respect, I would particularly like to thank Docents Martti 
Julkunen, Juhani Mylly and Timo Soikkanen and Dr. Tapani 
Paavonen, together with Anja Lehikoinen, Mika Hokkinen, Jaakko 
Mäkelä and Tapani Kunttu. They formed an enthusiastic and 
inspiring group. 


















In the final stages of the project, the author was also able to 
benefit from many discussions with Finnish scholars working in 
various specialist areas of historical research, something which 
proved of great assistance given the range of areas embraced. I 
would like to mention my appreciation to the following: Keijo 
Korhonen, Professors Sune Jungar and Hannu Soikkanen, Matti 
Nieminen, Professors Kauko Pirinen, Helge Nyman, Kai Laitinen, 
Jussi T. Lappalainen and Jorma Ahvenainen, Colonel Vilho 
Tervasmäki and Sulo Kolkka. 
During the course of research trips abroad the author also had the 
opportunity of exchanging opinions on some of the detailed points 
covered here with numerous historians and specialists on 
international relations. I would particularly like to mention 
Professor Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, René Girault and Dr. Pavel 
Korzek in France, Professor D.C.Watt, Dr. Anthony Upton and Dr. 
David Kirby in Britain, Professors Fritz Fischer and Wolfgang J. 
Mommsen in West Germany, and Professors Nils Andrén and Sten 
Carlsson, and Alf Johansson in Sweden. 
The substantial financial assistance provided by the Wihuri 
Foundation, together with a three-year research professorship from 
the Academy of Finland between 1980 and 1983, were of 
invaluable assistance in seeing the project through to completion. 
Finally, I would also like to extend my thanks to my translator, 
Peter Herring. 
Turku, September 1988 
Juhani Paasivirta 
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I The Finnish Grand Duchy 
in the Shadow of the First 
World War 
1. The nineteenth-century inheritance 
As part of the Russian Empire, Finland inevitably came under the 
shadow of the First World War following the outbreak of hostilities 
at the beginning of August 1914, but nevertheless escaped direct 
involvement. Geographically distant from the major theatres of the 
war and lacking an army of her own, her armed forces having been 
disbanded at the turn of the century as a result of increased doubts 
in St. Petersburg about the grand duchy's political loyalty to the 
Empire, Finland remained on the sidelines. Despite this, August 
1914 nevertheless came to be a major turning-point in Finnish 
history, marking the beginning of a period of significant and far-
reaching transition and change. 
The nineteenth century had, in many respects, been a period of 
positive development for Finland. Autonomy had provided the 
country with new opportunities and a new sense of dynamism. 
Virtual internal independence, based in its essentials on the 
constitutional laws and principles of justice inherited from the 
previous period of Swedish rule and underwritten by the personal 
guarantees given by Alexander I in 1809, allowed the development 
of a comprehensive administrative apparatus and judiciary 
embracing the entire gamut of central and local government. 
Finland was allowed a very real measure of freedom in the 
handling of her domestic affairs, a freedom which provided the 
basis for a whole range of developments in the cultural and 
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religious fields, the economy, politics and society as a whole; these 
developments saw Finland increasingly distanced from the rest of 
the Empire as the century progressed. It was against this back-
ground of largely separate development that a recognisably 
national identity began to take shape and gradually acquire its 
outwards forms and symbols. 
The country's political linkage with autocratic Russia, however, 
also brought a number of restrictions and brakes on development 
and, at least during the first half of the nineteenth century, a 
certain isolation from Western Europe, untypical of the preceding 
Swedish period. The degree of internal freedom and room for 
political manoeuvre allowed Finland was ultimately tied to the 
wider interests of the Empire as a whole and dependent on 
developments affecting the latter, and thus subject to sometimes 
unexpected shifts and variations. Finland's pattern of political 
development was, as a result, not one of stable continuity. 
Significant change and reform only really proved possible in the 
transitional periods following major wars and the crises they 
engendered within the Empire, as demonstrated by the cases of the 
Crimean and Russo-Japanese Wars, with their many repercussions 
on internal developments within Russia. 
The history of Finland's estate-based Diet provides a case in 
point. Inherited from the period of Swedish rule and reflecting the 
traditional division of society into four estates, the Diet remained 
unchanged in character throughout the nineteenth century and by 
the beginning of the twentieth century was the last institution of its 
type in the whole of Europe, with the exception of Russia itself, 
which lacked any form of diet or parliament. Change when it did 
come, however, was radical and sudden. The reform of 1906 in the 
wake of the Russo-Japanese conflict and the 1905 revolution 
brought an unicameral assembly and universal suffrage and 
transformed Finnish political representation almost overnight into 
one of the most superficially progressive in the whole of Europe. 
Despite this show of reform, however, the general division of 
power within the country's political system remained unchanged 
and strongly autocratic. The Russian Tsar, as Grand Duke of 
Finland, retained his absolute right of veto in approving new laws 
and the right to dissolve the Diet at will, a fact which ensured that 
the latter had only a limited ability to control legislation and 
influence imperial decision-making. 
12 
The pace of general economic development in Finland, when 
compared to that in Western Europe, was relatively slow 
throughout the century, and that of social development even 
slower. Industrialisation, initially mainly restricted to the timber 
industry, had nevertheless begun to make itself felt from the 1870s 
onwards. This had served to accelerate the general trend of 
movement away from the traditional economic base towards a 
modern money economy more dependent on the international 
market. For all this, Finland remained an essentially agrarian 
country throughout the nineteenth century. 	 Agricultural 
developments, characterised by a growing shift away from arable 
farming to stock raising from the 1860s onwards, created their own 
problems. Land tenure emerged as an increasingly critical and 
central social problem in Finnish rural society as non-landowning 
groups came to make up the majority of the population in large 
areas of South and West Finland. 
Economically and socially speaking, Finland occupied some-
thing of an intermediate position. The contrasts between condi-
tions in Finland and those to the West in Scandinavia were 
significant. Finland's economic base, with its strong agrarian bias 
and late industrialisation in comparison to Scandinavia, was 
particularly indicative of her place in the Eastern European 
continuum. At the same time, the Finnish peasantry, lacking a 
history of serfdom, had closer links with Scandinavian and West 
European traditions than with those directly to the East and South. 
The development of Finland's system of party politics and its 
late emergence was also reflective of the role played by the 
country's linkage with the Russian Empire in insulating Finnish 
developments from the Western European mainstream. Instead of 
political activity becoming focused around primarily ideological 
questions with a pattern of conservative groupings emerging 
followed by various liberal parties and finally the labour 
movement, as had been the case in Scandinavia, the language 
conflict and the resistance which developed after 1899 to Russia's 
policies aimed at imperial integration provided the impetus for the 
development of the country's party apparatus. Language provided 
the basis for the country's first parties, the Finnish and Swedish 
parties, the former splitting in the course of time into two factions, 
a split later reinforced in the wake of the reaction to the challenge 
to Finnish autonomy which developed in the post-1899 period. A 
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national labour movement and an agrarian party, both modern 
mass, largely special-interest political groupings, emerged 
relatively late, at the turn of the century and 1906 respectively. 
Finnish society in the nineteenth century was strongly 
conservative in outlook and marked by a deep division between 
the educated classes and the peasantry, and one reflected in wide 
differences in levels of education and learning and social attitudes. 
Although a growing degree of upward social mobility appeared 
from the middle of the nineteenth century onwards, general social 
attitudes, however, remained for long unchanged in their 
traditional mould. Patriarchal and conservative values continued 
to hold sway long after they had begun to fade elsewhere. The 
Finnish bourgeoisie never experienced the radical upheavals in 
political and social ideas which affected society in Western Europe 
as a result of the revolutions of 1789 and 1848, or the type of 
development which took place in Sweden, where liberalism 
emerged as a vital new force in society in the latter part of the 
century. Little significant movement was made in the direction of 
social reform for virtually the whole of the nineteenth century. 
Liberal opinion was restricted to a few small short-lived groupings; 
no organised liberal party emerged during the autonomous 
period.' 
An increasingly important role in Finnish society from mid-
century onwards was played by the growing conflict which 
developed between the Finnish and Swedish-speaking sections of 
the population. This saw the latter increasingly forced on to the 
offensive, in defence of its influential position in the country's 
administrative, cultural and economic life, in the face of the 
growing strength of the assault waged by its Finnish-speaking 
counterpart, keen for a greater opportunity for improved access to 
the upper echelons of power and committed to the creation of a 
new national culture with its own identifiable independent 
identity. 
Finland's entry into the twentieth century was marked by an 
increase in the pressures on Finnish social and political 
development. The policies aimed at greater imperial integration 
introduced after the February Manifesto of 1899 and lates severely 
1. Paasivirta 1975, p. 285. 
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undermined much of what had been taken to be the established 
basis of Finnish autonomy. As well as serving to sharpen political 
tension, they also brought a new mood of pessimism affecting both 
conservative and socialist opinion. The new policies also played 
their part in slowing down progress on various social reform 
questions. Many new laws covering such areas as the reform of 
local government and working conditions, although approved by 
the Finnish Diet, failed to receive imperial ratification. Social 
tensions were also intensified in the post-1905-6 period by the 
growing conflict which developed between ingrained traditional 
conservatism on the one hand and the forces of change associated 
with the electoral democratic process and the rise of organised 
labour. 
Finnish attitudes towards Russia had gone through a number of 
changes over the course of the years. The earlier, generally 
positive respect for the autocracy and the sense of loyalty towards 
the Empire that went with it, which had been particularly strong 
during the long reign of Alexander II, came under severe stress in 
the post-1899 period. In their stead came a new hostility initially 
directed towards the Tsar but which soon expanded to embrace 
Russia as a whole and the undemocratic system of government it 
was seen as representing. Ironically, this latter hostility gradually 
came increasingly close to the view, deeply antipathetic towards 
Slav culture and infused with a sense of innate cultural and ethnic 
superiority, which had developed in the latter half of the nine-
teenth century among the Swedish-speaking upper class and 
which had previously found little wider acceptance outside it. 
Following the move in 1908 by the new Russian assembly, the 
State Duma, to extend its legislative powers to embrace those 
Finnish issues considered to relate to questions of general imperial 
state interest, it became untenable to consider the Tsar and his 
advisers as the sole threat to Finnish autonomy, as both monarch 
and assembly appeared to be motivated by similar aims. This 
development served to confirm an increasing number of non-
socialist Finnish politicians in their belief that fundamental and 
perhaps irreconcilable differences existed between Finnish and 
Russian political attitudes and ways of thinking. The threat posed 
by Russia to the continuance of Finnish constitutional traditions 
came therefore to be increasingly underlined in these circles. 
Although not slow to condemn the dead hand of Russian 
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government, those in the labour movement preferred to stress that 
whatever threat existed emanated solely from the Russian ruling 
class, and that the politically unrepresented majority in Russia did 
not constitute any danger to Finnish autonomy.2 
While a clear sense of cultural independence had become well 
established by 1914 in Finland, the deep-rooted conservatism 
typical of Finnish society had, however, seen to it that political 
ambitions had not really developed beyond the notion of auton-
omy, even in the minds of the most adventurous political thinkers. 
Radical nationalism on the European model had remained an 
insignificant factor in Finland, except among those associated with 
the likes of Konni Zilliacus in the pre-1905 period. 
2. The military and political impact of the 
outbreak of war on Finland 
Rather than taking the form of a single grand opening of hostilities, 
the outbreak of the First World War in Europe occurred as a series 
of rapidly successive smaller-scale declarations of war and 
mobilisations spread over the first few days of August 1914. 
Austro-Hungary's declaration of war on Serbia was followed by 
Russian mobilisation and declaration of support for Serbia. The 
latter in turn was followed by the mobilisation of Austro-
Hungary's ally Germany and her declaration of war on Russia and 
France, which had also begun to mobilise her armed forces. 
Britain, allied to France, joined the war in the wake of Germany's 
offensive through neutral Belgium. With most of Europe mobilised 
and at war, the outline of the two major alliances which were to 
dominate the conflict had been cast. 
The German attempt at a decisive strike at the French heartland 
through a powerful offensive against Belgium came near to 
achieving its aim in the early days of the war, but by early 
September the French were able to mount a counter-attack along 
the Marne. This forced the advancing German forces to withdraw 
and before long served to transform the Western Front into a static 
2. Ibid., 1978, p. 396-7. 
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trench warfare-based stalemate. In the East, Russia attempted a 
pre-emptive strike through Poland on the German forces 
concentrated in East Prussia and on the Austrians further south in 
the very first weeks of the war. This brought Russia, however, two 
major defeats at the hands of the Germans, at Tannenberg between 
26 and 31 August and at the Masurian Lakes between 4 and 11 
September. She enjoyed better success in her campaign against 
Austria, where her forces were able to advance relatively easily 
into East Galicia. Like the Western Front, however, the military 
situation in the East too soon developed later in 1914 into a virtual 
stalemate along the entire front stretching from the Baltic to the 
Rumanian border. 
Situated in a sensitive area to the north-west of St. Petersburg, 
Finland was closely integrated into the mobilisation and defence 
plans drawn up by the Russian High Command and was therefore 
quickly affected by Russia's mobilisation when it began to be 
implemented. Fearing the possibility of a German seaborne attack 
on southern Finland followed by a thrust towards the Russian 
capital, it was decided, as part of the Imperial Army's overall 
deployment plan aimed at securing the general defence of St. 
Petersburg and guaranteeing the operational potential of the 
Russian Baltic Fleet based at Kronstadt, to concentrate the majority 
of forces belonging to the 22 Army Corps in two areas, between 
Kotka and Viipuri in the north-eastern corner of the Gulf of 
Finland, and Koivisto and Uusikirkko on the Karelian Isthmus. To 
act as a forward defence point, a further brigade was stationed 
along the coast further westwards between Helsinki and 
Tammisaari.3 The beginning of a major German offensive in the 
West against France on 4 August, bringing with it the prospect of a 
two-front German strategy instead of a single concerted attack 
eastwards, forced a rapid reassessment of these moves. Units of 
the 22 Army Corps were redeployed in consequence as early as 21 
August to positions in East Prussia where Russia was preparing to 
mount an attack against Germany. The transfer of these troops was 
followed by the arrival of new Russian units comprising two 
3. Rauanheimo 1950, pp. 153-5. 
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divisions and a number of smaller units. This same process was 
repeated in October, when these second-ranking replacements 
were themselves transferred and replaced by yet weaker units. 
Subsequent to these various transfers, the strength of Russian 
forces in Finland, by this stage mainly made up of conscript units, 
stood at around 35,000 men by the end of 1914.4 
Finland had been declared by an imperial order issued on 30 
July to be at a state of war. Seyn, the Governor-General, followed 
this with a decree on 1 August temporarily suspending peace-time 
legislation covering the freedoms of speech, the press, association 
and public gathering for the duration of the hostilities and 
subordinating them to his own jurisdiction. With this one move 
Seyn gave himself what amounted to dictatorial powers. Seyn's 
new position was one which he could well have hoped for himself 
when he had earlier advocated the adoption of measures designed 
to adequately safeguard what he had described as 'the authority of 
imperial officials and imperial interests in Finland' to the 
government in St. Petersburg. The reorganisation introduced at 
the beginning of August, however, also made Seyn responsible to 
the High Command of the St. Petersburg military district, although 
no mention of this was made in the official announcement 
covering the changes which appeared in the Finnish press on 2 
August. 
The declaration of a state of war, together with the granting of 
exceptional powers to the Governor-General, quickly made 
themselves felt during the late summer and early autumn of 1914 
when a total of nine Finnish newspapers were banned from 
appearing.5 Wartime censorship was introduced and the right to 
organise public meetings strictly curtailed. These rather heavy-
handed moves were designed both to ensure the continuation of 
peaceful conditions in Finland and in a more cautionary capacity 
to underline the limits of what the administration was prepared to 
allow. 
The outbreak of war came as a complete surprise to the Finnish 
population at large and the early days of adjustment to the new 
situation produced a number of short-lived panic-type reactions 
4. Ibid., 1950, pp. 154-5. 
5. Seitkari 1947, pp. 249-50; Kuusanmäki 1980 pp. 86, 89, 104. 
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linked to the general sense of fear and uncertainty which 
descended. Rumours quickly multiplied of a German landing on 
the south coast, and it was feared that Helsinki would soon become 
a prospective target for enemy bombing. This caused some 
temporary panic in the capital, with a number of people fleeing the 
city for the safety of the country. A similar situation, although 
significantly more chaotic, developed in Viipuri where the town's 
Russian commandant, mindful of the threat of a German attack, 
urged the inhabitants to begin voluntary evacuation. Some people 
in the towns along the Gulf of Finland rushed to sell their 
properties, fearing their possible imminent destruction. To help 
counter further unwanted developments of this kind, the Senate 
ordered the heads of government departments to ensure that all 
government officials set an example to the rest of the population by 
remaining at their posts in Helsinki.6 
The declaration of a state of war was in itself the cause of a 
certain degree of fear among the general population, creating a 
widespread sense of unease and leading many to suppose that it 
might only be a prelude to further Russian moves, exploiting the 
fact of the hostilities, to deprive Finland of her autonomous 
freedoms, particularly those related to independent political 
activity. Uncertainty about the future was further underlined by 
the increasingly isolated position Finland found herself in with 
regard to the outside world and information about developments 
elsewhere in Europe. All news about the progress of the war, not 
only that concerning the actions of the Russian army on the 
Eastern Front but also that coming from France, Britain and the 
capitals of the neutral countries, was subject to strict military 
censorship before being allowed to be published in the Finnish 
press. 
The initial mood of depression and anxiety affecting the country 
in the immediate wake of the outbreak of war was relatively 
quickly replaced, however, in part at least, by a strong wave of 
loyalty towards the Empire, verging in some of its expressions 
towards an enthusiastic bellicosity. Some 500 Finns, for example, 
volunteered for service in the Russian army and military 
6. Karjala 4.8.1914; Työ 5.8.1914; Väinö Hakanen 22.9.1982; Karhu 1917 p. 14. 
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academies during the autumn of 1914.' Loyalty to Finland's 
imperial connection had been established and championed by a 
wide section of political opinion during the previous century. 
Continuing Russian suspicions, which had been particularly 
evident in Russian attitudes in the post-1899 period, that Finland 
felt little essential loyalty to the rest of the Empire, convinced a 
number of influential Finnish figures of the need to ensure that no 
doubt was left in St. Petersburg of Finland's solidarity towards the 
Empire at this time of imperial crisis. It was also felt, particularly 
among the older generation, following the country's experience 
during the nineteenth century, that loyalty would also bring 
tangible benefits to Finland, if not in the short term then at least in 
the long term. 
The cautious wait and see approach with regard to developments 
between Finland and St. Petersburg adopted among much of 
political opinion was well reflected in the discussions between 
various leading Finnish politicians which took place soon after the 
outbreak of war under the leadership of the Young Finn K. J. 
Ståhlberg to consider the implications of the new situation. The 
mood among these figures was generally one of satisfaction that 
the country had remained relatively stable, and it was generally 
hoped and expected that calm would continue to prevail. If events 
were to take a less welcome turn, the press was seen as likely to be 
able to restore stability.8 Russia's overall attitude towards Finland 
remained, however, unclear to many observers of the time, a fact 
which was seen as casting a somewhat uncertain shadow over the 
country's future. 
The promise of the introduction of a measure of autonomy made 
to the Russian Polish population on 15 August 1914 had a modest 
effect in improving Finnish morale. This development was also 
seen as reflecting a more general change in Russian policy. 
Rumours of the time even went so far as to suggest that much of the 
post-1899 legislation which had been introduced to bind Finland 
more closely to the rest of the Empire, and seen in Finland as 
contrary to the grand duchy's constitutional laws, would soon be 
7. Turpeinen 1980, pp. 262-2. 
8. See Onni Hallsten's letter of 6.6.1914 to J. R. Danielson-Kalmari (Danielson-
Kalmari collection 2). 
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repealed, and that the Diet would be recalled to Helsinki in mid-
September to discuss the situation facing the country. Rumours 
such as this reflected the belief that took root in the latter half of 
August 1914, as evidenced in a wide section of the press, that a 
change of policy had occurred in the imperial government's 
attitude towards the Empire's border territories.9 There were also 
those who suggested that Russia's alliance with the Western 
powers might allow, or inspire, some form of diplomatic initiative 
by Western representatives in St. Petersburg on Finland's behalf. 
Helsingin Sanomat and Hufvudstadsbladet, together with a 
number of other non-socialist papers, went to great pains during 
the course of August 1914 to emphasise that loyalty towards 
Russia was a general duty of all Finnish citizens. A somewhat 
more neutral message was conveyed by the socialist press, led by 
its leading representative Työmies, which urged its readers to 
comply with the military authorities and to avoid all forms of 
public disturbance, while also warning of the dangers of 
succumbing to war hysteria.10 In calling for Finland to take a more 
active part in the war effort, Uusi Suometar went substantially 
further in its advocacy of loyalty towards the imperial government 
than the country's other leading papers. Despite this show of 
solidarity, Uusi Suometar also found it necessary to emphasise, 
however, that as Finland lacked any armed forces of her own, a 
fact beyond her immediate control, there was no possibility of 
Finland 'taking direct part in the defence of the country or the 
Empire'.11 
Indicative of the sympathies existing towards the latter argument 
was the Finnish Red Cross' decision at the end of September to 
dispatch a team of Finnish doctors and nurses to the Eastern Front. 
A similar team had served in the Far East during the Russo-
Japanese War.12 Moves were also made by other sections of 
Finnish society to support similar action. The country's industrial 
9. Kuusanmäki 1966, pp. 59-60; Karjala 16.8.1914; US 17.8., 18.8., 19.8.1914; 
HS 17.8.1914; TS 18.8., 19.8.1914; Hbl 17.8., 19.8.1914. 
10. HS 2.8.1914; Hbl 2.8.1914; Työmies 1.8.1914; Sosialisti 3.8.1914; Kansan Lehti 
4.8.1914. 
11. US 2.8., 9.8., 5.9.,1914. 
12. Rosén 1977, pp. 85-99, 141-2; Suomen Punaisen Ristin hallituksen ptk., 
4.8.1914; Faltin 1961, pp. 224-229. 
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community offered to fund the dispatch of a second Finnish 
medical crew to the Russian Front. A number of towns in Finland, 
following the example of the Russian federation of town councils, 
also decided to sponsor their own medical detachments.13 In all 
three of these cases, however, support for the work of the Finnish 
Red Cross was kept carefully separate from the activities of similar 
organisations within Russia itself. While wanting to make some 
show of loyalty towards the Empire at a time of national crisis, 
every effort was made to act in a way which would emphasise 
Finland's special and separate status within the Empire. A public 
fund was set up to collect money for the Red Cross and soon 
amassed a respectable sum, indicating the generally positive 
attitude of public opinion towards the imperial war effort during 
the early months of the war. It is perhaps typical of this general 
desire to underline solidarity with the rest of the Empire that in its 
analysis of the conflict between the great powers virtually the 
entire press was united in blaming Germany for having begun 
hostilities. Even the Church newspaper Kotimaa told its readers 
that the war was the result of long preparations by the Germans 
and that a warmonger mentality was deeply entrenched in German 
society.14  
All news concerning events in the war appearing in the Finnish 
press was subject to strict wartime censorship restrictions, as was 
all editorial comment on the war and the regularly published 
general surveys of the state of hostilities. Although the Finnish 
papers were allowed a fair degree of freedom in their resume 
coverage of events on the Western front, such as the German 
advance through Belgium and into France during August and 
September, the authorities proved decidedly more sensitive about 
the reporting of events on the Eastern Front involving Russian 
military action. The major victories won by the Germans over the 
Russian armies at Tannenberg and around the Masurian Lakes at 
the end of August and the beginning of September were only 
passingly referred to in the Finnish press and even then in largely 
13. Rosén 1977, pp. 113-115, 141-143; Suomen Punaisen Ristin hallituksen 
ptk., 8.9.1914; US 19.8.1914. 
14. US 2.8.1914; Työmies 3.8., 4.9.1914; Arbetet 4.9.1914; Sosialisti 7.9.1914; 
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non-committal terms. Russian forces, according to early official 
news reports, were said to have suffered what were described as 
'serious setbacks', but these were soon referred to as being only 
temporary, while much was made of the Russian forces' subse-
quent return to the offensive. Ensuing reports were worded so as 
to give the impression that the Germans had failed in their 
attempts to surround and cut off Russian units, and that the 
Russian army had finally halted the German advance in East 
Prussia.15 
The carefully selected nature and wording of the news stories 
which were allowed to appear about events on the Eastern front 
meant that the actual outcome of the battles at Tannenberg and 
which involved heavy losses for Russian forces, for example, never 
reached the Finnish public through the domestic press. News of 
the true course of events only eventually slowly filtered through 
from Sweden during the course of the autumn 16 These revelations 
about what was really happening on the Eastern Front seemed 
little short of sensational to the cosseted Finnish public and 
provoked renewed uneasy discussion about the general progress of 
the war and future prospects. 
The actual events of the war during the course of 1914 did not 
directly affect Finland or Finnish territory. The following two 
years followed the same pattern, with Finland's direct involve-
ment in the war limited to a couple of separate small incidents. 
The success of a German naval detachment's bombardment of the 
military fortifications on the island of Utö off the Finnish south-
west coast, the westernmost part of the defensive chain designed to 
protect St. Petersburg, on 10 August 1915, destroying them 
completely, was deliberately played down by the Russian forces in 
their official communiqué on the incident, which merely referred 
to German forces as having bombarded various lighthouses in the 
general area of the Aland Islands and as having been successively 
repulsed." The German airship 'Zeppelin' appeared over the 
Aland Islands on 25 July 1916, dropping a few bombs on Marie- 
15. US 2.9., 4.9., 17.9., 19.9.1914; HS 2.9.1914; TS 2.9., 3.9., 4.9.1914; Hbl 
2.9.1914; Kuusanmäki 1966, p. 76. 
16. Lauri Pihkala 27.2.1976; Carl Bergroth 18.5.1978. 
17. Hannula 1935, p. 28; US 13.8.1915; HS 13.8.1915; AU 13.8.1915. 
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hamn. German seaplanes also bombed other islands in the area at 
around the same time. Russian official sources, while reporting 
both events, described them in the most general terms as having 
taken place in the southernmost part of the Turku-Aland 
archipelago.18 
The Aland area had begun to receive some attention from 
Russian military planners from the spring of 1915 onwards, with 
the stationing of a Russian naval battalion on the Islands in April 
1915. In June of the same year it was announced that Russia was 
withdrawing from the 1856 Paris agreement banning fortifications 
on the Islands. It did not take long for these moves, together with 
the German attack on Utö in August, to prompt an upturn in 
Swedish press interest in the area. It is interesting, and at the same 
time indicative of an exceptional flexibility on the part of the 
official censor, that the Finnish press was allowed to report on the 
Swedish debate which developed around the future of the Islands, 
despite its obvious political overtones, and, perhaps more 
importantly, present its own views on the issue.19 The reason 
behind this surprising extension of the freedom allowed to the 
press could well have been that the authorities were only too 
willing for the rumours which had begun to reach Finland of 
Swedish plans to annex the Islands to be underlined and for 
Sweden to appear as a threat, however modest, to Finnish 
territorial integrity, thereby serving to strengthen Finnish loyalty 
towards the Empire. 
The loyalty shown by Finland towards the Empire typical of the 
early months of the war had been followed from November 1914 
onwards by a period of change and transition in Finnish political 
attitudes. This change had its roots in a variety of developments, 
including the imprisonment and deportation to Siberia of P. E. 
Svinhufvud, one-time speaker of the Finnish Diet, and the 
publicity surrounding the publication of what was known as the 
November programme, drawn up by the imperial authorities and 
aimed at tying Finland much more closely to the control of the 
central government. This programme was seen as representing a 
new stage in the Russian campaign to restrict Finland's autonomy 
18. Hannula 1935, p. 32; US 28.7.1916; TS 28.7.1916. 
19. Hbl 24.8., 25.8.1915; DPr 24.9.1915. 
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of action in political and economic affairs. The November 
programme does not appear to have been prepared by the 
government in St. Petersburg in direct response to any particular 
specific problem. Instead, it seems to have been an amalgamation 
of various earlier demands relating to the need to limit the extent 
of Finnish administrative freedoms in the cause of imperial 
stability, which had been voiced by the High Command prior to 
the beginning of the war, and which, at a time when the influence 
of the military had decisively increased, were now given the seal of 
official support.20 
Wartime conditions meant that the Finnish press was barred 
by the official censor from freely publishing its views of the 
November programme and from voicing its criticism of the gov-
ernment. No doubts existed among the country's politicians, 
however, that the programme's overall aim was unambiguously 
one of fusing Finland completely with the rest of the Empire, and 
in the short term of russifying the country. The news that the 
programme had already been approved by the Tsar, which spread 
at the time of its announcement, provoked particular anxiety.21  
The bureaucratic inflexibility of the censor in Finland, however, 
saw to it that while the Finnish press was not allowed to comment 
directly on the November programme or argue Finland's case 
against it, it was permitted to report on Russian press response to 
the issue, even that of the liberal papers. The latter, including such 
papers as Rjetsh, Golos Moskvy and Russkiya Vedomost, described 
the new legislation proposed for Finland, based on an expansion of 
the 1910 Duma-approved law enshrining the supremacy of 
imperial interest in the grand duchy and an extension of the 
embrace of new and existing imperial legislation, as more 
ambitious than anything Bobrikov had attempted, during his spell 
as Governor-General between 1898 and 1904.22 
The events of November 1914 had a direct and powerfully 
negative impact on public opinion and morale in Finland, serving 
to strengthen the increasing general sense of pessimism about the 
future otherwise typical of the time. Nothing was seen as having 
20. Rasila 1966, pp. 41-2; Paasivirta 1978, p. 396. 
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happened since the declaration of a state of war to indicate that the 
government in St. Petersburg was concerned with improving its 
relations with Finland. In fact, the thrust of Russian policy seemed 
directed at quite the opposite, at attempting to subjugate the 
country more completely and systematically than previously. One 
result of the growth of this mood of pessimism was the reduction it 
encouraged in the infighting within Finnish opinion over attitudes 
towards the country's relationship with St. Petersburg. 
The Old Finns, in particular, were dismayed at the seemingly 
bleak future contained in the November proposals, and the about-
turn in their attitudes towards government intentions was all the 
more forthright as a result than that of other political groupings. 
'One can only deplore the fact that ... those voices and forces for 
whom the sowing of distrust and the creation of conflict between 
the Empire and Finland has become little less than the sole 
purpose of life, have neither faded nor weakened,' wrote Uusi 
Suometar at the beginning of 1915 in a review of developments 
during the previous year.23 The Old Finns, with a new-found 
hindsight, gradually began to see their belief in compromise and 
'bridge-building' between Finland and Russia, which had formed 
the basis of the conciliatory style of policies towards St. Petersburg 
they had for long supported, as having been largely misplaced. For 
those associated with past policies of passive resistance to Russian 
policies, the new programme presented much less of a surprise 
and was rapidly condemned as merely a logical continuation of the 
position which had been adopted by the imperial government at 
the turn of the century. 
Considering the question of Finland's overall future in 1915, 
figures such as Emil Schybergson and R. von Willebrand, among 
the few who publicly debated the issue, thought it unlikely that the 
immediate future, despite the pressures brought by the war, would 
see any positive progress or improvement in Finland's position, 
pointing to the fact that the great political upheavals of 1905 had 
not produced any significant changes in Finland's favour in the 
country's degree of autonomy. Similarly, Finland's long-term 
general development during the nineteenth century had, it was 
emphasised, been dependent upon a host of unpredictable and 
23. US 1.1.1915. 
26 
uncertain factors rather than on single, easily-identifiable events.24 
Strong doubts about the likelihood of Finland's ability to maintain 
an independent existence were felt within the Swedish People's 
Party, coupled with a more general fear that the continuance of the 
war would severely increase the possibility of the eruption of 
internal social crisis. Swedish-speaking conservatives became 
increasingly anxious as the war progressed that the country's 
entire established social system was in danger of destruction. 
Prompted by these fears, the party made considerable efforts from 
late 1915 onwards to develop a greater measure of cooperation 
with the country's other non-socialist parties, particularly the 
Young Finns.25 
There were those, however, who came to assume that large-scale 
changes in Finland's political status might well be inevitable as a 
consequence of the war. This shaking of established beliefs about 
the continuity of Finland's political status quo within the Empire 
was part of the general uncertainty and unease caused by the war, 
and indicative of the growing level of political dissatisfaction 
within Finland in some circles. Among the leadership of the 
Young Finns, Heikki Renvall was only one of those who predicted 
that the final stages of the war would see the question of Finland's 
political future reassume focal attention. Social questions, on the 
other hand, were not thought likely to become a critical issue.26 
Past experience, however, made many wary of expressing any very 
positive hopes for Finland's future. 
Some discussion on the question of the country's future also took 
place to a limited extent with the labour movement. Finland's 
socialist leaders had in general taken little part in the debate about 
the war and its aims which had developed within the international 
labour movement in both combatant and neutral countries as the 
war continued. Although Finland had been spared direct 
involvement in the hostilities, many Finnish socialists considered 
it inevitable that Finland too, together with the rest of Europe, 
would be affected by the social disruption that would be left in 
their wake, simply because of the very geographical and political 
24. Emil Schybergson 1915, p. 142; v. Willebrand 1915, p. 3. 
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extent of the conflict.27 It was also generally felt by the socialists 
that the overall role of the labour movement in developments was 
likely to expand. It would seem correct to assume, however, that, 
during the first years of the war at least, no one in the Finnish 
socialist leadership seriously considered a major revolution 
capable of triggering changes in Eastern Europe as at all probable 
within the near future in Russia. 
Press comment on the question of the country's future, limited as 
it was by the restrictions imposed by wartime censorship, made 
much use of analyses and commentaries on developments abroad 
and international events as a whole to carry indirect references to 
Finland's own situation and possible fate. The press was not slow 
to draw attention to Western political figures, for example, when 
they spoke of the right of self-determination as one of the major 
aims of the war. It never proved politically wise, however, to draw 
comparable attention to publicly-expressed war aims when they 
were presented by Russia's enemies. The press was allowed to 
report events in the smaller European countries which had 
managed to remain outside the hostilities with relative freedom. 
Neutrality was often described in these articles as a viable, if not an 
ideal policy for small countries. This tendency to underline the 
positive value of neutrality undoubtedly lay in the hopes felt in 
various circles regarding Finland's own political position, linked 
to the general desire to see Finland remain unembroiled in 
hostilities. 
3. Finnish political activity abroad 
Traditional political opinions on the question of Finland's status 
in the Empire of the type espoused by the established political 
parties began to be paralleled in the period following the first few 
months of the war, and particularly after November 1914, by a 
growing interest in an alternative type of political outlook, typified 
by a rejection of the respect for imperial interest which 
underpinned much of non-socialist thinking, and an open anti-
Russian tone. Despite, or perhaps because of the radicalism of 
27. H. Soikkanen 1975. pp. 190-3. 
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these views they were, however, restricted to only a small minority 
of Finnish society. Many of the ideas behind the activist 
philosophy had their roots in the opposition which had developed 
in response to the imperial government's various russification 
policies introduced in previous years, in particular the opposition 
and pessimism which had emerged during 1908 and 1909. These 
latter years had seen quite a substantial deterioration in relations 
between Finland and St. Petersburg, marked by the gradual 
reintroduction under Stolypin of many of the disliked imperial 
government policies, or revised but largely similar versions of 
them, which had been proposed or introduced at the turn of the 
century. Resistance to these policies and the expansion of 
imperial control they brought had been widespread, extending 
across the majority of non-socialist opinion, and had contributed 
to a new, although largely temporary, sense of national solidarity.28 
Against this background and that of the more widely 
disseminated general conviction derived from experience during 
the previous century that Finland's best opportunities for 
introducing internal developments and reforms lay at precisely 
those times when Russia was most exposed either to internal or 
external threat, the continuing world war came to be looked upon 
as a cause for optimism within activist circles rather than 
pessimism, as it was within much of the rest of Finnish opinion. 
As Russia's enemy, Germany came increasingly to be seen in terms 
of the potential she might provide as a lever to either indirectly 
influence the imperial government or force its hand in its dealings 
with Finland. The scale of the Russian military defeats at the 
hands of the Germans at Tannenberg and the Masurian Lakes, in as 
far as accurate information about them filtered through to Finland, 
only reinforced the attraction of this line of argument and opened 
up new vistas with regard to the possible final outcome of the war 
and its effect on Finland's position. 
The leading supporters of the activist cause were largely drawn 
from among the young generation and the small group of Finnish 
emigres living in Sweden. The extent to which the political 
aspirations and view of Finland's future of this latter group, 
numbering Konni Zilliacus, Jonas Castrén and Herman Gummerus 
28. Paasivirta 1978, pp. 380-2. 
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among its main members, were rooted in radically different 
presuppositions from those of the established Finnish parties was 
reflected in its decision to hold direct talks on the Finnish question 
with representatives of the German Foreign Ministry at the end of 
August and beginning of September 1914 in Stockholm and 
Berlin.29 Central to the activist case was the conviction that the 
only action likely to have a perceptible effect on improving the 
country's position and future development was that undertaken 
abroad. The movement's ideas found a ready audience among the 
young educated class then beginning to emerge and the student 
community at Helsinki University, whose political concepts had 
been shaped solely during the post-1899 period and whose 
perception of the imperial relationship was as a result largely 
negative, to a much greater degree than that of the older generation 
of politicians dominant in the established parties. 
It was from among these groups that the idea of sending Finnish 
volunteers for military training to Sweden or Germany and 
acquiring the necessary weapons to arm them, to create a force 
capable of militarily exploiting Russia's weakened position from 
within Finland itself, emerged during the latter months of 1914. 
To be successful, any armed action would require, it was 
supposed, a combination of favourable factors. Hopes centred 
around the possibility of Sweden joining the war in alliance with 
Germany and the latter winning a decisive military victory over 
Russia, followed by a popular rebellion in Finland. Sweden's 
resistance to the Finnish overtures made on the question turned 
attention solely on Germany. P. H. Norm6n, Kai Donner, Y. 0. 
Ruutu, Väinö Puhakka, Bertil Paulig and Walter Horn acted as the 
main movers in the movement, the latter two of these travelling to 
Stockholm at the beginning of December 1914 with a request 
addressed to the German Legation for military training for 150 
Finnish volunteers and shipments of arms. Formal contact with 
German diplomats in Stockholm over the issue was, however, 
finally made by Herman Gummerus on 8 December.30 
Developments within the activist movement in Finland itself 
were paralleled not only by those within the Finnish emigre 
29. Apunen 1968, pp. 64, 73-4, 80-3. 
30. Lauerma 1966, pp. 56-7; Apunen 1968, pp. 100-1. 
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population in Sweden but also by those of the Finnish community 
sympathetic to the cause living in Berlin. Fritz Wetterhoff 
emerged as the central figure in the early days of this group, 
establishing an ad hoc 'Finnish Committee' with a number of his 
like-minded compatriots. Once started, Wetterhoff quickly made 
contact with a number of high-ranking officials within the German 
Foreign Ministry, Ministry of War and Chiefs of Staffs. For all his 
gifts of persuasion and diplomacy, however, Wetterhoff was to 
prove something of a liability to the movement in the long run, 
lacking as he did any real links to Finland proper and prone to 
pursue his own initiatives without consulting the rest of the 
movement.31  
The attitude of the German military and Foreign Ministry 
towards Finland at the turn of 1915 was one of general rather than 
emphatic interest, and German statements on Finnish matters 
betrayed a lack of a clear overall policy. Finland tended to figure 
in German thinking largely as a potential source of revolt along the 
Empire's sensitive north-western border, a view owing allegiance 
to the established German strategic analysis identifying all non-
Russian nationalities as inevitable weak spots in Russia's defences. 
The possibility of Finland's representing just such a gap in Russian 
defences had been highlighted in the latter part of the nineteenth 
century by the prominent German military planner General 
Moltke. A similar view had been adopted by the German High 
Command in 1909 in the course of its negotiations with Sweden 
over possible cooperation with Swedish armed forces in the event 
of a future war.32 Faced with the unofficial Finnish requests for 
assistance, the German High Command and Foreign Ministry 
initially aimed at an answer allowing for a minimum of German 
commitment. It was decided in Berlin at the end of January 1915 
to tell the Finns that Germany would be willing to provide a short 
period of military training for 200 Finnish volunteers. The brevity 
of the time allotted for training would allow for little more than 
instruction for sabotage-type operations against Russian forces 
stationed in Finland. Similar operations were planned for other 
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areas of the Eastern Front. 
Following the early success of the general offensive along the 
Eastern Front mounted later in the spring of 1915 and which led to 
the northern flank of the front gradually moving as far north as 
Riga on the Baltic, Finland came to assume a wholly new 
significance for German planners. When the German High 
Command came to review its earlier position on the Finnish 
volunteer question in the summer of 1915, therefore, it was not 
surprising that the scale of the revised plans was significantly 
enlarged. Allocation was now made for training a force of some 
1,200 men to be capable of mounting independent military 
operations or indirectly preparing the ground for a rebellion or 
national uprising in Finland. 
The early groups of specially-recruited volunteers which left 
secretly for training in Germany were largely composed of upper-
class Swedish-speaking students from Helsinki University, but as 
recruiting got under way the Finnish force came to embrace a 
much wider range of social backgrounds, including ordinary 
peasant farmers and industrial workers, although students still 
retained a prominent place within the movement. By this stage the 
overwhelming majority of volunteers were also Finnish-speaking, 
drawn largely from southern Ostrobothnia and southern Karelia.33 
The impact of this completely new departure in Finnish political 
developments was initially restricted by the limited numbers of 
volunteers, recruiting officers and others involved, who only 
totalled some 2,000 to 2,500 men in all. The secrecy surrounding 
the movement also meant that the rest of Finnish society only 
became aware of its existence over a period of time and then only 
through fragmentary reports. The number of those who expressed 
various degrees of sympathy with the volunteers as news of the 
operation spread far outweighed the number of those actually 
involved. The development of widespread popular opinion 
favourable towards the volunteers was also latterly significantly 
influenced by the general course of political events and the 
changes which took place in Finland's overall situation. 
Stockholm became the centre of the diplomatic efforts of the 
volunteer movement following Wetterhoff's fall from grace in the 
33. E. Hornborg 1956, p. 410; Lauerma 1966, p. 108; Enckell 1980. pp. 62. 147-48. 
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autumn of 1916.34 The movement's main effort nevertheless 
continued to be focused on maintaining and developing relations 
with Germany, although hopes remained high of the possibility of 
Sweden entering the war. As the capital of a neutral country, 
Stockholm offered the activists welcome room for manoeuvre in 
comparison to conditions in Finland and the possibility of 
maintaining a wide network of international contacts, as well as 
the opportunity to freely publicise their cause. The real 
beginnings of the diplomatic bridgehead established in Stockholm 
lay in the work of a three-man committee led by Herman 
Gummerus formed in July 1915 which, enjoying good links with 
the Swedish press and various political groups, quickly assumed 
the role of chief coordinator of the movement's information-
gathering and publicity efforts. New members were added in 
January 1916 and the title of the 'Stockholm delegation' was 
adopted under the leadership of Adolf von Bonsdorff. In its new 
form, the Stockholm delegation served as a discussion forum 
collating information on international developments and events 
on the Eastern Front, and debating the various options open to 
advancing the cause of the volunteer movement. As a committee 
of equals, however, the level of practical cooperation existing 
within this body was sometimes less than ideal, a fact not helped 
by the freedom allowed to members to continue to work through 
their personal contacts. The unofficial diplomacy undertaken by 
the volunteer movement abroad was never based on any authority 
granted to it by the Finnish people as a whole and solely 
represented an extension of the activities of the small activist 
groups operating within Finland. The movement's underground 
and unofficial status was, in fact, a major handicap for it in its 
dealings with Germany.35 
The continuance of the war also provoked another departure 
from the traditional Finnish policy of loyalty towards the Empire 
in the shape of moves to reorientate public opinion in favour of the 
Western powers, primarily Britain and the United States. Various 
attempts were made to gain some form of support from this quarter 
34. For the background to Wetterhoffs fall from grace, see Enckell 1980, pp. 171-
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for Finland in her problematic relationship with the imperial 
government in St. Petersburg. This attempt to gain Western 
support proved short-lived, however, and failed to achieve any 
semblance of permanent form comparable to the more organised 
activities of the volunteer movement. Interest in the possibility of 
Western assistance remained restricted to a handful of individuals, 
and then only for a relatively short period of time during the early 
years of the war, and failed to develop any wider significance. 
This group of Western-aligned figures drew their practical 
inspiration from the Western reaction to developments in Finland 
which had emerged at the beginning of the century. Indeed, it had 
been the countries of Western Europe which had been most 
forthcoming in their support for the Finnish cause following the 
increased pressure of russification after 1899. It was primarily this 
which encouraged the hopes felt in some quarters following the 
outbreak of the war that the Western powers, and in particular 
Britain, would be willing to exert their influence as allies on 
Russia to re-recognise Finnish autonomy. This largely diplomatic 
support would, it was hoped, be deployed during the actual course 
of the war but most particularly during the peace negotiations that 
would follow.36 The increasing emphasis put on liberalism and 
democracy and, above all, on the idea of national self-deter-
mination, by the Western powers as the war progressed only 
served to further encourage the hopes of Finnish anglophiles. 
Finland's long struggle in defence of her constitutional freedoms 
was thought to have engendered a respect in the West for Finland 
as a country which had shown that it possessed a developed sense 
of national identity, a will to survive, and a respect for Western 
principles of justice. 
Kaarlo Ignatius, who travelled to Britain in November 1914 and 
J. N. Reuter and Lorenzo Kihlman, the former with a long record of 
promoting the Finnish cause in Britain and America, who 
travelled to Western Europe and the United States in January 1915 
to discuss securing Finland's autonomous position through a 
system of international guarantees, were typical of those Finns 
who trusted to the potential influence of the West in Finnish 
36. Paasivirta 1949A, p. 425. 
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affairs. Their efforts were supplemented by those of various 
expatriate Finns resident in London and other Western capitals 
able and willing to use their personal connections and influence to 
help further the Finnish cause.37 
4. Finland's position during the early years of 
the war as seen from abroad 
The possibilities of Russia's total collapse and defeat, or her sueing 
for a separate, negotiated peace were among the potential 
conclusions to the war considered by the German High Command 
and Foreign Ministry when planning the overall outline of German 
strategy for operations on the Eastern Front. Because of the very 
wide range of possible developments in the East that had to be 
taken into account, it was only natural that the German leadership, 
despite its modest interest in Finland, consistently fought shy of 
aligning Germany too closely with the Finnish volunteer battalion 
during its period of training at Lockstedt near Hamburg, or with 
the Finnish cause in general. Finland's main significance in 
German eyes lay in her proximity to Sweden. The possible use of 
Finland, or rather of the prospect of future changes in Finland's 
political status and the latters' potential impact on Sweden's 
international position, as a bait to persuade Sweden to enter the 
war on the German side, exercised the minds of German military 
strategists for some time. Far from breaking new ground, this idea 
closely paralleled the persuasive diplomacy used by the Western 
powers during the Crimean War. 
The onset of hostilities in Europe had seen Sweden faced with a 
number of difficulties relating to her ability to maintain her 
neutrality and territorial inviolability. It was only logical therefore, 
against this background of more pressing concerns, that Finland 
came to be seen in Swedish eyes as only marginally distinguished 
from the greater mass of the Russian imperial whole during the late 
summer and early autumn of 1914. The rumours circulating at the 
time about a possible German landing on the Finnish southern 
37. Holsti 1940, p. 117. 
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coast were reported in the Swedish press, but interest was short-
lived.38 The knowledge that Russian mobilisation had not at this 
stage been extended to include the Aland Islands appears to have 
calmed popular anxieties in Sweden in the early weeks of the war 
and to have dampened debate about Finland as a whole. 
From mid-November 1914 onwards, however, after news began 
to filter through of Svinhufvud's imprisonment and deportation to 
Siberia and of the announcement of the November programme, the 
Swedish press embarked on an extensive debate of the Finnish 
question, its first of the war, some of it highlighting the threat 
posed to Sweden by the Russian moves in Finland.39 The debate 
assumed somewhat larger proportions when a number of 
conservative papers such as Nya Dagligt Allehanda and Svenska 
Dagbladet attempted to use the example of Russian oppressive 
policies in Finland as a weapon in their attacks against the liberals 
and social democrats in Sweden, who liked to emphasise the 
Entente powers' commitment to fighting for freedom and demo-
cracy.40 Finland was not treated as a self-contained entity by the 
press in Sweden at this stage, but very much from the point of view 
of her possible fate in the context of the overall conflict within 
Europe. 
During the spring and summer of 1915, Finland's position and 
likely future became the subject of extensive discussion in the 
Swedish press. The spread of information about the clandestine 
activities of the volunteer movement partly explains this, but the 
success of the German offensive on the Eastern Front and the 
emergence of activist opinion in Sweden itself in the debate which 
developed around the country's foreign policy proved the more 
important catalysts in this increased interest in Finland. It was at 
this stage that the German Foreign Ministry attempted to persuade 
Sweden to reassess her neutral foreign policy and enter the war in 
alliance with Germany. In support of the German case, it was 
hinted that if events were to prove favourable it might be possible 
to transfer the Aland Islands to Sweden and Finland give her 
independence.41 Parallel to these German moves, Sweden's own 
38. Eskola 1965, p. 70; DN 3.8., 4.8., 8.8.1914; StD 9.8., 11.8.1914. 
39. Eskola 1965, p. 101. 
40. Ibid., pp. 71-5. 
41. Carlgren 1972, pp. 102-5, 117-121, 124-8. 
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small band of activists also worked towards persuading their 
government to bring Sweden into the war allied to Germany. 
Sharing a number of common political ideas, the Finnish and 
Swedish activists in Stockholm had found themselves able to work 
to an extent hand in hand. The Finnish activists had been notably 
successful in getting a significant amount of coverage of their cause 
in Swedish newspapers and magazines, a fact which had also 
indirectly reinforced the activist input to the debate on Sweden's 
foreign policy.42 This campaign of persuasion pursued by the 
Swedish activists was not unfavourably viewed by Aftonbladet 
and Nya Dagligt Allehanda, two of Sweden's most important 
newspapers, but the great majority of the press remained firm in its 
opposition to any change in the country's foreign policy.43 The 
German attempts at persuasion were all rejected by the Swedish 
government. In underlining Sweden's intention to maintain her 
policy of neutrality, both the Prime Minister, Hjalmar Hammar-
skjöld, and the Foreign Minister, Knut Wallenberg, also avoided 
making any public statements concerning Finland's position. 
Despite the decline in activist opinion in Sweden which set in 
from the autumn of 1915 onwards, the seeds of a continuing 
interest in Swedish political debate in Finland's fate and possible 
future developments in the East had nevertheless been sown. The 
interest of the Swedish press in Finnish affairs became focused on 
the possibilities of either a restoration of Finnish autonomy or the 
acquisition of independence. It was generally thought that 
progress on either issue would be slow in forthcoming, if at all, 
particularly in the case of the latter. In the event that Finland did 
become independent, her chances of staying so were generally 
rated low. 
The possibility of Finland's future independence was virtually 
ignored by the socialist and liberal press, probably because of their 
distaste for any solution which would require German military 
involvement. It was also assumed that any political development 
of this kind in the Baltic area involving some degree of great power 
intervention would also have a negative impact on Sweden's own 
international position. The attitude of the Swedish Right, on the 
42. Eskola 1965, p. 23. 
43. Pakalahti II 1934, pp. 46-54; Eskola 1965, pp. 133-6; Apunen 1968, p. 265. 
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other hand, towards the possibility of Finland's becoming 
independent with German assistance was far from being so 
pessimistic, as such an outcome was seen as likely to be only 
beneficial to Sweden's security in the East. Conservative opinion 
also proved somewhat more sanguine about the possibility of 
Finland's being able to maintain her independence, if she achieved 
it. 
As the idea that Russia was going through a period of important 
change gained ground, it brought new impetus to the debate 
surrounding Finland in the Swedish press. The Social Democrats 
and the Liberals, in particular, laid great store by this 
interpretation of events, believing that it heralded a new and more 
advantageous development on the road to strengthening Finland's 
future position. The autumn meeting of the Russian Duma in 1915 
and the apparent strength of the opposition parties which it 
witnessed only reinforced these and similar views. The Swedish 
Right, in contrast, remained unconvinced that any changes in the 
Russian political system would bring significant improvement in 
Finland's position.44 
The sharpness of the differences of opinion over foreign policy 
in Sweden was such that the members of the Finnish volunteer 
movement active in Sweden were largely shunned by all the major 
political parties except those on the Right. Erik Palmstierna, 
writing in his party's paper Social-Demokraten in the autumn of 
1916, underlined his belief, shared by many in the more liberal 
parties, that Finnish activism relied entirely on German support 
and that it had allied itself with a power which was unlikely to 
have much say in any negotiations that might take place at the end 
of the war, and one which would have little or no influence to 
wield in support of Finnish independence. Similar criticism of the 
Finnish movement also featured in the pages of Dagens Nyheter at 
around the same time.45  
With the overall weakening of Germany's military position 
which took place during the summer of 1916, the level of interest 
in the Finnish question among the German leadership also 
declined. The statement made to the leaders of the Finnish 
44. Eskola 1965, pp. 111-14, 127-30, 141-3. 
45. Ibid., pp. 148, 172-7. 
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volunteer movement by the usually reserved German Foreign 
Ministry on 24 October, formally limiting future German assist-
ance to no more than a promise of help in the restoration of 
Finnish autonomy, was symptomatic of this change. The possi-
bility of Germany sueing for a separate peace with Russia was then 
very much in the minds of German leaders.46 The German military 
command nevertheless did not underestimate the potential 
advantage to be gained, if the war was to continue, if Russia's 
north-western border, in the shape of Finland, was to become 
unstable, thereby tying up a sizeable quantity of Russian forces. 
These developments in German thinking presented the Finnish 
activists with a difficult and somewhat unexpected problem, 
namely that of what would happen to the Finnish volunteer 
battalion if, at the conclusion of the war, Finland continued to 
remain part of the Russian Empire. While it is true that the Finns 
were informed by the German Army on 18 December 1916 of the 
German intention not to disband the unit, thereby eliminating 
some of the Finnish anxieties, a major question mark over what the 
future would bring for the movement remained. 
British concern about the restrictions imposed on Finnish 
autonomy and the general curbing of political freedoms in the 
grand duchy introduced by the Russian authorities had been 
cautiously expressed to the Russian Foreign Ministry at the end of 
1914 and again towards the end of the summer the next year by the 
British Ambassador in St. Petersburg.47 Whether these comments 
had any real influence on Russian thinking is difficult to say. At 
most, they might perhaps have acted as a slight brake on any new 
policies envisaged by the imperial authorities likely to clash with 
Finland's autonomous position, but otherwise their effect was 
minimal. The Foreign Office's anxieties as communicated to St. 
Petersburg were not, however, born simply out of respect for 
Finland's independent national development, but owed their 
origin to what were seen as the wider implications of Russian 
action in Finland. Russia's oppressive policies in Finland were 
seen as being instrumental in generating and inflaming anti-
Russian sentiment in Sweden, which, if left unchecked, could, it 
46. Pakaslahti II 1934, pp. 223-5, 243-6. 
47. Lyytinen 1980, pp. 62-5. 
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was feared, push Sweden into abandoning her traditional policy of 
neutrality in favour of an alliance with Germany. 
Britain's interest in developments in Finland can be seen 
therefore as dictated by general strategic considerations. Finland 
had assumed a completely new significance in the international 
situation created by the war as a link between the Western powers 
and Russia. This only grew after the Bosphorous was closed to 
Entente shipping and subsequent attempts to reopen the channel 
failed, as witnessed by the debacle at Gallipoli. Britain's strategic 
interest lay in ensuring the maintenance of Finnish stability and 
preventing dangerously close ties developing between Finland and 
Germany. 
France showed a distinctly low level of interest in Finland 
during the early years of the war and in the few cases this did 
change the cause ultimately usually lay elsewhere than within 
Finland itself. French fears of German expansionist intentions in 
the northern Baltic appeared to be confirmed when it became 
known that Finnish volunteers were receiving training in 
Germany. Rumours circulating about the possible fate of the 
Aland Islands provoked similar suspicions in Paris. 
5. The impact of the war on the Finnish 
economy 
Finland had by 1914 established a substantial network of 
international trading relations and these naturally suffered serious 
upheaval and dislocation following the outbreak of the war. 
Trading links between Finland and Germany and her allies fell 
away sharply during the very first days of the war. This was soon 
followed by increased difficulty in maintaining trading ties with 
Britain, the rest of Western Europe and the Americas. 
The maintenance of trading links with Sweden was of central 
importance to Finnish business in the difficult supply conditions 
imposed by the war. General uncertainty in the Baltic, reaching as 
far north as the lower reaches of the Gulf of Bothnia, saw traffic 
move northwards to run between Rauma or Pori on the Finnish 
side and Gävle in Sweden, or transferred to rail via Tornio and 
Haaparanta. Sweden was also used as a bridgehead by Finnish 
business to maintain links with countries further west. Butter 
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exports to Britain, for example, were channelled through Sweden 
and Norway for a short time until the spring of 1915, while London 
and Scandinavian harbours were used to import coffee from South 
America.45 A rail link between Tornio and Karungi in Sweden on 
the Finnish-Swedish border, funded by the Russian government, 
was built during the autumn of 1914 to link the Swedish and 
Russian rail networks, enabling trade between Russia and Britain 
to be carried on the Finnish rail system. Transit traffic through 
Sweden became less reliable from 1915 onwards, however, 
following German pressure on the Swedish government to halt the 
service, which forced the Russian authorities to experiment with 
new routes to the West running via Rovaniemi and Kirkenes and 
Archange1.49 
A long period of readjustment in the Finnish economy set in 
after August 1914. The virtual total break in trading links with the 
West proved a very real blow for Finnish exporters. The severance 
of these established ties was felt almost immediately in the timber 
and paper industries, most especially by companies exporting 
sawn timber and slightly less so by those exporting paper, pulp 
and carton products. Butter exports to the West were also seriously 
curtailed. Imports of raw materials and finished goods from 
Western countries were similarly affected, while cotton imports 
had to be re-routed, with variable success, through Sweden.50 
Once the scale of these economic difficulties became clear, the fear 
that they would have catastrophic domestic consequences rapidly 
spread. Rampant unemployment would result, it was predicted, 
possibly even leading to the whole industrial workforce being 
thrown out of work within three months. With the prospect of such 
a development ahead, Hufvudstadsbladet counselled the need for 
all forms of class rivalry to be put aside in the cause of industrial 
and political peace.51 The possibility of a repetition of a national 
disaster comparable to that of the famine years of 1867-8 also 
loomed large for some observers. Uusi Suometar reflected a 
general fear when it argued that a worsening of the economic 
situation was inevitable and that possibly large-scale industrial 
48. Hbl 15.8.1914; DPr 13.8.1914; HS 16.8.1914; Rolf Berner 2.12.1976. 
49. Pihkala 1980, p. 39; Hoving I 1947, p. 221. 
50. Karhu 1917, pp. 73-9. 
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and social unrest would follow.52 A number of industrial plants 
did in fact cease production completely during August 1914, 
including the Gutzeit and Halla sawmills and timber-processing 
plants in Kotka and two major textile and tobacco factories in 
Turku. Statistics for September showed some 20,000 unemployed, 
amounting to about a fifth of the total industrial labour force. 
Many factories were also forced to introduce shorter working 
weeks.53 
As the autumn of 1914 wore on, however, it became increasingly 
apparent that the country was adjusting to the changed economic 
situation significantly better than had been feared by the more 
pessimistic observers in the early weeks of the war. An important 
factor making for relative calm and optimism lay in the country's 
high stocks of bread grains and cereals. Acting against the express 
wish of the Finnish Diet, the imperial government had decided 
back in July 1914 not long before the outbreak of war to impose an 
import duty on all grain imported into Finland from elsewhere 
than Russia itself. Fear of this move had served prior to its 
announcement to accelerate the import of grain, mainly from 
Germany.54 
The severance of Finland's economic links with Central and 
Western Europe caused by the war served to transform Finnish-
Russian trade relations, and it did not take long for the Finnish 
economy under this pressure to become closely tied to the Russian 
war economy. In itself, this phenomenon was not surprising as a 
similar development had taken place during the Russian-Turkish 
War of 1877-8 and, more recently and more extensively, during 
the Russo—Japanese War of 1904-5.55 The impact of the First 
World War on the Finnish economy, however, was to prove of 
unprecedented proportions. Its very scale fuelled a boom in trade 
with the rest of the Empire. As time went on Finland became 
increasingly more closely tied to Russia in economic terms than 
at any time since 1809. The significant degree of economic 
52. US 22.8.1914. See also K. N. Rantakari's letter of 5.8.1914 to Danielson-Kalmari 
(Danielson-Kalmari collection 5). 
53. Suomen virallinen tilasto XVIII A/13 1914, pp. 116-17; Karhu 1917, pp. 74, 
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independence which had been achieved from the mid-nineteenth 
century onwards was rapidly lost in the decisive early years of the 
war. This shift in economic ties in Russia's favour also brought an 
increasing degree of political sympathy with Russia within the 
Finnish business community. 
From late autumn 1914 onwards, large imperial government 
orders began to flow in to the Finnish metallurgical, rubber, leather 
and textile industries, gaining real momentum from the spring of 
1915. Some two-thirds of these orders were placed with heavy 
industry. Over 400 Russian ships were repaired and overhauled at 
the Hietalahti shipyard in Helsinki between 1914 and 1917, while 
the Crichton, Wulcan and Rautateollisuus companies in Turku 
consistently enjoyed extensive order-books throughout the war for 
ships and military equipment. Textile companies also began 
receiving large Russian Army orders from 1915, which for 
companies like Turun Verkatehdas in Turku presaged significantly 
increased output and correspondingly increased profits.56 The 
overall effect of war-related orders on the Finnish economy can be 
seen in the virtual doubling of the gross value of industrial output 
which took place between 1913 and 1916. The number of workers 
employed in heavy industry rose by some 55% over the same 
period, and of those in the rubber and leather industries by nearly 
16%, and in the textile industry by nearly 18%.57 
The timber industry, in contrast, found itself faced with a 
number of problems. Saw mills proved particularly vulnerable to 
wartime conditions as it was difficult to find new markets for the 
sawn goods previously exported to Western Europe. Many of the 
leading companies like Gutzeit nevertheless strove to keep their 
plants in operation, at the expense if necessary of swelling their 
stocks. The conviction that the war would not last long and that 
Western markets would soon be reopened to Finnish exports was 
initially widespread among the business community. As hopes of 
a speedy conclusion to hostilities faded, however, overstocking 
became a very real problem and many companies were forced to 
run down their operations.58 Reductions in felling, hauling and 
56. Pihkala 1980, p. 36; Jutikkala I 1957, pp. 148-9; Gripenberg 1932, pp. 132-9; 
143; Nikula 1950, p. 72. 
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floating work were automatic, thereby further reducing the 
employment opportunities of the already swelling rural landless 
population. The strained wartime conditions in Europe put the 
Finnish timber industry in a difficult predicament and one which 
eventually led to the laying-off of a significant number of those 
employed in the industry. 
The war years brought a radically different set of opportunities 
for the Finnish paper industry than for its timber-producing 
counterpart. Demand for Finnish paper in Russia rose dramati-
cally. Companies like Kymi were able to sell as much paper and 
paper products on the Russian market as their production capacity 
allowed. With the general rise in prices which took place profits 
also increased, giving the larger Finnish companies substantial 
opportunities for reinvestment in new plant and machinery.59 
The rapid growth in Russian imports from Finland caused by the 
war came to dominate the whole structure of the Finnish economy. 
Industry in southern Finland in particular developed close ties 
with the Russian economy, although the situation in northern 
Finland remained largely unchanged, with the area retaining its 
traditional agrarian base. The economic collapse widely feared as 
inevitable in August 1914 never materialised. The Russian share 
of Finnish exports rose from 28% in 1913 to 77.6% in 1915, while 
Russian imports into Finland rose from 28.3% to 66.6% over the 
same period.60 Finnish industry was able to reap sizeable profits 
from the increase in trade with Russia during the early war years, 
despite the problems caused by the different demands of the 
Russian wartime market from those of the pre-war Western one. A 
rapid redistribution of income and resources took place within 
Finland's industrial infrastructure to accommodate these changes. 
Some sections of the economy were unable to avoid the stigma of 
being branded as profiteering from the war. Despite these 
readjustments, the overall profile of Finnish industry remained 
relatively stable over the war years. Machinery was modernised, 
factories extended and new production processes introduced 
across the whole spread of industry, to such an extent that 
58. Hoving I 1961, p. 157; Ahvenainen 1972, p. 59. 
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shortages of skilled labour were experienced in certain areas. 
In as far as any thought was given to the future of Finland's 
trading relations in the postwar period during the early years of the 
war, Finnish industrialists tended to assume that Finnish industry 
would be able to retain a better level of access to the Russian 
market than that enjoyed before 1914. Germany, it was presumed, 
would permanently lose her economic influence in Eastern Europe 
and Russia. A clear defeat for Russia or victory for Germany were 
both ruled out as unlikely by the business community. Trading 
relations with Britain would remain important, it was thought, 
while those with Germany would decline. Predictions in the press 
also highlighted the fact that Sweden and Norway would probably 
be in a better position to benefit on the post-war Western timber 
market than Finland because of the latter's wartime isolation. The 
demands of the post-war European market would, it was generally 
conceded, require a general overhaul of Finnish trading relations, 
including the setting-up of a special Finnish chamber of commerce 
in St. Petersburg and the development of a centralised network of 
commercial representatives covering Western Europe.61  
The influence of three further factors, the beginning of large-
scale military fortification work, the lack of guaranteed food 
supplies, and currency uncertainties also contributed to the strain 
on the Finnish economy and Finnish society imposed by the 
continuation of hostilities in Europe. 
Extensive fortification work was begun in Finland at the 
beginning of 1915 in accordance with defence plans drawn up by 
the military command in charge of the St. Petersburg military 
district. Work was started along the south coast and on the most 
outlying islands of the Turku archipelago and in the interior of the 
country, where staggered defence zones complete with permanent 
field equipment were created. As the war developed, however, the 
emphasis of Russian defence plans for Finland gradually shifted. 
The earlier focus on repulsing a seaborne attack mounted across 
the Gulf of Finland was supplemented by a new-found concern for 
the in-depth defence of the Finnish hinterland. Defence interest 
also became centred around the possibility of an enemy force, 
either a Swedish or a joint Swedish-German force, mounting an 
61. Kauppalehti 16.9., 9.12.1914, 30.5.1915. 
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attack across the Gulf of Bothnia. Fortification preparations were 
extended to the Aland Islands in 1915.62 The scale of the 
fortification programme put in hand, with its large manpower 
requirements, had a powerful impact on overall levels of employ-
ment and soon made it a significant factor within the Finnish 
economy and society as a whole. The number of men involved on 
projects in the plan rose at times to as many as 30,000. On-site 
supervision and discipline were uniformly ill-organised, making 
for often unsatisfactory working conditions and contributing to a 
small but appreciable rise in social instability and discontent.63 
The food supply situation in Finland remained satisfactory 
throughout the autumn of 1914, without any shortages of cereals 
developing. While grain imports from the West, mainly Germany 
and the United States, had already ceased by this point, imports 
from the rest of the Empire continued relatively unhindered, 
except for some problems encountered ensuring adequate trans-
port for contracted shipments. Taking advantage of this, the 
State Food Committee, set up to ensure continuity of supplies, 
embarked on a programme of buying and stockpiling Russian 
cereals. The overall food situation was also helped by the fact that 
Finland's own harvests in 1915 and 1916 were both good. The 
government and the Committee both proved unprepared, however, 
for the war and wartime conditions lasting as long as they in fact 
did.64 
The exceptional conditions brought by the war caused food 
prices to gradually rise, particularly from the autumn of 1916 
onwards, although this was countered to some extent by the rise 
that took place in industrial wages over the period. The first years 
of the war saw increased profits for the more prosperous of the 
farming community able to sell a proportion of what they 
produced, although smaller, self-sufficient farmers were unable to 
benefit. As time went on the wages of the industrial workforce also 
increasingly failed to keep pace with rising prices. The overall 
difference between the state of industry in terms of pay and 
conditions and of the economy as a whole in 1915 and 1916 from 
62. Rauanheimo 1950, pp. 155-64. 
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that of the pre-war years nevertheless remained relatively small, 
particularly when compared to what happened to the economies of 
those countries actively engaged in the war. 
Despite the pressures on the money market and the imperial 
economy caused by the war, Finland was able to avoid being 
forced to abandon her own currency and move back to the rouble. 
For a country beset by setbacks in a variety of other areas, this 
represented an important symbolic achievement. The actual 
business of maintaining the Finnish mark's value in wartime 
conditions, however, proved a difficult task for the Bank of 
Finland. This was partly due to the flood of Russian roubles which 
entered the country as a result of the costs incurred by the upkeep 
of Russian military forces in Finland, the large orders placed with 
Finnish industry by the imperial government, and the high cost of 
the fortifications programme. Finland soon acquired a large rouble 
surplus, coupled with inadequate reserves of other foreign 
currencies, as a result.65 
Although the exchange rate of the rouble abroad steadily fell 
from 1914 onwards, no similar decline took place in Finland, 
where the Russian authorities were unwilling to tolerate such a 
development, both for reasons of simple political prestige and 
because of their desire to avoid any increase in real terms in their 
expenditure in Finland. With the fall in the value of the rouble 
and the Finnish authorities forced to go on quoting unrealistically 
high exchange rates, the international value of the Finnish mark 
also inevitably fell. This, in turn, saw the value of the currency of 
Finland's only real wartime international trading partner, Sweden, 
rise against the mark. Beginning in the summer of 1915, the Bank 
of Finland decided, despite Russian opposition, to begin allowing 
the Finnish rouble exchange rate to fall. This move was forced on 
the Bank by the increasingly large losses it had suffered in 
converting its rouble holdings which had grown as the rouble's 
real value abroad fell, coupled with the increase in Finnish-
Russian trade and the development of currency speculation. To 
counter this continually growing currency problem and to calm 
inflationary pressure, the Bank of Finland and a number of Finnish 
65. Meinander 1963, pp. 58-61. 
47 
commercial banks also began negotiating mark-denominated loans 
with Russia from early 1916.66 Overall, the rouble problem proved 
a sensitive issue for Finnish bankers. For all its relative 
independence, the Bank of Finland was in no position to forget the 
possible political consequences of its actions and was forced to 
show the upmost caution in all its financial dealings with the 
Russian authorities. 
6. Finland's cultural and sporting links abroad 
Finland's increasing isolation from the West during the war, 
brought by the disruption and severance of the country's 
traditional links abroad and deepened by internal social 
developments and the growth of official restrictive measures, also 
made itself felt in the international activities of Finnish writers, 
artists and athletes. This sense of isolation was felt all the more 
keenly since Finland had for long enjoyed untroubled contact with 
developments abroad in these fields. 
The war saw the country's traditional and important academic 
links with universities in Germany totally eliminated. Academic 
contacts with Sweden and the rest of Scandinavia were also 
reduced to a minimum as it became increasingly difficult to obtain 
passports to travel abroad. This was in large part due to the 
suspicions of the authorities that travelling academics, particularly 
those intending to visit Sweden, might be sympathetic towards 
separatist activities or perhaps directly associated with the 
volunteer movement.67 Similar travel restrictions were encoun-
tered by writers and artists, who fared little better in their attempts 
to maintain their pre-war links abroad. 
Literary and artistic magazines, such as Aika and Valvoja, 
nevertheless continued to try and cover foreign developments as 
best they could through their articles and reviews, although these 
inevitably often proved cursory. Swedish-language publications, 
such as Finsk Tidskrift and Nya Argus, often achieved a slightly 
wider coverage of foreign and especially Scandinavian issues. 
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Publishers' contacts abroad were also affected, a fact reflected in 
an overall gradual reduction in the number of translations of 
foreign fiction appearing on the Finnish market. The prospects for 
selling the translation rights of Finnish fiction also fell off as part 
of the same development.68 
The isolation brought by the war also affected Finnish sportsmen 
who, with the memory of their successes at the Baltic Games held 
in July 1914 in Malmö in Sweden and at the Stockholm Olympics 
still fresh in their minds, found themselves unable to travel to 
what international meetings were still being held and, as the war 
continued, not even to Scandinavian ones. A small Finnish 
contingent took part in the winter sports competitions held in the 
Scandinavian countries in the early months of 1915, including the 
skating championship between teams from Oslo, Helsinki and 
Stockholm held in the Swedish capital. By 1916, however, even 
Scandinavian meetings became closed to Finnish athletes, with 
the Finnish team chosen for the Holmenkollen Ski Champion-
ships, for example, being forced by the authorities to withdraw in 
the early spring of 1916. This was largely the result of a 
government order, designed to contain the activities of the 
volunteer movement, banning the issuing of passports to all men 
between the ages of 19 and 35, and which succeeded in almost 
completely preventing the participation of top-ranking Finnish 
sportsmen in Scandinavian competitions.69 Following this, the 
only foreign competitors to take part in Finland's own 'interna-
tional' competitions came from the rest of the Russian Empire. A 
number of Estonian athletes took part in various wrestling and 
track and field competitions held in 1916, and some Russian 
competitors in skating championships held the same year, while 
Finnish skaters travelled to meetings in St. Petersburg.70 
The war also put a question mark over the summer Olympics to 
be held in Berlin in 1916. Even were the Games to be held, Finnish 
sportsmen faced the probable prospect of having to compete as 
part of the Russian team following the decision of the conference 
68. SKL:n ptk., 21.1., 22.3.1916. 
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of national Olympic committees held in Paris in June 1914 that 
only teams from independent sovereign countries would be 
eligible to participate in future Games." Finland and Bohemia, for 
example, both of which had sent teams to the Stockholm Games in 
1912, would have automatically failed to qualify under these new 
conditions. Whatever doubts and problems arose over the possible 
participation or non-participation of Finnish athletes in the Berlin 
Games, however, were soon overshadowed by the certainty that it 
would be impossible to hold the 1916 Games in any case, with the 
war still raging unabated. 
7. The effect of the war on the Finnish 
parliamentary elections of 1916 
Finland's position within the Empire took on a new and unex-
pected dimension for the imperial government during the course 
of 1915 when, following the loss of the majority of Poland, 
Lithuania and Courland to advancing German forces, Finland 
became the most important remaining non-Russian area on 
Russia's western border. 
The announcement by the Russian Prime Minister, Goremykin, 
to the State Duma at the beginning of August 1915 that the 
government had prepared a bill granting Poland local autonomy 
amounted to little more than a propaganda move at a time when 
Poland was in the process of being occupied by German forces.72 
Despite the apparent magnanimity of this gesture, it was still easy 
for Russia's critics to point to Finland as an example of the reality 
behind the picture the Russian authorities liked to give of their 
treatment of non-Russian areas within the Empire. As more 
territory fell under German control, the treatment of the various 
minority populations within the Russian and German spheres of 
influence in the area to the north of Poland and the attitudes of 
these populations to both sets of governments came to represent a 
71. Paasivirta 1962, pp. 42-4. 
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growing test of wills between the two powers. 
Some criticism of the imperial government's repressive policies, 
including its treatment of Finland, was voiced by the opposition 
parties in the Duma during the course of 1915, but was rejected by 
the government, which stressed the all-important need to mobilise 
all available resources in defence of the Empire. Two members of 
left-wing opposition groups within the Duma, Alexander Kerensky 
and K. Tseidze, called for the reinstatement of Finnish autonomy, 
the former being instrumental in drawing up a draft bill to the 
effect, for which he became widely known in Finland.73 Had 
Kerensky's proposal been approved instead of receiving the 
support of only some thirty, mainly left-wing Duma members as it 
did, it would have meant the complete repeal of Stolypin's 1910 
law removing the right of the Finnish Diet to legislate on matters 
considered of general imperial interest.74 Wartime pressures 
caused the liberal Cadet Party, many of whose members had 
previously argued in defence of Finland's constitutional rights, to 
moderate its earlier views and satisfy itself with voicing a general 
hope that the imperial government would not resort to extreme 
measures in dealing with Finland. 
Faced in the early months of 1916 with the decision as to 
whether to allow normal elections in Finland the following 
summer to go ahead, the imperial government was forced to once 
again reassess its attitude towards Finland's autonomous position 
following the uncovering by military intelligence of the fact that 
Finnish volunteers were being recruited and trained in Germany.75 
In deciding to allow the holding of elections, the Russian 
government probably hoped that the focus of public attention in 
Finland would as a result return to purely domestic affairs. No 
doubt it was also hoped that separatist sentiments and left-wing 
agitation would diminish to more manageable proportions. The 
elections would, the argument went, serve to channel political 
activities into conventional forms of expression and put a brake on 
the appeal of extra-parliamentary action. The Tsar's advisors were 
well aware, on the basis of prior experience, that Russian power in 
73. HS 5.8., 11.8.1915; Työmies 10.9., 15.9.1915; Hbl 6.8.1915. 
74. HS 5.8., 11.8.1915; Hbl 6.8.1915; Työmies 10.9., 15.9.1915. 
75. Turpeinen 1980, pp. 78, 104, 200. 
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Finland had never been seriously threatened by the workings of 
the Finnish representative system and that the Finnish Diet had 
always proved amenable to cooperating with the imperial 
authorities. 
The St. Petersburg government was also aware that the decision 
to allow free elections in Finland might prove a useful example in 
any international debate between Russia and Germany about the 
treatment of non-Russian nationalities within the Empire. With 
the Western powers increasingly stressing the ideological aspects 
of the war and clearly seeing Russia's 'reactionary' reputation as 
something of a liability, the imperial government saw the potential 
of the Finnish elections to serve as an example of Russia's 
enlightened policies in this quarter. 
The result of the July elections brought a significant change in 
the balance of power between the parties in Finland, with the 
socialists gaining a slender majority of 103 seats against a non-
socialist total of 97 seats in the new Diet, a result unique in the 
whole of Europe. In domestic terms, the new Diet, with its Social 
Democrat working majority, contained within itself the potential 
for establishing a new type of party politics. Without the benefit of 
hindsight, however, it was difficult for politicians in 1916 to assess 
the real significance of the elections, or to accurately predict the 
likely shape of future developments in Finland. 
The war in Europe and the international events which spread out 
in its wake had come to assume a dominating influence on social 
life in Finland since the very beginning of hostilities. Finland was 
faced not only with having to adjust to an expanding dependence 
on the Russian Empire, but also to an increasing isolation from the 
rest of Europe. The difficult conditions imposed by the war bred a 
new sense of resignation. The free exchange of news and infor-
mation, in particular, virtually disappeared, with only a very few 
having continued access to reliable unofficial news sources. The 
heavily censored press was able to provide only a sketchy guide at 
best to the overall progress of the war, but one which nevertheless 
perhaps proved satisfactory for the needs of what was after all a 
scattered and largely rural population. 
Popular interest in general issues and events fell away as the 
everyday problems of securing adequate food and employment 
gradually assumed greater significance. Political passivity became 
increasingly widespread, as indicated by the relatively low poll of 
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55.5% at the 1916 elections. The general atmosphere of fear and 
uncertainty generated by wartime conditions, and the activities of 
the military police and the power of the censor in particular, go 
some way towards explaining why political views and debate 
feature so surprisingly little in popular correspondence of the time 
and why relatively little discussion of the war took place at the 
grass roots level. Few people, if any, in Finnish society had been 
prepared for Finland's isolation to continue for a matter of years. 
No previous period within living memory had had such a powerful 
political, economic and human impact on Finland as that heralded 
by the outbreak of war in August 1914, one only matched by the 
period of radical change and upheaval in 1808 and 1809, during 
which Finland's whole political future had been rewritten and her 
link with Russia established. 
Finland's low level of contacts with the outside world during the 
war years was partly alleviated by the awareness within the 
country that Finland was nevertheless fulfilling an important role 
as a communications and transit link between the Western powers 
and Russia, a fact reflected in the large rail shipments passing 
through the country in both directions and the heavy use of the 
postal and telegraph services. Significant numbers of foreigners 
travelled through Finland en route to St. Petersburg or on their 
return from Russia and in such quantities that they cannot have 
gone unnoticed by the average observer. 
As only an indirect combatant in the war Finland never 
experienced any overt campaign aimed at generating a sense of 
national solidarity in the war effort similar to that experienced in 
those countries directly involved in the war. Finland's overall 
participation in the imperial war effort as such was never more 
than lukewarm. Finland's experiences during the war were 
paralleled to some extent by those of minority nationalities in 
other parts of Europe. The Czechs, Poles, South Slays and the 
various nationalities of the Baltic provinces, despite belonging to 
different empires, all experienced many of the same pressures on 
their identities. Radical national movements, drawing on each 
nationality's often long independent national traditions and 
dedicated to the aim of gaining national independence, appeared 
throughout these areas, and all courted the more powerful 
European countries for support. 
Growing class tensions represented a parallel pressure to that 
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coming from the minority nationalities within the societies of the 
major combatant countries involved in the war. Following the 
initial superficial social unanimity typical of the early stage of the 
war, internal social pressures developed sharply throughout 
Europe as the war progressed during 1915 and 1916, opposition 
opinion being variously directed against governments, continuing 
social injustices, or simply at campaigning for an end to the war. 
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II Finnish Developments 
Against the Background 
of the Continuing War 
and the March 
Revolution 
After her successful territorial gains on the Eastern Front during 
the course of 1915, Germany turned her military attention in 1916 
to mounting a major offensive in the West around Verdun in an 
attempt to inflict a decisive set-back on the French army, a move 
which, however, proved unsuccessful. German forces enjoyed 
considerably more success in repelling Russian troops advancing 
on the Eastern Front and were able to push into Rumania, which 
had only shortly previously allied herself to the Entente powers, 
thereby extending the front down to the Black Sea. 
At sea, the Royal Navy had succeeded in maintaining a naval 
blockade against Germany from the very beginning of the war, 
cutting off Germany's links with her overseas colonies. This had 
forced the German Navy to concentrate its resources on submarine 
warfare aimed at disrupting Britain's important convoy routes 
from the colonies and the United States. The German campaign 
against British shipping was extended to embrace operations 
against all merchant ships from February 1917 onwards. With 
America's already close economic ties with the Western powers in 
Europe steadily expanding, this new German threat only served, 
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however, to reinforce anti-German sentiment in the United States.' 
As the war progressed, propaganda increasingly emerged as a 
significant new element in the hostilities. Publicly-stated war 
aims became a sine qua none in the propaganda war. Early 
German propaganda concentrated on the need to retain the 
extensive territorial gains her forces had made on both fronts, 
while that directed towards the East focused on appealing to the 
nascent nationalist feelings common among the non-Russian 
nationalities within the Russian Empire and the often widespread 
sense of ethnic and social superiority felt by them with regard to 
the Russian population. Western war aims included not only the 
demand that Germany be expelled from the territory she had 
occupied but also an appeal to a number of higher ideological 
ideals. Western emphasis on the importance of popular democracy 
and national self-determination was designed to counter the 
authoritarian style of government typical of the central European 
powers and to ferment unrest among the minority peoples living 
under German and Austro-Hungarian control. By stressing these 
higher ideals, the Western powers also hoped to be able to 
persuade the United States to join the war.2 
1. Finland's relations with the Russian 
Provisional Government 
The eruption of the March Revolution in St. Petersburg in 1917 
came as the climax to a period of mounting domestic tension and 
increasing popular discontent with Russian involvement in the 
war against Germany and Austro-Hungary. Opposition opinion in 
Russia among the liberal middle class, the industrial workforce 
and the extensive landless peasantry had consistently grown since 
1915. Dissatisfaction with the inefficiency of the autocratic 
imperial government, the disarray of the economy and the 
inadequacy of food supplies, coupled with rapidly mounting war-
weariness, all acted to ferment an explosive growth of social 
discontent directed against both the person of the Tsar and his 
government. 
1. Liddell Hart 1930, pp. 214-26, 261-6, 296-7. 
2. Th. Schieder 1973, pp. 172-8. 
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The working class uprising which broke out in mid-March 1917 
in St. Petersburg, followed by the mutiny of a number of army 
units stationed in the capital, quickly led to the abdication of Tsar 
Nicholas II and the formation of a provisional government drawn 
from members of the pre-revolutionary Duma. Lvov was named as 
prime minister, Miljukov, one of the leaders of the Cadet Party, as 
foreign minister and the Social Revolutionary Alexander Kerensky 
as minister of justice. Immediate plans were put in hand to 
establish a National Constituent Assembly to be entrusted with 
resolving the central issues resulting from the reorganisation of the 
Empire's political system. A workers' and soldiers' soviet was set 
up in Petrograd during March, following the example of events 
during the 1905 Revolution.3 
The ultimate nature of the new political structure, together with 
the land question, soon emerged as the two major domestic issues 
facing the provisional authorities. On the question of the position 
of the non-Russian nationalities within the Empire, plans were 
mooted for the establishment of a federal system of government. 
While the Provisional Government underlined Russia's continuing 
allegiance to her Western allies and its determination to continue 
the war against Germany and Austro-Hungary, however, the labour 
movement increasingly began to demand immediate peace 
negotiations on the basis of combatants' pre-war borders and an 
abandonment of post-war reparations claims, and the granting of 
the right of self-determination to minority nationalities. 
The radical political and social aims brought to the fore by the 
March Revolution rapidly assumed international currency, having 
a direct impact on public opinion in virtually all of the countries 
involved in the war and forcing governments to pay renewed 
attention to their countries' continued role in the war and the 
possible future position of any minority nationalities living within 
their borders. Following the revolution, hostilities on the Eastern 
Front virtually ceased for a short period. 
The relative importance of Finland to the Provisional 
Government was evident from the very first days of its existence 
with the early dispatch of special envoys to Helsinki and 
elsewhere in Finland, entrusted with the task of ensuring the 
3. Chamberlain I 1954, pp. 73-85. 
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loyalty of Russian forces stationed in Finland to the new 
government and thereby eliminating the danger of their possibly 
intervening in the situation in Petrograd in defence of the deposed 
Tsar.4 This primary concern of the Provisional Government was 
paralleled by a secondary, less urgent interest in preventing 
possible unrest among the Finnish population which, it was 
hoped, could be averted by promising future changes in the 
country's political status. This latter move, designed primarily to 
secure Finnish loyalty to the new government, also had an 
international aspect for the Provisional Government, as security 
for the Petrograd area still remained of decisive importance when 
Russia remained at war with Germany. 
It took only a few days from the outbreak of the revolution in 
Petrograd for observers in Finland to realise that a political 
transformation of perhaps unprecedented proportions, and 
decidedly more far-reaching and extensive than anything that had 
happened in 1905, was in the making. The sense of freedom and 
optimism about the future this brought in Finland was immediate 
and widespread. The scale of the political upheaval in Russia 
seemed such that many saw the floodgates opened for large-scale 
governmental and social reform. The deposing of the Tsar seemed 
to signal the destruction, with one almost unreal stroke, of the 
whole inflexible governmental framework which, with the 
exception of its relative impotence during the events of 1905, had 
held back significant political and social development in Finland. 
Progress in Finland up until 1917 had been uneven and had 
allowed a number of national and social tensions to develop into 
major problems, which had only been further exacerbated by the 
additional difficulties brought by the war years. 
Despite the great sense of freedom felt by the ordinary 
population in Finland and the general conviction that the 'new 
Russia' would automatically right the wrongs of the Tsarist regime, 
the country's political leaders, both socialist and non-socialist, 
adopted a cautious policy of wait and see with regard to events in 
Russia. The truth was that the revolution in Petrograd had taken 
them all largely, if not completely, by surprise. The memory of the 
rapid development of events during the 1905 Revolution also 
4. Polvinen I 1967, 10-16; Upton I 1980, pp. 52-3. 
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counselled caution until the longer-term effects of what had 
happened could be appreciated. The adoption of this passive 
approach was also influenced by the fact that Finland was still at a 
state of war and that significant numbers of Russian troops, whose 
future actions could not be entirely safely predicted, remained in 
the country. All of these factors combined to make Finland adopt a 
more cautious approach in March 1917 than had been the case in 
1905.5 
The Provisional Government acted quickly to remove the 
Governor-General, Seyn, and the deputy chairman of the Senate's 
administrative department, Borovitinov, from office as the most 
prominent and now unwanted representatives of the Tsarist 
government in Finland, having them imprisoned and sent to 
Petrograd under the orders of the commander of the Baltic Fleet. A 
number of central and local government officials, branded as 
stalwarts of the Tsarist regime, were forced to resign, as were a 
large number of civilian and military police. The loss of the latter, 
however, subsequently proved instrumental in undermining the 
ability of the authorities to maintain internal order. A significant 
purge of the Russian officer corps stationed in Finland also took 
place following the fall of Nicholas II. 
With its issue of what became known as the March Manifesto, 
the Provisional Government, in its first major reformist move in 
Finland, hoped to establish a viable base for the development of 
new and improved relations between Russia and Finland. The 
outcome of discussions between representatives of the new 
government in Petrograd and Finland's main political leaders, the 
Manifesto repealed at a stroke all the decrees restricting Finnish 
autonomy enacted since the February Manifesto of 1899.6 With 
this and subsequent moves the Provisional Government estab-
lished its position, as seen from the Russian perspective, as the 
arbiter of supreme power in Finland and as the direct inheritor of 
the authority which had previously been wielded by the Tsar. 
This move was followed by the appointment of a new 
administration by the Provisional Government, after much 
5. Paasivirta I 1947, pp. 59-63; Lappalainen 1977, p. 50. 
6. Paasivirta I 1947, pp. 64-71; H. Soikkanen 1975, pp. 199-200; Upton I 1980, 
pp. 54-5. 
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political wrangling among Finland's own politicians. Six seats 
were allocated to the Social Democrats in the reconstituted Senate 
and the same number to the non-socialist parties. Oskari Tokoi's 
nomination as deputy chairman gave the Social Democrats, 
however, the casting vote. The overall policy of attempting to 
return Finnish political life to at least a semblance of traditional 
constitutional legality was also reflected in the recall of the Diet 
elected in 1916 at the beginning of April 1917. With the restart of 
regular Diet sittings, it became possible to consider the running of 
the country's autonomous administration as having been fully 
returned to normal. 
The Provisional Government adopted similar policies to those it 
used in Finland during the period immediately following the 
March Revolution in dealing with Russia's other minority 
nationalities along the Empire's western border. The right to local 
self-government was granted to the Baltic provinces in April 1917, 
and local assemblies based on universal suffrage were established 
in Estonia and Livonia. Marking a completely new departure for 
Russian policy in these areas, the decision to establish local 
assemblies was received with enthusiasm by the nationalist 
movements of the region. The Provisional Government hoped that 
the move would transfer power away from the small Baltic German 
élite which had previously dominated local government in the 
area to the majority populations. Following this development, 
local soviets began to be set up throughout the Baltic region from 
the summer of 1917 onwards.' 
Because of its strategically sensitive geographical location, 
Poland continued to represent a special case for the new 
government in Petrograd, as it had done for its predecessor. A 
special manifesto was issued at the end of March 1917 addressed 
to the Polish people, who were then mainly living under German 
occupation, promising extensive future political reforms, in direct 
response to the declaration made by the German occupying forces 
in October 1916 announcing the German intention to restore the 
Polish monarchy.' 
Ensuring a favourable Finnish attitude towards the new status 
7. v. Rauch 1953, pp. 193-5. 
8. Ibid., pp. 190-1; Chamberlain I 1954, p. 103. 
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quo in Petrograd, thereby resulting in a restoration of Finnish 
loyalty towards the imperial government, lay at the heart of the 
Provisional Government's policies towards Finland. Despite the 
relative calm then existing along the Eastern Front, the Provisional 
Government was well aware that it was in no position to ignore the 
potentially explosive situation existing between Russia and 
Germany. It was thus all the more important to those in Petrograd 
that Finland should not be allowed to slip out from under Russian 
control or break away from her political ties to the Empire. 
A certain degree of support for the Russian war effort was 
undoubtedly expected from Finland by the Provisional 
Government in Petrograd, despite the suspicions about the depth 
of Finnish loyalty which had taken further root since Russian 
intelligence had confirmed that Finnish volunteers were 
continuing to be trained in Germany. Kerensky's three trips to 
Finland during the spring of 1917, in his new role as minister of 
justice, indirectly reflected the political and strategic importance 
the Provisional Government attached to Finland. Kerensky's 
references to what he called the 'German threat' in his various 
speeches made in Finland, such as the one he gave in Helsinki in 
May, were clearly meant to make the Finns aware of the 
seriousness of the international situation and at the same time 
reinforce Finnish loyalty towards the Empire!' 
The low-key approach adopted by the Provisional Government 
in Finland was very much part of its more extensive and 
essentially flexible pacification policy, with its careful recognition 
of minority national identities, followed throughout the Empire's 
western border area. The real extent of the concessions the 
Provisional Government was willing to make to these non-Russian 
nationalities, however, took time to fully emerge. The imperial 
government remained concerned at all costs not to allow the 
integrity and unity of the Empire to be seriously undermined, and 
was not slow to brand as 'separatist' any moves which threatened 
to lead in this direction. The defence of Russian imperial interest 
against Germany, if necessary at the cost of further prolonging the 
war, lay at the heart of the Provisional Government's concerns. 
The increased militancy of the working class which emerged in 
9. Polvinen I 1967, pp. 35, 85; The Russian Provisional Government 1917 I, p. 340. 
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the latter half of March 1917 in Finland on the heels of the 
revolution in Petrograd spoke of a widespread sense of release 
from earlier social restrictions. 	 The very extent of the 
demonstrations, mass meetings and strikes which ensued reflected 
a general feeling that the country had at last been freed from a long 
period of artificial political and social restraint. The semi-
ideological, semi-intuitive belief that the working class now had 
the opportunity to 'make history' played an important part in 
underpinning popular optimism of the time. The Social Democrats 
and the trade unions, in particular, saw their memberships 
suddenly expanded. The majority of the newcomers, the 'March 
men' as they were known, were young and lacked any prior 
experience of belonging to large organised movements and tended 
as a result to feel little allegiance to the past traditions of the Left. 
The result of this sudden influx of new members was little short of 
an internal revolution within the labour movement, bringing with 
it an inevitable redistribution of power. As society as a whole 
gradually slipped towards increased instability, the labour 
movement also came to embrace many whose allegiance to the 
movement's professed aims was at best questionable and who were 
simply carried along on the wave of change and reform which 
appeared to be overtaking the country.10 
Following the forced resignation of many government officials 
and the losses of personnel experienced by the police forces in the 
majority of urban centres which had taken place in the wake of the 
March Revolution, the administration in Finland found itself faced 
with what amounted to uncontrolled social turmoil." The 
restoration of order was also complicated by the fierce debate 
which had developed in the meantime over who ultimately had 
the right to wield power and who was to decide the fate of the new 
rights and reforms being so loudly clamoured for from all quarters. 
The demand for an eight-hour working day campaigned for by 
workers in heavy industry was quickly acceded to by employers. 
A similar reduction in working hours for the rest of industry was 
debated in the Diet. The lack of any legislation on the issue, 
however, saw the wave of strikes in support of a uniform reduction 
10. Paasivirta I 1947, p. 101; Lappalainen 1977, pp. 64-9; H. Soikkanen 1975, pp. 
260-2. 
11. Upton I 1980, pp. 107-136; Kylävaara 1967, pp. 57-60. 
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in working hours swell and extend to embrace the rural population 
by May 1917.12 
The unresolved conflict between the established social order 
and the promise of change brought by the revolution was also 
reflected in the contrast that continued to exist between a 
democratically elected Diet on the one hand and largely un-
democratic municipal and rural local government councils on the 
other. The real power behind local food distribution committees 
also continued to remain concentrated in the hands of a privileged 
few. Working class unrest was often directed against local councils 
as a result, as in Turku, stretching local government resources to 
the extreme.13 With governmental authority under increasing 
threat, the Senate was forced to dispatch a number of its members 
to the provinces in an effort to calm tempers. The gulf between the 
non-socialists and the labour movement only continued to widen, 
however, fuelled by increasingly bitter wrangling over who 
decided what and deepening mutual fear and distrust. Workers' 
demands for social reforms were often seen by many non-socialist 
politicians as only the beginnings of an attempt to completely 
overturn the established balance of power in society, forcing them 
as a result to retreat yet further into inflexible opposition to any 
demands for change. 
Finnish society, with its long tradition of patriarchal values and 
established and inflexible social and political mores, found itself 
in the spring of 1917 faced, somewhat late in the day, by a swelling 
tide of demands for radical change. With the fall of the autocracy 
and the collapse of an important pillar supporting the traditional 
social fabric and political status quo within Finland, the pattern of 
future developments appeared shrouded in uncertainty. 
2. Finnish party political attitudes towards the 
independence question during the spring of 
1917 
In addition to growing social unrest, the weeks immediately 
following the March Revolution brought with them a whole host of 
12. Rasila 1966A, pp. 111-16; H. Soikkanen 1975, pp. 220-3. 
13. H. Soikkanen 1975, pp. 226-8; Upton I 1980, pp. 116-18. 
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other changes in Finnish society. The freeing of political detainees 
and the return of those exiled to Siberia symbolised for many the 
new sense of freedom which had developed; Svinhufvud, on his 
return to Finland, received an extensive welcome. It was also 
around this time that the Finnish volunteer battalion which had 
been serving with the German Army on the Eastern Front near Riga 
since the autumn of 1916 was transferred to Libau for further 
training. 
The effective restoration of autonomy, which had taken place 
without any Finnish participation in the revolutionary events of 
March, caused a significant number of Finnish politicians to feel a 
strong sense of debt towards the new government in Petrograd. 
Prominent Russian opposition figures, including some who had 
been vocal in the defence of Finnish rights, now sat as members of 
the Provisional Government. These included Kerensky, who had 
strongly argued Finland's case in the Duma in 1915, and who even 
found himself honoured with popular dance tunes named after 
him in Finland as a result, and Miljukov, who had strongly 
opposed the passing of the legislation enshrining the supremacy of 
imperial interest in 1908. 
The wave of optimism about the possibility of a rapid peace 
which spread through Finland during the spring of 1917 also owed 
its origin, indirectly, to the March Revolution. People came to 
hope and believe that the war would come to an end solely through 
the influence of international democratic opinion, even without 
conventional peace negotiations. The international labour move-
ment was particularly prominent in arguing the case for a rapid 
peace, as was the labour movement in Finland, both responding to 
what they saw as a new role for the Left. Not that the belief in the 
restoration of peace and the power of compromise was restricted to 
the Left alone, as the enthusiasm of some student circles and a 
large number of liberals for the idea showed.14 
The March Revolution was seen by many as heralding a new 
period in Finnish history which would see society freed from the 
limbo it had been trapped in and new political and national 
freedoms finally achieved. The depth of this conviction was 
reflected in the small, but steadily increasing number of public 
14. Sunnuntai 6.5., 13.5.1917. Also see Henning Söderhjelm's letter of 4.6.1945 to 
the author. 
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figures and others who began to demand the granting of complete 
Finnish independence subsequent to March 1917.15 Socialists and 
non-socialists were united in seeing the March Revolution as 
instrumental in freeing both Russia and Finland from the burden 
of the past. Expectations were universally high about the future 
and what it might hold. The belief that Russia was changing and 
changing for the better, and in a way which would benefit Finland, 
and that the two countries would be able to develop good relations 
as a result came to be widely accepted. The importance of 
establishing cultural contacts with the newly liberal Russia which 
was emerging was emphasised by the poet Eino Leino, writing in 
the weekly magazine Sunnuntai which he edited. Danielson-
Kalmari, the historian, went so far in a speech in Helsinki on 25 
March 1917 as to compare the revolution in Petrograd to the 
French Revolution of 1789, arguing that Eastern Europe was 
entering upon a similarly decisive historical period to that which 
had overtaken Western Europe following the Paris uprising.16 
Although the traditional conservative views and attitudes 
typical of the ruling élite during the nineteenth century largely 
disappeared from public debate following the March Revolution, 
they did not disappear completely. Viktor Magnus von Born, 
an aristocrat of the old guard, for example, appealed to the 
Provisional Government at the end of March to withhold approval 
of the proposed new Senate in which the Social Democrats would 
enjoy a slim majority; to no avail, however, as it turned out.17 
Despite the radical change in government in the Russian capital, 
the leaderships of the older non-socialist parties, the Young and 
Old Finns and the Swedish People's Party, remained singularly 
committed in their political aims and policies to the style of 
politics which had been adopted in the campaign for Finnish 
rights from 1899 onwards. The members of these parties were 
united in their shared sense of historical continuity deriving from 
the part they had all taken in the political and cultural struggle to 
maintain Finnish autonomy. The autonomous ideal had not 
dimmed for them over the years. Their respect for constitutional 
values, however, effectively restricted the range of long-term 
15. Paasivirta I 1947, pp. 103-6. 
16. Sunnuntai 25.3., 15.4.1917; US 26.3.1917. 
17. Estlander 1931, p. 674. 
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policy options open to them and their room for day to day political 
manoeuvre. Their view of history was essentially conservative and 
based on the conviction that little permanent or valuable could, or 
was likely to be achieved through revolutionary means. All three 
parties looked to the Provisional Government, which they saw as 
essentially anti-revolutionary and liberal and a power to counter 
the groundswell of political upheaval and mass unrest, for support 
against the potential excesses of the Left. 
The attitudes of the various leaders of the established non-
socialist parties during the spring of 1917 were also strongly 
shaped by the realities of the situation that Finland found herself 
in. The continuing presence of Russian forces on Finnish soil 
inevitably served to restrain political ambition during the dis-
cussion of potential future policy ideas. Hopes remained very 
much alive, however, that the future would bring a definite, if 
gradual change in Finland's position, fed by the widespread 
optimistic view that the March Revolution represented only one 
part of a wider overall process of change affecting Russia. Any 
change in Finland's status would take place constitutionally, 
through negotiation and without undermining Finnish loyalty 
towards the Provisional Government, it was argued and generally 
accepted by all the major non-socialist parties at their party 
conferences during April and May 1917.18 
A small number of pro-Entente sympathisers represented the 
only significant divergent group of opinion within the non-
socialist camp during the spring of 1917. With their focus of 
attention on events taking place mainly outside the Baltic area, 
however, although not actually shunned, they tended to be looked 
on as being somewhat detached from the demands of the moment. 
V. A. Lavonius, for example, spoke warmly at the party conference 
of the Young Finns of the ideals of Woodrow Wilson and the 
strength of internationalism and its potential to revitalise the 
world. A small group of academic and literary intellectuals 
sympathetic to the aims of the Entente powers became associated 
with the Ad Interim magazine, which had become a prominent 
voice in the latter stages of the war in warning against the danger of 
a spread of German influence in Finland.19 In the final analysis, 
18. Paasivirta I 1947, pp. 114-28. 
19. HS 16.4.1917; Rantavaara II 1979, pp. 83-5; Tyyni Tuulio 26.4.1978. 
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however, those who actively identified themselves with the 
Entente cause lacked a practical powerbase and influence in day to 
day politics. 
Attitudes towards the question of Finland's political status and 
possible future were sharply polarised between the younger and 
older generations within the non-socialist parties. Younger party 
members generally felt themselves much less tied to the type of 
policies inherited from the earlier struggle for Finnish rights than 
their older colleagues. Coming to political maturity in the period 
following 1899, they sensed the need for a reassessment of their 
parties' aims and ideals. Complete national independence became 
their adopted motto. The very fact of the March Revolution, as the 
younger generation saw things, required a rethink of political 
ideals and the abandonment of outmoded and outdated policies. 
The new duty of Finnish politicians was seen as one of putting 
Finland's interests before those of the Empire, as argued in the 
pages of the two newspapers closest to the supporters of this view, 
Uusi Päivö and Svenska Tidningen. 
The progress of the war and the March Revolution were seen as 
having helped, and as likely to continue to help, the Finnish cause 
by this young generation of Finnish politicians. Their opinions 
were also influenced by their links with and sympathy for the aims 
and intentions of the volunteer movement. While few young 
politicians were willing to openly express this tie, it can often be 
seen behind their enthusiasm for radical policies and public 
statements. Although these young politicians found themselves in 
the minority at all the party conferences of the non-socialist 
parties, including that of the Swedish People's Party, their vocal 
arguments ensured publicity for their radical views. They 
nevertheless enjoyed a notable success at the Swedish People's 
Party conference, where a motion clearly putting the case for 
eventual Finnish independence was accepted.20 
The Agrarian Party represents something of a special case in 
this instance, as its supporters became increasingly confident 
following the events of March 1917 that it would only be a matter 
of time before Finland gained a greater measure of independence. 
The idea of a 'free association' between Finland and Russia was 
20. Paasivirta I 1947, pp. 115, 121, 125-8. 
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discussed by the party's parliamentary group in April, but this was 
soon supplanted by a call for total independence. Santeri Alkio 
outlined a demand for complete national sovereignty at the end of 
May, but this never came to be publicly advocated by the party's 
parliamentary group following calls for caution from within and 
outside the party and the realisation of the danger of such a move 
with the continued presence of Russian troops in the country.21  
The revolution in the Russian capital took the Finnish labour 
movement by surprise almost as much as it did other sections of 
society and was initially seen as returning both Russia and Finland 
to a similar situation to that which had ensued after the 1905 
Revolution, with the difference that the fall of the autocracy would 
inevitably mean more far-reaching changes for the future than had 
been conceivable in 1905. The Finnish labour movement, 
however, never proved able or willing to develop close ties with 
the Provisional Government. The socialist leader Kullervo 
Manner's emphasis on the need to defend the 'rights of the Diet 
and the Finnish people' during his inaugural speech as the new 
speaker of the Diet at the beginning of April, and Yrjö Mäkelin's 
publicly-expressed hopes for the development of independent 
Finnish political activity free from Russian-imposed restrictions, 
typify the independent line adopted by the Social Democrats.22 
Domestic events since 1899, together with the impact of the more 
recent war years, had added a distinctly nationalist tone to the 
Finnish labour movement's demands and hopes for radical social 
reform. No attempt was made to gloss over Finland's exposed 
position as a small country which had been subjected to continual 
pressure from its great power neighbour. Disliking both the 
imperial government that had gone before and the Finnish 
authorities, which they wrote off merely as an extension of the 
former, the socialists saw a wider degree of real autonomy or total 
sovereignty for Finland as necessary to open up the way for the 
social reforms which had hitherto been blocked by both the 
imperial authorities and reactionary elements within Finnish 
society. While the events of March 1917 and afterwards 
engendered a general sense of optimism within the movement, 
21. Mylly 1978, p. 39. 
22. Paasivirta I 1947, pp. 130-8; H. Soikkanen 1975, pp. 212-3. 
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they also, however, caused much debate among the leadership 
about how to react to the new Russian regime. The socialist 
majority in the Diet and the unrest at the movement's grass roots 
level pointed the socialist leaders towards the need to opt for some 
kind of political initiative. 
As the labour movement's enthusiasm for the Provisional 
Government waned, its attachment to what was seen as the 'new 
Russia', the oppressed Russian masses represented by the Russian 
socialist movement, which had been so central in the 1905 
Revolution, only deepened. The cautious attitude of the Provi-
sional Government towards granting Finland more control over 
her own affairs, together with Kerensky's public emphasis on the 
need to concentrate national resources on defence of the Empire, 
served to confirm the movement in its conviction that the 
Provisional authorities fundamentally differed little from their 
autocratic predecessor. 
Oskari Tokoi, speaking before the Diet on 20 April, in arguing the 
case for complete Finnish independence, focused on two major 
themes. Emphasising the strengthening of the sense of national 
identity which had taken place in Finland in recent years and 
especially following the introduction of oppressive Russian 
policies at the turn of the century, he also openly referred to the 
existence of the volunteer movement, the first time this had been 
admitted to in such an official context, and expressed his 
sympathy with its motives. 'The pattern of social, economic and 
cultural development in Finland has been so different from that 
which has prevailed in Russia,' Tokoi argued, 'that there should be 
no question of uniting these two societies in any way in which one 
or the other would suffer.' Tokoi nevertheless showed himself not 
to be completely free of the optimistic spirit of the times in his 
affirmation that there were still good grounds for developing 
harmonious Finnish-Russian relations on the basis of what he 
described as a 'union' between 'a free Finland alongside a free 
Russia'.23 
Developments in the international situation in the spring of 1917 
and in particular the increasingly vocal debate about the 
possibilities of a rapid peace then spreading across Europe also 
23. VP 1917 ptk., pp. 46-8; Paasivirta I 1947, pp. 107-9: Upton I 1980, pp. 78-9. 
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proved the source of some considerable optimism for the Finnish 
labour movement. The Finnish socialists were able to establish 
their first real contacts of the war with their fellow socialists 
abroad at the various meetings between representatives of national 
socialist parties which took place in Stockholm on the initiative of 
the Dutch-Scandinavian committee of the Second International to 
discuss the overall prospects for peace in Europe and the 
possibility of presenting a socialist peace initiative. Events in 
Russia also gave the movement increased cause for optimism when 
it became clear that the general situation there was somewhat more 
fluid than had at first been supposed and that the labour 
movement was steadily acquiring more influence. 
The leadership of the labour movement, although wanting to 
appear to be taking an active part in the debate about Finland's 
position within the Empire, found it difficult to decide on a 
practical and effective policy on the question, preferring in the end 
to experiment with a number of policy ideas. The two Finnish 
Social Democratic representatives sent to Stockholm during the 
spring, K. H. Wiik and Yrjö Sirola, nevertheless emphasised the 
necessity, for what turned out to be largely national reasons, of 
achieving Finnish independence. The independence of small 
national groupings, it was argued, was a natural historical develop-
ment, but one which, in Finland's case, was threatened by the 
ambiguous attitude of the new Provisional Government. Wiik's 
and Sirola's views met with a mixture of support and opposition, 
depending largely on representatives' different interpretations of 
the revolution in Russia as either a positive social development or 
simply as a welcome weakening of Russia's imperial integrity. 
Overall, however, the Finnish socialists were forced to conclude 
from their experience in Stockholm that their advocacy of Finnish 
independence had gained them relatively little sympathy and few 
friends in the international labour movement.24 
The Social Democrats established contacts with the various 
Russian socialist parties then active in Petrograd, the Mensheviks, 
the Social Revolutionaries, the Bolsheviks and the Plekhanov 
group, at the beginning of May, in an attempt to clarify the general 
attitude of the revolutionary movement towards the Finnish 
24. Kirby 1974, pp. 78.80; H. Soikkanen 1975, pp. 215-6. 
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question. The Bolsheviks emerged as the group clearly most 
favourable towards the Finnish case, while most of the others, 
commanding the major part of the power and influence within the 
local soviets, proved largely unwilling to commit themselves.2e 
The Finnish Senate's proposal for a reform of the structure of 
governmental authority in Finland and giving extended powers to 
the Senate, set out to the Provisional Government at the beginning 
of April, had met with some resistance in Petrograd. A special 
constitutional committee set up by the Lvov government con-
cluded that the Provisional authorities were in no position to 
modify Finland's status in relation to the rest of the Empire and 
that only the National Constituent Assembly, when it met, would 
be entitled to fully discuss the major aspects of the issue. This 
interpretation of the situation was strongly supported throughout 
the Russian press. Kerensky, an influential member of the 
Provisional Government, described the Finnish proposal as aiming 
to 'overturn' the very basis of established relations between 
Finland and the Empire.26 
A similar view was repeated to a Finnish delegation led by 
Oskari Tokoi which visited Petrograd at the end of May during 
discussions between the two sides on the issue on 23 May.27 The 
bill finally put to the Diet at the beginning of June by the Senate, 
aimed at providing some form of interim organisation and covering 
the extension of the Senate's powers, turned out to be a much 
watered-down version of the original proposal for a larger-scale 
transfer of governmental prerogative away from Petrograd to the 
Finnish assembly following the consistent Russian resistance the 
original had encountered. It retained the Provisional Government 
as the final arbiter in the approval of new legislation, the 
dissolution of the Diet and the nomination of important govern-
ment officials.28 Although aware that in its modified form the bill 
provided for only a marginal increase in the Senate's powers, the 
25. On the attitudes of the various Russian socialist parties to Finland's position, 
see Paasivirta I 1947, pp. 177-82; Polvinen I 1967, pp. 52-8; H. Soikkanen 
1975, pp. 213-15. 
26. Upton I 1980 pp. 80-1, 152. 
27. See Evert Huttunen's speech on 22.5.1917 and Yrjö Mäkelin's on 25.5.1917 
(VP 1917 ptk., pp. 302-3, 330). 
28. Paasivirta I 1947, pp. 167-9. 
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leaders of the established non-socialist parties nevertheless saw it 
as a step forward, if only largely one from a practical admin-
istrative point of view.29 Reform, however superficially meagre, 
was seen by the non-socialists as cause for some measure of 
optimism about the future. 
3. The problem of supreme governmental 
authority 
The resignation of the Cadet leader Milyukov as Foreign Minister 
and Gutshkov as Minister of War from the Provisional Government 
in May and their replacement by Menshevik and Social Rev-
olutionary politicians was seen as clear confirmation by the Social 
Democratic leadership in Finland that the power and influence of 
the Russian labour movement was in the ascendant, as the party 
had been led to think through its contacts with the various socialist 
parties active in the Russian capital. This apparent shift in the 
balance of power in Russia was seized on by the party in June 
during its annual conference, when the leadership aligned itself to 
all intents and purposes behind a call for complete Finnish 
independence. In a bid to speed up progress towards achieving 
real reform of the Senate's powers, the Social Democratic leaders, 
with the tacit support of Tokoi and the other socialist members of 
the Senate and what appears to have been similar support from 
some non-socialists as well including the Agrarian Party under 
Alkio, decided at the end of June to appeal directly for support for 
the Finnish cause to the All-Russian Congress of Soviets then 
meeting in Petrograd.3" This move was paralleled by increased 
calls by the socialists for the Finnish Diet to adopt a more active 
role in the campaign to secure national independence.31  
Following discussions with the Finnish socialist delegation 
attending the Congress of Soviets, the Menshevik and Social 
Revolutionary majority approved a special resolution calling for 
29. Ibid., p. 169. 
30. UP 15.5., 29.5., 5.6.1917; SvT 30.5.1917. 
31. Paasivirta I 1947, pp. 189-91; Polvinen I 1967, p. 73; H. Soikkanen 1975, pp. 
216-17. 
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the wide-scale transference of governmental power in Finland, 
excluding that relating to foreign and defence issues, from the 
Provisional Government to Finland's own political institutions. 
The Bolshevik minority at the Congress repeated its support for 
granting complete independence which had been communicated 
by Alexandra Kollontai shortly previously during her visit as 
official representative of the Bolshevik Party to the Social 
Democrats' party conference held in June in Helsinki.32 Compared 
to the other socialist parties, however, the political influence and 
power of the Bolsheviks continued to be relatively minimal at this 
stage. 
The majority resolution on the Finnish question approved at the 
Congress of Soviets was seen by the Social Democrats as signalling 
a change in the general Russian attitude towards Finland and as 
providing the basis for a renewed Finnish political initiative 
directed towards achieving a reform of governmental power in 
Finland aimed at guaranteeing the country complete internal 
independence.33 The need to come to some form of accommo-
dation with the Provisional Government, previously recognised as 
the major arbiter in the Finnish question, appeared to have 
receded. Hopes now focused on the Diet as the body most likely to 
champion the struggle for governmental reform, in preference to 
the Senate and the modest negotiated settlement it had managed to 
achieve. In its completely redrafted form, the bill proposed the 
transfer of governmental power directly to the Diet in all matters 
relating to Finnish internal affairs, leaving only foreign and 
defence questions to imperial jurisdiction. Despite the 
revolutionary change it outlined for the structure of government in 
Finland, the bill was carefully debated by the Diet according to 
standard procedure, underlining the general desire to adhere as 
closely as possible to the letter of the law and be seen to be acting 
constitutionally and in line with the advocacy of constitutional 
governmental action which had featured so prominently in 
Finnish political life for most of the previous twenty years. The 
socialists also hoped that this approach would help gain the 
32. Paasivirta I 1947, pp. 192-3; Polvinen I 1967, 74-80; Kirby 1979, p. 43. For 
Kollantay's speech at the Social Democratic Party's conference (6.1917), see 
SDP:n puoluekokous ptk., pp. 56-9. 
33. Paasivirta I 1947, pp. 206-7. 
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support of the non-socialist groups in the Diet for the bill. 
The reluctance of the Social Democrats to adopt a conciliatory 
attitude, if only temporarily, towards their political rivals, 
however, saw them decide to avoid entering into meaningful 
discussions with their non-socialist colleagues on the issue, 
despite the obvious sympathy felt among the ranks of those non-
socialists dedicated to the cause of Finnish independence. The 
overall attitude of the socialists to the problem was summed up in 
Yrjö Mäkelin's speech to the Diet on 10 July, and in particular his 
declaration that: 'Based as this bill is on reinstating rights 
previously enjoyed by the Finnish people, I am sure that it 
represents the unshakeable will of the majority of the population. 
We cannot draw back from the decision which must be made. 
When this bill becomes law, as it must, it will determine Finland's 
status until her position among the nations of Europe is finally 
resolved.'34 
The problem of what attitude to adopt to the proposed bill 
reforming the powers of the Finnish authorities provoked a clear 
division of opinion among the non-socialist parties in the Diet. 
Those otherwise dedicated to the cause of independence saw the 
bill as essentially going as far as was practically possible in the 
circumstances. The bill's opponents, in contrast, and there were 
many more of them than its supporters in the non-socialist camp, 
emphasised the need for caution in relations with the Provisional 
Government, and underlined their anxiety and fear that the 
extended powers proposed for the Diet would seriously 
undermine the traditional division of power within the country. 
Those opposing the bill came therefore to reaffirm the fact, as they 
saw it, that supreme authority in Finnish internal affairs belonged, 
if only temporarily, with the Provisional Government in 
Petrograd.35 
During early July, the Finnish Social Democrats received a visit 
from a delegation of Menshevik politicians from Petrograd, whose 
members attempted to cool local enthusiasm for the proposal. 
This attempt to soften the Finnish initiative was indirectly 
linked to the actions of the Ukrainian Central Soviet in Kiev in de- 
34. VP 1917 ptk., pp. 877-80. 
35. Paasivirta I 1947, pp. 215-20; Wahlbäck 1968. pp. 17-18. 
74 
manding self-government for the whole Ukrainian area, a move 
which had precipitated serious disagreements within the 
Provisional Government and led to the resignation of all the Cadet 
Party ministers. The failure of the major Russian offensive against 
the Germans on the Eastern Front led by General Brusilov at the 
beginning of July, which had been particularly supported by 
Kerensky and to a lesser extent by the Menshevik and Social 
Revolutionary-dominated All-Russian Congress of Soviets, in spite 
of Bolshevik opposition, and which began to become clear from 16 
July onwards, only added fuel to the government's problems in 
Petrograd.36 
The Bolsheviks attempted to exploit the sudden change in the 
overall situation, initiating an attempted uprising against the 
Provisional Government in Petrograd.37 Taking his cue from the 
apparent about-turn in the Provisional Government's fortunes, 
which seemed in socialist eyes a positive development from 
Finland's point of view, especially coming so soon after the 
Menshevik attempt to dampen Finnish enthusiasm, the Finnish 
Prime Minister, Oskari Tokoi, announced to the Diet on 17 July 
that following recent events the Provisional Government was no 
longer in any position to stand in the way of approving the Finnish 
proposal for governmental reform.38 The bill was finally passed on 
its last reading by a sharply divided Diet on 18 July by a large 
majority (136-55), made up of socialists, pro-independence non-
socialists and some members of the Agrarian Party, opposed by 
the hard core of the old-established non-socialist parties. Three 
members of the Swedish People's Party, including the conserva-
tive Ernst Estlander, felt so strongly that the new law undermined 
the basis of the country's constitution that they requested to be 
allowed to resign from the Diet forthwith.39 
Soon after the bill's approval in Helsinki, the Diet decided, in 
complete contradiction to the logic of the new legislation, to 
request the Provisional Government's approval for the Finnish 
move, despite the fact that as a result of the bill the Provisional 
36. Chamberlain I 1954, pp. 157-8, 163-5. 
37. Ibid., pp. 167-70; Deutscher 1978, pp. 134-7. 
38. VP 1917 ptk., p. 1033. 
39. See Ernst Estlander's G. G. Rosenqvist's and A. Frey's notes dated 19.7, 20.7 
and 23.7.1917 (Eduskunnan arkisto 1917 I VP). 
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Government was, from the Finnish point of view, no longer 
entrusted with supreme legislative authority in Finnish affairs. 
Despite the radical nature of the Diet's decision, the Social 
Democrat majority clearly wanted to minimise the scale of the 
break in relations with the government in Petrograd. This 
concession to what was known to be the majority Russian view 
about the Provisional Government's right to exercise supreme 
authority in Finland would, the Social Democrats hoped, go some 
way towards softening the former's opposition to the reform. 
For all its apparent loss of control, the Provisional Government, 
however, had proved able to maintain its hold on Petrograd and 
Russia as a whole. Appealing to the need for national unity in the 
face of the continuing dangerous situation at the front, it was able 
to put down the attempted uprising organised by the Bolsheviks, 
and followed this by banning the party's activities and closing 
down its newspapers. In a move designed to strengthen the 
government's hand, Lvov was replaced as Prime Minister by 
Kerensky. Announcing its adoption of a compromise solution over 
the question of Ukrainian self-government, Kerensky's new 
administration declared its determination to continue the struggle 
against the enemy without and social anarchy within the Empire.4° 
This consolidation of the Provisional Government's position and 
its grip on the reins of power also served to strengthen its 
determination in its dealings with Finland. This was reflected in 
the increasingly sharp nature of the criticism of Finnish affairs and 
the new law in particular which had begun to appear in many pro-
government newspapers from the end of June onwards and which 
continued undiminished into August.41 Finland's open 'attempt at 
secession' was described by Rjetsh as taking the country into the 
camp of Russia's enemies and as serving to make Finland a threat 
not only to future national security but also more particularly to 
that of the imperial capital. The same paper was not slow to draw 
its readers' attention to Germany's interest in the possibility of 
Finnish independence. Back in June, Denj had described the 
demand for Finnish independence made at the Social Democratic 
40. Chamberlain I 1954, pp. 184-5, 188. 
41. Commentaries appearing in Rjetsh and Denj were quoted extensively in the 
Finnish press of the time. See, for example, Uusi Päivä 26.5., 10.8.1917. 
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party conference as amounting to little more than a stab in the back 
for Russia and the Provisional Government. 
It did not take long for the government in Petrograd to decide 
that its only practical response to the Finnish move lay in 
dissolving the intransigent and rebellious Finnish assembly. The 
sharp division within opinion in Finland over the bill and the 
deepening struggle developing between the socialists and non-
socialists in its wake gave added impetus to the idea. The 
announcement of the dissolution of the Diet and the holding 
of new elections was made on 31 July, and was subsequently 
accepted by the Senate by a slim majority of non-socialist votes 
and the casting vote of the Governor-General (7-6). Svinhufvud, 
as Attorney-General, appears to have supported the Senate's 
majority view.42 
The Russian offensive begun at the beginning of July had caused 
the administration in Petrograd to embark on a review of Russian 
military forces, including the state of its units stationed in 
southern Finland, to counter any possible increase in tension 
between Russia and Germany. A Cossack division was transferred 
to Finland on 12 July and reinforced on 3 August by a cavalry 
division and an infantry brigade.43 This increase in the Russian 
military presence in Finland and using troops felt to be loyal to the 
provisional authorities was designed to strengthen overall 
defences against a possible German landing and at the same time to 
prevent the outbreak of unwanted 'separatist unrest' in Finland. It 
seems clear that the Russian military command was aware, at least 
to some extent, of the plans of the Finnish activist groups abroad 
and within Finland to ferment a popular uprising as and when 
Russia's hold on the country appeared to weaken. By late August 
and early September, the total strength of Russian forces in 
Finland had risen to some 100,000 men.44 
42. Paasivirta 11947, pp. 228-9; E. W. Juva II 1961, pp. 48-9; Upton I 1980, pp. 
183-9. 
43. Polvinen I 1967, p. 93; Upton I 1980, p. 178-9. 
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4. Trade difficulties and growing internal 
social unrest 
Finnish-Russian trade relations began to take a new and decisive 
turn from the spring of 1917 onwards as Finland's close 
association with the Russian war economy which had developed 
between 1914 and 1916 began to disintegrate. This transformation, 
which ultimately resulted in a virtual complete halt to Finland's 
sizeable exports to the rest of the Empire, was not immediately felt 
in heavy industry, with its pattern of long-term contracts, until the 
summer by which time its extent could no longer be ignored. No 
new orders were placed by Russian buyers and a number of earlier 
contracts were cancelled. For those other sectors of industry more 
closely tied to the war boom, such as the textile, rubber and 
leather-working industries, however, the drop in production was 
much more sudden.45 The fall-off in orders in these latter 
industries caused a rapid increase in the level of unemployment, 
which had already begun to rise with the halting of fortification 
work by the Russian authorities in the southern part of the country. 
This downturn in the overall economic situation had extensive 
and visible social consequences. 
The disruption of trade relations between the two countries also 
exacerbated the exchange situation. While Finnish imports from 
Russia were reduced to limited supplies of foodstuffs, the 
Provisional Government continued to spend heavily in Finland to 
cover the costs of stationing and provisioning Russian forces in the 
country, a fact which resulted in a steadily growing Finnish rouble 
surplus. To counter this, the Bank of Finland was forced to adopt a 
significantly more independent stance than previously towards 
the rouble exchange rate and allow the rouble's value to fall 
sharply, which in turn forced the Russian exchequer into 
intermittently having to draw on its dollar and sterling reserves to 
purchase the Finnish marks it required. These exchange 
difficulties served to further restrict trade between the two 
countries and, in particular, the export of Finnish paper to Russia, 
reducing trade between the two countries by the autumn of 1917 to 
little more than barter exchange.46 
45. Lento 1955, p. 483; Virrankoski 1975, pp. 188-90. 
46. Meinander 1963, pp. 58-60; Pihkala 1980, p. 33. 
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Food supplies came under increasing strain from early spring 
1917, with the situation steadily worsening following the virtual 
halt of food imports from Russia. Rye imports had been the first to 
succumb in October 1916, while cereal orders became increasingly 
uncertain from November and December onwards, and supplies of 
other grains and flour from Russia ceased completely in February 
and March 1917.47 Following a survey of food stocks ordered by 
the Senate and completed in April showing that the country's 
stocks of bread cereals available until the next harvest amounted to 
only some 40% of normal consumption, the government had little 
choice other than to begin rationing. Bread rationing was 
introduced in April in Helsinki and in June in the rest of the 
country.48 A bill designed to provide the authorities with greater 
control over food supplies and modelled on comparable Swedish 
legislation, granting exceptional powers to the Senate to regulate 
food sales and consumption, was put before the Diet in April and 
approved and made law at the beginning of June. Fixed price 
ceilings for foodstuffs were established and stocks requisitioned.49 
Continual efforts were made by the government to buy cereals 
from both East and West. Agreement was reached at the end of 
June with the Provisional Government on the sale of 62,000 tons of 
cereals over a four month period, which it was hoped would ease 
the situation until the harvest later in the year. Despite payment for 
the entire order being promised in advance in an effort to 
guarantee early shipment, only about a fifth of the total originally 
ordered, however, ever arrived. Negotiations with the Americans 
were also held on cereal purchases, resulting in a contract for a 
similar-sized order to that made with Russia, which was also paid 
for in advance. The entry of the United States into the war, with its 
repercussions on American trade, however, inevitably held up 
shipment of the order across the Atlantic.5° 
Spiralling unemployment, the worsening food supply problem 
and increasing inflation gave added impetus to the growing 
working-class unrest which had emerged in the spring of 1917. 
47. Pihkala 1980, p. 33. 
48. Rantatupa 1979, pp. 65-9. 
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Rumours about speculators, secret stockpiling of food and the 
authorities' alleged aim of 'starving' the urban poor only served to 
fuel the flames of popular disaffection, which was further 
deepened by the generally widespread suspicion felt among the 
ordinary population towards local government officials and those 
in charge of overseeing the food supply situation. Demonstrations 
and other mass action against local councils, such as the butter 
riots which took place in Turku and Helsinki, were typical of the 
wave of popular unrest which spread through the country during 
the late summer of 1917. Although only one aspect of the country's 
heightening internal social tension, popular reaction to the lack of 
adequate food supplies was probably the most visible sign of this 
unrest.51 The continuing lack of adequate police forces served to 
prevent the authorities from calling any real halt to the unrest. 
Political developments in the wake of the dissolution of the Diet 
also acted as a new and additional factor in deepening the schism 
which had opened up in Finnish society. 
5. The question of Finland's future status 
The course of the war during 1917, although not bringing any end 
to the hostilities in Europe, did see developments which presaged 
significant changes ahead. The entry of the United States into the 
war alongside the Western powers at the beginning of April 
marked a departure away from a purely European struggle, whilst 
also underlining America's growing great power status. American 
economic interests had become closely linked with the British and 
French war efforts between 1914 and 1917, and under President 
Wilson this economic aspect was reinforced by an increased 
emphasis on the role of the war as a struggle about the right to 
national self-determination and democracy, directed first against 
Germany and the conservative values it represented and 
subsequently the revolutionary values represented by the Russian 
Revolution. 
While events in Russia in 1917 failed to have a decisive 
influence on the course of the war, they did nevertheless increase 
51. Rantatupa 1979, p. 92. 
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the pressure for social and political change in various parts of 
Europe. In Russia itself, attitudes towards the continuing war came 
to be an important factor in dividing political opinion and 
determining political allegiances.52 Kerensky consistently opposed 
the idea of negotiating a separate peace with Germany, preferring 
instead to maintain Russia's alliance with the Western powers. 
The failure of the Russian offensive on the Eastern Front begun on 
his initiative at the beginning of July, however, only served to 
intensify the calls for peace in Russia, among which those of the 
Bolsheviks were the most uncompromising, with their demand for 
an immediate end to hostilities. 
The centre-left majority of the German National Assembly 
pressed the government to sound out the possibilities for peace in 
July 1917, but to little effect. The real power in Germany lay with 
the military leadership, in the shape of Hindenburg and 
Ludendorff, who together ensured that all major political decisions 
were taken with little reference to the Chancellor or the official 
government. Kerensky's failed July offensive in the East was 
followed on the northern sector of the front by a German counter-
attack, which led to the capture of Riga at the beginning of 
September. German hopes of a Russian collapse, however, were 
not realised. Parallel to its success on the Eastern Front, the focus 
of the German Army's military surveillance operations extended 
into the northern Baltic area, and Germany grew increasingly 
interested in the possibilities of shaping popular political opinion 
in Finland.53  
The position of Kerensky's Provisional Government began to 
appear increasingly fraught against the background of continuing 
Russian military setbacks and the growing power of the 
Bolsheviks, who had begun to recover from the failure of their 
attempted rebellion in July. At the other end of the political 
spectrum, conservative opinion committed to a return of the 
autocracy was also beginning to regroup. Unable to look to support 
from a national representative assembly as one had yet to be 
elected, Kerensky called a state conference embracing represen-
tatives from across the social spectrum in Moscow at the end of 
52. v. Rauch 1968, pp. 19, 22. 
53. Carr I 1950. pp. 90-1; Eyck I 1954, pp. 26-9. 
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August, in the hope of gaining some much-needed backing for his 
policies. This proved unable, however, to agree on any general 
consensus on the two central questions of governmental authority 
and national defence. The beginning of September saw the 
outbreak of a rebellion led by General Kornilov in a bid by 
conservative groups to topple the Provisional Government and 
neutralise the influence and power wielded by the workers' and 
soldiers' soviets. Sufficiently alarmed by this display of right-wing 
discontent, the various socialist parties were finally galvanised 
into forming a united front with Kerensky, enabling the rebellion 
to be put down.s4 
The Bolsheviks were able to consolidate their position at the 
expense of the Mensheviks and Social Revolutionaries. This 
change in the balance of power between the socialist parties was 
reflected in September in the Petrograd Workers' and Soldiers' 
Soviet, when the Bolsheviks gained a majority and Leo Trotsky 
became chairman. The Bolsheviks immediately followed this 
with demands for the introduction of extensive social reforms, 
including the nationalisation of the means of production and the 
distribution of land to the peasants and a rapid ending of Russia's 
involvement in the war. With their deliberate distancing of 
themselves from the Provisional Government and its policies, the 
Bolsheviks, unlike the more moderate socialist parties, repre-
sented an untried and as yet untested political option in Russian 
politics. 
Developments inside Russia, in the Baltic area and in Russian-
German relations were naturally of major interest to all sections of 
Finnish opinion. International events in particular received 
increased attention in Finland during 1917, especially when 
compared to their typically limited discussion earlier. Press 
coverage on events in Europe was no longer subjected to the same 
degree of censorship as had been common between 1914 and 1916. 
Sweden and Swedish affairs, in contrast, came to assume a much 
less central position in the Finnish consciousness than previously. 
Events in Western Europe and on the Western Front nevertheless 
remained distant to the average observer. Even such major events 
54. Chamberlain I 1954, pp. 200-20. On Kornilov, see Mannerheim I 1951, pp. 
227-30. 
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as the transfer of large numbers of American troops to the 
European theatre of war received relatively little attention, nor was 
there much public discussion about the general effect on the war of 
this development. Geographical distance, in the final analysis, 
dictated where Finland's main interests lay. 
The period immediately following the Provisional Government's 
dissolution of the Diet marked a new and difficult stage in 
developments in Finland. The question of possible future national 
independence, together with the more pressing issue of the 
country's social problems, shared the centre stage. Both issues 
were to have a profound impact on the realignment and regrouping 
of political and social opinion in Finland. 
The political efforts of the Social Democrats, which had reached 
something of a peak with their attempt to push through their bill 
on a transfer of governmental power, had received an unexpected 
and sharp setback with the dissolution of the Diet, one which 
provoked hostility within the party both towards the Provisional 
Government for instigating the move and towards those of 
Finland's non-socialists who had been active in opposing the 
reform.55 The socialists' overall intentions contained in their 
proposed reform bill, however, gained the support of non-socialist 
pro-independence politicians at the beginning of August. Pro-
independence commentators, such as those writing for Uusi Päivä, 
described the bill as reflecting the view of the majority of popular 
opinion of the type of constitutional arrangement best suited to 
future Finnish-Russian relations. While the socialists were 
commended for their decision to act on the resolution passed by 
the All-Russian Congress of Soviets on the Finnish issue, they 
were nevertheless criticised for having made little attempt to work 
together with non-socialist groups to gain greater support for the 
bill.56  Svenska Tidningen echoed a similar view in its support for 
the socialists' attempt to prevent the Provisional Government from 
assuming ultimate power over Finnish domestic affairs and in its 
condemnation of the attitudes of the established non-socialist 
parties, which were described as having acted in virtual alliance 
with the Russian authorities against Finnish interests. The 
55. Paasivirta II 1949, pp. 21-4. 
56. UP 9.8., 10.8.1917. 
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socialists' decision to request the Provisional Government to 
approve the reform had, however, in the paper's opinion, shown 
an unfortunate loss of determination. Both the Senate and the 
Diet, according to Svenska Tidningen, should have refused to 
accept the Provisional Government's decision to dissolve the 
Diet.57 
The role of non-socialist pro-independence politicians as an 
independent political force began to grow from mid-August 
onwards. This predominantly young group, which had previously 
contented itself with internal opposition from within the non-
socialist parties, now began to align itself behind a body of older 
more established politicians, including Svinhufvud, who had up 
until then preferred to observe developments very much from the 
sidelines. The debate and publicity surrounding the Diet's reform 
proposal also indirectly gave added impetus within much of the 
non-socialist camp to more vocal demands for a greater degree of 
independence than had hitherto been advocated. Opposition to 
developments in this direction was declared to be little short of 
politically bankrupt at a time of declining Russian power and an 
increasing German military presence in the Baltic. Pro-inde-
pendence politicians began to demand a united front calling for 
complete national independence. Parallel to this nationalist case, 
they also stressed the importance of the need to ensure a non-
socialist majority in the new Diet to counter the increasing social 
unrest affecting the country and what they saw as the inability of 
the socialists to take decisive control of the situations" A change in 
the balance of power in the Diet held the prospect for these pro-
independence politicians of improving their own political 
position and of possibly achieving an important say in the 
country's future moves towards independence. 
The established non-socialist parties, with the vocal support of 
Uusi Suometar and Helsingin Sanomat, advocated acceptance of 
the Provisional Government's decision to dissolve the Diet, in line 
with the non-socialist senators' decision to comply with 
Petrograd's manifesto to the effect. This essentially conciliatory 
line was accompanied by a strong rearguard attack on the 
57. SvT 10.8., 11.8.1917. 
58. UP 22.8.1917; SvT 24.8.1917. 
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socialists' reform bill, which argued that, for all their activities, the 
socialists had, in fact, failed to achieve any real improvement in 
Finland's position.59 The obvious aim of the non-socialists' 
campaign was to engineer a shift in popular support away from 
their socialist opponents, who had successfully consolidated their 
position during the spring and summer through their role as the 
major political group most clearly identified with a policy of 
attempting to gain a greater measure of independence for Finland. 
The focus of these parties' political activities became centred on a 
single-minded anti-socialist campaign, in which the socialists 
were made to bear the brunt of responsibility for the social unrest 
and disruption afflicting society. The non-socialists' main concern 
was to ensure the defeat of the socialists in the coming elections .60 
That the various non-socialist parties were able and willing to 
sink their difference, which in any case had been mainly inherited 
from the differences of views over the best way to react to an earlier 
set of Russian policies, and present something approaching a 
common front was undoubtedly a result of the success of the Left 
in gaining a majority in the Diet at the 1916 elections. The 
concentration of the non-socialists on the negative aspects of 
Finland's domestic developments subsequent to the March Revol-
ution, while linked to their criticism of the socialists, was also tied 
to their assessment of Finland's relations with the rest of the 
Empire. While the socialists clearly hoped that a favourable 
change in the country's relationship with Russia would also create 
the basis for progressive domestic social reform, the non-socialists 
hoped that any change would bring social stability and a halt to 
any movement towards social revolution in Finland. It was 
therefore only logical for the non-socialists not to oppose the 
dissolution of the socialist-controlled Diet. A new assembly with a 
clear non-socialist majority would, it was thought, guarantee stable 
social development and a more considered approach to the 
handling of the question of Finland's future political status. 
As the elections drew closer, the leaders of the established non-
socialist parties, Ståhlberg, J. R. Danielson-Kalmari and R. A. 
Wrede, were forced, despite their previous apparent unwillingness 
59. US 10.8., 11.8., 25.8.1917; HS 16.8., 22.8.1917. 
60. US 19.8.1917. 
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to formulate their views with any real clarity, to make their 
positions clear on the question of Finland's future political status, 
both to the voting public and to establish their political distance 
from their fellow non-socialists who had come out in active and 
open support for national independence. 
Wrede declared his support for the ultimate aim of complete 
internal independence for Finland in mid-August. He remained 
adamant, however, that Russian opinion would nevertheless have 
to be taken into consideration in the immediate future. Finland 
remained, Wrede emphasised, politically and constitutionally a 
part of the Russian Empire and Russian troops remained stationed 
in the country.61 Wrede advocated that an agreement struck 
between the Finnish Diet and the All-Russian National Constituent 
Assembly, as and when the latter met, should form the basis for 
any future settlement of the issue. Wrede readily admitted, 
nevertheless, that this approach, despite its advantages, would not 
be without its difficulties. His overall idea depended in large part 
on the assumption that internal unrest and anarchy in Russia 
would be short-lived and would inevitably be followed by a more 
conventional, stable form of government, an analysis that appears 
to have drawn much of its inspiration from the pattern of events 
following the 1905 Revolution in Russia. 
Wrede thought any attempt to gain total sovereignty and 
involving completely severing Finland's ties with Russia would be 
a dangerous and unwise gamble. Russia, he was sure, would not 
willingly surrender Finland in the certain knowledge that the 
country could easily fall within the German sphere of influence 
and thereby become a threat to Petrograd. Finland, Wrede 
emphasised, lacked the military resources either to free herself 
from Russia's hold or to defend her independence, were she to gain 
it. The idea of Finland's possibly achieving independence with 
foreign support was rejected by Wrede. Wrede was also doubtful 
that any international guarantees regarding Finland's position 
would be likely to be forthcoming from a future European peace 
conference. 
In somewhat similar style, Ståhlberg also emphasised the 
importance of adopting a cautious and consistent policy attitude 
61. Hbl 17.8.1917; HS 17.8.1917; US 17.8.1917. 
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towards Russia. In an assessment of the situation made at the end 
of August, he described the socialist-sponsored reform bill as 
having been 'reckless' and an example of over-ambitious policies 
which would only undermine the basis of Finland's privileged 
position within the Empire. Complete internal independence 
figured nevertheless in his estimation, as in Wrede's, as a 
reasonable ultimate aim. Ståhlberg was also sympathetic to the 
idea of future Finnish-Russian relations developing on the basis of 
a negotiated agreement backed up by possible international 
guarantees.62 Demands for complete independence were naive and 
unrealistic and ignored the fact that Finland's border with Russia 
ran what he described as 'only a few kilometres' away from the 
Russian capital, which alone had a population as large as that of 
the whole of Finland. While Ståhlberg did not deny that Russia's 
overall position had weakened, he nevertheless saw no reason to 
assume that its complete collapse was in any way inevitable. 
Convinced as he was that it was ultimately self-interest which 
dominated the policies of the great powers, he made no attempt to 
hide his suspicion that the West's vocal advocacy of national self-
determination did not obscure the fact that it remained, in the final 
analysis, very much a secondary war aim. 
Danielson-Kalmari's conservatively traditional view of Finland's 
future political position as aired in September took some account 
of the changes in the international situation in the Finnish area 
that had recently taken place, including the German capture of 
Riga on 2 September.63 Although alluding in an article in Uusi 
Suometar on 11 September to the possibility that what he 
described as 'major world events' might lead to Finland's 
separation from Russia, he concluded that it was decidedly more 
likely that Finland would remain part of the Russian Empire at the 
end of the war, a view which he repeated in similar terms in a 
speech on 23 September. In line with traditional conservative 
opinion, Danielson-Kalmari emphasised that past experience 
pointed to a constitutional agreement between Finland and Russia, 
giving Finland full autonomy, as being the best guarantor of 
Finland's future security, pointing to the positive aspects of the 
62. HS 28.8.1917. 
63. US 11.9., 24.9.1917. See also K. R. Rantakari's letter of 24.8.1917 to Danielson-
Kalmari (Danielson-Kalmari collection 5). 
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earlier union between Sweden and Norway and the dual monarchy 
in Austro-Hungary. Concentration on complete independence to 
the exclusion of other possible solutions would only unnecessarily 
endanger Finland's position. Danielson-Kalmari was nevertheless 
open-minded enough to accept the possibility that Russia might 
attempt, again in the light of past experience, to place what 
Finland might consider unacceptable conditions on its granting 
Finland independence, such as the return of the province of 
Viipuri to Russia to guarantee the security of the Russian capital, 
thereby reinstating the border established in 1721. 
Finland's future was very much linked in Danielson-Kalmari's 
mind with the question of guaranteeing the security of Russia's 
north-western border, even in the event of Finland's remaining 
part of the Russian Empire. This would best be achieved, in 
Danielson-Kalmari's view, by allowing Finland her own army 
responsible for the complete peacetime defence of the country and 
thereby removing the need for any Russian military presence in 
Finland. Danielson-Kalmari was nevertheless careful to stress the 
importance of ensuring that Finnish territory should never be 
allowed to form a threat to the defence of Petrograd at times of 
crisis or war. If Finland's own armed forces were to prove 
incapable of defending the country, Russia must be allowed the 
right to transfer military units to Finland to halt enemy advances 
and, as the situation demanded, to assume command of Finnish 
forces. 
Finland's overall political situation during August and Septem-
ber 1917 was seen by the country's non-socialist pro-inde-
pendence politicians as essentially fluid and, above all, as one 
requiring the abandonment of traditional constitutionalist-style 
policies. Finland, it was claimed, was faced with a unique 
opportunity, and one which it would be politically irresponsible to 
pass up, to determine her own future and to aim for complete 
independence. Finland's hand was seen to have been inestimably 
strengthened by the internal crumbling of the Russian Empire, 
coupled with Germany's increasing military presence in the Baltic. 
In sharp opposition to the views of Wrede and Ståhlberg, pro-
independence politicians argued with some vehemence that 
Finland should avoid any binding agreements with the Provisional 
authorities designed to guarantee Finland some level of regional 
autonomy, and instead actively work towards a more radical 
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solution likely to give the country real independence. 
The overall attitude among pro-independence opinion was of a 
sense of urgency. Although the West's advocacy of national self-
determination was seen as potentially favourable towards 
Finland's case in the long run, in the more immediate future it was 
thought unrealistic to conclude that Finland must merely bide her 
time and wait for the peace conference at the end of the war to 
resolve the independence issue. Finland had to be willing to act on 
her own behalf to achieve a settlement of her international 
position, which would then only have to be rubber-stamped by the 
victors. 
Many pro-independence politicians, however, were concerned 
about the implications of a possible further crumbling of national 
consensus. Their own attitude towards the socialists during the 
early autumn was virtually consistently critical, resulting from 
what was seen as the socialists' ambiguous attitude towards the 
country's deepening social disorder and revolutionary unrest. 
Their criticism did not nevertheless extend to an all-out anti-
socialist campaign condemning the socialists and everything they 
represented, as was more typical among their more conservative 
fellows. This latter style of attack, from which the pro-
independence group were keen to disassociate themselves, was 
seen as self-divisive and as serving to divert attention away from 
the major theme of the elections, the question of independence.64 
Svinhufvud's decision to ally himself with the pro-indepen-
dence movement provided the latter with an important filip to its 
potential political influence and a leader at one and the same time. 
As one of the major campaigners for Finnish rights earlier in the 
century, Svinhufvud commanded wide respect. Svinhufvud's 
view of post-1905 Russia, which concentrated on the Empire's 
unsteady political and social development, typified by violent 
swings between autocracy and anarchy, forced him to conclude 
that it could only be to Finland's advantage if she was able to break 
her constitutional links with the Empire. Finland's proximity to 
the centre of the Russian Revolution might also see increased 
revolutionary activity within Finland, Svinhufvud feared. In 
common with a number of other like-minded figures, the 
64. UP 18.8.1917; SvT 21.8., 24.8., 1.9.1917; UP 6.9.1917. 
89 
importance of achieving a non-socialist majority in the Diet also 
loomed large in Svinhufvud's thinking.65 
Svinhufvud was joined in his move by another of the older 
generation of leading non-socialist political figures, Edvard Hjelt. 
Hjelt travelled to Stockholm at the end of August to survey the 
state of Finland's clandestine relations with Germany. The fate of 
the volunteer battalion in Germany had been an important cause of 
concern for pro-independence politicians since the March 
Revolution and one compounded by the volunteer move-
ment's unreliable diplomatic contacts with Germany and the 
various internal disputes which afflicted the overall work of the 
Stockholm delegation.66 With the international situation con-
tinuing uncertain and with no real indication of improved 
prospects to come, pro-independence politicians felt themselves 
in no position to allow any breakdown in communications with 
Berlin. 
As the major movers behind the reform bill, the socialists had 
suffered a particularly unwelcome blow with the dissolution of the 
Diet. They had been unprepared for the Provisional Government's 
determination not to allow the bill to go through and disappointed 
by the failure of the Mensheviks and the Social Revolutionaries to 
follow up their resolution in support of the Finnish move, and 
incensed by the rapidity with which the non-socialist parties had 
begun to prepare for the new elections following the Provisional 
Government's decision. 
Kullervo Manner's decision as Speaker of the Diet to temporarily 
postpone further sittings of the old Diet following the 
announcement of the Russian decision reflected the socialists' 
initial expectation that this might only be a temporary setback. 
Although continuing to stress the illegality of the Provisional 
Government's decision, the socialists, however, were gradually 
forced to accept the fact, which their non-socialist opponents had 
already done, that new elections would be unavoidable. The 
socialists made no attempt to hide their bitterness at this 
development, describing the dissolution of the Diet as the joint 
work of a secret coalition between the Petrograd authorities and 
Finland's own conservative parties.67 
65. See Svinhufvud's speech on 19.8.1917, as reported in UP 22.8.1917. 
66. Paasivirta II 1949, p. 104; Lappalainen 1977, p. 96. 
67. Paasivirta II 1949, pp. 22-4; H. Soikkanen 1975, pp. 233-4. 
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Manner recalled the old Diet on 29 August. Its some 140 
members, forced to sit in the House of Estates after being prevented 
from entering their usual chamber by Russian troops, failed to win 
any significant political influence, eventually becoming little more 
than a discussion forum. The socialists came face to face with their 
isolated position and the problem of deciding on their future 
policy options when it became clear that both pro-independence 
and Agrarian Party members leant towards accepting the 
inevitability of the need for new elections. The following meeting 
of the Diet on 28 September, at which all non-socialist members 
stayed away, ended up as little more than a token demonstration of 
opposition to the holding of elections.68 
Despite these setbacks, however, the socialists did not com-
pletely abandon their proposed reform bill ideas. They continued 
to sound out the possibilities of its being eventually approved, 
despite the obvious hostility to the plan of both the Provisional 
Government itself and the majority of the All-Russian Congress of 
Soviets. It was not surprising therefore that contact began to be 
established between the Social Democrats and the Bolsheviks, who 
had previously proved most sympathetic to the Finnish cause and 
who had at around the same time achieved a dominant position in 
the influential Petrograd soviet, despite the significant differences 
that existed between the Finnish party's nationalist, Kautsky-style 
policies and the Bolsheviks' advocacy of and involvement in direct 
revolutionary action. This move appears to have taken place in late 
September through the person of Evert Huttunen, a socialist 
member of the Diet who had links with the executive committee of 
the Congress of Soviets. 
Huttunen presented the leaders of the executive committee in 
Petrograd with a specimen agreement entitled 'A proposal for an 
agreement between Finland and Russia', which envisaged the 
Russian government's granting Finland complete internal 
independence while retaining responsibility for Finnish foreign 
affairs until the question of the country's international status was 
finally resolved.69 It was also proposed that Russian military forces 
would be allowed to remain in Finland and that the Finnish 
68. Paasivirta II 1949, p. 44; Upton I 1980, p. 238. 
69. Työ 9.10.1917. 
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authorities would refrain from pressing for the formation of a 
national army as long as hostilities in Europe continued. Both 
governments would be allowed some form of diplomatic repre-
sentation in the other country's capital. In essence, the proposal 
aimed at what amounted to confirming, albeit late in the day, the 
Diet's approval of the reform bill on 18 July, and appears to have 
been predicated on the assumption that the socialists would 
acquire a majority in the new Diet. 
The Finnish socialists, in addition to their determination to 
retain an active role in the Diet, were also concerned to maintain 
interest in the Finnish question among those attending the 
international socialist congress in Stockholm. This was in large 
part motivated by their fears that the All-Russian National 
Constituent Assembly, to be entrusted with resolving Russia's 
constitutional problems, would ultimately lean towards favouring 
imperial interests at the expense of those of minority national areas 
like Finland. The socialists, drawing on the lessons of recent 
history and in particular the experience of the post-1905 period, 
were also not slow to see that there was also every chance of events 
in Russia swinging sharply and unpredictably in favour of a 
conservative reaction. 
6. Increasing unrest in Russia and Finland's 
shift to the Right 
The parliamentary elections held at the beginning of October saw 
the combined non-socialist parties gain a clear majority (108-92), 
reversing the previous balance of power in the socialists' favour. It 
did little, however, to bridge the quite considerable gulf existing 
between pro-independence supporters within the non-socialist 
camp and their more traditionally conservative colleagues, which 
continued to remain as real as before. With the former still in the 
minority, the latter were able to gain control of the Senate, albeit a 
virtual rump Senate led by E. N. Setälä, and take over as Finland's 
provisional government, following the resignation of the socialist 
senators. 
Internal developments in Russia continued to be closely 
followed in Finland after the Moscow congress and the failure of 
the Kornilov rebellion, but observers found it increasingly difficult 
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to get an overall grasp of the situation or the likely trend of future 
developments. General indications, as interpreted in Finland, 
seemed to point to the likelihood of radical political opinion 
gradually gaining ground and to the position of the Provisional 
Government becoming increasingly undermined. The increase in 
military action in the Baltic area also provoked increased political 
speculation. The German capture of Riga at the beginning of 
September, in particular, served to focus many minds on the 
changes in military fortunes which had taken place on the Eastern 
Front, and raised the question, voiced widely in the press, of how 
far and in what direction the Germans would be able to maintain 
their advance. Petrograd, in any case, seemed increasingly 
vulnerable. 
Finnish views of the overall situation in the Baltic were also 
influenced, although to a lesser extent, by political developments 
in Sweden. The elections for the second chamber of the Swedish 
Parliament held in mid-September resulted in a clear victory for 
the liberals and social democrats, followed by the forming of a new 
coalition government of the victorious parties under Nils Edén in 
mid-October. Relatively little coverage of the Swedish elections or 
the subsequent change of government appeared in Finnish papers 
such as the moderate Helsingin Sanomat and the socialist 
Työmies.70 Uusi Suometar, in contrast, in its more extensive 
commentaries, described the Swedish result as likely to signal a 
more distinct Swedish leaning towards the Entente powers and an 
increasingly reserved Swedish attitude towards Finnish moves 
towards independence." Events in Sweden and, in particular, 
their possible repercussions on the German position, naturally 
proved of most interest to pro-independence opinion. Both 
Svenska Tidningen and Uusi Päivä described the forming of 
Eden's new government as likely to presage a greater Swedish 
willingness to accede to possible Western pressure.72 
Two proposals outlining a possible future Finnish constitution 
and an agreement on future Finnish-Russian relations were 
published by a specially set-up constitutional committee on 3 
70. HS 17.9., 17.10., 18.10.. 21.10.1917; Työmies 17.9., 20.10.1917. 
71. US 16.9., 18.10., 20.10.1917. 
72. SvT 20.10.1917. 
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October, immediately following Finland's parliamentary elections. 
The work largely of Ståhlberg and Wrede, they represented the 
mainstream of opinion within the established non-socialist 
parties. While it was assumed in both proposals that Finland 
would remain, with the exception of some minor clarification of 
her autonomous position, a part of the Russian Empire, they 
nevertheless allowed for a significant expansion of Finland's own 
political institutions and the adoption of a presidency, the 
formation of a national army and the barring of the stationing of 
Russian troops in Finland during peacetime.73  
The proposed republican form of government found some favour 
with members of the administration in Petrograd, who feared that a 
possible Finnish monarchy would inevitably adversely affect the 
course of Finnish politics. The Russian leadership, however, 
rejected out of hand the Finnish plan to allow Russian troops on 
Finnish soil only during wartime.74 The overall Russian attitude 
towards the Finnish proposals, as it emerged during October, gave 
Finnish politicians little encouragement that any agreement with 
the Provisional Government over the country's position within the 
Empire would be possible in the short term. 
The deepening schism between Left and Right afflicting social 
and political life in Finland was only further exacerbated by the 
October elections. The country's growing social problems 
continued to represent a bewildering and unexpected challenge to 
the non-socialist parties and, while there was no real attempt to 
ignore them or argue them away, no real movement was forth-
coming on efforts to solve them either. The increasingly violent 
social unrest among the country's working class, together with the 
other widespread signs of social disaffection affecting the country, 
were often seen as the results of revolutionary agitation directed 
from Russia, rather than as the result of deeper dissatisfaction with 
the state of Finnish society. 
The authoritarian tradition of government in Finland had never 
encouraged any deep-rooted popular attachment between the 
government and the people. A patriarchal noblesse oblige-
coloured social order was taken for granted by the majority of 
73. See the committee proposals, numbers 6 and 7. 
74. AU 20.10.1917; HS 24.10.1917, a news item based on material from Rjetsh. 
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conservative opinion. To many, there seemed to be only a choice 
between two options, maintaining the established status quo or 
opening the floodgates to revolution. Liberalism, which might 
have acted to counteract these outdated views, had had little real 
impact on the Finnish political scene and was unable therefore to 
provide the basis for any attempt at social and political 
compromise. Maintaining the government's hold on society 
remained the overriding concern of political opinion outside the 
Left. 
On the Left, there was an increased sense of bitterness, accom-
panied by growing calls for revolutionary action. The Left's 
electoral defeat and the fact that the reform bill and the legislation 
on local government and the eight-hour working day passed by the 
previous Diet remained unratified were among the most prominent 
factors contributing to this mood. Their non-socialist opponents 
were not slow to criticise, and sometimes strongly and aggres-
sively, this obvious failure of the socialists' legislative programme. 
The dissolution of the Tokoi-led socialist Senate and the 
subsequent electoral defeat served to force the labour movement, 
and the socialist press with Työmies at its head, into something of 
an ideological corner and into the adoption of a policy of 
accusation and open confrontation with the non-socialist parties. 
The growing food shortages in urban areas and the irregularity of 
cereal supplies provided ready material for increased criticism of 
the bourgeois authorities and in particular of Harald Åkerman, the 
senator in charge of food supplies and distribution.75 
September and October saw Finnish society move significantly 
closer towards open social crisis with the setting up of Red militia 
units to counter the Civil Guard detachments which had sprung 
up in various parts of the country shortly previously. Workers 
were encouraged by their trade unions to join their local socialist 
militia units from 20 October onwards.76 The labour move-
ment's publication of a programme outlining socialist complaints, 
entitled 'Our demands', on 1 November only added to the 
increasing level of social tension. In essence, it amounted to a 
protest against the result of the recent elections and contained a 
75. Rantatupa 1979, pp. 98-101. 
76. Upton 1980, p. 252. 
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number of demands for the previous Diet's legislation on central 
and local government and the eight-hour working day to be made 
law, as well as a call for the disbanding of Civil Guard units, 
although not those of the Red militia. 
Their failure at the October elections and the dissolution of the 
old Diet, typically blamed on what were described as secret 
dealings between Finnish and Russian reactionary circles, soon 
came to take on the nature of an almost psychological impasse for 
the socialists. The socialists' new programme included a novel 
proposal for calling a national assembly, effectively bypassing the 
newly-elected Diet, to be entrusted with resolving the country's 
constitutional problems. The socialists' proposals as a whole took 
the form of a series of ultimatums, issued on a virtually 'take it or 
leave it' basis to their non-socialist opponents. The appeal of direct 
revolutionary action as the only real alternative to ineffectual 
parliamentary activity was slowly but surely, however, beginning 
to grow among the rank and file of the labour movement." 
The increasing level of social unrest had also been coloured 
since the late summer of 1917 by the continued presence of 
Russian troops in Finland. The latters' revolutionary sympathies 
and involvement in Finnish domestic events saw phrases such as 
'society at the mercy of the troops' become common headlines 
across the pages of Helsingin Sanomat and Uusi Suometar and 
many other non-socialist papers during the later summer and early 
autumn. These were often coupled with reports of Bolshevik-
inspired agitators spreading unrest and uncertainty and repeated 
references to what was termed increasing 'fraternisation' between 
the Russian troops and the Finnish working class.78 Uusi Päivä and 
Svenska Tidningen, both associated with the pro-independence 
movement, also frequently carried articles sharply criticising the 
threat to society posed by the continued presence of Russian 
troops and reporting cases of their intervention in Finnish affairs. 
In contrast to the more conservative press, however, the role of the 
Bolsheviks tended to be seen more in the context of their activities 
and role in the balance of power within, rather than outside 
77. H. Soikkanen 1975, pp. 241-2. 
78. See the news coverage appearing in HS and US between 25.8-30.10.1917. 
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Russia.79 The possible benefits to Finland and her chances of 
independence, if the internal power struggle in Russia were to 
continue and the Provisional Government possibly finally to 
crumble, also provided much cause for speculation in this section 
of the press. 
The socialist standard-bearer Työmies also began to devote an 
increasing amount of space from the end of August onwards to the 
dangers inherent in the presence of Russian forces on Finnish soil 
and the growing number of cases of sabotage and violence.80 The 
earlier participation of Russian troops in demonstrations outside 
the Diet during July in support of local government reform and the 
introduction of an eight-hour working day had particularly 
unsettled the socialist leaders, who were only too aware that their 
political opponents were ready and willing to use examples like 
this in their campaign to lay the blame for the disorder affecting 
the country firmly at the socialists' door. The socialist leadership, 
however, proved largely incapable of formulating any concrete 
policies of their own to regain control of a situation, which, as they 
only too well realised, was in fact rapidly slipping out of their 
hands. 
The unsettled international situation in October 1917 also gave 
every appearance of containing the seeds for further unexpected 
developments. The German occupation of the Estonian island of 
Hiiumaa in the Baltic directly to the south of Finland in mid-
October prompted Helsingin Sanomat to conclude that Finland 
would soon be faced with the strong possibility of an imminent 
German landing in the Aland Islands and along the southern 
Finnish coast, and Russia herself with German naval bombard-
ment of Kronstadt and Petrograd.81 Various sightings of the 
German airship 'Zeppelin' along the Finnish coast caused air-raid 
warnings and black-outs in Helsinki.82 These indications of an 
increased German military presence in the Finnish area provoked 
a flood of rumours and swelled speculation about the possible 
course of international developments. 
79. See the news coverage and commentaries on the situation in Russia appearing 
in UP and SvT over the same period. 
80. Työmies 22.8.-30.10.1917. 
81. HS 21.10.1917. 
82. SvT 17.19.1917; AU 18.10.1917. 
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Following the break in discussions caused by the furore over the 
reform bill, contact between the new Setälä-led Senate and the 
Provisional Government was re-established in meetings in Helsin-
ki and Petrograd held to reconsider the prickly question of 
supreme authority in Finnish affairs. The sense of urgency felt by 
the Finnish negotiators led by J. K. Paasikivi not only reflected the 
issue's constitutional importance but also its practical impli-
cations for the coming budget and any tax changes it might 
include.83 The discussions, however, proved slow and largely 
futile from the Finnish point of view as the Provisional Govern-
ment, despite its increasingly threatened position, remained 
unwilling to make any concessions liable to encourage what it saw 
as Finland's 'separatist' aims. 
The intensification of hostilities between Russia and Germany 
along the Eastern Front which had taken place from July onwards 
had raised hopes among Finnish activists abroad of the possibility 
of getting direct military support for the independence cause from 
Germany. Small activist groups within Finland had also begun to 
consider the likely chances of a successful popular uprising in a 
more favourable light. The volunteer movement saw no reason to 
doubt that Germany would be willing and able to extend military 
operations to Finnish territory if the circumstances required.84 It 
does not appear, however, that the German High Command had 
any plans for action in Finland, at least during August, when it was 
concentrating army planning and resources on the imminent 
German offensive in the Riga area. The German military command 
appears to have come to the conclusion, on the basis of its sources 
in Stockholm, that the preparations for an uprising in Finland, put 
in hand by the volunteer movement under Colonel Mexmontan 
and his fellow activists operating from the Swedish capital, were 
unrealistic and for the major part ill-planned. It seemed to German 
eyes even possible, given the movement's shaky lines of 
communication, that the planned uprising might begin almost 
spontaneously, without any final decision on the part of the 
movement's leaders, and thereby be condemned to virtually 
certain failure. 
83. HS 21.10.1917. 
84. Lappalainen 1977, pp. 95-6; Upton I 1980, pp. 157-61. 
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Anxieties within the High Command caused General Ludendorff 
to re-outline the German position on the Finnish question to the 
volunteer movement on 21 August and to stress that Germany 
would only be willing in the immediate future to send small-scale 
arms shipments to Finland to consolidate anti-Russian opinion. A 
shipment of some 6,500 German rifles from Danzig was in fact 
unloaded at the end of October near Kokkola.85 The German High 
Command also proposed that the activists operating within 
Finland should send a representative to Stockholm to coordinate 
communications with Germany, a move amounting to a virtual 
vote of no-confidence in the emigre leadership in Stockholm and 
reflecting Germany's particular dissatisfaction with the activities 
of the military planning committee led by Colonel Mexmontan. 
Edvard Hjelt arrived in Stockholm, in response to the German 
request, at the end of August and was shortly afterwards given a 
free hand by Svinhufvud and his allies at the beginning of 
September, in a move typical of the period, to make any 
agreements on Finland's behalf with the German authorities which 
the situation demanded, without prior reference to the government 
in Helsinki.86 
85. For details on the German arms shipments, see v. Gagern III 1964, pp. 335-7. 
86. Hiilsen 1921, p. 239; Paasivirta II 1949, pp. 103-5; Lappalainen 1977, p. 96. 
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III The October Revolution 
and the Finnish 
Declaration of 
Independence 
1. Revolutionary Petrograd 
In hiding in Finland from July 1917 onwards, Lenin came to the 
conclusion during the autumn that a successful armed coup d'état 
in Petrograd was within the reach of the Bolsheviks and his 
adoption of the demand 'All power to the Soviets' typified 
his drive to present a clear challenge to the authority of the 
Provisional Government. At Lenin's initiative, the Bolshevik Cen-
tral Committee decided to begin preparations for an uprising timed 
to take place, after some changes to the original plan, on 25 
October. The detailed preparations of the operation were handled 
by a special military committee in which Leo Trotsky, who had 
joined the party the same summer, played a leading part. The 
uprising was timed to coincide with the meeting in Petrograd of 
the second All-Russian Congress of Soviets, now with a Bolshevik 
majority. The plan for the uprising revolved around the capture by 
workers' militia of a number of strategically important sites in 
Petrograd, including the Winter Palace which had been used by 
the Provisional Government for its meetings. 
The success of the storming of the Winter Palace led to the 
capture of a number of government ministers, with the exception 
of Kerensky, who managed to escape abroad.' The Provisional 
1. Carr I 1950, pp. 98-108, v. Rauch 1968, p. 22; A Short History of the USSR 
1965, pp. 35-45. 
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Government was replaced by the Congress of Soviets in the wake 
of the Bolshevik uprising with a new administrative organ, the 
Council of People's Commissars, under the leadership of Lenin, 
which was entrusted with governmental powers until such 
time as a national constituent assembly met to resolve the 
nature of the country's future constitution. One of the new 
government's first moves included an appeal to all those involved 
in the war in Europe to begin immediate negotiations to achieve 
what was described as a 'just and democratic peace without 
annexation or indemnities'. All Russia's treaties of alliance with 
the Western powers were effectively declared null and void and all 
responsibility for debts incurred by the Provisional Government 
and Tsarist authorities summarily disclaimed.2 The authority of 
the Council of People's Commissars in the period immediately 
following the revolution, however, extended to only a few major 
cities in addition to Petrograd and, at least initially, it could only 
call on workers' militia numbering a few thousand men at most, 
together with a few Latvian revolutionary battalions. The situation 
was further complicated by the refusal of the majority of the Social 
Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks at the Congress of Soviets to 
support the new government, and their subsequent joint walk-out 
at the assembly. The Council appealed directly to the working 
class throughout Europe and the world for support, describing 
itself as representing the first stage in a series of future national 
and international revolutions.3  
2. Supreme power in the hands of a regency or 
the Diet? 
As well as signalling a radical change of direction in Russia's own 
internal development, the October Revolution also inevitably had 
a major and immediate impact on Finnish-Russian relations. 
Initial Finnish reactions to the events of the October Revolution 
differed markedly from those inspired by the earlier March 
2. Carr II 1952, pp. 138-9; Carr III 1953, pp. 9-30; A Short History of the USSR 
1965, pp 38, 50-6. 
3. Carr I 1950, pp. 162-77; A Short History of the USSR 1965, p. 46. 
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Revolution, with opinion sharply divided between Right and Left. 
The general consensus over the fact that Finland's own position 
would inevitably and perhaps significantly be affected by 
developments in Russia could not hide the wide disagreement 
which emerged over how this would make itself felt and to what 
extent the shift in power would be favourable for Finland. 
Argument was heated over whether Finland's position had in fact 
been improved by the fall of the Provisional Government and to 
what extent Russia's territorial integrity had been weakened, and 
how the new Council of People's Commissars would react to 
Finland's status within the Empire and Finnish moves towards 
independence. There was also wide concern about what the 
Bolshevik seizure of power would mean ideologically and socially, 
and whether it would give added impetus to social revolution 
outside Russia, and in Finland in particular. The Left was keen to 
know whether the events in Petrograd would inspire workers in 
Finland to follow the Russian example of revolutionary action. 
The Right too was concerned whether Finland's close proximity to 
Petrograd would see the country rapidly succumb to revolution. 
No one felt sure, on the other hand, whether the Bolsheviks 
represented a passing phenomenon or whether they were in power 
to stay. Political opinion in Finland during November 1917 was in 
virtual disarray. 
Soon after the first news of the revolution in Petrograd reached 
Finland a number of non-socialist politicians proposed the 
establishment of a special regency to act as the supreme political 
and constitutional authority in Finland and to put an end to the 
state of constitutional limbo, with its constant shifting of authority 
from one set of provisional authorities in Russia to another, which 
had afflicted Finland ever since the fall of the autocracy. Article 
38 of the Gustavian Act of Government of 1772 covering 
eventualities 'in the event of the king's death' was invoked as the 
constitutional basis for the setting-up of a special three-man 
regency committee, a somewhat belated recourse to the 1772 Act 
some eight months after the fall of the Tsar.' The move reflected 
an obvious desire by the established non-socialist parties to adopt a 
more active and independent style of policy in contrast to their 
4. Paasivirta II 1949. pp. 134-5; Polvinen I 1967, p. 124; Lappalainen 1977, p. 73. 
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previous one of cooperation with the Provisional authorities in 
Petrograd. A temporary regency would allow, it was supposed, in 
line with traditional conservative political thinking, the 
established division of power within society to be maintained and 
restrict the pace of change to constitutionally manageable 
proportions.' 
The labour movement, in contrast, responded to the developments 
in Petrograd by demanding the immediate approval of the 'Our 
Demands' programme by the Diet and with it the final ratification 
of the reform bill and the legislation on the restructuring of local 
government and the introduction of the eight-hour working days A 
clear demonstration of the increasingly radical nature of opinion 
among the working class was given by a week-long general strike 
which began on 18 November. Marked by a number of violent 
clashes, it only served to deepen the hostility of non-socialist 
opinion towards the labour movement and its intentions. 
Taken together, these developments marked an unprecedented 
heightening of political and social tension within Finnish society, 
bringing the prospect of the transformation of radical social unrest 
into revolutionary action and the destruction of any semblance of 
national unity yet closer. Socialist opinion had by now become 
increasingly and openly revolutionary, the activities of the Red 
Guards increasingly uncontrolled and violent. The socialist 
leaders, lacking any coherent and comprehensive pattern of 
policies to counter this development, were in no real position to 
halt the tide of events.' The killing of some 25 non-socialist figures 
by the Red Guards during the General Strike had the effect of 
sending a shock wave through conservative opinion and 
contributed to further distorting the picture common on the Right 
of the Left as advocating and instigating untrammelled violent 
action, and gave added impetus to the expansion of the Civil 
Guard.' 
Social unrest at home, together with the Bolshevik take-over in 
Petrograd, served to cause a strong swing towards a more 
5. Paasivirta II 1949, pp. 129, 136. 
6. Ibid., p. 128; Kirby 1979, pp. 47-8; Polvinen I 1967, pp. 120-1. 
7. H. Soikkanen 1975, pp. 244-6; Upton I 1980, pp. 2811-7. 
8. J. Paavolainen I 1966, p. 76; Upton I 1980, p. 340; Hersalo I 1966, pp. 155-6. 
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unambiguously pro-independence stance among the non-
socialist parties. This change, which had begun earlier in the 
autumn among the ranks of the established conservative parties, 
soon embraced virtually the whole of non-socialist opinion. 
Constitutionalist politicians previously identified with a con-
ciliatory and cautious approach to the Russian authorities and 
loyalty towards the Empire, faced with an increasingly critical 
domestic social situation, found themselves arguing for a break 
with Russia as the only practical solution. Finland had to be 
insulated at all costs from the 'anarchy' that was Russia. The fear 
of a revolution in Finland, triggered by the example of events in 
Petrograd, provoked the adoption by the traditional political élite 
in Finland of a radical policy aimed at securing national 
independence. Only independence seemed to offer the means to 
defend society against those intent on its destruction or radical 
transformation and preserve the established political power and 
social position of conservative political opinion. 
This shift in non-socialist opinion effectively served to bridge 
the gulf which had developed through the spring and summer 
between the younger pro-independence generation and their more 
conservative elders. Pro-independence politicians, who for long 
had been in the minority, despite a slight increase in their numbers 
in August and September, found themselves in November with a 
significantly expanded level of political influence. From being a 
small, if vocal minority, the group now emerged as the new 
leadership of non-socialist opinion. The October Revolution and 
the General Strike in Finland also indirectly caused pro-German 
sentiment to spread to include a much wider spectrum of 
bourgeois opinion than previously, when it had been largely 
restricted to the volunteer movement. Germany was now seen as 
Finland's best ally against the Russian threat and that of internal 
social revolution. 
Attitudes within the labour movement during November moved 
in completely the opposite direction to those current among their 
non-socialist opponents. The loss of a socialist majority in the Diet 
had had the effect of bringing the prospect of the movement losing 
all effective political influence that much closer. The movement's 
self-assurance, deriving from its strength among the working class, 
its past election success and the strong left-wing press, had 
suffered a blow which seemed to have every likelihood of 
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provoking open rebellion among its members. Increasing 
unemployment and inadequate food supplies, together with the 
onset of winter, only increased the level of discontent at the 
movement's grass roots level. 
There was much admiration in the labour movement for 
the Russian masses and their instrumental role in achieving 
significant changes in the Russian political system, an admiration 
which became associated in the movement's own collective 
memory with the sense of power which had been felt during the 
1905 General Strike in Finland. Less the result of ideological 
factors, this admiration largely represented a general enthusiasm 
for revolutionary action and what it could apparently achieve 
compared to the slow progress of constitutional reform. Mass 
action, however, tended all the same to be seen as simply a tool to 
pressure for radical social reform and as a means to seize power, 
rather than as the stuff of revolution or the key to changing the very 
basis of the social structure.9 
The attitude of the labour movement towards Finland's position 
and possible future subsequent to the October Revolution differed 
significantly from its early position towards Finnish-Russian 
relations. The replacement of the disliked Provisional Government 
by a Bolshevik-dominated administration, one likely on the basis 
of past evidence to be appreciably more favourable towards 
granting Finland her independence than one controlled by 
the Mensheviks and Social Revolutionaries, made the movement 
adopt a conciliatory approach to the new authorities. While the 
non-socialist parties had generally moved towards increased 
advocacy of a non-negotiated independence, the socialist 
leaders aligned themselves behind a negotiated settlement, 
believing that it offered a real possibility of a satisfactory 
settlement of the independence question. Some doubts continued 
to linger nevertheless among the socialists about the ability of the 
Bolsheviks to retain their grip on power in Russia. 
The proposal by the non-socialists in the Diet on 8 November for 
the setting-up of a special regency committee provoked some sharp 
debate between the various parliamentary parties over the whole 
question of what would be involved in the transfer of supreme 
9. Paasivirta 1957, pp. 59-61; Upton I 1980, pp. 300-1. 
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authority to Finland's own political institutions and the 
consequent redistribution of political and social power within the 
country. The main focus of argument centred around the possible 
maintenance of the established division of executive and 
governmental power and the possibility of a significant increase in 
the power of the Diet. The problems brought up by the discussion 
of the reform bill in the summer also raised their heads again. The 
regency proposal, aimed as it was at retaining the established 
powerbase, was quickly labelled by the socialists as an attempt to 
ensure the continuance of the country's traditional autocratic style 
of government. The socialists continued as a result to argue for 
adoption of their earlier reform bill, despite the fact that its 
proposed transfer of power on only domestic issues had been 
largely bypassed by recent developments. 
The attitude of the Agrarian Party came to be decisive. In a 
proposal put before the Diet on 15 November, Santeri Alkio 
suggested that supreme power in its entirety be transferred to the 
Diet, thereby giving Finland control of her own affairs and at the 
same time rebalancing the power structure within government in 
an effort to calm the country's largely unchecked social unrest, 
symbolised by the General Strike, which had just then begun. 
Alkio's proposal was accepted the same day by a large Diet 
majority of 127-68, made up of Agrarian members, pro-
independence non-socialists and the Social Democrats. In line 
with the aim of calming popular discontent, this move was 
followed by the rapid approval of the local government and 
shortened working day legislation which had been the subject of 
inter-party dispute since July. 
The Diet's decision on 15 November to independently reorganise 
Finland's government structure, which excluded any reference to 
Russian involvement in foreign or military affairs, clearly signalled 
Finland's long-term commitment to shedding her political and 
constitutional ties with Russia.10 The chaotic nature of the 
domestic situation, however, meant that despite the gravity of the 
decision, political and public attention remained very much firmly 
focused on the more immediate issue of the General Strike. 
Developments in the political arena were paralleled and 
10. Paasivirta II 1949, pp. 143-7. 
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influenced by the sharp downturn in Finland's economic 
involvement in the Russian market which had taken place by the 
autumn of 1917. The possibility of Finland's using her rouble 
surplus to purchase forest land and sawmills across the border in 
East Karelia had been argued as late as May, reflecting the general 
feeling of the time that the future would not bring any significant 
changes in Finland's status within the Empire.11 By the summer, 
however, Finnish business opinion had begun to take a much more 
pessimistic view of the future continuity of Finnish-Russian 
economic relations and of the profit to be made from them.12 This 
shift in views and the country's economic focus signalled the 
breaking of an important link tying the Finnish economy to Russia, 
and complemented and underwrote the political developments 
taking place pointing Finland's course towards independence. A 
large question mark nevertheless remained over the shape of 
Finland's future foreign trade links. Hopes were mainly centred 
on re-establishing a reasonable measure of trade with Sweden and 
the rest of Scandinavia, an official trade representative being sent 
to Stockholm in October to sound out the prospects for reopening 
trade ties.13 
The ending of the General Strike in the wake of the reforms voted 
through by the Diet failed to bring any real reduction in the level 
of social tension. The strike had a powerful impact on political 
opinion and reinforced and deepened political hostilities, both 
within the political parties and in society as a whole. This growth 
of mutual suspicion served to undermine and weaken the 
chances of establishing any significant degree of national unity, 
and virtually ruled out the possibility of forming a coalition 
government drawing on representatives from all the political 
parties, similar to that set up after the March Revolution. The 
swing towards more traditional policies among the non-socialist 
parties which took place in direct response to the events of 
November was also reflected among pro-independence supporters, 
who, under Svinhufvud, adopted a strong anti-socialist position, 
and within the Agrarian Party. The strength of this shift in non- 
11. Kauppalehti 16.5.1917; Hoving I 1947, p. 308. 
12. Kauppalehti 9.8., 5.9.1917; Mercator 31.8.1917. 
13. Kauppalehti 23.11., 28.11.1917; Paasivirta 1968, p. 38. 
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socialist opinion was decisive when the Diet came to vote on the 
choice of a new government programme and administration on 26 
November, when Svinhufvud was chosen to head a non-socialist 
cabinet in favour of the socialist alternative proposal, which would 
have made Oskari Tokoi Prime Minister.14 
3. Svinhufvud and the declaration of 
independence 
Following the revolution in Petrograd, the socialists had initially 
hoped that the new Bolshevik government would issue a manifesto 
on its position towards Finland similar to that issued by the 
Provisional authorities earlier in the year in March, thereby 
providing a framework for future bilateral relations." This, 
however, would have meant the Finnish authorities indirectly 
recognising the Bolshevik government, which the non-socialist 
parties were unwilling to do, and the socialists in any case 
had their own doubts about the Bolsheviks' chances of main-
taining their hold on governmental authority. Political initiative 
on the independence question shifted from the socialists to their 
opponents, however, when the new government under Svin-
hufvud took office. Svinhufvud was particularly keen for the non-
socialist parties to grasp the independence challenge, one which 
he saw as closely linked to Germany. Back at the beginning of 
September, although then admittedly in a purely private capacity 
as a supporter of the volunteer movement, he had argued 
for maintaining secret contacts with Germany. Both he and Hjelt 
regarded the German military presence in North-East Europe as of 
central importance to Finland's position and overall security and 
the general pattern of developments in the Baltic region. 
Svinhufvud pressed for the issuing of an additional statement on 
Finnish sovereignty, this time directed to the wider international 
community, to complement the Diet vote taken on 15 November. 
Svinhufvud was undoubtedly only further convinced of the need 
14. Paasivirta II 1949, pp. 161-3; Polvinen I 1967, pp. 160-1; Upton I 1980, pp. 
339-41. 
15. Paasivirta II 1949, p. 175. 
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to publicly isolate Finland from her earlier ties to Russia after 
hearing of the discussions which had been held under General 
Ludendorff at German Headquarters on 26 November through 
Hjelt, who had been present as a representative of the volunteer 
movement, regarding a possible armistice between Germany and 
the Soviet Russian government.16 Svinhufvud's decision to call a 
meeting of the leaders of the non-socialist parties on 29 November 
marked a further step towards his aim of announcing a separate 
declaration of Finnish independence. Opinion within the non-
socialist camp on the issue, however, was split, with Wrede, 
Kairamo, Ingman and Ståhlberg favouring a cautious approach and 
only Alkio siding with Svinhufvud, while at the same time calling 
for involving the socialists in any decision on the issue. 
Svinhufvud's success in converting the cautious majority to his 
bolder policy and his refusal to countenance discussions with the 
socialists reflected the weight of influence Svinhufvud carried in 
non-socialist opinion and also that of the pro-independence 
politicians allied with him, as well as the increasing influence of 
pro-German sentiment.17 
Caution and a desire to avoid any unnecessary histrionics cha-
racterised official moves on the independence question. Svin-
hufvud was keen to keep control of developments solely in 
governmental hands. The government's proposal for a new 
constitution put before the Diet on 4 December made the 
government's view clear that de facto independence had already in 
fact been achieved. In his speech accompanying the bill's 
publication, Svinhufvud declared that the Diet's decision on 15 
November making itself the country's supreme authority meant 
that, as he put it, 'The Finnish people have recognised their right 
and their duty and taken their fate into their own hands, in the 
awareness that the country cannot realise her national and cultural 
potential in any other condition than one of complete freedom. 
Our longing for freedom, which has gone unanswered for so long, 
must now be satisfied. The Finnish people must be allowed to 
stand beside the other peoples of the world as an independent 
nation ... We do not believe that the free people of Russia or the 
16. Ibid., pp. 179-83; Lappalainen 1977, p. 88. 
17. Alkio: Päiväkirja 29.11.1917; E. W. Juva II 1961, pp. 77-80; Lappalainen 1977, 
pp. 82-3. 
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Russian constituent assembly will want to stand in the way of 
Finland's wish to join the ranks of the free and independent 
nations of the world ...' 
The government wanted the Diet in particular to agree to a public 
announcement of the fact of Finland's complete independence. 
Discussions were put in hand between the government and the 
various non-socialist parliamentary parties on the issue, but no 
attempt was made to include any socialist representatives. Angry 
at being excluded from these talks and being forced to take what 
amounted to a side seat on the whole issue, despite the Diet 
decision of 15 November giving the assembly supreme authority 
on constitutional issues, the socialists decided to propose an 
initiative of their own.18 This contained, in line with the party's 
general argument for cooperation with the Bolshevik authorities 
which had been advocated since November, the proviso that the 
question of a final declaration of independence should be fully 
discussed with the Russian authorities and a special Diet 
committee be set up to coordinate negotiations with Petrograd.19 
The Diet thus found itself eventually faced with two separate 
and competing proposals for a declaration of independence, one 
socialist and one non-socialist, sharing a similar general content, 
but worded and argued differently. The simple mathematics of the 
balance of power within the government necessarily meant that it 
was the latter of the two, presented by Svinhufvud two days 
earlier, which was finally approved on 6 December by a majority of 
100-88 as the official declaration of Finnish independence. 
4. The problem of foreign recognition of 
independence 
Following the declaration of independence, the government was 
immediately faced with the problem of acquiring foreign 
recognition for its move. Every effort was made to avoid 
concentrating this diplomatic effort on any single country or 
group of countries. The requests for recognition of Finnish inde- 
18. Paasivirta II 1949, p. 189; Lappalainen 1977, p. 86; H. Soikkanen 1975, p. 252; 
Upton I 1980, p. 347. 
19. Paasivirta II 1949, pp. 190-1; Polvinen I 1967, pp. 166-7; Kirby 1979 p. 48. 
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pendence sent to the German, British, French and American 
governments were all essentially similar and almost word for word 
the same as those addressed to the Swedish authorities and those 
of the other neutral Scandinavian countries. All the requests, 
regardless of their destination, were forwarded through each 
country's consular representative in Helsinki or their legations in 
Petrograd. The government's caution was also reflected in its 
decision not to use the services of the activist leader Edvard Hjelt 
in its communications with Berlin and to request Sweden to pass 
on the Finnish note.20 These initial notes were followed by the 
dispatch of separate delegations to each of the countries in 
question to present a more formal request for recognition. 
This cautious diplomacy was dictated by the government's 
awareness of the tenseness of the international political situation. 
However much Svinhufvud and other members of his government 
felt especially sympathetic towards Germany, they were in no 
position to ignore the West's obvious potential influence on the 
issue. With Finland's trading relations with Russia deadlocked 
and the country suffering food and other shortages, the importance 
of reopening commercial links with the West, moreover, 
could similarly not be underrated. In sharp contrast to its attitude 
towards the European powers, however, the Svinhufvud 
government made no initial attempt to establish diplomatic 
contact with Russia. Following the departure of Carl Enckell, the 
Finnish administration's official representative, from Petrograd in 
the wake of the October Revolution and his return to Helsinki, 
Finland in fact had lacked any high-ranking representative in the 
Russian capital. The government wished to avoid any 
commitment to, or recognition of, the Bolshevik government until 
the situation in Petrograd showed some signs of becoming less 
confused.21  
The government had high hopes of receiving a rapid response to 
its diplomatic initiative in the West. The government's emphasis 
on the country's future neutrality would, it was also hoped, act to 
trigger progress on the difficult question of the evacuation of the 
Russian forces remaining on Finnish territory. A neutral and 
20. Paasivirta 1957, p. 23. 
21. Ibid., pp. 26-7; Lappalainen 1977, p. 87. 
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independent Finland was similarly also seen by the government as 
likely to be in German interests at a time when the German and 
Soviet governments had begun armistice negotiations. Fairly rapid 
Western recognition of Finnish independence would serve both to 
improve Finland's overall position and to persuade the Russian 
authorities to accept the fact of Finland's new status. 
No rapid positive reaction from the West of the type imagined by 
the Finnish authorities, however, proved forthcoming or in 
prospect on the basis of the information the government received 
from various sources from mid-December onwards. This finally 
persuaded the government of the need to establish some contact 
with Russia. The Diet decided on 22 December to appeal directly 
to the All-Russian National Constituent Assembly, due to meet in 
the near future, and request recognition of Finland's declaration of 
independence.22 
5. Events in Finland in 1917 as seen from 
abroad 
The March Revolution and the formation of the Provisional 
Government in Petrograd had been greeted with some satisfaction, 
and in some cases modest enthusiasm, by the Western powers. 
Hopes that the change in government would bring an improvement 
in Russia's military capability were also mixed with a sense of 
relief that the autocratic regime had been replaced by a more 
acceptable and Western-style liberal Russia. British and French 
interest was virtually solely focused on the questions of the impact 
of Russia's upheavals on the progress of the war, to the exclusion 
of any real concern at the other possible implications of the change 
of government in Russia, including its potential effect on the status 
and future of non-Russian nationalities within the Russian Empire. 
The British and French governments, in fact, lacked any clear 
policy on this latter issue and, by implication, no real policy on 
their attitude towards Finland, beyond a very general hope that the 
Russian authorities would avoid unnecessarily pressuring 
22. Paasivirta 1957, p. 29; Polvinen I 1967, p. 168. 
112 
minority groups. The limited nature of Western interest with 
regard to Finland was well reflected in Balfour's reply, in his 
capacity as British Foreign Secretary, to a parliamentary question 
put to the government in the House of Commons at the beginning 
of April concerning the Finnish position, in which he described 
Finnish opinion as being completely satisfied with the March 
Manifesto issued by the Provisional authorities.23 
French press interest in the non-Russian nationality question 
was mainly restricted to Poland, as part of the legacy of French 
interest in Poland dating from the various Polish rebellions of the 
nineteenth century. A fair degree of editorial and news coverage 
during the spring of 1917 was devoted to the promises of freedom 
given to the Polish population by the Provisional Government and 
to the fate of the Posen and Silesian Poles under German 
occupation, who it was hoped would be removed from the German 
sphere of influence in the peace negotiations at the end of the war. 
French press comment on Finland subsequent to the March 
Manifesto, which was largely based on Russian sources, in line 
with France's close ties to Russia, was restricted to items on 
the issuing of the March Manifesto, the forming of the new 
government under Tokoi and the recall of the Diet.24 Finland was 
generally described, in much the same terms as used by Balfour in 
his parliamentary answer, as a loyal part of the Russian Empire 
and as satisfied with her degree of autonomy. The Finnish 
proposal for a major transfer of governmental authority put 
forward in the summer, coinciding as it did with the major Russian 
offensive against the Germans in the central part of the Eastern 
Front, evoked some criticism from the major French papers, which 
described it as an ill-timed display of lack of loyalty towards the 
authorities in Petrograd.25 
Finland was also the subject of some attention by the major 
British papers in the wake of the March Revolution and the interest 
23. See Balfour's statement to the House of Commons on 2.4.1917 (Parliamentary 
Dabates. House of Commons 1917 Vol. 92, p. 884). 
24. On the Polish question, see Journal des Debats 26.3., 1.4., 15.4.1917; Le Figaro 
2.4.1917; Le Temps 20.3., 1.4.1917. For Finland, see Journal des Debats 22.3., 
30.3.1917; Le Figaro 26.3.1917; Le Temps 21.3., 30.3.1917. 
25. Journal des Debats 30.7., 4.8.1917; Le Figaro 5.8.1917; Le Temps 15.7., 23.7., 
30.7.1917. 
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and enthusiasm generated by the emergence of the new liberal 
regime in Russia. This was in large part a mere continuation of the 
positive coverage of Finnish affairs which had been established 
since 1899, when the British press had first expressed its sympathy 
with the Finnish struggle against Russian attempts to restrict the 
country's autonomy.26 No comparable interest in Poland or the 
Polish cause to that shown by the French press surfaced in its 
British counterpart. Despite the very restricted nature and amount 
of news about Finland published in Britain, the British press 
nevertheless devoted more space to Finnish issues than to those of 
any other non-Russian nationality along Russia's western border. 
As a naval power, British concerns embraced the Baltic area as a 
whole. The re-recognition of Finnish autonomy by the Provisional 
authorities in the spring of 1917 was therefore seen as a positive 
development in indirectly acting to reduce the influence of 
pro-German opinion in Sweden.27 Although the British press 
wrote openly and positively about the country's autonomous 
status, Finnish political moves towards total independence, 
including the initially abortive reform bill, were significantly less 
favourably looked upon, largely as a result of a general desire to 
avoid endangering Russia's alliance with the West. Pro-
independence moves tended, in fact, to be seen as linked to the 
growing expansion of the German sphere of influence in North-
West Europe.28 
Following the October Revolution and the setting-up of the 
Bolshevik administration, it soon became clear to observers in 
France that the new Soviet government had no intention of 
maintaining Russia's alliance with the West. The nascent sense of 
betrayal that this engendered was only intensified when the news 
that the Bolsheviks were planning to start armistice negotiations 
with Germany filtered through to Paris. This latter move was 
interpreted as only likely to strengthen the hand of France's main 
enemy. French reaction took the form of a statement on the future 
direction of French foreign policy by the newly-elected Prime 
Minister, Clemenceau, issued on 25 November, announcing 
26. Paasivirta 1978, pp. 335-6. 
27. The Times 20.3., 23.3., 26.3.1917; Manchester Guardian 19.3., 24.3., 28.3.1917. 
28. The Times 16.7., 29.8., 17.10.1917; Manchester Guardian 26.5., 16.7., 
18.7.1917. 
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France's intention to have no official links with the new Russian 
government. 
While Clemenceau's government necessarily concentrated its 
main efforts on attempts to restore French morale and improve 
the national war-effort and thereby push back the German army 
on the Western Front, some moves were put in hand to evolve a 
new French policy for Eastern Europe, taking account of the 
loss of Russia as an ally, and sympathetic towards the separatist 
ambitions of the non-Russian nationalities within the Russian 
Empire. Rather than reflecting a sudden favourable shift in French 
sympathies towards these nationalities, this development pointed 
to an attempt to exploit these areas in line with France's overall 
policy of creating a defensive zone in Eeastern Europe against 
Germany. For its success, the French plan depended on involving 
Poland and the Ukraine. Contact was established with the Polish 
group led by Roman Dmovski, opposed to Josef Pilsudsky's Polish 
volunteer units operating in Austrian Galitsia. French intentions 
were made clear in the announcement made to the National 
Assembly by the French Foreign Minister, Pichon, on 27 December 
to the effect that France's long-term political aim was for 'an 
independent and undivided Polish state'.29 France also worked 
towards encouraging the formation of a national army in the 
Ukraine to act as a buffer against Germany and at the same time 
protect France's important economic investments in the area.3° 
Finland also featured in the new Eastern European policy 
outlined by the French government. Although Clemenceau 
remained mainly interested in Central and Southern Europe, 
Pichon appears to have been keen to include Finland in the new 
anti-German defensive zone France planned for Eastern Europe. 
While aware of the pro-German sympathies of some sections 
of Finnish opinion, Pichon was convinced that anti-Bolshevik 
feelings were strong in Finland. French support for Finnish 
independence would in any case, Pichon assumed, weaken the 
influence of this pro-German opinion. Pichon's favourable attitude 
towards Finland was further reflected in a French Foreign 
29. See Pichon's statement made on 27.11.1917 (Annales de la Chambre des 
Deputes. Debats parlamentaires 1917 III, p. 3795). 
30. Kosyk 1981, pp. 141-4. 
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Ministry memorandum of 8 December prepared immediately after 
the Finnish declaration of independence. Pichon also brought the 
Finnish question up for discussion at the high-level Allied talks 
held at Versailles on 23 December. Despite the agreement reached 
between the British and French leaders at this meeting on spheres 
of influence in southern Russia, the British proved unwilling to 
follow the French argument on the need for a positive attitude to 
Finnish independence. Despite British reluctance, however, the 
French government remained unswayed in its desire to recognise 
Finnish independence as and when circumstances allowed, and 
preferably before Germany did so.31  
Britain's foreign policy-makers were mainly concerned with 
avoiding any sudden changes in British relations with Russia. 
Contact was maintained with those circles of Russian political 
opinion which had been favourably disposed towards Russia's 
alliance with the West. The Foreign Office considered the All-
Russian National Constituent Assembly as all-important in 
shaping the future of Russia. While relatively little importance 
was attached to the Soviet government's long-term role in 
determining Russia's future, it was generally thought unwise in 
London to attempt to isolate discussion of the Finnish question 
from its wider Russian context. The British government, despite 
its obviously cooler approach to Finnish affairs compared to its 
French counterpart, was keen nevertheless to make some friendly 
gesture towards the Finnish administration and offered its help in 
organising food supplies from the West. The British authorities 
appear to have assumed that Germany would not make any rapid 
decision on the question of recognising Finland's declaration of 
independence and particularly not before the conclusion of the 
German-Russian negotiations at Brest-Litovsk. The Foreign Office 
also remained doubtful that the Soviet government would be 
willing to recognise Finnish independence.32 
German foreign policy thinking on Eastern Europe in the period 
31. K. Hovi 1975, pp. 71-82, 93-7. Also see General Niessel's report to the 
French War Ministry dated 7.12.1917 (SHAF 6 N 24). For press coverage, see 
Le Temps 11.11., 12.12.1917; Le Matin 10.12.1917. 
32. Lyytinen 1980, p. 79, 81. See also Balfour's statement in the House of Com-
mons made on 15.1.1918 (Parliamentary Debates. House of Commons 1918 
Vol. 101, p. 137). 
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following the March Revolution was dominated by the question of 
negotiating a separate peace agreement with Russia which would 
allow Germany to concentrate her military effort on the struggle 
along the Western Front. The German leadership outlined an 
overall policy for the area at the end of April 1917, which included 
the setting-up of a Polish monarchy under German protection, as 
had been promised in the autumn of the previous year, and the 
creation of independent administrations in Lithuania and 
Courland. Bringing Livonia and Estonia within the German sphere 
of influence was also proposed.33 Finland, however, continued to 
remain outside German plans at this stage. 
The future of the Finnish volunteer battalion, which had served 
on the Eastern Front near Riga before being moved to Libau in 
March 1917, remained unclear and gave every appearance of 
becoming even less clear as the prospect of a separate peace 
between Germany and Russia, in which Finland would remain 
part of the Russian Empire, came closer. Such a development 
would effectively prevent the volunteers from returning to 
Finland. Various solutions to the problem were considered by the 
German authorities in 1917, including settling the volunteers on 
demobilisation on farms in East Prussia.34 
Political developments in Finland in the wake of the March 
Revolution, and particularly the reinstatement of Finland's 
autonomy, received favourable coverage in the German press. 
Adequate and up to date information on Finnish affairs was 
difficult to come by for German journalists, however, because 
of the war, and what was available mainly came through 
Stockholm.35 The German press' major focus of interest in its 
coverage of Russia's western border areas indisputably lay with 
Poland, whose loyalties had been the subject of sharp German-
Russian competition since the outbreak of the war, with both 
countries vying with each other in their promises of future reforms 
and freedoms. Germany's general interest in Russia's minority 
nationalities, heightened by the imminent prospect of far-reaching 
changes in Eastern Europe, naturally extended to Finland. This 
33. Ritter III 1964, pp. 482, 506-9. 
34. Hubatsch 1956, pp. 100-5. 
35. Frankfurter Zeitung 19.3., 21.3., 22.3.1917; Berliner Tageblatt 22.3.1917. 
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provided Finnish activists with the opportunity of occasionally 
getting articles published in the German press. From the late 
spring of 1917 onwards, these argued more or less directly for the 
gaining of Finnish independence.36 
The scope of German coverage of Finnish politics grew 
considerably during the summer of 1917 at the time of the furore 
over the reform bill. While German commentators generally 
sympathised with Finland's desire to extend the limits of her 
autonomy following earlier Russian attempts to restrict Finnish 
political freedoms, they were nevertheless somewhat pessimistic 
about Finland's future against the background of Russia's clear 
intention of maintaining her strategic position in the northern 
Baltic. Finland, in fact, was often compared with the Ukraine as an 
example of 'separatist sentiment' within the Russian Empire.37 
With the resurgence of German military activity along the 
Eastern Front in the autumn and the German capture of Riga, 
Finland gradually came to assume greater significance in the eyes 
of the German High Command, a fact reflected in the secret arms 
shipments sanctioned for dispatch to the Finnish volunteer 
movement. This also contributed to a re-evaluation of the value of 
the Finnish volunteer battalion and resulted in small groups being 
selected from within its ranks and sent secretly to Finland to carry 
out military intelligence-gathering and sabotage operations.38 
Despite the German army's positive attitude, communicated to 
the Finnish government at the end of November, towards a 
possible declaration of independence, the overriding importance 
of the armistice negotiations begun a little later at Brest-Litovsk 
with the Soviet government was such that the German authorities 
proved unwilling to countenance endangering the progress of 
these talks by pressing the Bolsheviks over granting independence 
to Finland. When the two sides agreed to a month-long cease-fire 
on 15 December it was therefore no surprise that the agreement 
made no mention of Finnish independence or the evacuation of 
Russian troops from Finnish territory. The German authorities 
36. See Samuli Sario's article 'Zur Lage in Finnland' in Deutsche Politik 
(29.7.1917) and Herman Gummerus' 'Finnlands Kampf fur die Unabhängig-
keit' in Europäische Staats- und Wirtschafts-Zeitung (30.6.1917). 
37. Frankfurter Zeitung 21.7.1917; Berliner Tageblatt 21.7.1917. 
38. Lauerma 1966, pp. 777-9. 
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tried instead to persuade the Finnish government to start direct 
negotiations of its own with the Soviet leaders, following the 
German example.39 
The March Revolution was also extensively covered in the 
Swedish press. While the restoration of Finnish autonomy which 
took place in its wake was universally seen as an important 
development from Sweden's own point of view, opinions among 
the various political parties were widely divergent about Finland's 
political prospects and overall future. A general upswing in 
Swedish interest in Finnish affairs during the spring of 1917, 
however, was apparent across the whole political spectrum. 
Dagens Nyheter and Social-Demokraten, despite or rather 
because of their political sympathies with the Entente powers, had 
always found Russia's pre-revolutionary restrictive policies in 
Finland difficult to accept. The March Revolution appeared to 
remove this problem and was seen at the same time as bringing the 
Western powers and Russia closer together to form a more 
integrated alliance.40 The moderate right of centre Svenska 
Dagbladet, which had been closely associated with Hammar-
skjöld's government and supported Swartz's government which 
had replaced it in the spring of 1917, saw post-revolutionary 
developments in Finland as likely to ease the pressure on 
Sweden's international position. Finland and Russia were de-
scribed as now having the opportunity to establish their bilateral 
relations on a sound footing based on cooperation and mutual 
respect. In the longer term, it was hoped that some kind of 
international guarantee establishing Finland's special position 
might be forthcoming from the peace conference likely to take 
place at the end of the war, or some other comparable international 
meeting.41  
Aftonbladet, Nya Dagligt Allehanda and Stockholms Dagblad all 
expressed dissatisfaction with the progress of events in Finland, 
despite the positive developments that had taken place subsequent 
to the Revolution. All three papers had been sympathetic to the 
wave of activist opinion which had emerged in Sweden during 
39. Nurmio 1957, pp. 18-21, 28-32; Paasivirta 1957. pp. 25, 28. 
40. DN 23.3.1917; Soc-Dem 22.3.1917. 
41. SvD 25.3.1917. 
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1915 and had been favourably disposed towards the Finnish 
volunteer movement. Prior to the announcement of the March 
Manifesto, Aftonbladet warned Finland's politicians to be on their 
guard against agreeing to partial concessions, as had happened in 
1905, and to aim for an internationally-backed solution to the 
Finnish question.42 All three papers printed statements by the 
Stockholm representatives of the volunteer movement at the end of 
March condemning acceptance of the new post-manifesto status 
quo in Finland and demanding a radically new approach to the 
question of guaranteeing the security of Finland's future position.43  
Although coverage of events in Finland in the Swedish press 
grew substantially during the spring of 1917, commentators 
remained cautious in the extent of their political analysis. It had 
come to be assumed, both within the Swedish government and by 
the leading Swedish papers, that excessive Swedish comment on 
the state of Finnish politics could easily rebound against Finnish 
interests by creating difficulties in Petrograd. The fact that Finland 
remained to all intents and purposes under Russian occupation 
forced Swedish observers to be doubtful about the extent of 
possible future changes in Finland's position and to see these 
changes as largely dependent on the general development of the 
international balance of power.44 Finnish 'separatist' opinion was 
often closely linked by the liberal and social democratic press with 
the pro-German lobby. 
News of the Finnish reform bill in July 1917 was reported in 
the Swedish press alongside that of the attempts by the Ukraine 
to secede from Russia and the German National Assembly's 
statement favouring a peace settlement. Aftonbladet, together 
with the other Swedish papers which had previously been 
sympathetic towards the volunteer movement, enthusiastically 
described the Finnish Diet's decision of 18 July as representing an 
important step forward towards the country's major aim of 
independence.45 The liberal and left-wing press, in the shape of 
Dagens Nyheter and Social-Demokraten, took a more cautiously 
42. Abl 19.3., 21.3.1917; StD 28.3.1917. 
43. Abl 22.3.1917; StD 22.3., 27.3.1917; NDA 22.3.1917. 
44. StD 2.5.1817; DN 12.5.1917. 
45. Abl 22.7.1917; StD 21.7.1917; NDA 22.7.1917; SvD 21.7., 22.7., 27.7.1917. 
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optimistic view, stressing the many problems and restrictions 
imposed on Finland by her political and geographical position.46 
The October Revolution in Petrograd and the German army's 
advance into the Baltic provinces during the autumn of 1917 
provoked a wide debate in Sweden about the extent of the changes 
in the overall situation in the northern Baltic and their impact on 
Sweden's international position. A number of Swedish politicians 
who had actively supported Swedish activism in 1915 began to 
demand a reassessment of Sweden's foreign policy strategy. These 
moves, representing a general right-wing attack on the policy of 
neutrality advocated by Eden's government, were supported by 
Aftonbladet, Nya Dagligt Allehanda and Stockholms Dagblad. 
The question of Russia's uncertain internal situation, doubts 
over the continued existence of the Empire as a political entity and 
the possible development of Russian-German relations, dominated 
the increasingly tense Swedish debate surrounding the country's 
position. It was generally assumed amongst right-wing opinion 
that Russia was on the decline and entering on a period of gradual 
disintegration. This also naturally prompted the re-emergence of 
the Aland Islands question. This was given further momentum 
following the sensational revelations by the Soviet government of 
documents showing that the Tsarist authorities had agreed a 
programme of permanent fortifications for the Islands with France 
and perhaps the other Western powers in February 1917. News of 
this provoked a number of Swedish papers to suggest that the 
Islands should be annexed to Sweden, arguing that this in any case 
reflected the wishes of the local population.47 
All this contributed to increased column space being devoted to 
Finnish affairs, either independently or linked to the Aland 
Islands issue, in the Swedish press during the late autumn of 1917. 
Aftonbladet made great play of what it described as the 'historical 
and ethnic obligations' linking Sweden to Finland in an article 
published on 8 November, while also stressing the importance of 
improving Sweden's international position in the Baltic. The 
paper even went so far as to suggest the idea of using Swedish 
troops to temporarily occupy Finland to protect both countries' 
46. DN 21.7.1917; Soc-Dem 21.7.1917. 
47. NDA 26.11.1917; StD 27.11., 2.12.1917; SvD 28.11., 30.11.1917. 
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interests, and hinted that, in compensation, Finland might 
consider transferring the Aland Islands to Swedish sovereignty.48  
The November General Strike and its accompanying violence, 
together with Finland's steadily worsening social conditions, 
served to strengthen the call in Sweden for sending humanitarian 
aid to Finland, above all food. Supporters of this move stressed the 
similarity of some of the problems faced by the two countries, 
painting a rosy picture of the possibility of an independent 
Finland closely allied to Sweden. A few hinted at the more distant 
possibility of Finland's one day being reunited with Sweden, 
reawakening memories of Sweden's great power past.49 
Aftonbladet's enthusiasm for the Finnish cause was further 
reflected in its proposal made on 1 December, nearly a week before 
Finland's actual declaration of independence, that Sweden should 
recognise Finnish independence forthwith, a call subsequently 
taken up in largely similar form by Nya Dagligt Allehanda and 
Stockholms Dagblad.50 Eden's government, supported by a large 
parliamentary majority, was careful to keep a judicious distance 
between itself and the views of this vocal, but nevertheless small 
group sympathetic to the Finnish cause. The Social Democrats 
and Liberals in particular favoured a cautious and restrained style 
of foreign policy. Social-Demokraten strongly opposed the idea 
put forward in the pages of Aftonbladet at the beginning of 
December for some form of Swedish intervention in Finland, 
arguing that any move of this type would seriously undermine 
Swedish neutrality. It would be foolish to gain sovereignty 
over the Aland Islands at the cost of sacrificing Swedish neutrality, 
the paper argued, a view echoed by Dagens Nyheter in its con-
demnation of any acceptance of sovereignty over the Islands in 
exchange for helping Finland in her hour of need. Social-
Demokraten, together with the liberal press, nevertheless favoured 
sending food aid to Finland.51  
Finland's declaration of independence naturally gave added 
impetus to the discussion of Finland and Finnish affairs in 
48. Abl 8.11.1917. 
49. Abl 16.11., 26.11.1917. 
50. Abl 1.12.1917; NDA 11.12.1917; StD 13.12.1917. 
51. Soc-Dem 7.12., 11.12., 12.12., 13.12., 18.12.1917; DN 10.12.1917; Forum 
1.12.1917. 
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Sweden. In line with its overall cautious approach, the Swedish 
government decided against immediately recognising the Finnish 
move until the attitude of the major powers, including Russia, 
became clear. Sweden did not feel herself in a position to 
recognise Finland's independence alone, as Gustav V made plain 
to the Finnish government delegation sent to Stockholm to sound 
out Swedish attitudes on the question on 28 December, and echoed 
by the Swedish Prime Minister, Edén, in a speech two days later on 
30 December.52 The Swedish government's reserved response was 
greeted with some bitter comment and dissatisfaction in the 
Swedish press.53 
The attitude of the new Soviet government to Finland's declar-
ation of independence was closely linked to its insecure position 
immediately following the October Revolution. Its influence 
within Russia was initially restricted to a relatively small area 
outside Petrograd and Moscow and a few other major cities, and 
was especially weak in the countryside. Its continued existence 
was also threatened by White Russian military action and the 
imminent danger of a German attack south of the Gulf of Finland 
against Petrograd. 
Finland's position was therefore prominent among the Bolshevik 
government's concerns when it began negotiations with Germany 
at Brest-Litovsk in December. It was assumed in Petrograd that the 
Finnish question would emerge at the talks and that an 
independent Finnish delegation might also take part following 
Finland's unilateral declaration of independence. The possible 
attitude of the government in Helsinki, its potential sympathies 
with Germany and its willingness to adopt a conciliatory approach 
to Petrograd, were important factors to the new Soviet authorities. 
Finland represented a significant potential security problem for 
the government in Petrograd. It is not surprising therefore that 
Lenin's encouragement to the Finnish socialists to begin a popular 
uprising and seize power, made in a speech on 5 December at the 
All-Russian naval congress, was given at the same time as the 
beginning of the Brest-Litovsk talks. Similar encouragement was 
52. Pakaslahti 1937, pp. 27-30. See Eden's speech on 30.12.1917. Also Soc-Dem 
31.12.1917. 
53. NDA 29.12.1917; Hamilton 1956, p. 193. 
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also provided by Stalin, the People's Commissar for Minority 
Nationalities, when he attended the Social Democratic party 
congress in Helsinki at the end of November.S4 
Svinhufvud's government, however, did not look upon the idea 
of establishing contact with the ideologically suspect Soviet 
authorities with any great enthusiasm at the beginning of 
December 1917. This reluctance was given added weight by 
Enckell's opinion that it was highly probable that the Bolshe-
vik government would in any event soon collapse." This doubt 
over the continued existence of the regime in Petrograd and 
the instability of the internal situation in Russia in general also 
affected the socialist leaders, who made no attempt to press the 
Finnish authorities to immediately approach the Soviet govern-
ment on the question of recognition of Finland's declaration of 
independence.56 The view that some move would nevertheless 
have to be made towards Russia, however, steadily gained ground 
among the members of the government. By way of a compromise 
solution, the Diet decided on 22 December to appeal directly to the 
All-Russian National Constituent Assembly on the question of 
Russian recognition of Finnish independence, thereby bypassing 
the contentious issue of Finland's official attitude to the Bolshevik 
government. 
As it became clear that the new government in Petrograd showed 
all the signs of remaining in office at least for the immediately 
foreseeable future, the Social Democrats, who up until now had 
shared a similarly cautious approach to their non-socialist 
opponents, decided that contact with the authorities in Petrograd 
would be necessary. The party's executive committee decided on 
23 December to send a three-man delegation, made up of Evert 
Huttunen, Kullervo Manner and Eetu Salin, to Petrograd to meet 
the Bolshevik leadership to argue the case for a favourable Soviet 
response to Finland's declaration of independence. During the 
discussions that entailed, Lenin agreed to the Finnish request in 
54. See Lenin's speech to the All-Russian Naval Congress on 5.12.1917 and Stalin's 
speech at the Finnish Social Democratic Party's conference on 27.11.1917. 
Also, The Bolshevik Revolution 1917-1918, p. 284: 'Kansalaissota dokument-
teina I, pp. 288-91; Lenin: Teokset 35, p. 290. 
55. Paasivirta 1957, p. 26. 
56. See K. H. Wiik's memorandum 'Miten Suomen itsenäisyys saatiin tunnustetuk-
si' (TA 327 47:471 "1917"). 
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principle on 29 December. Trotsky, in his capacity as Bolshevik 
Foreign Minister, emphasised, however, that Finland would have 
to address an official request to the government in Petrograd before 
official recognition would be possible.57 
Finland's failure to gain rapid Western recognition of her 
independence served to dampen the government's faith in the 
wisdom of directing the entire weight of the country's diplomatic 
effort westwards. It also soon became clear that the German 
government, which, it had been hoped in Helsinki, would be 
favourable to the Finnish request, would only be willing to 
recognise Finnish independence after the Soviet government had 
done so. Sweden's similar attitude had also by now become 
known to Helsinki.58 The Finnish government was left with little 
option but to rethink its initial refusal to present a formal request 
to Petrograd, especially after the news of the departure of the 
socialist delegation to the Russian capital leaked out. 
The government nevertheless continued its cautious approach 
towards the Soviet authorities after deciding to sound out the 
latters' attitude on the question. Only after Enckell and K. G. 
Idman had established contact with the government in Petrograd 
and received a favourable response to their enquiries, did Svin-
hufvud, together with a group of advisors, travel to Petrograd to 
present the Russian authorities with an official request for 
Bolshevik recognition of Finnish independence. This was agreed 
to by the Bolshevik government on 31 December and approved by 
the party's executive central committee on 4 January 1918. 
The background factors which led to the all-important Soviet 
decision to recognise Finnish independence are difficult to pin 
down with any certainty.59 The tense internal situation in Russia 
and the Bolshevik government's difficult position, the party's 
declared positive ideological attitude to minority nationalities and 
the earlier promises given to the Finns, all contributed to the 
decision. The Bolshevik's need to consolidate their overall 
position and safeguard the country's north-western border 
57. Paasivirta 1957, p. 32. 
58. Nurmio 1957, pp. 28-33; Hbl 28.12.1917. 
59. Paasivirta 1949A, pp. 460-1; Paasivirta 1957, pp. 121-3; Polvinen I 1967, pp. 
155-60, 181-3, 191-3; Lappalainen 1977, p. 89; Upton I 1980, pp. 358-9. 
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obviously also weighed heavily. Although no other country had 
agreed to recognise Finland's independence by the end of 
December, the Bolshevik authorities were no doubt aware of the 
Finnish government's various attempts to persuade the Western 
powers to do so and the willingness of some of these to recognise 
Finland as and when the Soviet government made a similar 
decision. 
It must also be remembered that no other non-Russian 
nationality within the Empire of the time represented such a 
clearly-defined geographical and ethnic entity as Finland, a fact 
backed up by the country's century-long period of autonomy. 
Many prominent Bolshevik figures also had personal experience of 
Finland as a result of their stays in Finland and their contacts with 
other groups opposed to the Tsarist authorities prior to the 
Revolution. 
The ultimate nature of the new government in Helsinki and its 
likely future attitudes towards a Soviet state remained somewhat 
unclear to the new Petrograd administration. The Bolshevik 
analysis of the situation in Finland appears to have concluded that 
independence was supported by all political groups in Finland to a 
greater or lesser extent, a fact reflected in the Diet's appeal made to 
the All-Russian National Constituent Assembly, the discussions 
the socialist delegation had had in Petrograd and the official 
request presented by the Finnish government. The additional fact 
that Lenin, together with the other major Bolshevik leaders, had 
since the spring of 1917 publicly advocated their support for 
national self-determination served to give the Soviet government 
relatively little room for manoeuvre on the issue by December 
1917. Taken together, the ideological background and the 
immediate political situation made the final Bolshevik decision 
the most probable. 
The Soviet decision to recognise Finnish independence was also 
linked to the Bolshevik vision of future political and ideological 
developments, including Lenin's own theory developed earlier 
in the war, which visualised Russia's minority nationalities 
going through a temporary period of independence before finally 
returning to the Russian fold as revolution spread outside Russia's 
national borders. In making his decision as head of the Soviet state 
to accept Finland's declaration of independence, however, Lenin 
left himself open to criticism from within the Bolshevik party. His 
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defence of the government's move against the first wave of criti-
cism at the beginning of January and subsequent ones leaned 
heavily on the theory of worldwide revolution and the associated 
idea of the eventual return of the minority nationalities to Mother 
Russia. 
A similar line of argument was also later used by Stalin in his 
defence of Lenin and the need for a peace treaty against those 
opposed to its terms, following the signing of the Brest-Litovsk 
agreement between Russia and Germany at the beginning of 
March, when the Soviet government was forced to relinquish the 
Baltic provinces, the Ukraine and part of the Caucasus. In an 
attempt to lighten the pessimistic mood which followed the treaty 
during March and April, Stalin listed the national groups, which 
included Finland, which he assumed would eventually be 
reunited with Russia.60 It cannot be ignored, however, that there 
was a distinct difference in the tone and attitude within Russia 
towards the whole question of Finnish independence between the 
Soviet government and the Bolshevik party itself, and between the 
Russian views communicated at an official level and those aired 
within the party. 
By deciding to recognise Finnish independence on 31 December 
1917, the Soviet government also removed the major obstacle 
standing in the way of recognition for a number of other countries. 
The Soviet decision alone proved sufficient for the Swedish 
authorities, who followed the Russian lead and recognised Finland 
on 4 January. Since the Soviet government's decision was only 
finally approved by the executive central committee on 4 January, 
by deciding not to wait for this formality Sweden became the first 
country to officially recognise Finnish independence, albeit after 
provisional Soviet recognition. 
Unlike the Swedes, the German authorities waited for official 
confirmation from Petrograd of the Russian decision to reach 
Berlin, which it did on 6 January, before deciding to recognise 
Finland's new status. This caution on the part of the German 
government was linked to the fact that the peace negotiations with 
the Soviet authorities had reached a critical point following their 
postponement for ten days on 26 December. France, as the first of 
60. Stalin: Teokset IV, p. 75. 
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the Western powers, made her decision before the Germans, 
announcing her recognition virtually simultaneously with Sweden 
on 4 January. This in turn caused the German government when it 
came to announce German recognition two days later to add that 
Germany's actual decision had, in fact, been taken on 4 January, 
the same day as the French one.61  
This relatively rapid recognition of Finnish independence 
by Russia, Sweden, France and Germany served to show the pro-
gress the Finnish cause had made on the European scene in the 
matter of only a few weeks. Finland's independent status had been 
recognised by the successors to the Tsarist authorities, two 
representatives of the two major alliances involved in the war, and 
a Scandinavian neutral. Of the major powers, only Britain refused 
to grant recognition until the opinion of the All-Russian National 
Constituent Assembly was known. 
61. Paasivirta 1957. pp. 33-4. 
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IV Finland in the Final 
Stages of the War 
The recognition by Soviet Russia and a number of Western 
countries of Finland's declaration of independence was the cause 
of some considerable satisfaction in Helsinki, not only to the 
government but also to the Diet and a wide spectrum of political 
opinion, following the weeks of uncertainty which had intervened 
between the government's statement and its first foreign 
recognition. Despite the general hostility felt among non-socialist 
opinion towards the Soviet government, the Bolsheviks as a whole, 
and the Western powers and Sweden as well, there was no 
disguising the enthusiasm and relief, and some surprise, felt at the 
news of the recognition of Finland's new status by these powers. 
The main focus of attention naturally centred on the Soviet 
government's decision. A number of non-socialist commentators 
were surprised that diplomatic recognition had finally proved 
more rapidly forthcoming from Finland's eastern neighbour than 
from the West, and that the shedding of the country's 
constitutional ties with Russia appeared to have taken place so 
painlessly.1 Russia was described by some papers as having 'paid 
her debt' to Finland by granting her her independence. Whilst 
there was no let-up in the ideological criticism of Bolshevism as an 
unwelcome social and political phenomenon, commentators 
found it difficult not to find some grudging words of gratitude for 
the Soviet authorities. Hopes were also expressed that the future 
1. UP 5.1., 8.1.1918. 
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would bring good relations between the two countries.2 Those 
papers which had been most closely associated with the 
independence cause, including Uusi Päivä, nevertheless did not 
forget to underline Germany's past role in encouraging Finnish 
moves towards independence, describing Germany as a country 
which had always supported the interests of the small countries of 
Europe.3 
The significance and importance of the wide recognition that the 
Finnish declaration of independence had achieved was also 
recognised by the socialist press. Having been effectively 
excluded from the preparations surrounding the declaration, the 
socialists now took this opportunity to emphasise their role in 
establishing the contact with the Soviet authorities which had led 
to Russian recognition.' The socialist papers, in fact, were not 
slow to claim that the all-important agreement with Russia had 
been achieved as a direct result of following the policy of 
negotiated agreement which the socialists had advocated in the 
Diet on 6 December, in opposition to the uncompromising stance 
adopted by the Svinhufvud government. The overall tone of 
socialist comment was optimistic. Internationally, the favourable 
developments at the Russo-German talks at Brest-Litovsk were 
seen as strengthening the likelihood of a general European-wide 
peace agreement, while on the domestic front the country's newly-
won independence was seen as offering real potential for a major 
reform of domestic social injustices and a more open struggle 
against the capitalist system.5 
Following the achievement of at least partial international 
recognition for its declaration of independence, the government 
now set about the job of appointing Finland's first official 
diplomatic representatives abroad. Alexis Gripenberg and Edvard 
Hjelt were appointed as temporary charges d'affaires, in Stockholm 
and Berlin respectively, in early January. Carl Enckell was 
appointed to Petrograd on 23 January to take charge of negotiations 
with the Soviet government on what were described as 'questions 
2. US 6.1.1918; HS 6.1.1918; SvT 7.1.1918; Hbl 6.1.1918. 
3. UP 8.1.1918. 
4. Kansan Lehti 3.1.1918; Sosialidemokraatti 10.1.1918; Kansan Tahto 4.1.1918. 
5. Työmies 11.1., 20.1.1918; Sosialisti 7.1.1918; Kansan Tahto 7.1.1918; Savon 
Työmies 8.1.1918. 
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relating to the dissolution of Finland's constitutional ties with 
Russia'.6 A new government department to handle foreign affairs, 
the forerunner of the later Ministry of Foreign Affairs, had been 
established on 10 January. Disagreements about the overall shape 
of future foreign policy, despite the decision announced to the Diet 
on 8 January that the government was committed to a neutral 
foreign policy, served to slow down the early work of the new 
department. The idea of neutrality ran counter to the views of a 
number of leading government figures, who advocated close links 
with Germany as the best way to ensure the country's future 
security and retain some say in the fate of the volunteer battalion. 
This conflict of ideas also contributed to the delay which ensued 
in the naming of a senator responsible for foreign affairs, and 
meant in practice that Svinhufvud, in his capacity as chairman of 
the Senate, retained control over foreign affairs questions.' 
Finland's declaration of independence and its recognition 
abroad alone, however, did not bring the country immediate and 
complete national sovereignty at a time when a significant number 
of Russian troops remained on Finnish soil. Although the overall 
size of the Russian military presence had significantly fallen from 
its peak of some 100,000 men reached in August and September 
1917 as a result of the Provisional Government's desire to be able 
to repulse any possible German landing along Finland's southern 
coastline, some 40,000 men nevertheless remained by the latter 
half of January 1918, a cause for some understandable disquiet on 
the part of the Finnish government.8 The primary importance of 
resolving this problem was recognised and discussed in non-
socialist circles immediately following the news of the first foreign 
acceptance of Finland's new status. While not blind to the 
problem, socialist opinion tended to regard the whole question of 
any evacuation of Russian troops as one ultimately best left alone 
as long as the Brest-Litovsk negotiations remained unresolved. 
Convinced as they were of the central importance of maintaining 
friendly relations with the Soviet government, the socialists 
argued that Finland should be willing to contribute to the defence 
6. Paasivirta 1968, pp. 44-5. 
7. Ibid., pp. 41-2. 
8. Rauanheimo 1950, p. 167; Lappalainen 1977, p. 99. 
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of Petrograd against any possible German attack.9 
The government's second major foreign policy problem revolved 
around the country's steadily worsening economic isolation, 
which had set in in earnest following the virtual collapse of trading 
relations with Russia in the latter half of 1917. The continued 
severance of trading links with both Germany and the Western 
allies, Finland's other major trading partners, also presented major 
problems. Contacts with Sweden, Finland's only other remaining 
significant partner abroad, had been somewhat improved with the 
dispatch to Stockholm, in the late autumn of the previous year, of a 
number of trading agents to supplement the work of the official 
commercial attaché who had taken up office in October.10  
Hopes for an improvement in the situation were initially pinned 
on the peace negotiations then taking place between the Soviet and 
German governments, which, if successful, held out the 
opportunity of opening up the Baltic to trade. A Finnish trade 
delegation was sent to the Ukraine in mid-January following the 
latter's signing of a separate peace with Germany, in the hope of 
negotiating an agreement with the Kiev government giving Finland 
much-needed access to Ukrainian foodstuffs in return for exports 
of Finnish industrial goods.11 
The business community hoped that Finland would be able to 
benefit from her non-combatant status in the war. As and when 
normal trading relations were re-established, it was hoped that 
Finnish industry would be able to exploit her large reserves of 
sawn timber accumulated over the war years in the boom 
conditions likely to be generated by the first flush of post-war 
reconstruction.12 
1. Towards civil war 
A combination of circumstances made Finland both the first new 
independent state to be born out of the First World War and the 
first country outside Russia to be drawn by its own internal social 
9. Paasivirta 1957, p. 46; Työmies 26.1.1918. 
10. Hbl 2.12.1917. 
11. Mercator 18.1., 25.1.1918. 
12. Kauppalehti 23.11., 28.11.1917; HbI 28.11.1917. 
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tensions into the whirlwind of civil war. Finnish society had gone 
through a number of rapid changes during the course of 1917, 
virtually all of which, to some extent or another, had led to a 
deepening and consolidation of the schism between Right and 
Left, a development which had prevented the emergence of any 
real spirit of social or political compromise. The indecision and 
argument surrounding the question of supreme governmental 
power had resulted in the country being deprived of adequate 
internal policing capable of maintaining social order for the 
majority of 1917. The state of limbo that had resulted had allowed 
the pent-up forces within society to range relatively freely and 
uncontrolled. 
The view that what was at stake was little less than the 
preservation of the entire existing social fabric had spread in non-
socialist circles during the latter months of 1917. Any demands for 
reform had increasingly come to be seen in this camp as direct 
threats to the continued existence of society in its familiar form 
and the security of the non-working classes. Reform and social 
change came to be looked upon as synonymous with a policy of 
dangerous political concession and one which could only lead to 
renewed social ferment.13 Society, for all its injustices and 
imperfections, had to be defended against revolutionary anarchy, 
it was argued. The labour movement, with the memory of the 
revolutionary events of 1905 still fresh in its mind and the example 
of the October Revolution even fresher, found it difficult to 
disengage itself from the magic-like aura associated with mass 
popular action. Socialist leaders were also faced with increasing 
difficulties in maintaining their authority within the ranks of the 
labour movement itself. As the year wore on, these problems only 
worsened, while the more established problems of social 
insecurity and low living standards among the working class were 
compounded during the latter half of 1917 by steadily deepening 
mass unemployment, growing inflation and increasingly severe 
food shortages.14  
At the other end of the political spectrum, the General Strike in 
November and the murders of a number of non-socialist figures 
13. Paasivirta 1957, p. 63. 
14. Kirby 1979, p. 46. 
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which took place in its wake, coupled with the revolution in 
Russia, contributed to a dangerous upswing in suspicion and fear 
of all things socialist and of the labour movement's ultimate 
loyalty to the Finnish cause. For the labour movement, both 
leadership and membership, the sudden ending of the General 
Strike had been an unwelcome defeat, signalling what appeared 
to be a major setback to the Left's influence in society. The 
movement's leaders, in particular, lost some of their earlier 
confidence in their ability to shape the country's future. The 
movement's view of its opponents as purely reactionary and 
committed to opposing socialism in any form intensified, 
undermining the position of those within the Social Democratic 
party supporting parliamentary action, while at the same time 
strengthening that of those calling for open class conflict. The end 
of 1917 saw a small group of left-wing trade unionists with close 
links to radical circles in Petrograd going back to 1910 assume a 
growing role on the Left.15 
The approval by the Diet on 12 January 1918, in the face of left-
wing opposition, of a government proposal, prompted by the 
activities of the Red Guard militia set up with the approval of 
the Social Democrats and the trade union leadership, for the 
establishment of a new police force and army represented an 
attempt by the government to regain control over the worsening 
social situation and civil unrest.16 In practice, however, it came to 
act very much as a double-edged weapon against social disorder by 
uniting the labour movement in a concerted defence of its position. 
It also indirectly gave added impetus to the attempts of the more 
revolutionary-minded elements within the Social Democrats to 
gain control of the party. A shift in power in favour of the latter 
did in fact take place within the party leadership from mid-January 
onwards. This take-over was rapidly followed by the beginning of 
preparations for a nationwide uprising at the end of January. The 
decision by the Left to embark on a course of revolutionary action 
was, it should be emphasised, the result first and foremost of social 
and political developments within Finland, rather than of those in 
15. Paasivirta 1957, pp. 57-61, 67; Paasivirta 1967, p. 12: Lappalainen 1977, pp. 
103-6; Lappalainen I 1981, pp. 15-20; Upton I 1980, pp. 437-42. 
16. Paasivirta 1957, p. 66; Lappalainen 1977, p. 104; Kirby 1979, p. 48. 
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Russia, although events in Russia and particularly the October 
Revolution obviously served to heighten revolutionary enthusiasm 
and convince those on the Left of the wisdom of such a move. 
Parallel to these developments in the socialist camp, General 
Mannerheim, acting at the request of the government, had begun 
military preparations designed to safeguard the maintenance of 
public order and allow the carrying-out of local cleaning-up 
operations to give his White forces a secure operational base. 
Mannerheim planned to establish his headquarters in southern 
Ostrobothnia, stripping the scattered Russian troops in the area of 
their arms when the opportunity arose. These and other plans, 
however, were put in a radically different light following the self-
styled occupation of Viipuri in South-East Finland by Civil Guard 
units on 22 January in a move to isolate the local Red Guards and 
the Russian troops stationed in the town. This action made Viipuri 
an immediate focus of national attention and indirectly 
accelerated the outbreak of open social conflict elsewhere in the 
country. The trade unions in the area responded by declaring a 
general strike. The situation was temporarily defused by the local 
Russian troops who, finding themselves cut off from Petrograd, 
presented the occupying Civil Guards with an ultimatum to 
withdraw, which the latter complied with.17 
The sudden emergence of Viipuri as a dangerous flash-point took 
Mannerheim largely by surprise, forcing him to bring forward the 
start of his own operations in southern Ostrobothnia against the 
wishes of Svinhufvud in Helsinki, who had asked him to postpone 
action as long as possible. The small scattered Russian garrison 
detachments in the area were stripped of their arms on 
Mannerheim's orders on the night of 27-28 January by Civil 
Guard units.18 This move exactly coincided with a coup d'état set 
in motion in Helsinki by radical elements of the labour movement, 
although purely by chance, as neither Mannerheim nor the 
revolutionary leaders in the South had any definite forewarning of 
each other's plans. Of all those involved, it was Svinhufvud who 
was caught most unprepared by the course of developments, both 
17. Paasivirta 1957, pp. 77-8; Polvinen I 1967, pp. 217-20; Lappalainen 1977, 
pp. 110-14, 118-9; Lappalainen I 1981, pp. 24-6. 
18. J. 0. Hannula 1956, p. 58; Lappalainen 1977, p. 120. 
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by the change decided on by Mannerheim in the timetable of 
operations in southern Ostrobothnia and the Left's surprise coup 
in the capital, about which he had had only the most general 
suspicions.19 
The scale of the chain of events which unfurled after 28 January 
came as something of a surprise to virtually everybody, the White 
forces under Mannerheim and their backers in Helsinki, the 
leaders of the uprising in Helsinki, as well as the more moderate 
leaders of the labour movement in the capital and the provinces, 
who suddenly found power had slipped irretrievably out of their 
hands. Events were to show that developments had in fact gone 
much further than either side knew or supposed: the country was 
on the brink of national civil war.20 
2. Red versus White 
Contact had been established by one of the groups within the 
radical wing of the labour movement responsible for the decision 
to attempt a coup d'état in Helsinki, prior to its actually taking 
place on 28 January, with circles in Petrograd in an attempt to 
secure arms supplies for the uprising. The fact that weapons 
proved forthcoming points to those who approved the shipment as 
having had some forewarning of what was planned in Helsinki.21  
While no one in Petrograd could have been under any illusion that 
arms alone would guarantee the success of an uprising in Finland, 
it was clearly realised that arms were a necessity if it was to have 
any chance of getting off the ground. A revolt in Finland would 
also help to relieve some of the pressure on the new Soviet 
government. 
Following the successful disarming of Russian troops in 
southern Ostrobothnia, Mannerheim placed the Civil Guards 
under his command in defensive positions to await further devel-
opments. This decision was largely forced on him by his shortage 
of manpower and the need to secure his base in Ostrobothnia, 
19. Paasivirta 1957, pp. 77-8; Lappalainen 1977, pp. 118-26. 
20. Paasivirta, 1957, p. 80. 
21. Polvinen I 1967, p. 208; Lappalainen I 1981, pp. 52-3. 
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particularly on his northern flank. Oulu and Tornio were occupied 
to ensure a secure line of communications across the border to 
Sweden. A number of Civil Guard units, however, acting against 
Mannerheim's instructions, decided on their own initiative to 
advance southwards, fanning out from the important rail junc-
tions at Haapamäki and Pieksämäki in central. Finland, rapidly 
establishing positions to the south of Vilppula and Mikkeli. Civil 
Guard units operating in Karelia, similarly acting on their own 
initiative, established a bridge-head to the south of the river 
Vuoksi. Gaining contact with these far-flung units proved difficult 
for Mannerheim operating from his headquarters in Ostro-
bothnia.22 
Although having sanctioned the uprising in Helsinki, the labour 
movement's revolutionary leadership actually possessed little 
control over events in the early stages and, together with the 
movement as a whole, were to all intents and purposes swept 
along in the tide of events following the lead given by those in the 
capital. The aim of the Red leadership centred on radically 
rewriting the balance of power which had been established in 
Finland as a result of the parliamentary elections held in the 
autumn of 1917 and the developments which had followed in their 
wake. The Left's plan for a future form of government for Finland, 
giving a central role to the Diet, was only published in February 
and clearly reflected a conviction that the labour movement would 
be likely to enjoy the support of the majority of the population. 
The document did, however, contain the important proviso that 
'there shall be no restriction on the means to be used... should 
reactionary forces (again) threaten the country.'23 The social 
reforms proposed in the socialist programme were decidedly more 
social democratic in nature than revolutionary or socialist, nor did 
they show much similarity to those favoured in the radical 
demands espoused by Bolshevik ideology.24 The reforms called 
for, in fact, were largely ones which had already been voiced 
before the beginning of the Civil War from within the labour 
22. J. 0. Hannula 1956, p. 58; Hersalo I 1966, pp. 483-9, 522, 524; Upton I 1980, 
pp. 511-16. 
23. Holmberg 1943, p. 110; Paasivirta 1957, pp. 84-5; Upton I 1981, pp. 217-21. 
24. H. Soikkanen 1975, pp. 273-6; Upton II 1981, pp. 162-6, 214-7, 222-3. 
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movement. 
Lacking any clear idea of what the reception of the Helsinki 
insurrection might be throughout the country as a whole, even 
among the working class, the Red leadership appears to have 
optimistically assumed that its move would somehow inevitably 
trigger a mass revolutionary landslide, leading to the installation of 
a revolutionary government. In practice, however, the leadership 
did not possess any clearly — formulated military strategy about 
how this was to be achieved. The sudden and unexpected 
appearance of consolidated opposition to their aims, in the form of 
Civil Guard forces advancing southwards, forced the Red leaders 
to hastily improvise defensive positions as far north as was 
practical, along a line dictated by the rail connections between 
Pori, Tampere, Riihimäki, Viipuri and Petrograd. With the 
gravitation of the frontline towards an axis running from the north 
of Pori through Vilppula eastwards to Mäntyharju and south-east 
to the Vuoksi, the ground was laid for the development of a trench 
war style of conflict in those areas where the opposing forces were 
most firmly established, along the railway lines and major roads. 
Mannerheim issued a statement addressed to the Russian forces 
still remaining in the country on 29 January, appealing for their 
non-interference in the internal struggle between Red and White 
forces.25 The Russian response to events, however, was somewhat 
uncoordinated. The 22 Army Corps initially instructed the forces 
under its command to withdraw from western Finland in the 
direction of Viipuri, where the headquarters staff were based, and 
the Karelian Isthmus. This was soon counter-ordered by the 
revolutionary leadership of the Russian Soldiers' Soviet in 
Helsinki, which instructed Russian forces to remain where they 
were and be prepared to resist any attempts by the Civil Guards to 
strip them of their arms, as had taken place in southern 
Ostrobothnia. This latter order reflected a desire both to continue 
protecting Russian military interests and to show solidarity with 
the revolutionary cause in Helsinki. The situation was further 
complicated by the official orders issued between 5 and 11 
February allowing for the withdrawal of conscripts drafted 
between 1904 and 1914, a move which accelerated the pattern of 
25. Paasivirta 1957, p. 78. 
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progressive Russian withdrawal which had been put in hand in 
Finland from December 1917 onwards.26 
A large number of Russian weapons and other equipment fell 
into the hands of the Red forces in the early days of the Civil War 
following the beginning of the Russian withdrawal. With the 
exception of a single unit which appeared on the front in the 
Vilppula-Ruovesi area in early February, and a Lettish unit 
operating further eastwards in the area around Mäntyharju 
somewhat later, however, no Russian units consistently fought 
alongside Red forces. The Red leadership did have some access to 
Russian military advisers, but it seems doubtful whether their 
operational advice had any significant impact on the overall 
progress of hostilities, largely because of the primitive nature of 
the Red Guards' military organisation and its inability to respond 
to the demands of mobile warfare. Some Russian specialists were 
nevertheless recruited by Red forces to train and direct artillery 
crews. 27 
Both sides in the struggle were hampered by their lack of 
military experience and the fact that their forces were made up of 
hastily-formed units. Action along the front on both sides was in 
large measure restricted to a small proportion of the total number 
of men involved. When the flow of volunteers on the Red side 
began to dry up, the Red leadership turned to the trade unions to 
act as temporary draft boards to provide the additional manpower 
needed. This method recommended itself as it served to ensure 
a fair degree of political reliability among the new recruits. It 
only proved effective, however, in urban areas and other centres 
of population where the option of joining the Red Guards 
provided an attractive alternative to unemployment and poverty.28 
Recruitment among the tenant farmer and rural landless 
populations operated against a substantially different background. 
Decisions to join the Red Guard in these areas were often made in 
the face of the silent opposition wielded by the deadweight of 
traditional conservative rural opinion and the unspoken threat of 
26. Ibid., pp. 124-6. 
27. On the part played by the Russians on the Red side, see Paasivirta 1957, pp. 
126-8; Polvinen I 1967, pp. 228-39; Lappalainen I 1981, pp. 23-4, 78, 84, 
131, 166-8. 
28. Paasivirta 1957, pp. 173-4; Lappalainen I 1981, pp. 157-63. 
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possible future reprisals. This, together with the fact that 
revolutionary sympathies were at their strongest in urban areas, 
led to the composition of the Red Guards being distinctly balanced 
in favour of the urban proletariat against a smaller number drawn 
from the rural poor.29 
From the very beginning of the conflict, the White army was able 
to draw on a reserve of professional officers and other ranks with 
varying degrees of military training. This group was substantially 
reinforced at the end of February with the return from Germany of 
the Jäger volunteer unit, numbering some 1,200 men. The White 
leadership was therefore relatively well provided with the 
potential to gradually develop its military infrastructure and adapt 
its forces to the demands of mobile warfare. Conscription was 
introduced in the latter half of February in areas under White 
control when voluntary recruitment began to fail to meet 
manpower requirements. Those elements known or suspected of 
socialist sympathies were carefully weeded out. Prior to being 
deployed, conscripts went through a brief military training 
programme coordinated by Jäger volunteers.3o 
Administrative power on the Red side in the conflict was 
wielded by a body known as the People's Delegation. Lower down 
the administrative hierarchy, progress proved slow in developing a 
serviceable infrastructure to replace the earlier pattern of local 
government in Red-occupied areas. The socialist leadership had 
little time in the midst of the Civil War to outline any overall 
programme for the future organisation of the country's commerce 
or industry. The leadership's energies were virtually solely 
concentrated on keeping industry and agriculture in production 
and minimising the inevitable dislocations caused by the 
hostilities.31  
Following the early events of the conflict concentrated in 
southern Ostrobothnia, hostilities grew dramatically and spread 
along wide areas of the front which developed between Red and 
29. Estimates of the exact proportions of rural and urban recruits are complicated 
by the fact that many of the rural landless described themselves, despite their 
social origins, as working class as a result of their previous employment in the 
Russian-sponsored fortification programme. 
30. Paasivirta 1957, pp. 184-8; 0. Manninen 1974, pp. 92-6, 109-14. 
31. Paasivirta 1957, pp. 84, 87-9. 
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White forces in southern Finland. The fact that advancing 
White forces met purely Finnish resistance with only the 
barest smattering of a Russian presence caused some surprise 
among Civil Guard units, although this had been predicted 
by Mannerheim and his headquarters staff. In their public 
pronouncements, however, the Whites glossed over this fact. In 
addition to underlining their task of putting down the Red-
inspired revolt and returning the rule of law to southern Finland, 
they also emphasised the struggle's wider ideological significance. 
It came increasingly in fact to be referred to as a 'war of liberation' 
in White circles, particularly in the White stronghold of 
Ostrobothnia, following the practice introduced by the German-
trained volunteers, with the Russians being identified as the 
White's main and ultimate enemy. 
The term 'war of liberation' spread significantly during the latter 
stages of the conflict until it came to occupy a prominent position 
in White propaganda, despite the fact that by this stage the role 
taken by Russian forces had become minimal, as had the overall 
Russian influence on events in Finland. This was largely a 
reflection of a clear White desire to give the struggle in its decisive 
final stages the mark of being one directed against Russian 
oppression and part, in a wider perspective, of the international 
struggle against the spread of Bolshevism. By inference therefore, 
the struggle came to be portrayed in White ideological rhetoric in 
almost crusade-like terms, as one aimed at purging the Finnish 
people of the curse of socialism.32 The Whites' emphasis on 
describing the Civil War as one of liberation gained added 
momentum following the arrival of German troops to assist White 
forces at the beginning of April. Out of the tens of thousands 
fighting on the Red side, however, the combined White Finnish 
and German forces were opposed by what probably amounted to 
only some 150 Russians. The White picture of the Reds as traitors 
and betrayers of Finnish independence, however, stuck and 
deepened.33 
Compared to the Reds, the White forces had the important 
advantage from the very beginning of the struggle that they were 
32. T. Manninen 1982, pp. 155-60, 178-9. 
33. Ibid., pp. 101, 190-1, 194-8, 222-3. 
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able to operate in the areas under their control with the full back-
up support of the country's official administrative infrastructure. 
Added to this, they also had an important edge in military 
organisation, with a leadership made up of trained and often 
experienced officers capable of adapting to new demands as they 
arose, and which, as the struggle developed, took on many of the 
traits of a true professional army. 
The general operational potential of both the Red and White 
forces was nevertheless hampered by the fact that both the 
areas under their respective controls lacked internal political 
uniformity. Taking the results of the elections of autumn 1917 as a 
yardstick, neither side enjoyed more than a generous 50% of the 
support of the local population in the spring of 1918. 
3. The international and domestic implications 
of the Civil War 
Neither side in the Civil War was able to ignore the need to attract 
foreign backing for their struggle. Both White and Red forces 
found themselves faced by a similar problem, however, in the 
shape of the general lack of Finnish experience in the diplomatic 
field. 
Some form of contact with Sweden was considered important by 
the revolutionary administration in order to prevent the Left 
becoming completely cut off from the West and to maintain trading 
ties with Finland's major trading partners in Western Europe. The 
movement's various attempts to establish ties with Sweden 
and further afield with the United States proved totally futile. 
Isolation from the West indirectly increased the Left's links 
with and dependence on Russia. The Soviet government soon 
emerged, therefore, as a central factor in the Left's contacts abroad. 
Negotiations between the Red authorities and the Bolshevik 
government were held in Petrograd at the end of February to clarify 
political relations between Soviet Russia and Finland, or that part 
of Finland under Red control, negotiations which the socialists 
hoped would strengthen their disputed political status. 
An agreement between what was referred to as the Finnish 
Socialist Workers' Republic and Soviet Russia was signed on 1 
March. Among its clauses, the Red authorities agreed to cede the 
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area around Ino on the Karelian Isthmus to Russia and guarantee to 
ensure Russian telegraph links to Sweden through Finland, 
reflecting the importance Russia attached to Finland as a line of 
contact between Petrograd and the West. In line with the spirit of 
internationalist revolutionary thinking of the time, the agreement 
also allowed the citizens of both countries the right to gain citi-
zenship of the other country if they wished.34 Despite the socialist 
leaders' clear desire to be seen to be acting as independently of the 
Russians as possible, the Soviet side undoubtedly carried the 
major influence in the negotiations. The potential of the socialists 
to adopt an independent position in Petrograd was, in the final 
analysis, limited by their isolation from the West and the 
instability and inadequacy of their control over the territory they 
occupied within Finland itself. 
Following their occupation of Oulu and Tornio, the White forces 
were able to open up a land link with Sweden at the beginning of 
February. Overall communications between Vaasa, the temporary 
home of the official government, and the outside world, however, 
were relatively poor given the geographical distances involved and 
the slowness and inflexibility of the means available. The 
government's lack of its full complement of members and the 
absence of Svinhufvud, who had been unable to move to Vaasa, 
also further complicated the White authorities' handling of foreign 
affairs. Disagreements, sometimes amounting to open distrust, 
between the Vaasa government and Mannerheim's headquarters 
staff over foreign relations issues were also not uncommon. 
The Vaasa authorities did have access, however, to the official 
Finnish diplomatic legations established in mid-January in 
Stockholm and Berlin. Particular difficulties were caused by the 
activities of Finnish activists abroad, especially in Sweden. 
Having supported the independence cause for some considerable 
time, often since the beginning of the war, activist figures often 
tended to assume that they had a natural right to a say in the 
country's affairs. The inevitable result was that much of the 
diplomacy carried out in the name of the White authorities lacked 
coordination and often went beyond the wishes and instructions of 
34. Paasivirta 1957, pp. 97-8; Polvinen I 1967, pp. 246-50. 
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the Vaasa government.35 Finland's representatives in Berlin and 
Stockholm, Edvard Hjelt and Alexis Gripenberg, both members of 
the older generation of non-socialist politicians, acted relatively 
independently of Vaasa in directing the thrust of White diplomacy, 
often presenting their younger colleagues back home with little 
more than faits accomplis. Germany, motivated by a desire to 
develop Finland as a base from which to follow British moves in 
Murmansk and keep a check on events in Petrograd, was also not 
slow to use its powers of influence on Finnish affairs.36 
In the early days of the struggle the White leadership made some 
effort to recruit volunteers from Sweden and acquire arms from 
both Sweden and Germany. As time went on, however, the Vaasa 
authorities increasingly came to abandon the style of neutral 
foreign policy which had been adopted in the immediate post-
independence period. This was reflected in a clear shift during 
February towards closer contacts with Germany. This was 
undoubtedly linked to the impressive success of the German 
army's rapid advance along virtually the entire length of the 
Eastern Front following the breakdown of the negotiations at Brest-
Litovsk and which was only halted by the peace agreement signed 
on 3 March, which ceded large areas in the East to Germany and 
brought an extensive eastward spread of German power and 
influence. Soon after the final signing of the Brest-Litovsk treaty, 
the Vaasa government itself signed two agreements with the 
Germans in Berlin on 7 March, laying the groundwork for the 
arrival of German troops in Finland and the development of 
bilateral trade relations. The latter of these agreements included a 
secret understanding giving Germany virtual control over 
Finland's entire foreign trade and tying Finland securely into the 
German sphere of economic influence.37 
The arrival of German troops to reinforce White forces took place 
at the beginning of April with the landing of a division 
commanded by General von der Goltz at Hanko on the southern 
coast. This was quickly followed by a rapid advance on Helsinki 
which, together with the capture of Tampere by White units at 
about the same time, signalled a major turning-point in the 
35. Tuompo 1938, 34-7, 46-8; Paasivirta 1957, p. 104. 
36. Paasivirta 1957, pp. 104-5, 112-3; Rautkallio 1977, p. 90. 
37. Paasivirta 1957, pp. 113-5; Rautkallio 1977, pp. 132-4. 
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struggle. The German landing at Hanko effectively broke the Red's 
hold on western Finland and served to accelerate the pace of White 
success, which had already begun in any case to outmatch that of 
their Red opponents. German troops occupied Helsinki and 
Hämeenlinna to the north, while further east White forces took 
Viipuri at the end of April. Following their withdrawal from 
western Finland, Russian troops had halted and taken up 
temporary positions on the Karelian Isthmus to ensure the 
protection of Petrograd. Viipuri and its surroundings remained of 
strategic importance to the Russians as long as scattered Russian 
units remained in southern Finland. White forces came up against 
determined joint Russian and Red Finnish resistance at Rautu on 
the Isthmus on the approaches to Petrograd at the end of Apri1.38 
The final result of the Civil War was ultimately decided by the 
superior resources and flexibility of the White army and the wider 
experience of its officer corps, from its commander-in-chief, 
Mannerheim, down to its German-trained field officers. Coupled 
to this, the Whites also possessed a greater sense of internal unity, 
together with a more integrated set of political aims and better 
morale.39 
By the latter stages of the struggle, forces on both sides had 
reached some 70-80,000 men. The number of dead ran to some 
3,000 all told during the course of the three-month conflict. More 
significantly, however, the number of those who lost their lives, 
both behind the lines during the war and in the repercussions 
afterwards, was much higher. Around 1,600 Whites were 
murdered by Red forces during the course of the war in southern 
Finland and some 800 Reds by the Whites in the rest of the 
country. In the aftermath of the occupation of Tampere and the 
ending of hostilities which followed soon after, over 8,000 Red 
prisoners were executed, while some 12,000 more Reds died in the 
hastily set-up prison camps, mainly of malnutrition, inadequate 
hygiene conditions and poor health. Of the over 28,000 who died 
in the Civil War and its aftermath, the proportion of those who 
died in active combat amounted only to between 20-25%.40 
38. Paasivirta 1957, pp. 214-5; Lappalainen II 1981, p. 88. 
39. Paasivirta 1957, pp. 103, 170-1, 189-96; Lappalainen I 1981, p. 228. 
40. Tanner 1919, pp. 12, 20; Paasivirta 1957, pp. 227-8; Mikola 1959, pp. 262-3; 
J. Paavolainen I 1966, 316-23, II 1967, 146-9. 
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The Civil War of 1918 was a conflict that grew out of, and to an 
important extent reinforced and consolidated, powerful and deep-
rooted social antipathies and its repercussions came to have a 
significant impact on future developments. This was not restricted 
merely to those who took part in the struggle but filtered through 
into the whole body of society, being particularly evident in the 
reactions of the middle and upper classes in southern Finland, the 
traditional backbone of the country, who experienced some three 
months of Red occupation. It was precisely this section of the 
population which was prominent in celebrating the liberation of 
Helsinki by the Germans from the Reds. For the defeated Reds, the 
unhappy fate of many of those interned in the temporary prison 
camps or forced to flee the country made a deep impression which 
time proved slow to dim. 
The events of the spring of 1918 came to play an important part 
in reshaping attitudes within Finland to the country's place in 
Europe and served to establish a distinct set of stereotypical 
attitudes towards Finland's neighbours and the outside world in 
general. Understandably, it was the White view of events which 
came to dominate. Among conservative opinion in the southern 
part of the country, the role of the German forces under von der 
Goltz and, by extension, German soldiery and heroism, became the 
subject of much unbridled admiration. This attachment to things 
German also tied into the sense of gratitude felt by these groups for 
the role Germany had played in helping Finnish volunteers earlier 
in the war. Germany's willingness to assist Finland at her hour of 
need was often contrasted by commentators with the lack of 
enthusiasm which had been shown by Sweden. Sweden, in fact, 
came to be looked upon as having virtually betrayed Finland, both 
by failing to provide the Whites with as much help as they had 
needed and by bringing unnecessary pressure to bear on Finland 
over the Aland Islands question at a time of national upheaval. 
The period immediately following the end of the Civil War also 
saw the emergence of a new and negative attitude towards Britain, 
particularly amongst the more pro-German elements within 
Finnish society. The British expeditionary force's recruitment of 
Red troops which had fled Finland, following its landing in 
Murmansk, led to it being immediately labelled as pro-socialist 
and potentially hostile to the White authorities. Post-Civil War 
White opinion also reflected a pronounced shift towards an 
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increased hostility and suspicion of Bolshevism and everything 
Russian. Although in large measure only an extension of earlier 
non-socialist views, this antipathy, one which developed both 
political and moral overtones, was given added force by the 
persistent argument underlying much of conservative comment 
that the Bolsheviks had been involved in provoking the Civil War 
from the very start, as part of a bid to strip Finland of her 
independence and her social and historical heritage.41  
Powerless and ideologically cowed after its defeat, Red opinion 
lacked any single common uniting factor which would have served 
to restore left-wing confidence. Anti-German sentiment was 
mixed with a vague and ill-defined attitude to the rest of Europe. 
The Left's overall sense of pessimism was only reinforced by the 
very real doubts which continued to surround the question of 
whether the revolution in Russia would be able to continue and 
expand or be turned back on itself. 
4. The aftermath of the Civil War — 
constitutional and foreign policy debate 
The end of the Civil War in May 1918 in a White victory and the 
withdrawal of the last Russian units remaining on Finnish soil set 
the seal on the severance of Finland's century-long political and 
constitutional links with Russia. With the replacement of Russian 
troops with German ones, in the shape of the expeditionary force 
commanded by General von der Goltz, however, Finland merely 
exchanged political and military dependence on Russia for 
dependence on Germany. 
When it became clear to the Western powers that the German 
force intended staying in Finland, they sent a number of notes to 
the Finnish government to sound out the extent of Finland's 
apparent new status as a German satellite state. In an effort to head 
off a possible German attempt at gaining access to the Arctic 
Ocean, the British government warned the Finnish authorities in 
no uncertain terms, in a note sent on 24 April, that they should not 
41. T. Manninen 1982, pp. 188-91; Upton II 1981, p. 459. 
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permit any aggressive action to be launched from Finnish territory 
against the British forces then operating south of Murmansk. The 
note also contained a list of the requirements that Finland would 
have to comply with before Britain would be willing to recognise 
her independence. France similarly made it plain to the Finnish 
government on a number of occasions during April that it would 
be impossible to establish diplomatic relations between the two 
countries until all German troops stationed in Finland had been 
evacuated. In their note of 30 April the French also demanded 
guarantees, along the lines proposed by Britain, that Finland 
would not permit or initiate any military activities across her 
eastern border. The Finnish response to these Western notes was 
in large part outlined in discussions with German diplomatic 
represen-tatives, who advised Finland to refuse the terms 
proposed. Finland's refusal was communicated to the British 
authorities through the intermediary of the Finnish official news 
agency, to avoid direct discussions on the issue.42 
The strong shift towards conservativism which had emerged 
within White opinion made itself especially felt when the 
government turned to the question of deciding the nature of the 
country's future constitution. The first outlines put forward in 
April embraced a variety of different constitutional models 
based on a bicameral parliament.43 By May, at the time of the 
celebrations of the White victory, opinion had swung strongly in 
favour of a monarchy and a style of government and political 
administration much closer to the German ideal. 
Those behind the monarchist idea never aimed at the 
establishment of a modern constitutional monarchy along the lines 
of the Norwegian model instituted after the dissolution of the 
union between Sweden and Norway in 1905, but rather at the 
creation of a strong monarchy in the style of the old-established 
European monarchies. Under such an arrangement, the monarchy 
would be able to act as an effective counterbalance to Parliament 
and the challenge of radical democracy and mass parties, and 
thereby protect the established social system. The proposed 
constitution put forward by the monarchists included an absolute 
42. Paasivirta 1961, pp. 22-3. 
43. Paasivirta 1957, pp. 257-62. 
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right of veto for the head of state on all constitutional questions 
and the requirement of a two-thirds parliamentary majority to 
reverse his veto on ordinary legislation when it was returned to 
the house. No real mention of the principles of parliamentary 
government was included. The conservative groups behind the 
monarchist proposal laid much of the blame for the outbreak of the 
Civil War at the door of the democratic developments which had 
taken place in Finland during 1917, which were seen as having led 
to the Diet gaining too much power and to an explosion of social 
anarchy within society. Seen in this light, the authorities had a 
duty to prevent the possibility of a similar situation again 
overtaking the country.44 It was also hoped that by adopting a 
more avowedly pro-German foreign policy and by choosing a 
German prince as the country's future king, Finland would be able 
to secure German support for her expansionist aims in East 
Karelia.45  
The monarchist constitution found little favour among more 
moderate political figures such as K. J. Ståhlberg, who came to the 
forefront of liberal republican opinion through his authorship of a 
pamphlet entitled 'Future outlooks', which appeared at the end of 
April. In this, Ståhlberg argued for the adoption of policies aimed 
at social reform and national conciliation to help heal the wounds 
that had been inflicted on Finnish society by the Civil War. 
Ståhlberg was particularly concerned to stem the atmosphere of 
revenge and fear which he felt had overtaken society in the 
aftermath of the ending of hostilities. In the eyes of Ståhlberg and 
his fellow like-minded republicans such as the Agrarian Party 
leader Santeri Alkio, the virtues of democracy and parliamentary 
government were undisputed, both as long-term ideals for the 
whole of human society and as the best basis for Finland's 
independent constitution. Nothing that had happened in the Civil 
War, as they saw things, necessitated the abandonment of these 
beliefs. On the contrary, the country needed a form of government 
acceptable to as wide a spectrum of the population as possible, and 
one which would be able to provide a framework for effective 
popular participation in politics to help rebuild and consolidate 
44. Ibid., pp. 256-7. 
45. Ibid., pp. 272, 282-3; UP 27.7.1918. 
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Finland's internal unity and strength after the traumatic 
experiences of the Civil War.4s 
Liberal republican opinion was guided by the conviction that in 
the long term the country's external security and its ability to 
consolidate its new place in the world were in large part 
dependent on the degree of stability achieved in the country's 
internal affairs. The country's future security was not, however, to 
be achieved at the drop of a hat, it was recognised, rather it would 
grow out of a gradual process of national development. In contrast 
to the monarchists, the republicans were considerably more 
sanguine about the potential ability of small nations to pursue 
their own independent foreign policy, and about the extent of 
Finland's potential room for manoeuvre in her dealings with 
Germany. While undoubtedly aware of the major differences in 
the political systems of the Scandinavian and Western countries 
from those of the countries of Central Europe, republican 
supporters, conscious of their comments' possible implications 
beyond Finland's borders, carefully avoided drawing any 
significant comparisons between the two types of government 
which might have reflected badly against the latter. While making 
no attempt to unrealistically minimise the powerful position 
enjoyed by Germany during the spring and summer of 1918, the 
republicans underlined the greater resources available to the 
Western powers. Their monarchist opponents, in contrast, put 
their trust in a final German victory. Finland could not afford, the 
republicans argued, to put all her political eggs in one basket and 
had to allow room for future flexibility in her relations with the 
rest of Europe. 
The conflict that developed between monarchist and republican 
opinion during the summer of 1918 was reminiscent, in its 
bitterness and uncompromising tones, of the bloodier struggle that 
had taken place the previous spring, with the difference that this 
time it was one waged only between the victors of the Civil War. 
Debate in the Diet, which began sitting again at the end of May, 
was handicapped by the fact that the house lacked all but one of its 
socialist members, some 90 out of a total of 200, making the 
assembly little short of a rump parliament. This gave the 
46. Paasivirta 1957, pp. 269-70; Lindman 1968, pp. 369-72; Mylly 1978, pp. 
67-8; Kaleva 24.7.1918; Ilkka 24.7.1918. 
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monarchists an effective majority, despite their numbering under 
60 members, although not a sufficiently large enough one to ensure 
their proposal's immediate approval. In a piece of calculated 
political brinkmanship aimed at bypassing the republican versus 
monarchist argument altogether, the monarchists pushed through 
a vote on Article 38 of the Act of Government of 1772 on 8 August, 
passed by a simple majority, allowing for the beginning of 
preparations for electing a monarch. 
The German economic grip on Finland, which had been 
guaranteed by the trade agreement signed by the Vaasa government 
with Germany in March, had been steadily growing.47 Finland's 
foreign trade had in a short period of time become increasingly 
concentrated on Germany and those areas of Eastern Europe 
extending into the Ukraine under German occupation, and become 
largely cut off from the rest of Europe. In response to this, Britain 
adopted a no-trade policy in May with what was described as 
German-occupied Finland, freezing Finnish assets and credits 
held with British banks. Sweden too adopted a cautious trading 
policy with Finland, partly, it is true, as a result of pressure from 
the West. 
Germany's powerful role in the Finnish economy was also 
reflected in the setting-up of centralised marketing and trading 
organisations to handle Finland's trade with Germany. The timber 
and paper industry, which had already had some experience of 
centralising its export operations, set up The Finnish Paper 
Producers' Association and The Finnish Cellulose Producers' 
Association at the beginning of July to act as common sales 
organisations for the industry, alongside the already existing 
Finnish Pulp Producers' Association.48 In other areas of the 
economy, however, there was some resistance to centralised sales 
organisations, as both unfamiliar and untried in Finnish 
conditions and largely unwanted but for the necessity of trading 
with Germany, and as likely to unfairly favour large companies at 
the expense of the interests of smaller enterprises.49 
47. Böhme 1973, pp. 378-93. 
48. T. v. Wright 1928, p. 8; Paasivirta 1968, p. 205; Rautkallio 1977, pp. 315-8; 
Kauppalehti 3.7.1918. 
49. T. v. Wright 1928, pp. 17-18. 
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The timber and paper industries, both with large stocks built up 
over the war years, had high hopes of expanding exports into the 
Ukraine. Two leading figures in the field, Gösta Serlachius and 
Rudolf Walden, travelled to the Ukraine in August to survey the 
local market's potential, which it was hoped would be sufficient to 
fill the gap left by the loss of the large Russian market. Exports to 
the Ukraine would also give Finland access to supplies of much-
needed Ukrainian products such as sugar.50 It was hoped in 
Finland that exports of timber and paper products to Germany 
would allow Finland to reciprocally begin imports from Germany, 
but this proved largely impossible in practice. Some shipments of 
grain, it is true, were authorised, but the continuation of the war in 
the West meant that Germany was unable to supply Finnish 
industry with the raw materials it needed, a factor which severely 
hindered Finland's industrial recovery after the Civil War. 
The Finnish Trade and Industry Commission was forced to 
control the country's foreign trading relations with a firm hand and 
within a framework of strict rationing regulations. Rationing took 
a somewhat similar form to that in Sweden and Germany, although 
it was introduced relatively late in the day.51 This allowed the 
growth of an active black market economy exploiting the shortages 
of food and other commodities affecting the ordinary population 
and exacerbating the general decline in purchasing power and 
inflation. Finland's difficult position in the summer of 1918 
forced the business community to aim at a policy of developing 
national self-sufficiency in as many sectors of the economy as 
possible. Optimism about the future, however, at a time when 
Europe was entering its fifth year of war, was understandably at a 
low ebb.52 
The reorganisation of the White army into a national defence 
force at the end of the Civil War similarly reflected the pro-
German policies that had been adopted as the basis of the country's 
foreign policy. Mannerheim's original plans were shelved at 
50. See R. Walden's memorandum of 3.9.1918 to the Finnish Association of Paper 
Producers and the latter's of 20.9.1918 to Leo Ehrnrooth. Also, Henrik Ram-
say's memorandum of 8.10.1918 to Leo Ehrnrooth (SMKL archive). Ahvenai-
nen 1972, p. 76; Kauppalehti 31.7.1918. 
51. Kauppa- ja teollisuusministeriö 1888-1938, pp. 114-5. 
52. Kauppalehti 7.8.1918. 
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Svinhufvud's direction, following the latter's decision to use 
German staff officers to coordinate the restructuring programme. 
This move prompted Mannerheim to resign as commander-in-
chief at the end of May and saw the appointment of the pro-
German General Wilhelm Thesleff as Minister of War. 
A special body of German officers under Colonel Konrad von 
Redern numbering 95 in all was given the task of establishing a 
new national army. Commandership of the new force was initially 
shared between a German and a Finnish officer, Colonel von 
Redern and Colonel N. G. Procope, but in August this was changed 
to give von Redern complete control.53 German aims focused on 
developing the army into a serviceable body of men capable of 
participating in German military operations in North-East Europe 
and particularly in possible joint German-Finnish action to force 
the British out of Murmansk.54 
Close links with Germany were seen by both Svinhufvud, the 
country's acting head of state, and Paasikivi, the new Prime 
Minister, as forming the basis for Finland's future security and as 
providing the backing needed for Finnish territorial expansion 
into East Karelia. Svinhufvud had been a strong advocate of pro-
German policies since the previous autumn, when he had come to 
the conclusion that only by tying Finland to Germany would the 
country gain both national security and a measure of protection 
against the threat of revolution spreading from Soviet Russia. 
Paasikivi's views had been shaped in large measure by his Civil 
War experiences. As a small, politically-isolated state with 
minimal military resources, Finland was in no position, in 
Paasikivi's view, to play a balancing act between the major 
wartime alliances, as Greece and Rumania had tried to do. Some 
form of close tie with Germany seemed to offer the best option, and 
the choice of a German prince, preferably a member of the 
Hohenzollern family, as Finland's first king the best guarantee of 
the future continuity of close Finnish-German relations.55 The 
need to develop Anglo-Finnish relations appeared to Paasikivi to 
be of much less importance, although he appreciated the need to 
53. Terä-Tervasmäki I 1973, pp. 40, 43. 
54. Paasivirta 1957, pp. 347-8; Polvinen II 1971, 21-5. 
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avoid war between the two countries. 
On the question of likely developments in the international 
situation, Paasikivi came to believe by the early summer that the 
re-establishment of Tsarist rule in Russia would only be a matter of 
time and that in its wake Russia's alliance with the Western 
powers would be restored.56 A number of his fellow monarchists, 
however, supposed that following the secession of the Ukraine the 
Russian Empire would eventually disintegrate into a number of 
smaller states, while some even went so far as to suggest that 
Petrograd would emerge as an independent free city as part of the 
same disintegration process.57 
Following the establishment of close political and economic ties 
between Finland and Germany, cultural links between the two 
countries also began to flourish anew, albeit with a more political 
colouring, following the lifting of the restrictions which had been 
imposed in the early part of the war. This new political factor also 
partly influenced the choice of those figures selected by the 
Finnish government to take part in handling bilateral cultural 
relations with Germany. The Germans for their part, in line with 
their desire to consolidate Finnish-German relations, also showed 
an active interest in encouraging these links, within the limits 
imposed by wartime conditions. 
The Finnish government's decision taken in the autumn to send 
a large cultural delegation to Germany reflected its conviction of 
the importance of consolidating ties across as wide a spectrum as 
possible. The group included a number of pro-monarchist figures 
such as Professor J. J. Mikkola, the scholar K. S. Laurila and the 
writer V. A. Koskenniemi.58 Finnish music by the likes of Sibelius, 
Palmgren, Järnefelt and Merikanto had featured prominently in 
Germany in the late summer in the series of concerts given by 
Georg Schneevoigt, the principle conductor of the Helsinki 
Philharmonic Orchestra. The Finnish singers, Hanna Granfelt and 
Irma Tervani, also held a number of concerts in Berlin and 
elsewhere in Germany.S9 Helsinki saw the visit of a number of 
56. See the minutes of the discussion between the Senate and leading non-socialist 
MPs dated 8.7.1918 (Eduskunnan arkisto 1917 II VP). 
57. US 17.4.1919. 
58. Kunnas 1976, pp. 159-60; UP 7.11.1918. 
59. For coverage of the visits, see US 3.8., 9.8., 11.8., 17.8., 21.8., 25.9., 26.9.1918; 
Hbl 6.8., 10.8., 16.8., 31.8., 15.9.1918; SvT 17.9.1918. 
154 
German theatre and operetta companies between July and 
September. Plans were also mooted in the autumn for the 
establishment of a German theatre in the Finnish capital.6° 
The importance of Finnish-German cultural relations was also 
emphasised within Finland's Swedish-speaking community, 
which, at least in its higher echelons, was prominent in stressing 
Finland's deep debt of gratitude towards Germany for her role in 
liberating the country. The Germanic ethnic roots of the Swedish-
speaking population were enthusiastically underlined, as was the 
Germanic spirit of the Swedish-language cultural inheritance in 
Finland.61 The importance of links with Germany was paralleled 
to that of those with Sweden. This did not prove entirely 
unproblematic, however, as a number of commentators in Sweden 
itself proved distinctly suspicious of what they saw as the 
Swedish-speaking population's uncritical and headlong embrace 
of closer ties with Germany. This led to an underlining of 
Finland's role as what was described as an 'outpost of Western 
civilisation against the East', and an emphasis on the White victory 
in the Civil War as one of Western values and ideals won against 
the threat of Eastern barbarism.62 
From the German perspective, Finland was necessarily seen very 
much in the context of Germany's overall policy towards Russia 
and Eastern Europe. The importance of maintaining good relations 
with the Soviet government following the Brest-Litovsk peace 
could not be ignored by German decision-makers. It was therefore 
no surprise that Germany proved quite willing to accede to Soviet 
interests in the outlining of the Soviet-Finnish border on the 
Karelian Isthmus to the north of Petrograd.63  
Relatively little attention was paid by the Finnish government to 
the military and political potential of the Western powers, or the 
continuing shift in the balance of military power along the Western 
Front caused by the steadily growing presence of American troops 
alongside the French and British forces." Following the Brest- 
60. US 27.8.1918; Hbl 17.9.1918; UP 3.7., 10.7., 27.7., 31.7., 24.9.1918. 
61. Nya Argus 1.5.1918. 
62. Nya Argus 1.5., 16.5.1918; Finsk Tidskrift II 1918, p. 155. 
63. Paasivirta 1957, p. 341. 
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Litovsk peace in the spring, Germany had been able to concentrate 
her military resources on the struggle in the West, but by the 
summer the German offensive had ground to a halt, with German 
troops suffering their first real setbacks at the beginning of August. 
It did not take long for the German High Command to realise that 
Germany's hopes of winning the war in the West had largely 
melted away, and the German government was informed on 29 
September that Germany's best option lay in sueing for peace. 
German problems in the West were further complicated by 
developments in the Balkans, where the combined German and 
Austro-Hungarian front began to show signs of crumbling 
following the beginning of the British offensive from Greece into 
Bulgaria.65 
By the time a new parliamentary government under Prince Max 
von Baden, including members from those political groups which 
had opposed Germany's war policy, took office on 3 October, the 
overall military situation in Europe was drawing close to the 
inevitability of an armistice and defeat for Germany and the other 
Central Alliance powers. This also spelt changes for Finland.66 
The Finnish decision to elect a German king, Prince Friedrich Karl 
of Hessen, taken on 9 October by a Diet majority of 58-44, sat 
uneasily with the views of some of the members of the new 
German government who had previously expressed their 
opposition to the whole monarchist idea. The climate of Finnish 
political opinion was also changing, rapidly making the 
monarchist decision virtually bankrupt before it had even been put 
into effect. The changes that had taken place at home and abroad 
would mean, as the republican paper Helsingin Sanomat put it, 
that the proposed king would ascend the Finnish throne 'not only 
against the wishes of the majority of the Finnish people, but also 
against those of the majority of the German people as well.'67 
Problems also developed in foreign trade, with Finnish hopes of 
a buoyant Ukrainian market rudely dashed by the Bolshevik 
capture of Riga towards the end of the year, thereby breaking 
Finland's overland route southwards, stranding a large shipment 
65. Eyck I 1954, pp. 49-51. 
66. Ibid., pp. 53-8. 
67. HS 8.10.1918. 
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of Finnish paper before it even left the harbour for onward 
shipment, and preventing the supplies of Ukrainian sugar which 
had been negotiated as compensation payment getting through to 
Finland.68 
5. The end of the war in Europe 
The ending of the First World War on 11 November 1918 in an 
armistice requested by Germany on terms dictated by the Western 
powers set in train a series of political and social transformations 
across Europe. Over four years of continuous war had left a deep 
mark on the societies of all the combatant countries and caused the 
loss of millions of lives and severe economic disruption across the 
whole continent. Losses were not restricted to the defeated and 
were as real for the West as for Germany and her allies. The 
closeness of the struggle, however, meant that the Western powers 
and France in particular, in their bid to secure the peace and make 
it stick, took an uncompromising stance towards the defeated at 
the peace negotiations which began in Paris in January 1919. 
The release of the pressures built up by the war following the 
armistice produced a strong political and social backlash within 
Germany and Austro-Hungary. The old imperial monarchies 
collapsed and were replaced by new political forces drawn from 
the Centre and the Left, both of which had been critical of wartime 
policies and had for some time prior to the end of hostilities 
advocated a negotiated peace. The leaders of these groups now 
rose to important positions of power and influence in the 
aftermath of defeat.69 
The defeat of the Central powers also presented the minority 
nationalities of the region with fresh hopes and the possibility, at 
least in theory, of realising their ideals of independence. The 
Czech independence movement, acting on the initiative of its 
emigre leaders Tomas Masaryk and Eduard Benes, had established 
a Czech National Council in Paris in 1916 and attempted to forge 
unofficial diplomatic links with the British, French and American 
68. T. v. Wright 1928, p. 18. 
69. Bracher VI 1975, pp. 19-27. 
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governments, in line with the movement's general leanings 
towards the West. Opinion in Poland on the question of the type 
and extent of great power support that would be necessary to 
guarantee the setting-up of an independent Poland had been 
divided and less certain of the West's ultimate victory. The hopes 
of those serving under Pilsudsky in Austrian Galitsia had never 
been especially high and were even less so after the signing of the 
Brest-Litovsk agreement in March 1918, which had only seemed to 
confirm the continuance of German military might. The Polish 
circles grouped around Roman Dmowski, which had been more 
optimistic about the West's possible success, had been encouraged 
by the inclusion in Article 14 of President Wilson's peace 
programme published in January 1918 of the aim of establishing an 
independent Polish state. 
An independent Czech republic was declared in Prague in 
October 1918 in the final stages of the war. Some weeks later this 
was followed by the setting-up of an independent Polish 
republican government under Pilsudsky in Warsaw. Yugoslavia 
began to take shape between October and December 1918 in Serbia 
and the south Slav areas of Austro-Hungary.70 All these nascent 
states shared a common dependency on Western political support 
for their future survival. 
For many observers in Europe a large question mark, however, 
hung over the future of Russia at the end of the war. The 
withdrawal in November 1918 of German troops from large areas 
of Eastern Europe removed a major anxiety from the concerns of 
the Soviet government, which had been able to claim control over 
only a part of European Russia in addition to Petrograd and 
Moscow after the signing of the Brest-Litovsk Peace. Bolshevik 
hopes were raised yet higher by developments in Germany 
following the latter's declaration a republic, and plans were put in 
hand for a westward advance by the Red Army to expand the 
Soviet authorities' hold on Russian territory. The focus of 
Bolshevik interest turned north-eastwards to the Baltic, in line 
with established pre-revolutionary Russian strategy. Operations 
were begun in the Estonian region and further south in an attempt 
to open up access to central Europe and direct trade links with the 
70. Komarnicki 1957, pp. 223-66; Lederer 1963, pp. 36-53. 
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West. The Bolsheviks were forced to confront the newly 
independent states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania and their 
liberal, agrarian and social democratic governments. Finland to 
the north of the Gulf of Finland, which had previously been the 
object of competing Russian and German ambitions, now became 
of minor importance in the new struggle.71 The situation was 
further complicated by the fact that within Russia itself the 
struggle between the Soviet authorities and the various White 
governments receiving Western support, especially along the 
Empire's borders, had begun to take on major proportions. 
The new tide of political and social change which swept over 
Europe at the end of the war was reflected in the establishment of 
new democratic governments in Germany and Austria, following 
the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and that of the new 
independent states. Change was not restricted, however, solely to 
those countries which had fought in the war, but also extended to 
those which had managed to escape involvement. In Sweden, for 
example, the social democrats and liberals actively campaigned for 
an increased measure of reform. The new strength of radical left-
wing ideologies was reflected in the revolutions such as that led by 
Bela Kun in Hungary, which took place in the spring of 1919. 
Although post-war Europe was in many senses divided into two 
political camps, the victors and the defeated, in ideological terms 
the sharpest and most absolute division between the nations of the 
region ran between the new Russia under the Bolsheviks and the 
rest of Europe. This division was symbolised in the persons of 
Lenin and Woodrow Wilson, the former personifying the ideals of 
violent social revolution and the elimination of capitalism, and the 
latter, with his appeal to the notion of national self-determination, 
which found widespread favour with the minority nationalities of 
the region, representing those of a more conventionally liberal 
future. Wilson's call for a fair peace, however, was quickly ignored 
when the great powers came to decide on the future of Europe. 
The split which had developed within the international labour 
movement between moderate and radical revolutionary opinion 
was strongly highlighted in immediate post-war Germany in the 
bitter argument which flared up between the majority under 
71. v. Rauch 1970, pp. 51-6; Paasivirta 1969, p. 21. 
159 
Friedrich Ebert, who advocated the defence of parliamentary 
democracy and the calling of a national assembly to resolve the 
constitutional basis of the new republic, and the more radical 
minority of the movement, which argued for building Germany's 
future on the basis of the workers' and soldiers' soviets established 
during November. The decision of Ebert's government to go ahead 
with elections for a national assembly provoked the spartakist 
minority to stage an uprising in Berlin in January 1919, which saw 
the death of two of the radical movement's leading figures, Karl 
Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg, when it was put down by the 
authorities with the help of the army.72 Neither conservative 
opinion, which still remained attached to the idea of German 
greatness, nor its radical counterpart, which remained convinced 
of its revolutionary ideals, however, proved receptive to the 
parliamentary constitution finally hammered out by the National 
Assembly. The new Austrian republic fared little better, with the 
deepening of the internal schism between the mildly radical 
social democrat-controlled labour movement and conservative 
Catholic opinion with its sympathies still closely associated with 
pre-1918 Austro-Hungary. Bela Kun's revolutionary government 
in Hungary managed to remain in power for some six months 
before collapsing and being replaced by a conservative 
administration headed by Horthy.73 
6. Finland and the Western powers 
The latter stages of the war, bringing with them the increasing 
prospect of a German defeat, had seen a significant deepening of 
the gulf in Finnish political life which had opened up during the 
earlier part of 1918 between monarchist and republican opinion, 
and this was only further highlighted in the wake of the German 
surrender. The republicans now gained added support from the 
Social Democrats, who had been largely inactive during the 
summer months in the aftermath of the Red defeat in the Civil War. 
The shift in international fortunes caused by the decline and final 
72. Jolt 1973, pp. 242-5. 
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collapse of German power and influence was understandably the 
cause of particular dismay and apprehension among the 
monarchists. The very foundation on which they had built their 
hopes of future Finnish security within Europe, and which they 
had seen as the ultimate guarantor of the continuity of the 
country's internal status quo, had simply crumbled away. There 
seemed little reason to doubt, in many monarchists' minds, that 
Finland would as a result be subject once again to the threat of 
renewed socialist-inspired internal unrest, coupled with a possible 
attack from the East." This doubt about the country's chances of 
avoiding such a development was reinforced by what appeared to 
be the strength of the revolutionary movement elsewhere in 
Europe. With the country's internal stability seemingly under 
threat for the second time within a year, the reorganisation of the 
Civil Guard was rapidly put in hand during November and 
December to provide the means of resisting any unwelcome 
developments, the organisation having fallen into some disarray 
following the end of the Civil War.75 
Republican reaction to the defeat of Germany was in many 
respects the complete opposite to that of the monarchists. The 
about-turn in the international situation provided the republicans 
with much cause for optimism after their months of having to play 
second fiddle to the monarchists. Typical of this sense of changed 
fortunes were the celebrations which attended the meeting of non-
socialist republican leaders held on 10 November in Helsinki 
following the news of the abdication of Kaiser Wilhelm II in 
Germany.76 Similar enthusiasm had also been evident among the 
Social Democratic leadership at a meeting held by the party in the 
capital slightly earlier to discuss the recent developments in 
Europe, and in the decision taken at a meeting on 5 November to 
set up a new temporary coordinating committee and issue a 
demand, in an attempt to upstage their non-socialist republican 
74. SvT 31.10., 14.11.1918; US 14.11., 5.12.1918; Hbl 15.11.1918; Karjala 
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opponents, for the holding of new elections and the appointment 
of a new government." 
Both republican groups shared the view, in opposition to the 
monarchists, that no major danger faced Finland as a result of the 
changed international situation, but that, on the contrary, the 
country now had the opportunity to work towards a more broad-
based consolidation of Finland's position with regard to the rest of 
Europe and to push forward with much-needed internal reform. 
Liberal republican opinion saw Finland's best option as one of 
genuine and 'permanent' neutrality. This was thought likely to 
win the most support from the West and thereby accelerate the 
process of Western recognition of Finnish independence, and be 
most attractive to the rest of Scandinavia, allowing for stronger ties 
in the Scandinavian region.78 The new Social Democratic 
leadership also favoured neutrality as the basis of the country's 
future foreign policy, and stressed the importance of gaining wider 
Western recognition for the declaration of independence.79 
The Social Democratic leadership believed that the ending of 
the war would be bound to have a positive effect on calming 
the situation within the country and removing the restrictions 
preventing the normalisation of Finnish political life. In particular, 
it offered the prospect of the party once again being able to 
challenge the artificially-maintained dominance of conservative 
opinion which had reigned since the end of the Civil War. The 
extent of socialist discontent at the unrepresentative nature of the 
Diet and the government was underlined in the appeal for support 
the party sent out to foreign social democratic parties in 
November, which declared in no uncertain terms that neither 
institution could justifiably claim the 'right to speak in the name of 
the Finnish people'.80 
Events on the wider European stage also went some way towards 
raising morale among the grass-roots supporters of the labour 
movement, although this did not take any very visible outward 
form, with workers' organisations remaining in a virtual limbo and 
77. SS 8.10., 18.10., 6.11.1918; H. Soikkanen 1975, pp. 322-4; J. Paavolainen 
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thousands of left-wing activists still imprisoned as a consequence 
of the Civil War and only one left-wing newspaper, Suomen 
Sosialidemokraatti, allowed to appear and then only irregularly. 
Opinion within the movement as a whole ranged from modest 
optimism about the future to open demands for revenge against the 
bourgeoisie. 
Change in the overall direction of Finnish politics was slow to 
come, however, even despite the decline in German fortunes 
which had began to make itself felt some time before Germany's 
final defeat, as a result of the close identification by conservative 
monarchist opinion of a pro-German foreign policy with the 
maintenance of the internal balance of power established after the 
Civil War. Any realignment of the country's foreign policy was 
feared likely to undermine the post-Civil War status quo and lead 
to further internal social instability. Conservative politicians were 
unwilling to make any real move until they could be sure of what 
the Western victory would mean in practice for Europe and until it 
became clear to what extent Finland would have to realign her 
foreign policy, and until it could best be determined how to 
effectively defend the country's internal political and social 
balance of power. 
Paasikivi's government decided to use the services of General 
Mannerheim to sound out British and French attitudes towards 
Finland and to clarify Finland's possibilities for improving 
her relations with the Western powers. Mannerheim was also 
given the thorny task of enquiring whether, in the changed 
circumstances, the West would be willing to accept Prince 
Friedrich Karl becoming the Finnish King.81 Monarchist fears 
were especially concentrated, with the Bulgarian example fresh in 
everybody's minds, on the possible negative consequences of an 
over-rapid Finnish disengagement from her previous pro-German 
policies, leaving Finland in a political no-man's land between 
Germany and the West.82 
Aware of the complexities of the situation, the government came 
to stress the need for a greater measure of cooperation between the 
81. Paasivirta 1961, p. 108. Also see Mannerheim's letter of 19.10.1918 to Werner 
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non-socialist parties as a means of ensuring a wider base of support 
for policy decisions and heading off a further possible challenge 
from the Left. This resulted in the setting up of a seventeen-man 
joint committee, including representatives from the republican 
parties, which up until then had been effectively excluded from 
government decision-making, to act as a coordinating body to keep 
a check on developments. Negotiations were also put in hand 
between the parties on the question of forming a new government. 
Progress on this issue was initially slow. A new government, 
however, under Lauri Ingman, with both monarchist and 
republican members, was finally appointed on 27 November, some 
two weeks after the end of the war in Europe. 
Mannerheim's visit in mid-November to London and Paris, 
while serving to put Finland's relations with the West on 
something of a new footing and one more appropriate to the 
changed international situation, did not, however, lead to the 
hoped-for Western recognition of Finnish independence which 
would have strengthened Finland's position in the lead-up to the 
Paris peace conference and extended and consolidated the 
country's network of diplomatic relations. Mannerheim, in fact, 
was only able to bring back details of the terms which the Finnish 
government would be required to meet before recognition could be 
approved.83 These included, in addition to the evacuation of 
German troops from the country, the holding of new parliamentary 
elections and the appointment of a new government. By imposing 
these conditions, Britain and France hoped to be able to ensure 
Finland's future friendly attitude towards the West and the 
removal of pro-German politicians from positions of power and 
influence in Finnish political life. 
Some more positive progress was nevertheless made on the other 
major issue of Finnish concern at the end of 1918, that of food aid. 
Finland had been included in the American food aid programme 
for Europe drawn up by Herbert Hoover as a country deserving 
some degree of assistance, although not as one of the major needy 
countries. Talks between Hoover and Rudolf Holsti, Finland's 
temporary diplomatic representative in London, led to the signing 
of a wide-ranging two-stage agreement on food aid shipments to 
83. Paasivirta 1961, pp. 114, 116. 
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Finland at the beginning of December.84 This allowed for an initial 
shipment of some 11,000 tons of grain to be immediately sent to 
Finland by Sweden and Denmark, both of which had previously 
expressed their willingness to assist in the problem, to be 
subsequently recompensed by the United States from its own 
reserves. Enough, it was thought, to satisfy Finland's short-term 
needs for approximately a month, this was to be followed by direct 
aid from the United States of up to a monthly maximum of 10,000 
tons of grain, 2,000 tons of pork, 1,000 tons of fat products and 
1,000 tons of sugar. The Western blockade would nevertheless 
otherwise remain in force. 
In addition to the obvious benefits this decision brought to 
Finland's straightened food supply situation, it also served an 
important role in assisting the establishment of closer working ties 
between Finland and the West. By deciding to grant Finland direct 
aid, the United States had also virtually given a de facto 
recognition of Finland's independent status. The Right cannot 
have been unaware of the tangible benefits to be gained from this 
aid in helping to stem further social discontent, intended as it was 
by its donors to help prevent instability in the newly-independent 
and emerging states of Europe. The unavoidability of the need to 
redraw the outline of Finland's foreign policy in the light of the 
changed international situation was ultimately recognised by the 
monarchist camp, although with some reluctance. Some fears 
remained, however, that the Western powers would attempt to 
interfere in Finland's internal affairs. The earlier dominance of 
Germany in monarchist thinking and the debt of gratitude felt 
towards Germany for her military assistance the previous spring 
were to be difficult for some to forget. 
The about-turn that had taken place in Finland's international 
position by the end of the year was tellingly reflected in the arrival 
of British and French military observers in Helsinki on the final 
evacuation of General von der Goltz' German troops in December 
1918.85 This switch in foreign military presence was also linked to 
84. Ibid., p. 93. 
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the change in the balance of power which had taken place as whole 
in the Baltic area. In addition to their obvious task of following 
developments within Finland, the new Western observers were 
also entrusted with the job of keeping a check on military and 
other developments in Russia, and Petrograd in particular, and the 
Baltic countries. Helsinki came, as a result, to assume a new and 
significant military and political role in Western eyes. 
7. Conflicting internal tensions 
The successive crises and upheavals affecting Finnish politics 
during 1918 had a significant impact on reshaping the nature of the 
party system. Established political allegiances and party political 
ideas inherited from the very different conditions and political 
priorities existing during the period of autonomy gave way to the 
development of a more European style of party apparatus, with a 
new emphasis on conservative and liberal parties. 
Awareness of the new demands imposed by recent develop-
ments and the proximity of the next elections served to accelerate 
the process of political regrouping which took place within the 
non-socialist camp.86 The founding of the National Coalition Party 
at the beginning of December 1918 by a group of non-socialists 
who had been closely associated with monarchist policies the 
same summer represented an obviously defensive reaction to the 
new political situation, a regrouping of forces by conservative 
opinion in the face of the German defeat and the growing strength 
of the supporters of more radical parliamentary democracy. This 
group represented the mainstream of right-wing conservative 
Finnish-speaking opinion. The new party was, all the same, less of 
a party in the modern sense of the word and more of a loose 
alliance of conservative politicians based around a core of shared 
conservative ideals, drawing its members from three very different 
earlier groupings; past supporters of conciliatory policies towards 
the Russians, passive resistance and the volunteer movement. 
The founding of the National Progressive Party, also at the 
beginning of December, united republican opinion, and particularly 
86. Borg 1965, pp. 125-9; Y. Blomstedt 1969, pp. 371-2. 
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that which had previously found a home within the Young Finns, 
into a single party organisation. The new party also served to fill 
the gap which had up until then existed on the Finnish political 
map for a European-style liberal party, committed to the ideal of 
bringing the country more firmly into the European political fold. 
Initially, however, it was mainly identified as the party for all 
those who felt themselves unable to support the National Coalition 
Party because of their dislike of the monarchists' plan to install a 
foreign prince as head of state. 
The nationalist Agrarian Party also enjoyed something of a 
renaissance. The party's self-confidence had been reinforced by 
the consistency of the republican policy championed by Santeri 
Alkio and the latter's unwillingness to compromise during the 
long arguments which had raged over the future constitution, 
and its continued ideological commitment to 'peasant democracy'. 
Distinctly less optimism was evident within the ranks of the 
Swedish People's Party, which found itself under increased 
pressure. As the traditional party of the political and social élite, 
its sympathies were close to the heart of White ideals and 
the monarchist cause. The country's increasing shift towards 
parliamentary democracy and populist politics, and which 
threatened to severely undercut the party's influence, was viewed 
with understandable concern. This was matched by the concern 
felt over the possible threat to the Swedish-speaking population's 
position posed by the increasing dominance of Finnish speakers in 
politics. The party's strong conservative and monarchist leanings 
were evident in its violent attack during 1918 on the leading 
Swedish-speaking politician Georg Schauman, following his 
advocacy of a republican form of government. Schauman later 
broke away from the party to form his own independent 
grouping.87 
The greatest difficulty facing the new leadership of the Social 
Democrats was that of overcoming the widespread resistance and 
suspicion felt towards the party throughout political opinion 
outside the Left in the aftermath of the Civil War, and of simply 
getting their party's opinions heard and regaining some political 
influence. The party found a partial ally in moderate non-socialist 
87. Nordström 1946, pp. 32-9. 
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opinion, which saw social democracy as a useful weapon in the 
struggle against Bolshevism. More conservative White opinion, 
however, proved consistently hostile to the whole of the Left. 
Although many of those prominent in the new Social Democratic 
leadership, including Väinö Tanner, had been or continued to be 
closely involved in the cooperative movement and lacked any 
history of involvement in Red activities during the Civil War, the 
party and the labour movement remained closely identified with 
the defeated Reds. Influential White opinion automatically 
associated the Left with a commitment to violent mass action and 
to an ideology which fundamentally ran against national interests 
and continued to threaten the basis of society. The reformed 
Social Democratic Party founded in December 1918 was quick to 
declare its political aim as one of Western-style social democracy. 
While condemning all those elements within the Left identified 
with Bolshevist or anarchist sympathies, the party nevertheless 
strongly criticised the treatment meted out by the authorities to the 
Red prisoners under detention, and called for an extensive 
amnesty for all political prisoners.88 
The parliamentary elections timed for March 1919 came as a 
natural conclusion to the period of transformation which had gone 
before, in the shape of the Civil War and the White interregnum 
which had followed. At the same time, because of their role as a 
watershed, they also generated significant political tension, being 
greeted with a mixture of enthusiasm, concern, doubt, fear and 
bitterness, depending on the political group in question. For the 
monarchists, the elections were to prove a difficult challenge, 
forcing them to come face to face with the fact of their minority 
status and the loss of the exceptional influence which they had 
been able to exert since May 1918. For republican opinion, both 
within the Progressive Party and the Agrarian Party, the elections 
held out the possibility of a significant growth in political 
influence and thus tended to be seen as a positive step forward. 
The Social Democrats entered the elections in a spirit of protest 
under their slogan 'A future free from oppression'.89 
88. H. Soikkanen 1975, pp. 329-32. 
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8. Towards a new foreign policy 
The consolidation of Finland's international position through the 
acquisition of wide-scale Western recognition for the country's 
independence took the centre stage in Finland's attempts to 
develop a new style of foreign policy following her disengagement 
from Germany. A central part in these efforts was played by 
General Mannerheim in his new role as Regent, to which position 
he was appointed on 12 December 1918, and by Carl Enckell, the 
foreign minister of the new Ingman government. 
The ending of the war and Finland's breakaway from her earlier 
pro-German policies served to ease trade between Finland and the 
Scandinavian countries, and allowed the dispatch of food aid from 
Sweden and Denmark. While the overall stabilisation of Finnish 
affairs and the Finnish economy was greeted with satisfaction in 
Sweden, being in line with Sweden's immediate general interests, 
there was less optimism among Swedish observers about the future 
of bilateral relations. There seemed the very real possibility of a 
long-term clash of economic interests developing between the two 
countries when Finland finally recovered from the after-effects of 
the Civil War to compete on more equal terms with Sweden on the 
lucrative Western market. In the short-term, Finnish-Swedish 
relations remained bedevilled by the Aland Islands issue. 
In December 1918, the Swedish government adopted a policy 
aimed at the holding of a regional referendum on the Islands to 
decide their fate, to be conducted in cooperation with the Finnish 
authorities. Such a referendum would, in Stockholm's view, be 
bound to run in Sweden's favour.90 Finland's apparent reluctance 
to make any definite move towards resolving the problem 
prompted the Swedish government to invite Mannerheim to 
Stockholm on an official visit in February 1919, in the hope of 
convincing Finland of the need to accelerate the pace of progress 
towards a solution acceptable to both sides. Discussions between 
the two countries' heads of state and foreign ministers, however, 
proved disappointing for the Swedes in the face of Mannerheim's 
insistence, on both political and military considerations, on the 
90. Gihl 1951, pp. 390-1; Rafael Erich: Päiväkirja 12.1.1919. 
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need to maintain Finnish sovereignty over the Islands.91 While 
aware of the mood of Finnish public opinion on the issue, 
Mannerheim was most concerned that, by acceding to giving up 
the Islands, Finland might possibly and dangerously undermine 
her international position, and also ultimately harm her 
relationship with Sweden. Seeing that bilateral negotiations were 
unlikely to get anywhere, the Swedish authorities finally decided 
to appeal to the Paris peace conference in April 1919, in the hope 
of achieving a more favourable resolution to the matter. 
The Swedish case in Paris gained added impetus following the 
refusal by the Allies of Finland's request to be allowed to send an 
official representative to the peace conference. Among the newly-
independent states, only Czechoslovakia and Poland, both of 
which had openly allied themselves with the West in their moves 
towards independence during the war years, were allowed to be 
officially represented. Finland was nevertheless permitted to send 
observers to the Paris negotiations. Despite the previous refusal of 
the major Western powers to recognise Finnish independence, it 
soon became clear that they all considered Finland a de facto 
independent state, a fact reflected, albeit only indirectly, in the 
decision not to include Poland or Finland in the joint discussions 
held at the end of January between representatives from all 
the countries involved in the Russian question.92 The dominance 
of Germany on the conference agenda, however, saw the 
postponement of any final decisions relating to Russia and, by 
extension, that of those relating to Finland and her new position. 
In the case of France, Pichon, the French Foreign Minister, 
announced that he was willing, in principle, to grant Finland 
immediate recognition, a move clearly influenced by the West's 
plans for intervention in Russia and in which, it was supposed, 
Finland and Mannerheim might be able to play a useful part. The 
British, on the other hand, refused to abandon their earlier 
demands for the holding of elections and the appointment of a new 
government as prerequisites to British recognition. Finland's 
determination to adopt a new foreign policy could only be 
guaranteed through elections, according to this view.93 
91. Jägerskiöld III 1969, pp. 91-5. 
92. Paasivirta 1961, p. 120. 
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Mannerheim decided nevertheless to continue his efforts in 
late January 1919 to achieve formal Western recognition of 
Finnish independence, convinced as he was of the potential of 
such recognition to improve Finland's immediate position.94 
Western recognition also held out the prospect of strengthening 
Mannerheim's own personal position as Regent. Mannerheim was 
acutely aware of the possibility that the forthcoming parliamentary 
elections could result in an important change in the political 
balance of power within Finland, and one which could indirectly 
weaken his influence over the direction of Finnish policy and 
ability to fulfil his ambition of involving Finland in military 
intervention against the Bolshevik government, a move which he 
had tentatively supported at the end of 1918. A successful 
diplomatic coup resulting in Western recognition occurring 
just prior to the elections would therefore both strengthen 
Mannerheim's own hand and offer Finland some much-needed 
room for manoeuvre on the international scene. 
The result of the March 1919 elections, which saw the Social 
Democrats gain a total of 80 seats, making them the largest party, 
probably came as something of a surprise, not only to a large 
section of the population, but also to many within the labour 
movement itself. With 42 seats from a spread of constituencies 
across the country, including southern Finland, the Agrarians 
emerged as the largest non-socialist party. The remainder of seats 
were divided relatively equally between the three other non-
socialist parties, with the Progressives gaining 26 seats, the 
National Coalition 28 seats and the Swedish People's Party 22 
seats. The result left foreign observers in no doubt that the balance 
of parliamentary support in Finland had swung decisively away 
from pro-German policies in favour of a more non-aligned form of 
foreign policy. From a domestic point of view, the control by the 
republican centre parties and the Social Democrats of around 150 
seats in the new parliament, against the some 50 held by the 
monarchists, put an end to the plans to establish a Finnish royal 
family which had been advanced in the previous minority Diet. 
94. Ibid., pp. 123-9; Jägerskiöld III 1969, pp. 35-40. Also see Pichon's memoran-
da dated 30.12.1918 and 20.1.1919 (AAEF, Finlande 16), and the memoran-
dum from the British Legation in Paris to the French Foreign Ministry dated 
19.1.1919 (FO 608/187). 
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The republicans nevertheless did not command the five-sixths 
majority needed to ensure the accelerated passage and approval of 
a new constitution. The election result made some kind of 
compromise a virtual necessity, if the issue was not to be 
postponed until after the next elections. The shift in the balance of 
power in Parliament towards the centre guaranteed the moderate 
parties a significant role in the new government which was formed 
in mid-April, although the posts of Prime Minister and Defence 
Minister, filled by Kaarlo Castrén and Rudolf Walden respectively, 
remained held by men close to Mannerheim. The pro-Western 
Rudolf Holsti was appointed as Foreign Minister in place of 
Enckell.95 
The general tone of the post-war atmosphere, both at home and 
in Europe as a whole, made the adoption of a monarchial system a 
virtual impossibility. The overall tide of development in Europe, 
which was clearly running in favour of parliamentary government, 
with the establishment of a new parliamentary constitution in 
republican Germany in February and Swedish moves to strip the 
King of his political powers, was welcomed by the Centre and the 
Social Democrats. Political attention on the Right, however, 
focused on other developments. The apparent success of Bela 
Kun's communist government in Hungary, the various attempts at 
rebellion by the extreme Left in Germany, coupled with a general 
fear of the spread of political and social anarchy, convinced 
conservative opinion in Finland of the need to maintain its call for 
a strong central government throughout the spring of 1919. 
A draft bill for a republican constitution, based on a somewhat 
problematic combination of a strong presidency within a parlia-
mentary framework, and drawing for its main inspiration on the 
Ståhlbergian vision of government in preference to the more 
parliamentary-based type of democracy advocated by the Social 
Democrats and elements of the Agrarian Party, was put before 
Parliament by Castren's government in May. In order to be able to 
be sure of preventing the adoption of a monarchy, the socialists 
and Agrarians were forced to make some compromises with 
their ideals.96 The leadership of the Swedish People's Party, in 
95. Lindman 1937, p. 45; Paasivirta 1961, p. 137. 
96. Y. Blomstedt 1969, pp. 374-5; Mylly 1978, p. 68; SS 18.7.1919. 
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contrast, was willing to see any decision on the constitution 
question postponed, favouring the continuation of the Regency in 
the interim. Above all, they opposed any solution which would 
institutionalise the ideals of popular democracy and full par-
liamentary government.97 It seems to have been assumed within 
the party that it would only be a matter of time, and perhaps only a 
short period of time at that, before there was a swing away from 
radicalism towards more traditional conservative values, both in 
Europe and in Finland. Such a swing, it was thought, might allow 
a revitalising of the plans for a monarchy, which continued to be 
seen within the party as the most secure form of government for 
the country. 
In abandoning the idea of a monarchy prior to the March 
elections, the National Coalition Party had been forced to admit 
that a decisive change had taken place in the political climate in 
Finland, and to come to terms with the increasingly apparent fact 
that parliamentary democracy had come to stay in European 
politics. This did not prevent the Right, however, from being 
critical of the proposed constitution, despite the wide powers 
planned for the new presidency. Feeling unable to make an 
absolute about-turn and accept the proposal in its initial form, 
championed as it was by republican figures who had previously 
been amongst the Right's most bitter opponents, the National 
Coalition decided to join forces with the Swedish People's Party 
in opposing the accelerated passage of the bill, which led 
automatically to its postponement until after the next elections. 
The issue did not stop here, however, as the question of a future 
constitution was soon returned to the centre stage of parliamentary 
discussion on the initiative of Heikki Ritavuori. This time the 
government proved willing to make some concessions to the Right, 
including giving the future president the right to grant decorations 
and titles, all of which persuaded the National Coalition, although 
not the Swedish People's Party, to agree at the end of June to vote 
for the accelerated passage of the bill.98 The continuation of the 
state of constitutional limbo imposed by its earlier opposition was 
ultimately considered by the party as likely to be prejudicial to the 
country's security. 
97. Hbl 24.5., 7.6., 13.6., 14.6., 15.6.1919. 
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Conservative opinion as a whole nevertheless continued to be 
divided on the constitutional question. Figures like R. A. Wrede 
remained convinced of the dangers to the country posed by 
unchecked parliamentary power, pointing to the cases of Britain, 
France and the Scandinavian countries as examples of the gradual 
decline of the power exercised by constitutional heads of state. 
Rafael Erich, a past fellow monarchist, in contrast, although 
disappointed at the abandonment of a monarchy, thought the 
proposal in its revised form a reasonable one.99 Considering the 
overall powers proposed for the new president, Erich believed that 
they offered future incumbents the possibility of a real measure of 
independence within the political system. 
Following the holding of elections in March and the 
appointment of a new government the next month, the West's 
terms for the recognition of Finnish independence had been finally 
met. Progress on the Russian question, under which the Finnish 
case also fell, had, however, been put on ice at the peace 
conference in Paris, to allow priority to be given to the peace treaty 
with Germany, which was largely agreed on in April. Finland's 
relatively low priority on the agenda and the difficulty of the 
Russian problem all pointed to the likelihood of Western 
recognition being postponed still longer. This prompted the 
Finnish authorities to attempt to persuade the Western powers to 
treat Finland's case separately and thereby speed up the process of 
recognition. 
Holsti's appeal on the issue to Hoover in London resulted in a 
memorandum being sent to President Wilson on 26 April putting 
Finland's argument and emphasising the obvious benefit to 
Finland of as rapid a recognition as possible. Wilson's raising of 
the question at a meeting of the leaders of the four major Western 
powers in Paris saw it passed to the Council of Foreign Ministers 
for detailed discussion. With the West committed to an overall 
policy of national self-determination, the recognition of Finnish 
independence did not present any major difficulties for the 
ministers. Following the recognition of Poland and Czechoslova-
kia and their being allowed to take part in the Paris conference, it 
would have been difficult to justify refusal of de jure recognition of 
99. US 13.6.1919. 
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Finnish independence when it had been declared as far back as 
December 1917. Neither was it possible for the West to ignore the 
fact of the country's established national and political identity, or 
the Finnish government's obvious determination to break with the 
country's short-lived pro-German foreign policy. It did not take 
long, therefore, for the Council of Ministers to decide to recognise 
Finnish independence, and the decision was announced on 3 
May.100  
Having succeeded in gaining official Western recognition for 
Finnish independence and thereby consolidated the country's 
international position with regard to the West, the government was 
then left with the problem of resolving Finland's foreign and 
security policy towards Soviet Russia. Attitudes towards the 
Bolshevik government and the future of Soviet-Finnish relations 
varied widely across the political spectrum, ranging from the 
hostility of Mannerheim and the Right through the less extreme 
reactions of the Centre to the more positive approach adopted by 
the Social Democrats. 
By the early spring of 1919, two main policy options had begun 
to dominate conservative thinking on the question. The first of 
these emphasised Finland's ethnic ties with related Finno-Ugrian 
populations across the border and advocated the annexation of 
East Karelia, while the second argued for Finnish participation in 
Western intervention against Petrograd. 
The ethnic argument had its roots in the linguistic and cultural 
interest in East Karelia which had flourished since the mid-
nineteenth century, and in the strong nationalist sentiment which 
had been moulded by the events surrounding independence and 
the Civil War. A number of organisations had emerged by the 
spring of 1919 devoted to organising, masterminding or otherwise 
supporting an active Finnish involvement across the border in 
Karelia. In terms of political backing, this nascent movement 
could count on the support of the wartime volunteers, the Civil 
Guard and, among the established political parties, the Agra-
rians.'°,  
The background to the interventionist argument, in contrast, was 
100. Paasivirta 1961, pp 142-53. 
101. Jääskeläinen 1961, pp. 206-10; Mylly 1978, pp. 87-9. 
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largely international rather than national and linked to the wider 
Western and White Russian struggle against Bolshevism. 
Scattered White Russian armies under Admiral Kolchak in Siberia, 
General Denikin in the Crimea and the Ukraine, and General 
Yudenich in the Estonian area, had begun an active campaign 
against the Soviet authorities and the Red Army from early 1919. 
The thinking behind interventionism shared a number of 
ideological similarities, and the same fear of the potential spread of 
international revolution, with the political ideas close to the heart 
of White opinion. Mannerheim's authority and personal influence 
within non-socialist opinion served to give the policy wide favour 
beyond the hard core of ex-Imperial Army officers, activists and 
right-wing political figures which made up its main supporters.102 
Both expansionist and interventionist arguments were predicated 
on a belief in the essential weakness of post-revolutionary Russia 
and its lack of internal unity. The advocates of both policies 
remained consistently committed to this basic interpretation, 
despite the fluid nature of the situation within Russia and the often 
conflicting reports coming out of the country. 
An attack by a force of volunteers, including a number of those 
who had taken part in the struggle against the Bolsheviks in 
Estonia, was made across the Finnish-Russian border into Olonets 
Karelia in April 1919. Equipped and funded by the Finnish 
government, this volunteer action quickly assumed something of 
the status of a semi-official attack against the Bolsheviks on the 
part of the Finnish authorities. The expedition was based on two 
major political assumptions, the first of these being that the local 
population in the region supported annexation of the area to 
Finland proper, and the second that the Western powers would 
approve the Finnish move, directed as it was at territory under 
Bolshevik control and not at that further north within the British 
sphere of influence extending southwards into Archangel Karelia 
from the bridgehead in Murmansk. Public opinion in the area, in 
fact, turned out to be much less unanimously in favour of the 
Finnish move, with only a relatively small proportion of local 
people supporting unification with Finland, some openly or 
102. For the background to the intervention question, see Footman 1961, pp. 192, 
304; Paasivirta 1961, pp. 207-10; Polvinen II 1971, 97-106. See also Kai 
Donner's letter of 22.5.1919 to Eino Suolahti (Eino Suolahti collection). 
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secretly supporting the Bolsheviks, and a large percentage 
preferring political non-involvement, suspicious that the region 
was being used as a pawn in a larger power struggle. The whole 
Olonets campaign was condemned by the Western governments at 
the Paris peace conference as comparable to the territorial 
expansion pursued by a number of newly-established states in 
Central Europe, aimed at pre-empting conference decisions on 
future European borders. The Finnish government made some 
effort to counter this view that the conference was being presented 
with a territorial fait accompli in Karelia by issuing a communiqué 
to the British and French governments on 9 May indicating 
Finland's willingness to respect the conference's final decision on 
the course of the country's eastern border.1°3 
Finland's Foreign Minister, Rudolf Holsti, was one of the few 
figures in the government to support the idea of working towards a 
diplomatic rather than a military solution to the question of 
transferring East Karelia to Finnish sovereignty, as he was 
confident that Britain, at least, would react favourably to the idea. 
His advocacy of this option, however, both in April and later in the 
summer, failed to win any wide support within the government.1°4 
From a military point of view, the Olonets expedition proved a 
major failure, with Finnish forces suffering a number of reverses 
and other setbacks after their initial successes. The successful 
attack mounted by Soviet forces along the River Tuulosjoki at the 
end of June marked a decisive turning-point in the operation, and 
by August the majority of Finnish troops had withdrawn back 
across the border, retaining continued control over only two 
border communities, Repola and Porajärvi.1°5 
Much of the Finnish enthusiasm for intervention in Russia 
typical of the spring of 1919 was linked to the early success of 
White Russian and other forces, the West's apparent determination 
to press ahead with further moves, and the possibility of aid being 
103. Paasivirta 1961, pp. 201-2; Jääskeläinen 1961, p. 227; Polvinen II 1971, pp. 
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gar 15.7., 16.7.1919 (UM 5 C 6). See also Holsti's telegram dated 14.7.1919 to 
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granted to Finland should she agree to participate. The only real 
cloud on the horizon appeared to be the ambiguity of White 
Russian attitudes towards Finland's new position. 
Mannerheim's attitude towards Russia had remained somewhat 
vague at the time of his appointment as Regent, although his 
hostility towards the Bolsheviks was well-known. His much-
publicised speech made during the Civil War at Antrea on the 
Karelian Isthmus in March 1918, although referring to his 
determination to push back what he described as 'Lenin's soldiers' 
into East Karelia and beyond, had not made any direct demands 
for the annexation of Karelia. The revolution had affected 
Mannerheim, an officer who had achieved high rank in the 
Imperial Army, deeply and had led him to look upon the future 
very much in terms of a deepening international struggle between 
the forces of social revolution and those of social continuity and 
stability, and one bypassing the more traditional conflict between 
political or national states. As a soldier of 28 years standing in the 
Imperial Army and now at the centre of the political and military 
stage in Finland, Mannerheim cannot have been averse to the idea 
of participating in this historic struggle. Mannerheim saw Russia's 
and Finland's separate fates as to a large extent inextricably 
intertwine d.1°6 
Possible Finnish participation in White Russian operations and 
particularly those against Petrograd begged the question, however, 
of to what extent anti-Bolshevik sentiment had displaced the 
more generally disseminated anti-Russian sentiment which 
had developed earlier, particularly in response to Russian 
moves against Finnish autonomy in the post-1899 period. 
Intervention found its most active supporters on the political 
Right, while the centre parties, including the Agrarians, tended to 
stress the primacy of guaranteeing Finnish security and territorial 
inviolability. While feeling some sympathy towards Finnish 
involvement in East Karelia, the latter argued against involving the 
country in the power struggle developing between the Bolsheviks 
and White Russians. 
A similar ambiguity towards the Russian question was evident in 
106. Heinrichs I 1957, pp. 354-6; Paasivirta 1961, pp. 226-8; Jägerskiöld III 
1969, pp. 152-63. 
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the attitude of the moderate paper Helsingin Sanomat. The threat 
to Finnish security, particularly along the Karelian Isthmus, posed 
by the continued insecure position of the Soviet government was 
underlined during the spring of 1919. The paper's strong 
ideological opposition to the Bolsheviks was nevertheless 
matched to a lesser extent by its suspicions over White Russian 
intentions; both sides had to be considered as threats to Finland's 
security, it was stressed.107 The paper's condemnation of Finnish 
military involvement in East Karelia and advocacy of a negotiated 
transference of sovereignty for the region, echoing the style of 
argument put forward by Rudolf Holsti, did not, however, prevent 
it coming out in support of the Olonets expedition, which it 
defended as a voluntary operation assisting Finland's ethnic 
cousins across the border.108 Hopes appear to have been focused 
on the possibility of events leading to a withdrawal of both 
Bolshevik and White Russian forces from the Olonets area, leaving 
the decision over the region's future to the local population. The 
attitude of the Agrarians to the White Russians was more hostile. 
They too also came out in strong support of the Olonets campaign, 
which was seen as part of a wide programme aimed at uniting 
Finland's ethnic territories.109 
The Social Democrats, in contrast, made no pretence of their 
opposition both to possible Finnish participation in intervention 
and to the Olonets expedition, refusing to accept Castren's 
interpretation of the latter as not being an invasion of Russian 
territory in the conventional sense. Instead of military adventures, 
the Social Democrats called for rapid peace negotiations between 
Finland and Russia as the best means to put relations between the 
two countries on a sound footing. Any Finnish military presence 
on Russian soil was only likely to have the effect of antagonising 
Russian attitudes towards Finland, a development which might 
prove fateful for the country's future position, as and when 
conditions in Russia stabilised, the party argued.11° Despite the 
107. HS 10.4., 11.4., 28.5.1919; Karjalan Aamulehti 13.7.1919. 
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party's overall opposition to military actions against Russia for 
whatever reason, there was nevertheless perhaps some support 
among a few of its leading figures for efforts directed at ensuring 
the transference of East Karelia, or a part of the region, to Finland 
by peaceful means, such as a local referendum.11  
The Social Democrats underlined the fact that, of all the political 
groups within Russia, it was the Soviet government which had 
accepted and recognised Finnish independence, a move which the 
White Russians showed little sign of doing in contrast. Finland's 
best policy with regard to her relations with Russia lay, as the 
socialist saw things, in the adoption of neutrality. The Bolshevik 
attack against Estonia was nevertheless roundly condemned, and 
it was stressed that if a similar move was made against Finland 
it would have to be repelled at all costs. The socialists were 
keen to keep the two questions of Finnish-Russian relations 
and Bolshevism as far apart as possible. The latter was criticised 
as a dangerous ideology committed to violent revolution and 
the undemocratic notion of the dictatorship of the minority. 
Bolshevism had to be considered, in the eyes of the Finnish 
socialists, as a purely Russian development, an experiment which 
had to be allowed to work itself out without the benefit of foreign 
interference.'12  
The question of possible Finnish participation in intervention 
gained added momentum during May, following the defeat of 
General Yudenich's forces in their attempted attack on Petrograd 
from the South-West. Mannerheim and Yudenich discussed the 
possibility of a joint Finnish-White Russian pincer offensive 
against Petrograd in June. Aware of the growth of Finnish 
resistance to any such move, caused by the clear opposition of the 
emigre White Russian leadership in Paris to the West's decision to 
recognise Finnish independence, Mannerheim tried to convince 
Yudenich of the need for a more favourable White Russian attitude 
towards Finland's new status, if there was to be any chance of the 
two countries cooperating militarily. No military campaign which 
held out the possibility of negating Finland's achievement in 
111. See the speeches made by Wäinö Wuolijoki, J. W. Keto and Hannes Ryömä on 
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gaining Western recognition for her independence, Mannerheim 
stressed, was likely to win much support in any section of Finnish 
society. The two men were able to reach a private understanding 
by the end of June on a proposed agreement for Finnish-White 
Russian cooperation. This included recognition for Finnish inde-
pendence, the granting of the right of regional self-determination 
to Archangel and Olonets Karelia, and the naming of Mannerheim 
as the future commander-in-chief of combined operations against 
Petrograd. 
Mannerheim was supported in these negotiations by the Prime 
Minister, Castrén, Leo Ehrnrooth, the acting Foreign Minister, and 
Rudolf Walden, the Minister of War, but strongly opposed by the 
major centre party politicians Santeri Alkio and Mikael Soininen, 
who both demanded that all contacts with the White Russians be 
broken off. Holsti's return from London at the end of June to take 
up his new post as Foreign Minister strengthened the hand of those 
opposed to any involvement with Yudenich, or any development 
in the country's foreign policy likely to undermine Finland's 
standing in Western opinion.73  
Britain's attitude towards possible Finnish participation in 
intervention in Russia was somewhat reserved, as reflected in the 
attitude of the British military representative in Helsinki, General 
Gough, and the British authorities' disinclination to offer Finland 
any military aid or include Finnish forces in their plans. British 
concern focused in part on the potential problems that would 
ensue in relations between a Russia under White government and 
an independent Finland, subsequent to the possible collapse of the 
Bolsheviks.14 France was the sole Western power to encourage 
Finnish participation in joint operations against the Soviet 
government. Marshal Foch saw Finnish forces as offering a useful 
addition to interventionist plans in the area to the west of 
Petrograd. His request to the French General Staff to consider 
limited transfers of arms and other equipment to Finland to assist 
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in strengthening Finnish military potential was agreed to, and a 
number of tanks were dispatched to Finland, although no 
economic assistance proved forthcoming.75  
In his discussions with General Kolchak, Mannerheim failed, 
however, to secure any wider agreement to the provisional treaty 
worked out with Yudenich on future cooperation between Finnish 
and White Russian troops. Kolchak, in fact, refused to go any 
further than recognising Finland's separate political status, 
stressing that there could be no question of accepting any 
modification of Russia's pre-revolutionary borders, and therefore 
of recognising Finnish independence, until the calling of Russia's 
National Assembly, which had sole responsibility for legislation 
on constitutional matters.116 Kolchak's real resistance to the 
agreement, however, lay in his inability or unwillingness to 
accept the possibility that Finland, a country that throughout 
the nineteenth century had been a part of the Russian Empire, 
might play a potentially decisive role in the liberation of Petrograd 
from Bolshevik control. His aim throughout was for a White 
victory with the minimum of concessions to his forces' non-
Russian allies. 
A more positive attitude towards Finland possibly participating 
in intervention in Russia became apparent among right-wing 
politicians and activist opinion from the early summer onwards. 
Uusi Suomi, together with a number of other papers close to the 
National Coalition Party, made great play of various border 
incidents which took place on the Karelian Isthmus during June 
and July, hinting more than a little obliquely that an attack by the 
Red Army against Finland, as part of an effort to impose a 
Bolshevik dictatorship, was in the offing. The same papers were 
not slow to criticise the cautious policies pursued by the centre 
parties. Although they claimed not to be blind to the question 
mark hanging over the ultimate aims and attitudes of the White 
Russians towards Finland, those on the Right stressed the long-
term benefits Finland would gain from such an alliance.117 
115. See Marshal Foch's memorandum of 24.5.1919 to the French War Ministry 
(SHAF 7 N 2069) and the latter's telegrams of 1.6., 2.6. and 7.6.1919 to the 
Finnish War Ministry (SHAF 7 N 2069). 
116. Paasivirta 1961, pp. 233-8. 
117. US 20.6., 21.6., 5.7., 13.7., 20.7., 23.7., 24.7., 1919. 
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Removing the Bolsheviks from control in Petrograd was also 
high on the priorities of the leadership of the Swedish People's 
Party, as such a move was seen as likely to contribute in no small 
measure to eliminating the threat of a renewed revolution in 
Finland. Comment in Hufvudstadsbladet during June, pointing to 
the possibility of an imminent attack by the Red Army, closely 
echoed that in Uusi Suomi. Finnish participation in intervention 
would be a powerful trump card in Finland's favour, according to 
the paper, in the event of a White victory, although it was admitted 
that such a victory would also bring some dispute over the 
question of Finland's future independence. Wasabladet, a leading 
voice of Swedish-speaking opinion in southern Ostrobothnia, 
in contrast, however, advised caution with regard to making 
any agreements with the White Russians or participating in 
intervention.118 
Finnish policy towards Russia by July 1919, therefore, was very 
much at a crossroads, but with opinion favouring some form of 
alliance with the White Russians in the ascendant. The sharply-
worded note on the border incidents along the Karelian Isthmus 
sent by Ehrnrooth, the acting Foreign Minister, in early June to the 
Russian Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Tchitcherin, made no 
attempt to disguise Finland's readiness to attack Russia if the 
threats continued.'79 
With his personal commitment to intervention, Mannerheim 
found the government's caution and unwillingness to commit 
itself particularly frustrating. Supported by a group of like-minded 
activists, he made a dramatic secret appeal to the leaders of the 
National Coalition Party in mid-July, asking for the party's 
participation in a new government more in line with his own 
views and committed to initiating military operations against 
Petrograd. The plan called for Mannerheim's first approving the 
proposed new constitution and then dissolving Parliament and 
calling new elections. The gap that would ensue between the latter 
and the appointment of a new administration would allow the 
setting-up of a temporary government which would empower 
118. Hbl 1.7., 4.7., 5.7., 12.7.1919; Wbl 22.6., 1.7., 6.7.1919. 
119. Jääskeläinen 1961, p. 235; Polvinen II 1971, pp. 195-9. 
120. Paasivirta 1961, pp. 239-41; Jägerskiöld III 1969, pp. 228-34. 
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Mannerheim to begin operations against Petrograd.120 The plan as 
a whole was based on the assumption that a successful attack on 
Petrograd would meet with widespread public approval and 
thereby act as an unspoken vote of confidence in Mannerheim, and 
strengthen his chances of being later elected president. The 
National Coalition leadership's decision to decline any part in 
what was seen as an unnecessarily reckless scheme caused the 
temporary shelving of any Finnish intervention. 
The choice of K. J. Ståhlberg as Finland's first President at the end 
of July, by a majority of moderate and socialist votes (143-50), 
resulted in the unusual situation of the main architect behind the 
country's new republican constitution becoming the first head of 
state to test it in practice. Ståhlberg had made his political 
reputation as a republican liberal on largely domestic issues. He 
was also identified with the opposition to Finnish involvement in 
intervention, and his appointment reflected the strength of this 
body of opinion. 
Ståhlberg was particularly committed to the ideal of the small 
nation state, and he was encouraged by the emergence of newly-
independent states in Europe, which he interpreted as a significant 
step forward in European political development. As a liberal, 
Ståhlberg was also one of those who put much faith in the League 
of Nations as a positive factor in redressing the balance of political 
influence in international politics and in reducing the overall level 
of international tension and defusing conflicts before they got out 
of hand. Expansionist policies of the type focused on East Karelia, 
and the general sympathy for Finland's ethnic connections typical 
of the Right, found little place in Ståhlberg's thinking. Finland's 
relations with Russia had to be seen, in Ståhlberg's view, re-
gardless of what the Bolshevik government might stand for in 
ideological terms, in the light of the inevitable balance of power 
existing between small and major powers. Ståhlberg's view re-
flected a belief in the overall continuity of Finnish foreign 
relations. Nothing had changed in the international situation, as he 
saw things, to allow Finland to ignore the importance of her 
relations with the East or with other major countries.721 Ståhlberg's 
121. For Ståhlberg's views, see his speeches of the period. K. Kauppi 29.5.1956. 
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central aim, as reflected in the editorial comment to be found in 
the pages of Helsingin Sanomat, a paper close to the republican 
camp, was one of creating an independent foreign policy for 
Finland free of unnecessary and unwanted restrictive agreements 
with any of the major powers. Commentators writing for Helsingin 
Sanomat stressed the fact of Finland's special geographical 
position and the need for the country to opt for a policy of 
complete neutrality. The heads of state of small countries would 
nevertheless be wise to remember, the paper argued, that the 
principles of fair play and equality of treatment, close to the hearts 
of all liberals, were seldom adhered to in the harsh world of 
international relations. Friendly links with neighbouring countries 
should be a sine qua non in the foreign policy thinking of all small 
states, but only, however, as long as they were not allowed to 
damage important national interests, which had to take 
precedence. On the question of Finnish expansion into East 
Karelia, Helsingin Sanomat took a decidedly cool attitude."' 
Ståhlberg appears to have concluded that Finland was best 
advised to adopt an undramatic and cautious style of foreign 
policy similar to his moderate approach to domestic policies. He 
was careful, nonetheless, not to underestimate the strength of pro-
intervention opinion in the army and the Civil Guards and the 
group centred around Mannerheim, and its potential to influence 
popular opinion. 
A number of those who had opposed Ståhlberg's choice as 
President, embittered by the defeat of their monarchist plans, 
remained dissatisfied with the parliamentary nature of the new 
constitution and tended to look upon the period following 
Ståhlberg's election as something of an interregnum. The choice of 
a moderate republican such as Ståhlberg particularly irked them; 
Mannerheim's election as President in his stead would have 
been much more to their liking. The prominent activist Kai Donner 
summed up the group's hostility to the moderate policies 
represented by Ståhlberg and supported by the centre parties and 
the Social Democrats in his description in the right-wing magazine 
Suunta of the election as amounting to little less than 'the funeral 
122. HS 22.8.1919. 
123. Suunta 9.8.1919. 
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of White Finland'.123 Opposition among the officer corps to 
Ståhlberg's election proved so strong that General K. E. Kivekäs, 
the acting Commander-in-Chief, was forced to publicly warn army 
officers against involving themselves in politics, describing the 
politically-motivated resignation requests he had received from a 
number of officers as indicative of 'ill-discipline and a lack of 
patriotism'.124  
Despite his failure to win election as President, Mannerheim did 
not entirely withdraw from an active role in foreign policy issues. 
His reaction to plans to appoint him head of the armed forces was 
typically forthright when he declared that his acceptance would be 
dependent on his being allowed sole decision-making power on 
the future use of Finnish army units in actions in the East. This 
demand for the right to act independently of both the government 
of the day and the President was not unsurprisingly rejected by 
Ståhlberg.125 
Given Mannerheim's obvious antipathy to him and apparent 
unwillingness to accept the political status quo, Ståhlberg was 
forced on to the defensive to secure his policies. Mannerheim's 
interest and involvement in the Russian question remained largely 
undiminished, and he maintained personal links with the official 
representatives of the Western powers stationed in Helsinki and 
kept them informed of his views on international developments 
throughout the autumn of 1919.126  His deep distrust of Ståhlberg's 
foreign and domestic policies, and of those of the centre parties 
supporting him, received public prominence in an address he 
made to the Civil Guards at the beginning of August. 'The struggle 
124. See General K. E. Kivekäs' order of the day. Also US 26.7.1919; Hirvikallio 
1958, pp. 16-17. 
125. See Ståhlberg's telegram dated 28.7.1919 to Mannerheim and the latter's 
reply of 30.7.1919. Also, Ståhlberg's letter of 31.7.1919 to Mannerheim (Man-
nerheim collection) and Mannerheim's letter of 8.8.1919 to K. Castrén. 
Castrén: Päiväkirja 28.7.-30.7.1919 (Castrén collection); Jägerskiöld III 1969, 
pp. 282-5. For subsequent press comment, see US 15.8.1919; HS 16.8.1919; 
US 17.8.1919; Hbl 13.9., 17.9.1919; SvT 9.9.1919. 
126. See the French military delegation's telegram dated 25.8.1919 sent from 
Helsinki to the War Ministry in Paris (SHAF 6 N 144), and Colonel Gendre's 
report of 28.8.1919 to the War Ministry (SHAF 6 N 143). Also see the 
telegram dated 21.9.1919 sent by the French envoy in Stockholm, Delavaud, 
to the War Ministry in Paris (SHAF 7 N 2069), and the communication dated 
2.8.1919 sent by the Swedish envoy in Helsinki to Stockholm (UD 1 0 34). 
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for liberation,' he declared, 'has yet to be concluded as long as our 
achievements remain insecure.' He described the government's 
conciliatory domestic policies, and particularly the granting of 
pardons to Red prisoners, as representing a serious danger to 
Finland's future and as likely to contribute to a possible outbreak 
of a second rebellion.127 
Together with General Hannes Ignatius, who had earlier resigned 
as Chief of the General Staff, Mannerheim travelled to France and 
Britain in mid-September to sound out the state of Western 
opinion with regard to Finland and particularly on the question of 
intervention. Events in June and July had led Mannerheim to 
suppose that, while Britain opposed his interventionist plans, 
France continued to be favourably inclined.128 By virtue of his 
military and political standing, Mannerheim gained relatively easy 
access to Western leaders and was able to meet both Clemenceau, 
the French Prime Minister, and Marshal Foch in Paris, as well as 
establish contact with the leading figures of the Russian emigre 
community. 
Mannerheim's continued commitment to the possibility of 
Finnish participation in intervention, which he saw as part of the 
long-term solution of the Russian problem, was further underlined 
in an interview with Mannerheim published on both sides of the 
Channel in Le Temps and The Times on 7 October. Finland's 
participation in the 'freeing' of Petrograd would create a firm base 
for the country's future relations with a White-administered 
Russia, Mannerheim argued. The overall tone of Mannerheim's 
comments gave the impression that his policies were supported by 
a significant proportion of the Finnish population. He did not hide 
his hope that the Western powers would soon give the go-ahead for 
the beginning of interventionist operations. Throughout the 
interview, Mannerheim avoided all mention of Ståhlberg and the 
new moderate Vennola government, although he did indirectly 
admit that they enjoyed the support of the majority of the 
electorate. Western agreement in principle to Finnish interven-
tion, Mannerheim explained, was all that would be needed for 
127. US 3.8., 16.9.1919. 
128. See Colonel Gendre's reports dated 20.6. and 28.8.1919 to the French War 
Ministry (SHAF 6 N 143). 
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what he described as the 'far-sighted elements in Finland' to begin 
plans for an operation that would benefit not only Finland but 
Russia and Western civilisation as a whole.729 
International developments as a whole, and Finland's relations 
with the Soviet Union in particular, continued to be the subject of 
widespread and sometimes fierce political debate within Finland 
throughout the autumn of 1919. Further impetus to the discussion 
was provided in mid-September by the Soviet government's 
proposal for the start of peace negotiations between Russia and 
Finland and the three Baltic republics. Overall reaction to the idea 
of beginning peace negotiations with Soviet Russia were generally 
mixed during September and October. The government favoured a 
policy of wait and see, and carefully refrained from giving any 
direct support to the interventionist plans in the air at the time. 
The government's obvious reluctance, however, to voluntarily 
enter into any negotiations with the Soviet authorities was made 
clear in a statement on the matter made by Vennola, the Prime 
Minister, to Parliament on 16 October, in which he expressed the 
government's hope that all the border states would act as one in 
their relations with Russia. Holsti attempted to mobilise Western 
support to back up Finnish policy on this issue.13° 
The Progressive Party adopted an essentially cautious attitude to 
the prospect of peace negotiations. There was a fear within the 
party, however, as expressed in Helsingin Sanomat, that Finland 
could easily become isolated in its dealings with Russia, and closer 
links with both the border states and Britain were considered 
important to counteract this danger. There was nevertheless a 
strong desire not to allow Finland's wish for some form of common 
front with the Baltic republics to obscure the nature of Finland's 
special position. The Agrarians shared a broadly similar approach 
to the Progressives, albeit with a slightly stronger emphasis on a 
more independent attitude towards the West.13' 
129. Le Temps and The Times 7.10.1919. See also Daily Telegraph 7.10.1919. 
Mannerheim I 1951, pp. 444-5. 
130. See Vennola's speech on 16.10.1919 (VP 1919 ptk., p. 1100). K. Holsti 1963, 
pp. 102, 106. 
131. HS 18.9., 5.10.1919; Karjalan Aamulehti 19.9.1919; Mylly 1978, pp. 102-5. 
See also the speeches made by Antti Juutilainen and A. Pitkänen on 
31.10.1919 (VP 1919 ptk., p. 1354). 
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The Right, in contrast, strongly rejected the whole idea of 
Finland, or any of the other border states, starting peace negoti-
ations with the Bolshevik authorities. Intervention remained close 
to the heart of conservative opinion. Contact with the Soviet 
government was ruled out on ideological grounds, as any return to 
normal relations, together with the reopening of the Finnish-
Russian border, was seen as likely to open the door to Bolshevik 
infiltration of Finnish society and encourage the possibility of a 
new left-wing rebellion sweeping the country. In the event that 
Finland had no option but to begin negotiations at some later date, 
it was hoped that these could take place in London or Paris with 
the help of Western mediation.132  
Strong hostility towards the Bolsheviks was also evident in the 
public statements arguing against the beginning of peace 
negotiations emanating from the Swedish People's Party. Hjalmar 
Procope, speaking in Parliament, expressed a general party fear 
that Finland's foreign policy was increasingly drifting away from 
the type of initiative advocated by Mannerheim. Procope 
suggested that this had also been the main cause behind what he 
saw as the clear drop in Western respect for Finnish policy which 
had taken place in the period following Ståhlberg's election as 
President. Erik Hornborg, another leading figure within the party, 
argued that beginning peace negotiations would be tantamount to 
betrayal of the West. This view was echoed by Ernst Estlander, 
who described Finland's good name, which had already suffered 
badly, he believed, as a result of the government's decisions to 
grant amnesties to Red prisoners, as bound to be finally lost in 
Western eyes should negotiations be allowed to go ahead.133 
In virtual complete contrast to the opinion common among the 
non-socialist parties, the Social Democrats came out in support of 
negotiations, declaring that on this issue Finland should be willing 
to act in her own interest, without regard to possible Western 
opposition. This meant a break with their support for the Vennola 
government, which they had largely backed on domestic issues. 
As discussion on the subject in the press and Parliament became 
132. US 18.9., 4.10.1919. See also the speeches made by Artturi Wirkkunen and 
Hugo Suolahti on 16.10.1919 (VP 1919 ptk., pp. 1102-4, 1112). 
133. Hbl 5.10.1919. Also, the speeches made by Hjalmar Procope, Ernst Estlander 
and Eirik Hornborg on 30.10.1919 (VP 1919 ptk., pp. 1335-41, 1345-6). 
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increasingly fierce, the Social Democrats were nevertheless forced 
to reiterate their opposition to the Bolsheviks as representatives of 
a minority dictatorship and advocates of violent revolution. It was 
pointless in the socialists' view, however, to try and ignore the 
Bolsheviks indefinitely. It was generally assumed among socialist 
opinion that a successful White campaign in Russia would 
automatically lead to a period of 'White terror' and possible 
widespread loss of life. The events surrounding the fall of Bela 
Kun in Hungary in the summer of 1919 and the seizure of power by 
Admiral Horthy were interpreted as clear warning of these 
dangers.134 
Discussion on the problems facing the country's foreign policy 
gained renewed impetus towards the end of October, following 
the initial success of a new White Russian attack against Petrograd 
led by General Yudenich in mid-October. The attitude of the 
government to this new development was initially cautious. 
Rumours quickly spread about changes in Western attitudes to the 
whole issue of intervention. Discussion tended, in large measure, 
to polarise around the policy options provided by Ståhlberg and 
Mannerheim. Uusi Suomi, in predicting that continuation of the 
policies advocated by Ståhlberg would inevitably prove fateful for 
Finland, called for the appointment of a new pro-interventionist 
government which would more fully reflect White opinion and be 
willing to reform the army leadership. Hufvudstadsbladet, the 
country's major Swedish-language conservative paper, in contrast, 
reacted rather more cautiously to the idea of Finnish participation 
in military operations against Petrograd.135  Helsingin Sanomat, 
Ilkka and Sosialidemokraatti all argued strongly against any form 
of intervention. The latter claimed that participation in any 
interventionist operations would, in any case, only serve as a 
prelude to a White coup d'état in Finland. The paper directed the 
main butt of its attack against Mannerheim, labelling him as a 
military and political adventurist.136 
Mannerheim's advocacy of intervention assumed more public 
134. SS 17.9., 19.9., 24.9.1919. See the speeches of Anton Kotonen and J. W. Keto 
made on 16.10.1919 (VP 1919 ptk., pp. 1104-1110). 
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and prominent proportions at the beginning of November, with the 
publication in Helsinki of an open letter of his from Paris 
addressed to Ståhlberg. By allowing publication of the letter, 
Mannerheim hoped to be able to appeal directly to Finnish public 
opinion to win a wider measure of support for his policies. In this 
dramatically-worded appeal, he argued that the fall of Soviet 
power would only be a matter of time and that Western Europe 
looked to Finland to act against the Bolsheviks in Petrograd. 
Finland's refusal to assist in the capture of Petrograd would, 
in Mannerheim's eyes, inevitably result in what he called 
'unpredictable difficulties' in future relations between Finland 
and White Russia.137 
Open support for Mannerheim's new public proposal was 
restricted to the Right, and within the press, to Uusi Suomi, 
Iltalehti and Hufvudstadsbladet. Underlining its defence of direct 
Finnish action against Petrograd, Uusi Suomi stressed the 
importance to Finland of establishing and maintaining good 
relations with the White Russians. Finland should also be willing 
to recognise White Russia's strategic defence interests with regard 
to the Finnish area, the paper argued, by providing White leaders 
with 'firm guarantees that Finland will resist all attempts, 
persuasive or backed by force, to use her territory as a base for any 
land or sea-borne attack against Russia.' A guarantee of this sort 
would, in the paper's opinion, remove any obstacles to White 
Russian recognition of Finnish independence. Iltalehti, with its 
activist background, stressed the ideological aspects of the 
question and the importance of a militarily and politically strong 
Finland, able and willing to act against Petrograd if the situation 
required.138 Hufvudstadsbladet, despite its earlier cautionary 
attitude towards intervention, now came out in open support of 
Mannerheim's appeal, which was described as meriting serious 
attention in the changed political climate. The centre parties, in 
government with tacit socialist support, were warned that they 
would be taking a possibly dangerous step if they refused to 
support some form of intervention.139 
137. Heinrichs I 1957, pp. 354-6; Jägerskiöld III 1969, pp. 333-7; US 2.11.1919. 
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Mannerheim's appeal, however, came too late to have any effect 
in involving Finland in the projected overthrow of Bolshevik 
power, as the Yudenich-led White Russian attack against Petrograd 
was, by early November, already beginning to faulter badly. This 
failure, coupled with other developments along the front and the 
beginning of a major counter-attack towards the end of November 
by the Red Army, together with the lack of White Russian success 
in acquiring any promises of Western arms, seemed to point to the 
imminent collapse of virtually the entire White Russian effort in 
the North-West.140 Within Finland, these developments contrib-
uted to an indirect strengthening of Ståhlberg's position and 
policies, allowing the Vennola government to refuse Yudenich's 
request for military cooperation which arrived at the beginning of 
November. The change in White Russian fortunes was followed by 
an increased, and in some cases explosive, wave of open criticism 
in the moderate and socialist press on the subject of Mannerheim's 
earlier public appeal for Finnish involvement in the White Russian 
effort.147 
Events appeared to be turning against Mannerheim and he left 
Paris for Warsaw, familiar to him from his years of service in the 
Imperial Army, to be in a better position to follow developments in 
Eastern Europe. Any hopes Mannerheim might have had of 
persuading the Poles to take part in intervention in cooperation 
with Finland and the forces under Yudenich, however, were 
dashed by General Pilsudsky's antipathy towards Russia, White or 
Red, and commitment to annexing Byelorussia and the Ukraine to 
Poland.142 Developments continued to be unfavourable to the 
White Russian cause and interventionist plans throughout the 
remainder of the year, and Mannerheim soon found himself very 
much out in the political cold. His return to Finland at the 
beginning of 1920 was a modest affair. Although he and his 
140. Polvinen II 1971, pp. 286, 293-304. 
141. HS 6.11., 9.11.1919; Karjalan Aamulehti 13.11.1919; Mylly 1978, pp. 100; SS 
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supporters retained some say in Finnish politics, the general trend 
was increasingly towards moderate republican opinion. 1919 
came to be something of a watershed in the debate surrounding 
Finnish foreign policy. Subsequent developments saw a sharp 
decline in the strength of aggressive anti-Bolshevik opinion 
committed to intervention and expansion in the East. Despite its 
very visible political profile, it had ultimately always been 
restricted to a minority of political opinion. 
9. A complete about-turn in foreign trade 
The end of the First World War in victory for the Western Allies 
presented Finnish trade and industry with a major problem of 
readjustment, similar to that faced only a little earlier when 
Germany had assumed dominance of the Finnish foreign trade 
market. The British blockade of Germany, which was extended to 
the Baltic in November 1918, served to sever Finland's by this 
stage extensive trading links with Germany and the territories 
under German and Austro-Hungarian control, and left large paper 
and pulp shipments already contracted for trapped on the 
dockside in Finnish harbours.143 
Commercial isolation was overshadowed by the political 
uncertainty surrounding the country's future prospects. That trade 
links with the West would soon be reopened was nevertheless 
widely assumed at the beginning of 1919. Hopes were also focused 
on a reopening of the Russian market, although these were largely 
predicated on a belief in the eventual fall of the Bolsheviks from 
power. Until the Whites managed to secure a victory, it was clear 
that those areas of Russia under the control of the Soviet 
authorities, including Petrograd, would remain closed to Western 
exporters following the Western decision taken in November 1918 
to declare them enemy territory and place them under blockade. 
The reopening of export markets was expected to provide 
Finnish industry with the chance of clearing the large stockpiles of 
sawn timber, paper and pulp, which had been built up during the 
143. Rautkallio 1977, pp. 369-70; 0. Hovi 1980, pp. 100-1; Berättelse över 
Finska Cellulosaföreningens verksamhet 1918, p. 22. 
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war years, on what was likely to be a boom reconstruction-fired 
market hungry for Finland's traditional exports. Finnish industry 
was nevertheless aware of the problems which could be faced as a 
result of the need to direct a significantly greater share of the 
country's export effort to Western buyers than prior to the war. 
The greatest degree of readjustment would be required in the paper 
industry, as the bulk of pre-war paper exports had gone to the 
Russian market. In the case of non-paper timber exports, the 
change was not so dramatic and amounted mainly only to re-
establishing existing links. Sweden, Norway and Canada, all of 
which had long experience of Western markets, were identified by 
Finnish managers as the country's major likely competitors.144 
Finland did, however, have claim to one potentially useful 
advantage over her competitors in that she already possessed 
centralised sales organisations to handle timber and paper-related 
exports, originally set up to coordinate trade with Germany. This 
centralised type of arrangement offered some important benefits to 
a small country operating in a large international market, by virtue 
of its integration of the export resources and established links built 
up by all the various companies operating in the same sector of the 
economy, and its potential to reduce costs and spread risks. The 
industry set up a joint central federation in December 1918 to act 
as an all-embracing organisation to oversee the industry's overall 
export-related interests, its links with government, and to 
coordinate marketing and information-gathering.145 
Pressure on the government from both consumers and the 
business community to remove import restrictions and thereby 
increase the availability of many basic commodities and allow an 
up-swing in industrial and commercial activity was strong in the 
immediate post-war period. There was some opposition to this, 
however, from both within industry itself and government. 
Industry, in particular, feared that a wave of foreign products 
flood-ing the market could hinder the restarting of domestic 
production, while the government was concerned that foreign 
currency reserves would be inadequate to allow any significant 
relaxation of import controls until exports got under way. As a 
144. T. v. Wright 1928, p. 22; HS 1.2.1919; Kauppalehti 5.1., 20.6.1919. 
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stopgap measure, it was decided to give the go-ahead for imports of 
foodstuffs and raw materials for industry to forestall any major 
difficulties in the economy.146 
The reopening of trade with the West was initially hindered, as it 
was in the case of a number of other countries including the 
neutral states, by the multiplicity of restrictive quotas which had 
been introduced by the Allies as a result of hostilities from 1914 
onwards and which took some time to dismantle. As part of an 
effort to reduce the problems this created for Finland, the Western 
governments set up a representative body in Helsinki, the Inter-
Allied Trade Commission, in January 1919, staffed by specially-
posted Western consular officials. Currency restrictions were still 
widely in force in many Western European countries. A further 
problem was caused by the British order declaring Finland an 
enemy of the West because of her pro-German sympathies, which 
had been issued on 21 May 1918 and which remained in force. 
This had resulted in the freezing of Finnish credits and deposits at 
British banks and with British companies. Import licenses were 
also required in both Britain and France on all imported goods, 
and there were further restrictions on paper products in Britain 
and prohibitive tariffs in France.147 
The opening-up of Finnish trade with the West was also held 
up by another, more general political factor relating to Fin-
land's international position, which continued to be viewed with 
uncertainty in some foreign quarters. Foreign doubts focused 
primarily on what was seen as the questionable stability of 
Finland's internal affairs following the Civil War of the spring of 
1918. This conflict had seriously undermined foreign attitudes 
towards Finland's status as a reliable trading partner, especially in 
those countries furthest from Finland. There was some suspicion 
within Finland that this was partly the result of disinformation 
about conditions in Finland spread by the country's Scandinavian 
export competitors.148 
With the country's international trading position showing little 
146. Kauppalehti 4.1., 14.1., 19.1., 29.1.1919. 
147. Haataja (ed.) 1978, p. 13; Suomen Paperi- ja Puutavaralehti 31.7., 15.8.1919; 
HS 4.3.1919. 
148. Kauppalehti 25.4.1919; Suomen Paperi- ja Puutavaralehti 15.4.1919; Times 
Trade Supplement 26.4., 29.4.1919. 
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sign of immediate improvement, the Finnish government, 
together with leading Finnish exporters, decided in January 1919 
to send a special trade delegation, including Jacob von Julin and 
Gösta Serlachius, two of the country's leading timber and paper 
industrialists, and a number of other representatives of major 
exporting companies, to Britain, France and the United States. In 
addition to being entrusted with the task of negotiating the general 
removal of obstacles to freer international trade, the delegation was 
also intended to survey the potential of Western markets for 
Finnish industry and promote the development of Finnish exports 
abroad through the setting-up of trading agencies, and negotiate 
whatever direct sales proved possible.149 
There was some considerable success during the spring, in fact, 
in getting many of the restrictions on Finnish exports to Western 
Europe removed, but progress in speeding up actual export 
shipments proved much slower. Some companies succeeded in 
shipping timber to Britain as early as April, while a trial pulp 
shipment was dispatched to the United States in May, but it was 
not until July that timber and paper exports really got under way. 
The signing of the Treaty of Versailles at the end of June and the 
ending of the Allied blockade against Germany also signalled the 
way for the start of Finnish exports, again mainly paper and pulp, 
to Germany. These soon swelled to a sizeable quantity. Overall 
exports to Western Europe as a whole increased rapidly during the 
autumn, helped somewhat by the continuing fall in the value of 
the Finnish mark on foreign exchanges.15° 
Agricultural exports to the West also began again during the 
course of 1919, albeit in much reduced volume compared to pre-
war figures and restricted largely to sales of butter to Germany. 
Demand at home, which had grown as a result of wartime 
shortages, also acted to limit export potential in this sector. 
Following the wartime problems associated with grain shortfalls 
which had seen Finland first dependent on imports from Russia 
and later the United States, the government decided on a policy of 
encouraging Finnish agriculture to become self-sufficient in grain, 
149. See Gösta Serlachius' memorandum from Paris dated 11.3.1919 (SMKL archi-
ve). 
150. H. Hornborg 1943, p. 40; Lundell 1930, pp. 16-17; Hbl 20.7.1919; 
Kauppalehti 15.8.1919; HS 10.8.1919. 
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and introduced tariffs on imported cereals in a bid to increase 
domestic production.151 
Despite the gradual upswing in trade with the West, Finnish 
industry remained faced with the problem of the continued 
impasse affecting trade with Russia, a market which had for long 
been important to Finnish exporters. This was the cause of 
particular concern to the country's heavy industry, which had 
considerably expanded its production capacity over the war years 
to satisfy Russian demand, and to a lesser extent to the textile 
industry and others. Unless these industries were able to find new 
markets for their products and new export opportunities, they 
seemed faced with little option but to content themselves with the 
small domestic Finnish market. Commercial circles traditionally 
associated with trade with Russia tried to keep themselves as well-
informed on developments in the East as possible, including the 
possibility of Western and Finnish intervention and the various 
plans for the capture of Petrograd which circulated during the 
summer of 1919. The prospect of Petrograd falling to the White 
Russians prompted some preliminary preparations for the 
beginning of Finnish shipments to Russia, should they prove 
feasible. Finland's geographical proximity to the Russian market 
and experience of trading with Russia would, it was hoped, give 
Finland a head-start on other European countries.152 
August saw the value of the mark rise somewhat on foreign 
markets for the first time since the end of the war, matched by a 
parallel increase in share prices and market confidence. The effect 
was short-lived, however, and soon put pay to the optimism it had 
inspired. The country's high level of imports served to keep the 
long-term balance of trade in deficit and contributed to the 
continuing decline in the international value of the mark, which 
was to continue for the next two years. Finland's high level of 
imports distorted the country's balance of trade particularly 
severely in the first half of 1919, with imports totalling some 900 
million marks against export earnings of only around 100 million 
marks. In an effort to gain extra revenue, the government 
introduced a special export deposit scheme on 26 March 
151. Jutila 1936, pp. 84-91; Halme 1955, p. 153; Haataja (ed.) p. 19. 
152. H. Hornborg 1943, p. 42; Keskuskauppakamarin vuosikertomus II 1919, pp. 
10, 28; Kauppalehti 23.7.1919. 
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applicable to all exporting companies, which caused further 
dissatisfaction within industry. Little improvement was 
forthcoming in the second half of the year, with the balance 
of trade continuing in the red. Export earnings rose to 880 
million, but this was offset by a tripling of imports to some 2,510 
million marks.153 The continuing fall in the value of the mark also 
became the subject of sharp political disagreement when it was 
seized upon by the Right as one of the main reasons behind 
Mannerheim's poor showing in the presidential election and as 
contributing to foreign uncertainty about Finland's future. This 
was dismissed by the government, which identified the country's 
growing trade deficit as the major factor in the continuing fall of 
the currency.154 
A particularly prominent feature of the changes which took 
place in the balance of Finland's trading relations with the rest of 
Europe in 1919 compared to the pre-war situation was the 
emergence of Britain as a major, if not dominant export market. 
From taking 26.8% of Finland's total exports in 1913, Britain 
accounted for 48.8% by 1919, a development which had been 
paralleled by the disappearance, to all intents and purposes, of 
Russia as an export market. Germany's share of Finland's exports 
fell from 12.8% to 9.3% over the same period, although the latter 
figure still represented a major advance in Finnish-German trade 
following its virtual cessation immediately after the end of the war. 
Exports to Sweden grew only marginally, from 4.1% to 8%. 
The new concentration of Finnish exports on Western markets 
which emerged from 1919 onwards was most evident in the timber 
and paper industries, with the latter rapidly gaining ground 
alongside the more established sawn goods trade. Food exports, as 
a proportion of Finland's total export effort, fell to half of pre-war 
figures, from 17% to 8.1%.155 The exceptional concentration of 
exports on timber and paper products, however, brought with it a 
heavy dependence on the fluctuations of the overall Western 
market, and the British market and the City of London in 
particular. The relatively high level of competition on Western 
153. Lundell 1930, pp. 11, 20-1. 
154. Hbl 31.7., 2.9., 10.10.1919; US 22.11.1919; HS 12.10., 6.12.1919; Kauppalehti 
1.8.1919. 
155. Halme 1955, p. 153. 
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markets also posed a continuing challenge to the technical and 
marketing capabilities of Finland's exporting industries, which 
had previously operated under significantly less demanding 
market conditions. 
Unlike the timber and paper industries with their efficient 
centralised export sales organisations, the remainder of Finnish 
industry, commerce and banking lacked any coordinating joint 
organisations. Finland's main Scandinavian competitor, Sweden, 
also lacked any comparable centralised sales organisations to those 
set up Finland, with individual companies completely responsible 
for their own marketing abroad. The need was recognised, all the 
same, for some form of organisation to support Finland's non 
timber-related and non-agricultural exports and to encourage their 
development to counterbalance the dominance of the traditional 
exporting industries. Plans were put in hand to transform the 
information office of the Central Chamber of Commerce, which 
had been set up in 1917, into a centre for coordinating information 
and advice on the wider aspects of export issues. Plans were also 
discussed for the Central Chamber of Commerce itself to act as an 
advisory body to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the 
appointment of diplomatic representatives or economic advisers to 
represent Finnish interests abroad.156 The founding of the Finnish 
Export Association in 1919 also reflected the general desire to 
widen the range of Finnish exports. 
10. International attitudes towards newly-
independent Finland 
Finland was undeniably fortunate in gaining the limited degree of 
international recognition she did for her declaration of 
independence at a time when hostilities in Europe were still raging 
and when events of much wider significance, such as the Brest-
Litovsk talks and the renewed German offensive in the East which 
followed their breakdown, dominated international interest. 
156. Kauppalehti 24.8., 28.9.1919; Suomen Paperi- ja Puutavaralehti 15.9.1919; 
Mercator 24.10.1919; Keskuskauppakamarin vuosikertomus II 1919, pp. 22-
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Above and beyond this, however, Finland did not otherwise attract 
much foreign attention during early 1918, except in Sweden. The 
reactivation of activity along the Western Front in the spring only 
further served to divert attention away from Finnish affairs. As a 
newly-independent state occupying a sensitive location on 
Russia's north-west border, Finland was all the same the subject of 
some interest abroad, both on a governmental level and within the 
international press. 
The outbreak of civil war in Finland provoked an unusually 
extensive and passionate debate in Sweden. Argument focused 
mainly on the conflict's implications for Swedish policy towards 
Finland. The Swedish Right argued strongly for giving assistance 
to White Finland, initially calling for direct intervention, although 
this later gave way to more modest demands for military aid to be 
sent to the Whites. The rural conservative press, together with 
right-wing pressure groups, were the most prominent in these 
calls, collecting a number of mass petitions calling for Sweden to 
help the White Finnish cause. The demands put forward by the 
Right during parliamentary discussions on the issue from February 
onwards were somewhat more temperate. Arvid Lindman and 
Ernst Trygger, two leading politicians on the Right, limited their 
arguments to putting the case for the right of the White authorities 
in Finland to purchase arms in Sweden and to be allowed transit 
rights across Swedish territory. It was nevertheless emphasised 
that the struggle in Finland was one not only in defence of 
legitimacy and the supremacy of the rule of law against the forces 
of revolution but also one which would decide whether the 
Finland of the future was to be a part of Scandinavia or a country 
firmly within the Russian sphere of influence.157 
The Right's desire to assist White Finnish forces was also linked 
to wider political considerations. By taking some form of initiative 
in Finnish affairs at a time of obvious Russian weakness, it was 
assumed that Sweden's overall international position in the 
northern Baltic would be strengthened, possibly to such an extent 
as to allow Sweden to regain something of the power and influence 
which she had enjoyed in previous centuries in the area. Hopes 
157. StD 3.2., 8.2., 21.2., 13.3.1918; SvD 3.2., 4.2.1918. See also Arvid Lindman's 
speech on 20.2.1918 and E. Trygger's on 27.2.1918 in the Swedish Parliament 
(RDPr 1918 AK I, n. 16, pp. 27-36; RDPr 1918 FK I, n. 12, pp. 3-9). 
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were also high that if Sweden was to help the Whites in their hour 
of need there was a good chance of the latter being willing to cede 
the Aland Islands to Sweden as recompense at the end of the 
conflict.' 58 
Eden's government, backed by the Liberals and Social Democ-
rats, however, remained firm in its opposition to any Swedish 
involvement in the Finnish struggle, fearing that too close an 
association with developments in Finland would inevitably result 
in a weakening of Sweden's traditional policy of neutrality. 
Pressure from the Social Democrats in particular served to keep 
the government committed to this established policy of non-
involvement, despite the willingness of Hellner, the Foreign 
Minister, to allow arms shipments to the Whites. Permission was 
granted in February, however, by the Swedish Maritime Ministry 
to the Finnish volunteer battalion, en route from Germany to 
Vaasa, to pass through Swedish territorial waters, thus giving it 
protection from possible Russian attack. 
No support was forthcoming from the Branting-led Social 
Democrats for the Finnish labour movement's decision to embark 
on a policy of violent social revolution. In a statement issued 
in mid-February, the Swedish party described the move as 
an unwarranted armed uprising against a democratically-
elected parliament and an attack on the very basis of democracy 
in Finland. The Swedish party's fears about the possible future 
consequences of events in Finland prompted a visit by the party 
secretary, Gustav Möller, to Helsinki at the end of February to meet 
a number of the leaders of the Red authorities, as part of an attempt 
to sound out the possibilities for Swedish mediation between the 
two sides to bring the Civil War to an end.159 
In contrast to this critical attitude adopted by the official Social 
Democratic party, Sweden's left-wing socialists, Carl Lindhagen 
and Zeth Höglund among the most vocal of them, who since 1917 
158. StD 7.2.1918; Abl 17.3.1918; K. G. Westman 1918, p. 23; Svensk Lösen 15.2., 
31.3.1918. 
159. See Eden's speeches in the Swedish Parliament on 20.2. and 27.2.1918 (RDPr 
1918 AK n. 16, pp. 5-10, RDPr 1918 FK n. 12, pp. 2-9); Hamilton 1956, pp. 
208-9; DN 3.2., 6.2., 7.2., 12.2.1919; Soc-Dem 31.1., 2.2., 4.2., 5.2., 6.2., 9.2., 
12.2.1918; StT 14.2.1918; Palmstierna II 1953, p. 131: J. Lindgren I 1950, pp. 
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had formed their own parliamentary group, came out in support of 
the struggle being waged by the Finnish Left. The events in 
Finland were described by Folkets Dagblad-Politiken, a paper 
close to the group, as a class struggle presaging the much wider 
European class conflict to come. It was also hoped that the Finnish 
situation would act to rekindle discussion within the Swedish 
labour movement about future policies and undermine Branting's 
position within the Social Democrats.16° 
The Aland Islands attracted much Swedish attention from the 
very beginning of the conflict in Finland, particularly as a result of 
the continued presence of Russian troops on the Islands. After 
some discussion, the Swedish government decided on 13 February 
to intervene in the area, in what was described as a 'purely 
humanitarian capacity', by sending a Swedish detachment to the 
Islands, accompanied by a warship escort. Its arrival coincided 
with that of a White Civil Guard unit from the Finnish mainland, 
and was soon followed by that of a group of Red militia from 
Turku. Negotiations were set in hand by the Swedes between the 
groups to defuse the tense situation which developed, leading to 
an agreement at the end of February providing for the departure of 
Red and White forces, stripped of their arms, to Turku and 
Ostrobothnia respectively, and of the Russian troops stationed on 
the Islands. 
The Aland Islands question quickly developed into a major issue 
of political contention in Sweden during the spring. In his defence 
of the government's decision to send Swedish forces to the Islands 
in Parliament on 20 February, Edén stressed that the detachment's 
aims were strictly limited and restricted to preventing bloodshed 
in the area and protecting local life and property, and that the 
move did not represent any attempt to prejudge the solution of the 
region's future political status.161  In sharp contrast to this 
interpretation of Swedish aims, the right-wing leader Ernst Trygger 
had suggested only a month before on 23 January that nothing less 
than complete Swedish sovereignty over the Islands could provide 
Sweden with the security she needed. This call gained added 
momentum during February with the news that a popular 
160. Folkets Dagblad Politiken 5.2., 6.2., 13.2.1918. 
161. Gihl 1951, pp. 366-9; StD 24.1.1918; DN 24.1., 3.2.1918. 
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referendum had been held on the Islands at the end of 1917. In 
this, a large majority had voted for annexation to Sweden, a 
petition to which effect was presented to the Swedish King, Gustav 
V, at the beginning of February by a special delegation of 
islanders.162 Although aware of these local views, Edén remained 
committed to the importance of maintaining friendly relations 
with Finland, arguing that any decision on the future status of the 
area would have to be arrived at through joint negotiations with 
the Finnish government and not through unilateral action on 
Sweden's part.'63 
The details of the content of the agreements signed by the White 
Finnish authorities with Germany on 7 March came as an 
unexpected shock to all sections of political opinion when they 
became known in Sweden. A steady expansion of German 
influence in the Baltic, as a result of Finland's decision to seek 
security through an alliance with Germany, was widely predicted 
likely to result. This prospect was especially unwelcome to those 
groups which had previously called for a reassessment of Swedish 
aims and the adoption of a more active foreign policy. The arrival 
of a German naval squadron in the Aland Islands at the beginning 
of March put a further brake on Swedish hopes regarding a 
possible transfer of the area's sovereignty. 
The general tone of Swedish comment on Finnish affairs 
became, in consequence, significantly more critical of the White 
Finnish authorities. Finland's motives in deciding to establish 
closer ties with Germany, in particular, came to assume a central 
position in the debate. Dagens Nyheter, in typical liberal fashion, 
argued that the Finnish decision meant that the country had 
become little more than a German vassal state, and that what had 
traditionally been interpreted in Sweden as the Russian threat was 
now developing into a joint German-Finnish threat, and as such 
undermined Sweden's established policy of neutrality.164 This 
unsympathetic view of Finland, together with comment on the 
likely destabilising repercussions of the Finnish decision on 
162. See Trygger's speech made on 23.1.1919 in the Swedish Parliament (RDPr 
1918 FK, n. 4, pp. 7-8). 
163. See Eden's speech made on 23.1.1919 in the Swedish Parliament (RDPr 1918 
FK n. 4, pp. 29-30); DN 15.1., 24.1.1918. 
164. DN 8.3., 9.3., 12.3.1918; StT 9.3.1918. 
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Sweden's international position, was echoed in the pages of 
Social-Demokraten, which described Sweden's best option in the 
changed circumstances as lying in developing closer links with the 
other Scandinavian countries, in a bid to create a unified Nordic 
neutral region. The value of Sweden's new trade agreement with 
Britain signed in March as a counterbalance to the developments 
set in train by the Finnish decision was stressed by Branting.165 
The latter agreement also underlined the determination of the 
Edén government to underpin the country's neutrality through 
links with the West. 
The increasing closeness of relations between Finland and 
Germany was seen as particularly disadvantageous to Sweden on 
the Swedish Right, primarily because of the restrictions it imposed 
on closer links between Finland and Sweden, and between 
Sweden and the Aland Islands. Finland was described as being 
finally lost to Sweden by the activist magazine Svensk Lösen. Any 
hopes of a change in Swedish foreign policy had also been dealt a 
severe blow, it was lamented. The blame for all of this was laid 
fairly and squarely at the door of the Edén government and its 
reluctance to provide the Whites with aid.166 
A decidedly cooler attitude towards Finland was evident in 
Sweden across the whole political spectrum following the end of 
the Civil War. The various splits which had developed within the 
Swedish labour movement over attitudes towards the Civil War 
dissolved in its aftermath in the criticism uniting the movement 
over the White Finnish authorities' treatment of Red prisoners. A 
strongly-worded protest note was delivered to the Finnish 
Legation in Stockholm at the end of April by Per Albin Hansson, 
Gustav Möller and Carl Lindhagen, condemning what was 
described as the unchecked 'White terror' then raging in Finland. 
Lindhagen also presented a similarly-worded note on the situation 
in Finland to the German Legation.167 The question of the fate of 
the Red prisoners in Finland became a focal issue in certain 
sections of the Swedish press during the summer of 1918. The 
publication of a highly critical report by Professor Robert 
165. Soc-Dem 9.3., 18.3.1918. 
166. StD 9.3., 10.3.1918; SvD 4.3., 6.3., 10.3., 20.3.1918; Det Nya Sverige 20.3.1918; 
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Tigerstedt on health conditions in the prison camps, and an 
interview with Väinö Tanner on the treatment of the prisoners, 
which appeared in both Social-Demokraten and Dagens Nyheter in 
August, attracted the most attention.168 
Increased criticism of the Finnish authorities also emerged in the 
major non-socialist papers in Sweden when it became clear that 
the Finnish monarchists were planning to choose a German prince 
as the country's future king. While aware of the pressures the 
government in Finland was under in the aftermath of the Civil 
War, Dagens Nyheter was nevertheless unable to hide its surprise 
and disappointment that no sufficiently authoritative figure 
capable of guaranteeing future internal domestic stability could 
apparently be found within Finland, and that the Finns had finally 
had to look to Germany for assistance. The rise in the influence 
and power of radical nationalist opinion in Finland also caused 
unease in Stockholm, and increased fears about the future security 
of the country's Swedish-speaking minority. This development 
was also seen as serving to further weaken Finland's relations with 
the rest of Scandinavia.169 
Swedish commentators similarly proved critical of Finnish aims 
in East Karelia. The future of the region was seen as uncertain at 
best, while any changes in the border in Finland's favour which 
took place with German assistance would, it was thought, inevi-
tably increase Finland's long-term dependence on Germany.170 All 
in all, relations between Finland and Sweden had reached an 
unusually low ebb by the latter half of 1918, with both countries' 
foreign policies structured on diametrically opposed assumptions 
about the final outcome of the war. 
German military interest in Finland began to show signs of 
revitalisation from mid-February 1918 onwards, following the 
failure of the Brest-Litovsk peace negotiations to progress in 
168. Soc-Dem 13.7., 27.8., 28.8.1918. A special 'Finnish committee' (Finlands-
kommitté), organised by the labour movement, assisting Finnish Reds fleeing 
Finland and organising demonstrations against the White government, was 
active in Stockholm during the summer of 1918. (see Finlandskommitté 
archive/AA). 
169. DN 28.6., 8.7., 7.8., 9.8.1918; StD 1.7., 10.7., 6.8., 11.8.1918; NDA 14.8.1918. 
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accordance with German hopes. The beginning of the major 
German offensive along the Eastern Front that followed only 
reinforced this German interest, while the Finnish Civil War, 
instead of alleviating German pressure, in fact offered Germany a 
convenient basis for intervention. The German decision to 
dispatch an expeditionary force to Finland was aimed at protecting 
German interests in the area by developing a bridgehead to repulse 
Western attempts to open up a new front in the Murmansk area. 
The German foothold in Finland also provided the government 
and military leadership in Berlin with a good vantage point from 
which to keep abreast of developments in Petrograd, and a 
convenient base for exerting military pressure on the shaky Soviet 
authorities. 
Germany's increased military activity in the East did not go 
uncriticised by certain sections of German political opinion. The 
Social Democrats and the centre parties were committed to a 
policy of achieving a negotiated peace and had naturally hoped 
that the talks at Brest-Litovsk would lead to peace in the East. 
These hopes had been particularly prominent in the pages of the 
newspapers most closely associated with these groups, Vorwärts 
and Frankfurter Zeitung. The victory achieved by the military in 
the decision of the German Imperial Council on 13 February to 
approve an extensive programme of territorial expansion in the 
East, however, meant a weakening in the positions of both the 
government and the Foreign Ministry, both of which had 
supported a less ambitious policy.'71  
The actual departure of German troops to Finland following the 
signing of the Brest-Litovsk treaty with Russia was delayed by 
Soviet opposition to the operation and the Bolshevik government's 
call for joint non-intervention in Finnish affairs, and by the 
criticism which had emerged to the plan from the opposition 
within the German National Assembly. The Social Democrats 
argued that those in favour of intervention in Finland were guilty 
of misrepresenting the situation when they described the Russians 
as the main opponents of the White Finns, and of ignoring the real 
class nature of the conflict. Instead of military involvement, 
Vorwärts argued, Germany should direct her efforts to providing 
171. Paasivirta 1957, pp. 156-7; Rautkallio 1977. pp. 55-7. 
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mediation between the two sides. This was echoed by the liberal 
Frankfurter Zeitung, which described the German leadership's 
agreement with the Vaasa government as an attempt to reduce 
Finland to the status of a dependent territory.172 Both papers 
doubted whether the government's policy would lead to good 
relations in the future between the two countries. 
During the interim that ensued following the German High 
Command's decision to postpone the departure of the expedi-
tionary force until after the Brest-Litovsk agreement had been 
ratified by the German and Soviet governments, the German 
Foreign Ministry established contact with the Red government in 
Helsinki, without the knowledge of the Vaasa authorities, to sound 
out the possibilities of mediation between the two sides, but with 
no success. The German Left, in the shape of figures like Philip 
Scheidemann, remained consistently opposed to any expansion of 
German aims in the East. A majority of Social Democrats abstained 
and the independent socialists voted against the agreements 
signed between Germany and White Finland when they came 
before Parliament for discussion in March, but to no avail.173 
Military intervention in Finland, in the shape of the dispatch of 
an expeditionary force under General von der Goltz to southern 
Finland in support of the White authorities, was defended by the 
government and influential conservative opinion in Germany as 
justified assistance to a country struggling against the encroach-
ment of Bolshevism. Germany and Finland were described as 
sharing similar aims in wanting to prevent the expansion of both 
Russian and Western influence into the Finnish area. In response 
to questions on the Finnish debate surrounding the issue of the 
country's future constitution, it was suggested that a republican 
Finland would be incapable of effectively resisting either Russian 
or British pressure. 
The success of the White forces and their ultimate victory over 
their Red opponents in the Civil War led to the spread of a general 
belief in Germany that Goltz's troops had been a decisive factor in 
172. Paasivirta 1957, p. 159; Vorwärts 8.3., 10.3.1918; Frankfurter Zeitung 8.3., 
12.3.1918. 
173. Frankfurter Zeitung 23.3.1918. Also see Scheidemann's and Haase's speeches 
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Band 311 pp. 4536, 4544). 
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the struggle. With little knowledge of the political and social 
situation in Finland, it was easy for German commentators to 
assume a close link between the consolidation of Finnish 
independence and the role of the German expeditionary force, and 
thereby create a narrow, stereotyped image of Finnish politics. 
The obvious gratitude towards the Germans felt amongst White 
opinion in Finland was paralleled in the exaggeratedly heroic tone 
in which the White struggle during the spring began to be 
described in Germany, and in the multitude of references to the 
White Finnish troops as having distinguished themselves as loyal 
comrades-in-arms.14 
German policy towards Finland in the post-Civil War period was 
shaped, as it had been previously, by Finland's position in 
Germany's overall policy strategy towards Eastern Europe and 
Russia. Finnish efforts towards establishing a monarchy with 
a German prince as the country's first king were regarded 
favourably, as such a move was only likely to strengthen future 
German influence on the course of Finnish politics. The German 
government refused, however, to contemplate allowing a member 
of the German Royal Family ascend the Finnish throne, as it was 
feared that this would unnecessarily tie Germany's hand in her 
future dealings with Finland. 
Following the shift in the focus of the German military effort 
during the spring to the Western Front, the maintenance of stable 
relations with the Soviet government on the basis of the Brest-
Litovsk agreement, combined with a desire to check the southward 
advance of British forces from Murmansk, became particularly 
important for the German authorities. This was reflected during 
the summer of 1918 in the unwillingness of the Germans to 
support Finnish territorial expansion in East Karelia and their 
attempts to persuade the Finns to participate in joint action against 
the British. 
Hopes were high in Helsinki at the beginning of the peace 
negotiations between Finland and Russia, which took place in 
August in Berlin with German cooperation, of the Finnish side's 
174. See for ex. Ullrich Schoultz: Aus Finnlands Freiheitskampf. Greifswald 1921; 
Ernst v. Hiilsen: Riickblick auf die Vorgeschichte des deutschen Finnland-
Feldzuges 1918; Deutsche-finnische Briicke 1928; C. Henke, G. Liesner: Urn 
Finnlands Freiheit. Berlin 1932. 
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potential to push through border changes in East Karelia. These 
attempts, however, were consistently refused by the Russians, 
tacitly supported by the Germans who made no effort to support 
the Finnish plans, who instead proposed moving the border on the 
Karelian Isthmus further northwards, towards Viipuri and away 
from Petrograd.175 While refusing to encourage Finnish expansion, 
the Germans were keen nevertheless for the Finns to take an active 
part in halting the British advance from Murmansk, in line with 
the agreement appended to the Brest-Litovsk peace treaty at the 
end of August which provided for cooperation between Germany 
and Soviet Russia in operations against the British expeditionary 
force. As part of this understanding, the German government had 
promised the Soviet authorities that its forces would ensure the 
withdrawal of any Finnish units taking part in joint action with 
German troops in the area north of Lake Ladoga back across the 
border at the end of operations, thereby guaranteeing in advance 
that East Karelia would remain part of Russia. The subsequent 
weakening of the German position on the Western Front which 
grew from August onwards, however, saw the halting of 
preparations for joint operations in the region.176 
The decision taken by a number of states at the beginning of 1918 
to recognise Finland's declaration of independence caused little 
comment in the British or French press. The Finnish question 
tended to be overshadowed by other more far-reaching develop-
ments taking place at the same time elsewhere in Eastern Europe 
and above all by the Russian question. Even the outbreak of civil 
war in Finland caused only the minorist of ripples in the London 
and Paris papers. British and French attitudes, particularly at the 
governmental level, towards events in Finland, despite the small 
scale of the coverage afforded the country, did show some 
differences of interpretation, however. 
The steady expansion of German influence in Eastern Europe 
formed the main focus of concern of the French authorities in their 
analysis of developments in the region, despite France's minimal 
potential to support anti-German opinion in the area. This was 
also apparent in the style of comment on the Finnish question 
175. Paasivirta 1957, p. 341. 
176. Ibid., p. 348; Polvinen II 1971, pp. 49-51. 
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which appeared in the major French papers and in the reports sent 
back to Paris by French diplomats stationed in Helsinki and 
Stockholm following the outbreak of the Civil War. French 
attention was ultimately drawn much less to the details and 
implications of the conflict for Finland than to the differing 
attitudes of the two sides to Germany and German influence. 
Given French support for fostering anti-German opinion and the 
motives behind the French recognition of Finnish independence 
given on 4 January, it was thus not perhaps entirely surprising that 
the French consul in Helsinki adopted what in practice amounted 
to semi-recognition of the Red authorities in the Finnish capital.17  
Some attention had been drawn in the French press to the 
problem of Finland's future foreign policy in the light of her new 
status as an independent state even prior to the beginning of the 
Civil War. It was hoped that Finland would develop close ties 
with the Scandinavian countries, in preference to concluding any 
alliance with either Russia or Germany. As the Civil War 
progressed, the French press was quick to seize on anything, such 
as the news that the Finnish volunteer battalion was to be moved 
from Germany to Finland and that Germany had agreed to send 
arms shipments to the Vaasa government, which seemed to point 
to White Finland's moving closer to Germany. Coverage was also 
given in Journal des Debats and Le Temps to the increasingly open 
pro-German public statements of Svinhufvud and Sario.178 
Deepening French fears that the White authorities were in fact 
committed to a definite policy of closer links with Germany were 
confirmed in early March, when the news reached Paris of the 
package of agreements signed between the Vaasa government and 
the Germans. News items about Finland, describing the country's 
steady slide into the German sphere of influence and her gradual 
adoption of the role of a German satellite, began to be increasingly 
featured in the French papers. Attention was also drawn to the 
increasing strain put on Sweden's neutrality by the developments 
in Finland.179 Dominated as it was by a concern with the wider 
international implications of the conflict within Finland, the 
177. K. Hovi 1975, pp. 98-9. 
178. Journal des Debats 28.1., 11.2., 18.2., 1.3.1918; Le Temps 23.2., 24.2.1918. 
179. Journal des Debats 15.3., 16.3.1918; Le Temps 9.3., 23.4.1918. 
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French press devoted little or no space to any news about the 
actual events of the Civil War itself. 
Britain's refusal to recognise Finnish independence in January 
1918 had been linked to a decision to wait for the reaction of the 
Russian National Constituent Assembly on the issue. Despite the 
dissolution of the Assembly then meeting in Petrograd by the 
Bolshevik authorities shortly prior to the outbreak of civil war in 
Finland, no moves were made by the British government to change 
its stance on the Finnish question, given the uncertain position of 
the Bolshevik government. The landing of British military units in 
Murmansk in November 1917 and the subsequent growth of the 
British military presence in the area, directed towards opening up 
a new Eastern Front, indicated the British commitment to a long-
term Russian policy and one which was not to be easily diverted 
by concessions to peripheral Finnish interests. 
Britain's intransigence gave her a significant advantage over 
France during the spring, in that by not recognising Finnish 
independence she was able to continue to use the question of 
recognition as a diplomatic and political lever to influence the 
course of Finnish politics. The Foreign Office kept itself closely 
informed of the changes and developments in White Finnish 
attitudes on foreign policy issues. The terms placed on the 
possible shipments of Western food aid to Finland and the Vaasa 
government's reactions to them in February 1918 were clearly seen 
in London as a measure of the overall position and allegiances of 
the White authorities. As the major country behind the Western 
blockade of Germany, Britain was also keen to extend restrictions 
to include trade relations between Germany and Finland, but the 
Vaasa government proved unwilling to accept the British 
proposals.18° 
News of the agreements concluded between the White 
authorities and Germany at the beginning of March forced the 
Foreign Office to conclude that its attempts to influence Finland to 
adopt a more pro-Western stance had failed. The Times, reflecting 
on the development, described the Baltic as having entered on a 
new period of 'Germanification'.181 British commentators also 
180. Paasivirta 1961, pp. 85-6. 
181. The Times 9.3., 9.4.1918; Daily Chronicle 20.3.1918. 
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increasingly began to note the prominence of White interest in 
Finland towards territorial expansion in East Karelia, a sensitive 
issue for Britain as, despite the changed international situation, 
there were still compelling reasons for ensuring that links in the 
area between the Western powers and Russia were not disrupted. 
Concern over Allied communications led both the British and 
French authorities to warn the Svinhufvud government at the end 
of April over involvement in East Karelia. Overall developments 
in the Arctic Ocean area during the summer of 1918 were the 
source of some anxiety to the British, with the penetration of 
German reconnaissance units as far north as Rovaniemi and 
Kemijärvi. A Finnish request at the end of June for the withdrawal 
of British forces from the Petsamo area was refused, and their 
advance southwards further east continued, resulting in the 
occupation of Archangel on the White Sea soon after. 
With the domination of the British and French press by news 
and comment on the major battles along the Western Front during 
the summer, little space remained for reports from Finland, 
although some issues, such as the plans for electing a German 
prince to the Finnish throne, did make an appearance. Finland 
was by now almost universally described as a close ally of 
Germany.182 
 The Finnish vote on the choice of a German King on 9 
October, coming at a time when the war in Europe was entering its 
final and decisive stage, however, provoked a strong French 
reaction, in the shape of an announcement on 15 October 
withdrawing French recognition of Finnish independence. This 
move, clearly designed to put pressure on the Finnish authorities 
to change their minds, could have left Helsinki in no doubt about 
the West's opposition to the Finnish decision and determination to 
see a modification of Finnish foreign policy towards one more 
favourably disposed towards the West. 
Following the end of the war, the basis of Finland's independent 
existence, however, was never seriously questioned by the British 
and French governments, although some differences of opinion 
between the two powers on the question of how to treat Finland 
182. For French comment, see Le Temps 26.5., 30.5., 7.8., 23.9.1918; Journal des 
Debats 7.7., 28.7.1918; L'Homme Libre 18.6.1918. For British comment, see 
Balfour's speech in the Commons on 8.8.1918 (PD 5h Ser., Vol. 101, p. 1628; 
The Times 2.8.1918; Manchester Guardian 11.10.1918. 
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did emerge. The Armistice brought a major change in the balance 
of power in the Baltic, with the withdrawal of German forces from 
Finland and the arrival of a Royal Navy squadron in the Baltic to 
complement the British land-based presence in the Murmansk 
area. Faced with the sudden crumbling of German support and 
with it the basis of the country's previous foreign policy, Finland, 
in need of the security offered by complete Western recognition, 
had little choice but to comply with Western pressure. Britain's 
decision to recognise Finland at the beginning of May fulfilled this 
Finnish requirement, while at the same time providing Britain 
with additional security for her interests along Russia's north-
western border. 
Britain's desire for stability in the Finnish area and the northern 
Baltic was also evident in the cautious attitude adopted over the 
question of Finnish intervention in Russia, one which neither 
directly encouraged nor pressured Finland to take part in any 
attack on Petrograd.183 British opposition was also made plain on a 
number of occasions to Finnish territorial demands in East Karelia, 
an area which was considered as being of too great an importance 
to Russia for the latter to be willing to allow its transference to 
Finland. On the Aland Islands question, the British argued 
successfully for the issue to be left to the League of Nations rather 
than the Paris peace conference to settle. 
French attitudes towards Finland improved after the end of the 
war, to such an extent that France was soon willing to renew her 
recognition of Finnish independence, which had been withdrawn 
as a consequence of the Finnish election of a German King. This 
change was closely linked to Western plans for intervention in 
Russia and a desire to register French support for Mannerheim 
as Regent. France's significant economic interests in Russia, and 
in the Ukraine in particular, underlay much of the French 
enthusiasm for ensuring White success against the Bolsheviks and 
the direct support given to the White Russian forces operating 
under General Denikin. The opposition of the French National 
Assembly and public opinion, however, meant that the 
183. See for ex. General Gough's memorandum of 2.7.1919 to Mannerheim (WO 
106/614) and E. H. Carr's memorandum of 10.7.1919 on the East Karelian 
question (FO 608/187). 
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government's most ambitious plans aimed at assisting the White 
effort, such as the dispatch of French troops to southern Russia, 
had to be shelved.184 
French diplomatic support for Mannerheim, therefore, was 
a relatively painless way to advance the cause of intervention, 
without exacerbating domestic opinion. Beyond generally 
encouraging Finland to take part in joint operations against 
Petrograd, however, France proved unwilling to offer any more 
substantial aid than promises of very limited quantities of 
weapons and military equipment. Finland's relatively minor role 
in French interventionist thinking was reflected in the major 
debate on the Russian question which took place in the French 
Chamber of Deputies in May 1919, in which the bulk of speakers 
addressed their attention to the problem of the Ukraine, with only 
one arguing directly for Finnish participation under Mannerheim's 
leadership in a joint campaign.185 
Some retrospective comment on recent events in Finland and 
shifts in Finnish policy appeared in the major British papers 
following the end of the war. Finland's role as what was often 
referred to as a close ally of Germany was not easily or quickly 
forgotten. Particular concern, both in the press and in the House of 
Commons, although somewhat belated in comparison with the 
Scandinavian countries, was focused on the question of the fate of 
the Red prisoners in Finland. Interest on the issue mainly 
originated from within the Labour and Liberal parties. The 
numbers of dead and executed in the specially set-up prison 
camps were the subject of continued comment in the Commons for 
a number of months after the end of the Civil War. A call was even 
made for the convening of a special committee to investigate the 
various accusations and counter-accusations concerning politi-
cally-inspired violence in Russia and Finland.186 Critical press 
comment on the treatment of the Red prisoners by the Whites 
extended from the left of centre Daily Herald and Manchester 
184. Grouzet 1969, pp. 219-20. 
185. Annales de la Chambre des Deputes. Debats parlamentaires 1919 II, pp. 
2314-8, 2338, 2351. The only reference to Finland is contained in the 
comment made by Chapelain. 
186. See the comments by J. C. Wedgewood and Smith made in the House of 
Commons on 21.5. and 31.5.1919 (Parliamentary Debates. House of Com-
mons 1919 Vol. 116, pp. 1504-6, 1509. 
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Guardian to The Times.187 The relatively wide coverage given to 
the issue in Britain, while reflecting a measure of genuine 
humanitarian concern, also owed part of its origin to the general 
anti-German sentiment then prevalent in Britain and which 
inevitably rubbed off on Germany's past allies. 
Finland's descent into civil war so soon after her declaration of 
independence had inevitably raised a number of doubts in 
Western Europe about Finland's overall readiness for independent 
statehood, although these were somewhat tempered in the light of 
the widespread upheavals affecting large portions of post-war 
Europe. There was some satisfaction in the West, especially 
within conservative opinion, that the Whites forces had been 
successful in putting down the Red insurrection, which was 
typically seen as having been largely a knock-on result of the 
October Revolution in Russia and inspired by, if not actively 
encouraged from Petrograd. It was against this interpretation of 
events in Finland that Mannerheim's name became known and 
respected in Britain and France.188 The relative calm that fell over 
Finland following the end of the Civil War was instrumental in 
improving Western attitudes towards the country and convincing 
both Britain and France of the wisdom of finally recognising 
Finnish independence. 
The discussion of possible intervention in Russia which 
flourished in the West during 1919 also had the effect of drawing 
further Western attention to Finland. Opinion in the leading 
British and French papers towards Finland and her future as a 
newly-independent state was divided. The conservative press 
made no attempt to hide its hopes that Finland would take part in 
joint operations against the Bolsheviks, a fact which explains 
Mannerheim's obvious popularity with papers like Le Temps and 
The Times. Both the latter continued to hint that Western 
recognition of Finnish independence, although by now officially 
given, remained somehow conditional and could be withdrawn if 
Finnish policies proved too out of tune with Western expectations. 
187. The Times 11.2.1919. 
188. See Henning Söderhjelm: The red insurrection in Finland 1918. Also John 
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Possible Finnish participation in intervention would, according to 
Le Temps, serve to consolidate Western faith in Finland's 
commitment to Western policies and at the same time ensure 
White Russian 'gratitude and friendship for many generations to 
come'. The Times was somewhat milder in its reservations about 
the Finnish position, arguing that Finnish support for General 
Yudenich would be sufficient proof of the fact that Finland had, as 
it were, 'truly earned' her independent status.189 
The official British and French attitudes towards intervention, 
however, had by this stage grown significantly more critical and 
less favourable to any form of involvement in Russia, Western or 
Finnish. The Manchester Guardian, reflecting this shift in 
opinion, wrote in approving tones of the Finnish government's 
refusal to assist White forces. The West would not have come to 
Finland's assistance in any case, the paper observed, and nor 
would the White Russians have agreed in the final analysis to 
recognising Finnish independence.190  
The elimination of first Russian and then German influence in 
Finland, and the change in the overall balance of power in the 
Baltic as a whole, had been of positive benefit in improving the 
security of Sweden's international position. Finland remained a 
problem for Swedish foreign policy-makers, however. The 
uncertainty over the Helsinki government's position towards 
possible future concessions over the Aland Islands put a large 
question mark over Swedish aims of extending discussion on the 
Islands to include that of their future sovereignty. Finland's 
increasing interest in the possibility of territorial expansion in East 
Karelia, together with joint intervention with the Western powers 
against Petrograd, seemed to indicate to the Swedes that devel-
oping good relations with her western neighbour was relatively 
low on the Finnish order of priorities. A possible White Russian 
victory in the East also held out the spectre of renewed Russian 
interest in the Aland Islands, one certain to frustrate any possible 
transfer of the area's sovereignty to Sweden. Trotsky's comments 
on the issue, made in his capacity as Soviet Commissar for Foreign 
189. Le Temps 25.10., 29.10.1919; The Times 24.10., 4.11.1919. 
190. Manchester Guardian 8.11.1919. 
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Affairs at the beginning of 1918, alluding to possible Soviet 
demands with regard to the Islands, also remained at the back of 
Swedish minds.191 
Mannerheim's visit to Stockholm in February 1919 provoked a 
widespread resurgence of analysis of the questions raised by the 
Finnish Civil War. The Left, in particular, did little to hide its 
continued hostility towards the White victors. Mannerheim was 
passionately attacked in the pages of the left-wing Folkets 
Dagblad-Politiken, which held him personally responsible for the 
ill-treatment of Red prisoners, to such an extent that the Swedish 
Attorney-General brought an indictment for libel against the 
paper.192 Social-Demokraten, in its commentary on Mannerheim's 
visit, stressed the opposition of the Swedish labour movement to 
the Finnish government's handling of the aftermath of the Civil 
War. Sweden, it was argued, should have waited until after the 
Finnish elections and for the restoration of some form of authentic 
Finnish democracy before making any direct moves towards 
improving relations between the two countries.193 
Sweden's major non-socialist papers proved much less critical 
towards Mannerheim's visit, interpreting it as an important step 
forward in the process of improving Swedish-Finnish relations 
and one possibly likely to improve the chances of a favourable 
solution, favourable that is to Sweden, emerging on the Aland 
Islands issue. The increased stability of bilateral relations was 
underlined in cautiously optimistic tones by Dagens Nyheter, one 
of the papers close to the government. The more right-wing Nya 
Dagligt Allehanda pointed to Mannerheim's visit, at the invitation 
of Eden's government, as indicating that both the centre parties 
and the Social Democrats now recognised, although admittedly 
late in the day, that the White struggle in Finland had been 
justified.194  
Swedish comment was also drawn to the question of Finland's 
possible participation in interventionist operations against 
Petrograd, and the country's presidential election in the summer of 
1919. While tacitly supporting a Finnish role in intervention and 
191. Gihl 1951, pp. 405-7; DN 6.5.1919; Palmstierna II 1953, p. 336. 
192. Folkets Dagblad Politiken 11.2., 12.2., 14.2.1919. 
193. Soc-Dem 4.2., 12.2., 13.2., 14.2.1919; Hamilton 1956, pp. 369-70. 
194. DN 14.2., 15.2.1919; NDA 3.2.1919. 
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thus in the international struggle against Bolshevism, Svenska 
Dagbladet feared that a White Russian victory would result in 
Sweden again finding herself faced with the same security 
problems in the East which had existed prior to 1914. It was even 
possible, the paper suggested pessimistically, that the Western 
powers might encourage Finland to agree to an union with Russia. 
The tendency of British and French papers like Le Temps and The 
Times to describe Finnish independence as somehow conditional 
on Finland's good behaviour was roundly condemned by Svenska 
Dagbladet, as were Western attempts to pressure Finland into 
participation in intervention. The choice of Ståhlberg as Finland's 
first President, however, was not especially welcomed, because of 
doubts over whether a liberal style of politics would be determined 
enough to resist the threat of Bolshevism in the East. Dagens 
Nyheter, in contrast, saw Ståhlberg's strength as lying in his 
potential to gain a wide measure of domestic political 
consensus.195 Aftonbladet, which had backed Swedish aid for the 
White forces during the Civil War, stressed the significance of the 
general struggle against Bolshevism and Finland's part in it for 
much of 1919. While supporting Mannerheim, and by extension 
his policy of involvement in intervention, Aftonbladet neverthe-
less warned that the latter contained a number of dangers for 
Finland.196 
The Swedish labour movement, together with its main 
newspaper Social-Demokraten, came out in strong opposition to 
all Western and Finnish plans for intervention against Soviet 
Russia. Mannerheim's being passed over in favour of Ståhlberg as 
Finland's first President was welcomed by the Left as an important 
and far-reaching change in Finnish political attitudes, and as one 
signalling the end of Helsinki being what was described as a 
hotbed of intrigue between the Western powers and the White 
Russians. The implications of the presidential election for 
Finland's domestic politics were also stressed, with the choice of 
the moderate Ståhlberg seen as marking the end of the state of 
limbo which had afflicted Finnish political life since the end of the 
Civil War the previous year.19' 
195. SvD 20.8., 26.10., 1.11.1919; DN 25.7.1919: StT 26.7.1919. 
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The end of the First World War saw an upswing in attempts by 
certain sections of Swedish opinion to strengthen Sweden's ties 
with Finland's Swedish-speaking population. This reflected both 
the heightened sympathy towards national minorities typical of 
the period and a more particular concern that the Swedish-
speaking minority in Finland was coming under increasing 
pressure from the country's newly-assertive Finnish-speaking 
majority. 'Riksföreningen för svenskhetens bevarande i utlandet', 
an organisation devoted to furthering the interests of Swedish-
speaking populations abroad, was particularly prominent in 
these efforts to develop new links with Finland, setting up a local 
office in Helsinki at the beginning of 1919. A special weekly 
supplement, devoted to Finnish affairs and aimed at consolidating 
links between mainland Sweden and the Swedish-speaking areas 
in Finland, also began to be published at about the same time by 
Aftonbladet. In addition to its other virtues, this also offered 
Finland-Swedes a convenient forum for airing their concerns 
about the future and sounding out suggestions and ideas designed 
to improve the future security of their minority position in Finnish 
society.198 
The main focus of German interest in the aftermath of the Allied 
victory lay with the Paris peace negotiations and subsequently 
with the terms and implementation of the Versailles agreement, a 
fact which left little room for concern with other issues. The lifting 
of the Western blockade on German foreign trade in the summer of 
1919, however, with its promise of restoring the German economy 
to something of its previous strength, had the effect of widening 
German foreign policy interests. Finland's willingness to re-
establish trading links, albeit as a neutral partner rather than as a 
close ally, was greeted with some warmth in Berlin.199  Those 
papers which had aligned themselves behind the new German 
government expressed no great sadness at the replacement of 
Finland's pro-German generation of politicians, although little was 
known of what to expect from the largely centrist figures which 
had emerged in their stead. Something of a more positive 
198. Abl (Veckoupplagga för Finland) 11.1., 8.2.1919; SvT 6.12.1918. 
199. Paasivirta 1968, p. 84. 
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sympathy towards Finland continued to be forthcoming from 
conservative and army circles in Germany, dating from Germany's 
involvement in the Civil War. For the majority of the rest of 
political opinion in post-war Germany, however, Finland 
represented little more than yet another small, newly-independent 
East European country. Finland's role in German thinking had by 
1919 significantly faded, replaced to some extent by the countries 
south of the Gulf of Finland, where German volunteers under 
General von der Goltz remained active.2°° 
Finland's relations with her powerful eastern neighbour were 
complicated throughout 1919 by the need to take both the White 
Russian and Bolshevik authorities into consideration in policy 
planning. The White Russians, with their insistence on the 
territorial inviolability of Russia's pre-war borders and their 
reluctance to accept the West's recognition of Finland as an 
independent state no longer linked to the Russian Empire, posed a 
particular problem. The emigre Russian leadership in Paris 
grouped around Le conference politique russe described the 
Western moves as purely temporary.201  
White Russian plans for Finland's future were, nevertheless, 
vague. Defence issues, however, were well to the fore. Plans for 
the defence of Petrograd, in the event of the White leaders coming 
to power as a result of a successful interventionary campaign, 
stressed the strategic need of Russia being able, if necessary, to 
close the mouth of the Gulf of Finland. Some form of Russian base 
on the northern shore of the Gulf between Helsinki and Hanko was 
envisaged as being necessary to effect this. Finland's right to enter 
into agreements with foreign powers was also to be restricted. The 
idea of a future defence union between Russia and Finland was 
similarly broached.2°2 
In the case of the Soviet government, the Bolsheviks' main focus 
of interest had moved away from Finland southwards to the Baltic 
countries and Central Europe. Some concern was nevertheless felt 
200. Ilvessalo 1959, pp. 38-41. The Deutsch-finnische Vereinigung, with General 
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about Finland's possible role in the event of an interventionist 
attack against Petrograd. Mannerheim's activities in support of 
Finnish participation in intervention and his links with leading 
Western politicians favourable to the idea were well known to the 
Soviet authorities. Finland's final decision to refuse a part in 
Western intervention represented an important development in 
consolidating the Soviet government's position, as Lenin himself 
admitted in his survey of the international situation over the past 
year at the end of 1919.2°3 
11. The Soviet-Finnish peace agreement 
The Soviet government's success in consolidating its position, and 
the weakening hold of the various White armies operating in 
Russia's border areas over the territory they had initially occupied 
during the course of 1919, saw a gradual, but fundamental change 
in Western attitudes towards the whole Russian question. The 
growing strength of the Red Army as an efficient fighting unit and 
its success in February 1920 in wresting control from the Whites of 
the whole length of the Murmansk railway line and in expelling 
Finnish forces from Petsamo only underlined this change in the 
balance of power within the North-West and elsewhere in 
Russia.204 The joint Western decision taken in December 1919 to 
make no further agreements with any White Russian forces, and 
the ending of the Western blockade on Soviet-controlled territory 
in January 1920, marked an important symbolic step in this 
development. 
This change in international attitudes, together with the 
increasing stability in the Baltic signalled by the signing of a peace 
agreement between the Soviet and Estonian governments at the 
beginning of February, did not go unnoticed in Finland, most 
particularly on the Rght.205 For the latter, developments in Russia 
meant the collapse of plans for Finnish intervention in cooperation 
with White forces. Recognition and acceptance of this about-turn, 
203. Holodkovsky 1978, p. 149. 
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however, proved slow among the hard core of conservative 
opinion, ideologically committed to opposing Bolshevism at all 
costs. The growing strength of the Soviet position nevertheless 
made the possibility of establishing any realistic non-communist 
alternative within Russia increasingly unlikely. 
Relations between the two countries, which had been 
consistently strained both before the October Revolution and 
afterwards, had occasionally verged on a state of open hostility, 
either indirectly as during the Finnish Civil War when the 
Bolsheviks had supplied arms to the Reds, or more directly as 
during the Finnish Olonets expedition a little later when the two 
sides had come into open military confrontation. A number of 
ugly border incidents had also taken place along the Karelian 
Isthmus, particularly during the summer of 1919. The border 
question, together with a more general desire to put bilateral 
relations on something of a normal footing, eventually served to 
highlight to both governments the need to negotiate a peace 
agreement. 
As part of an attempt to widen the base of potential political 
support for an agreement between the two countries, Ståhlberg 
made a number of efforts to sound out the possibilities of including 
the Right, in the shape of the National Coalition Party, in a new 
government. These moves led to the formation of a new non-
socialist coalition government under Rafael Erich in March 
1920.206 Opinion within the National Coalition Party, however, 
was far from united in favour of peace negotiations. While Erich, 
Ingman and Paasikivi supported cooperation with the other 
parliamentary parties for an agreement, Svinhufvud remained 
opposed to any treaty with the Bolsheviks as a matter of 
principle.207 Similar strong opposition towards peace negotiations 
was also typical of the leadership of the Swedish People's Party. 
The efforts of Erich's Foreign Minister, Rudolf Holsti, to acquire 
some form of foreign diplomatic support before beginning any 
negotiations failed to come to anything. Discussions with the 
Polish leadership under Pilsudsky on the issue proved fruitless, 
with the Poles determined to remain non-aligned and retain their 
206. Lindman 1937, pp. 108-11, 115-28. 
207. See Svinhufvud's communication of 8.1.1920 to J. K. Paasikivi (Ingman 
collection B 5:2). Also US 21.2.1920. 
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freedom of manoeuvre in the East. Holsti's contacts with various 
Western governments also failed to provide the backing that had 
been hoped for, with no Western country proving willing to 
commit itself to putting any pressure on the Soviet authorities on 
Finland's behalf, or to supporting Finnish proposals on the line of 
the final Soviet-Finnish border.208 
An all-party committee was set up by the government on 16 
April to take charge of preparing the groundwork for the Finnish 
delegation at the future negotiations, in the hope of guaranteeing as 
large a measure of advance parliamentary support for the 
government's position as possible. Divisions between the parties 
were most evident on the question of Finland's eastern border, 
although there was general agreement on the desire to annex 
Petsamo on the Arctic Ocean. While the Social Democrats were 
willing to accept the historical border dating from the 1617 Peace 
of Stolbova, leaving East Karelia completely in Soviet hands, their 
non-socialist colleagues were virtually united in demanding that 
the question of the area's possible annexation to Finland should be 
brought up for discussion at the talks.209 
Two developments, the about-turn of Soviet success in the 
Soviet-Polish conflict and the declaration of the establishment of 
the Karelian People's Commune in East Karelia, both indirectly 
serving to strengthen the Soviet negotiating position, were to 
significantly overshadow the peace talks when they finally got 
under way in Tartu in Estonia on 12 June. The capture of Kiev by 
the Red Army, until then occupied by the Poles, and the beginning 
of a powerful offensive westwards by Soviet forces towards the 
Polish heartland marked a major improvement in Soviet fortunes. 
News of the founding of the Karelian People's Commune on 8 June 
in East Karelia under the leadership of Edvard Gylling, one of the 
leading figures in the Red leadership during the Civil War who had 
fled to Sweden in the wake of the White victory, could have left the 
Finns in no doubt that, after granting the area regional autonomy, 
the Bolshevik authorities would be unwilling to discuss its 
possible future as part of Finland. 
The border question nevertheless quickly became the main 
subject of debate and the main bone of contention between the two 
208. K. Holsti 1963, pp. 115-8. 
209. Ibid., pp. 119-21; Tanner 1949, pp. 33-5. 
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negotiating parties at the talks in Tartu. The Finnish government 
and the Finnish delegation, led by Paasikivi in close association 
with Tanner, remained committed to trying to obtain some border 
adjustment in Finland's favour in the East. This intransigence on 
the part of the Finns ultimately led to the talks coming to a virtual 
halt in July, and to increased pressure from the socialist and other 
more moderate members of the Finnish negotiating team for a 
reassessment of the wisdom of Finnish attitudes on the whole 
question of territorial claims.270 Pressure also came from Paasikivi 
himself and Rudolf Walden, who were concerned that too long a 
delay might hinder opening up trade with Soviet Russia. 
The apparent change in fortunes in the struggle between Soviet 
Russia and Poland over the summer, which saw the Red Army 
forced to initiate large-scale withdrawals in the latter half of 
August, despite its success in advancing to within striking 
distance of Warsaw, however, served to strengthen Finnish 
determination to stand by the country's previous demands. The 
extensive discussion of the peace terms which re-emerged in the 
Finnish press at the beginning of September in the wake of this 
development saw repeated demands by the Right for Finland to 
defend her interests at all costs and to refuse to relinquish either 
Repola or Porajärvi, occupied during the Finnish expedition into 
Olonets Karelia. 
Ståhlberg, who ultimately determined the extent of possible 
Finnish proposals at the talks, considered Finnish access to 
Petsamo as of central importance and was willing to accept ceding 
Repola and Porajärvi, but opposed any territorial concessions on 
the Karelian Isthmus.21  Ståhlberg's flexibility on the East Karelian 
question finally broke the ice, and led to the signing of an 
agreement on 14 October. The Soviet-Finnish agreement increased 
the number of treaties signed between the Soviet authorities and 
the various countries along Russia's western border to four, in 
addition to the provisional agreement with Poland. 
As might have been expected, the subsequent debate on the 
Tartu treaty in the Finnish Parliament proved highly contentious, 
revealing substantial differences of opinion on both the actual 
210. J. Paavolainen 1979, pp. 335-40; Tanner 1949, pp. 79-89, 94. 
211. J. Paavolainen 1979, pp. 332-3, 339, 357-60; Tanner 1949, pp. 134, 144, 
150-2, 178; Kekkonen 1968, pp. 59-60. 
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content of the agreement and more generally on the wisdom of 
coming to any peace settlement with the Soviet authorities. The 
National Progressives, the Social Democrats, part of the National 
Coalition Party and the bulk of the press, which devoted wide-
scale coverage to the issue, aligned themselves behind the 
agreement. Helsingin Sanomat emerged as the main defender of 
the treaty. While not loudly advocating its virtues, it repeatedly 
stressed that the treaty was satisfactory. The very fact of a treaty 
between the two countries was important, in the paper's view, and 
marked an important step forward, even despite the fact that it 
could be no guarantee that the Soviet Union might not attack 
Finland at some time in the future. Karjalan Aamulehti, in its 
defence of the treaty, hinted that it might have been possible to 
negotiate a more favourable agreement had the government been 
willing to act faster, and had the Right not proved so opposed to 
any form of compromise.212 
The Social Democrats proved the most optimistic of the parties, 
considering the treaty the best possible in the circumstances and, 
by taking account of both countries' interests, as having a fair to 
good chance of surviving the test of time. Above all, the agreement 
was seen as consolidating the international situation in the 
northern Baltic and as marking an end to Finland's tacit 
attachment to the White Russian cause, and a recognition of the 
Soviet authorities as Russia's permanent government.213 Initial 
reaction within the Agrarian Party to the treaty, in contrast, was 
one of dissatisfaction, particularly on the question of Finnish 
claims to East Karelia, reflecting the strength of nationalist 
sentiment within the party's ranks. During the course of the 
parliamentary debate, however, the party, under Alkio's tutelage, 
decided to back the agreement, which for all its shortcomings was 
nevertheless seen as going some way towards clarifying the 
confused political situation in Europe and establishing Finland's 
position.74 
212. HS 7.10., 12.10., 16.10., 30.10.1920; Karjalan Aamulehti 6.10., 15.10.1920. 
213. SS 15.10., 26.10.1920; Kansan Työ 2.10., 16.10.1920. See also J. W. Keto's and 
Hannes Ryömä's speeches in Parliament on 28.10.1920 (VP 1920, ptk., pp. 
1050, 1052, 1059). 
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1063, 1494, 1499). 
8 — Finland and Europe 	 225 
Opposition to the treaty was strongest within the National 
Coalition Party and the Swedish People's Party. A significant 
number of the former's members, however, including Lauri 
Ingman and Ernst Nevanlinna in addition to the Prime Minister, 
Rudolf Erich, and Paasikivi, the leader of the Finnish delegation in 
Tartu, supported acceptance of the agreement. Echoing Alkio, 
Ingman argued that the treaty would help stabilise conditions in 
the Finnish area, and that the fact that the Bolsheviks had clearly 
established themselves as the dominant political force in Russia 
had to be accepted. Nevanlinna similarly suggested that Finland 
had achieved everything possible, given the unequal balance of 
power between the two negotiating parties. As one of those 
strongly critical or wholly opposed to the treaty, E. N. Setälä 
concentrated his attack on the failure of the Finnish negotiators to 
come away from Tartu with any concrete Russian concession on 
the East Karelia question. Setälä was joined by Theodor Homen 
and Tekla Hultin, who both drew attention to the continuing 
Bolshevik threat to Finland and the dangers inherent in 
undermining the achievement of the White victory. Forthright 
opposition to the treaty was also voiced in a number of rural 
newspapers associated with the party.215 
Criticism of the treaty within the Swedish People's Party 
concentrated less on the actual details of the agreement and more 
on the implicit recognition of the Bolshevik regime it symbolised. 
A more moderate stance was taken by the leading Swedish-
language newspaper, Hufvudstadsbladet which, together with 
Wasabladet, considered an agreement with the Soviet authorities 
as being in Finland's, as well as Russia's other neighbours' best 
interests, and as likely to protect Finland from the dangers 
inherent in adopting a go it alone policy.216 
The Tartu agreement was finally approved by Parliament after 
lengthy debate on 1 December by a majority of 163-27, a division of 
215. US 9.10., 31.10.1920; Vaasa 5.10., 9.10., 15.10.1920; Karjala 15.10., 28.10., 
29.10., 2.11.1920; Iltalehti 27.10.1920. See also the speeches in Parliament 
made by Rafael Erich, Ingman, Setälä, Homen and Hultin on 28.10. and 
30.11.1920 (VP 1920, ptk., pp. 1047-8, 1056, 1060, 1478, 1486). Also Rommi 
1974, p. 14. 
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votes which closely reflected that which had emerged some 
eighteen months earlier in the debate over acceptance of the 
republican constitution. Despite the obvious differences between 
the two issues, they both highlighted the difficulty which right-
wing circles, and in particular Swedish-speaking politicians, 
experienced in coming to terms with the balance of political power 
brought by parliamentary government, which favoured, at least 
temporarily, centre and centre-right policies rather than more 
conservative strategies. 
Official ratification of the Tartu treaty was quickly followed the 
same month by an invitation for Finland to become a member of 
the League of Nations, representing a further international 
recognition of Finnish independence. Of the newly-independent 
states, only Poland and Czechoslovakia, both countries with close 
links to the West, had previously been admitted to the new 
international organisation. Decisions on membership for the three 
Baltic republics and a number of other small states continued to be 
postponed indefinitely. 
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V Independent Finland's 
Foreign Relations During 
the 1920s 
1. Europe and the new post-war international 
balance of power 
The Europe which emerged out of the ruins of the First World War 
and the inter-connecting network of treaties imposed on the 
defeated countries rewriting their national borders was one very 
different from its pre-war forebear. The new-found ascendancy of 
the Western powers following the defeat of Germany, Austro-
Hungary and Russia, the emergence of a number of new inde-
pendent states, and the establishment of an isolated but ideo-
logically-dangerous Bolshevik government in Russia in the wake 
of the October Revolution, all represented aspects of this new 
balance of power, and one containing within it the seeds of fresh 
confrontation and tension. The wind of change was felt most 
acutely in Central Europe, where the defeated countries of the 
region found themselves faced with the challenge created by the 
emergence of newly-independent countries such as Poland and 
Czechoslovakia, both by-products of the Wilsonian doctrine of 
self-determination, but in reality ethnically heterogeneous, rather 
than homogeneous nation-states.' Typical of the new post-war 
status quo and of the new-found role of the West in deter- 
1. Bracher 1975, pp. 22-30. 
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mining European political developments was the grouping which 
emerged under French tutelage, linking France, Poland and 
Czechoslovakia, as a result of the military agreement signed 
between France and Poland in 1921 and the treaty of alliance 
signed between France and Czechoslovakia in 1924. This was 
further reinforced by the alliance network which had developed 
slightly earlier between Czechoslovakia, Rumania and Yugoslavia 
during 1920 and 1921 to counter possible Hungarian pressure. 
Severe dislocations were also evident in the post-war European 
economy. The general process of reconstruction and recovery was 
compounded by the heavy indebtedness of both Britain and France 
to the United States as a result of the war. Debate and uncertainty 
also continued over the quantity and nature of Germany's war 
reparations. The sharp disagreements on this latter issue eventual-
ly led to open crisis and the occupation of the German Rhineland 
at the beginning of 1923 by French and Belgian forces. Germany 
herself suffered massive inflation, bringing the country to the edge 
of economic catastrophe.2 Major difficulties were also encountered 
in the Danube basin, where the emergence of new independent 
states and the break-up of the Austro-Hungarian empire had led to 
the drawing of a mass of new national borders and the parallel 
erection of new customs barriers, all of which had the effect of 
fragmenting what had traditionally been a single unified trading 
area and creating new unforseen complications for the economies 
of the new nation-states in the region. 
In terms of political development, the end of the First World War 
saw a general breakthrough for the forces of parliamentarism and 
democracy. The political system adopted in Poland and the three 
Baltic republics reflected a strong bias towards parliamentary-
based forms of government, while Czechoslovakia and Finland 
incorporated strong presidential powers into their new constitu-
tions. Hopes for social and other reforms were also particularly 
strong following the years of political limbo imposed by the First 
World War. Extensive programmes of land reform of varying sorts 
were instituted throughout Eastern Europe, from Finland down to 
the Balkans. 
Those elements within European societies committed to violent 
2. Renouvin VII 1957, pp. 234-8; Eyck I 1954, pp. 312-30, 409-18. 
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revolution and the overthrow of capitalism remained for the major 
part in a clear minority, both at a national level and also, almost 
without exception, within the labour movement as a whole. The 
Communist International (Comintern) set up in Moscow in March 
1919 representing national communist parties, the French and 
German parties being among the most prominent, failed to acquire 
a real or effective measure of control over socialist politics outside 
Russia. Within more moderate left-wing opinion, the restoration 
of international ties between the European social democratic 
parties or their equivalents, many of which had experienced a 
significant expansion in their numbers of supporters, progressed 
slowly. Closer ties tended to be hindered by the deadweight of 
past national wartime allegiances, and the overall direction of 
ideological changes in the post-war world. The more moderate 
parties initially allied themselves with the reactivated Second 
International, while the more radical parties, favouring some form 
of cooperation with the Communist International, including the 
powerful Austrian Socialist Party, took part in the activities of the 
separate Vienna International founded in 1921, until the two were 
united in 1923 to form the Labour and Socialist International.3  
Soviet Russia, its attention focused almost exclusively on 
grappling with its own massive internal problems, assumed a low 
international profile in the early post-war years. The relief brought 
by the removal of the restrictions imposed by the Brest-Litovsk 
peace treaty following the German defeat was short-lived, with the 
country soon plunged into a civil war between the Red Army and 
White, Western-supported forces in large areas of the country's 
border regions, which only served to put further strain on Russia's 
already overstretched economy. The end of the Civil War, 
although marking the end of the worst disruptions affecting the 
country, failed to eliminate unrest altogether. Instead, com-
pounded with a general war weariness, it provoked a strong wave 
of criticism and dissatisfaction towards the Bolshevik authorities, 
which reached a peak in the Kronstadt rebellion of March 1921. 
After succeeding in putting down this threat to its authority, the 
Soviet government under Lenin's direction decided on a radical 
change of economic policy, in the shape of the adoption of the 
3. Borkenau 1938, pp. 161-3, 167, 199-201; Paasivirta II 1955, pp. 114-6. 
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NEP. This new programme opened the way for what amounted to 
a mixed economy. While control of major industrial production 
remained in the hands of the state, significant freedom was given 
to the private sector, and the peasants allowed to retain 
independent ownership over their smallholdings. From a political 
point of view, however, in contrast to this easing of economic 
direction, control from the centre was actually increased. A 
complete freeze was imposed on the activities of the other socialist 
parties, the Mensheviks and the Social Revolutionaries.4 After 
adopting the NEP, Soviet Russia also embarked on a process of 
developing its commercial links with Europe. Peace agreements 
with the country's western neighbours, the last with Poland, with 
which a treaty was signed in Riga in March 1921, were followed by 
preparations for opening up wider links with the West. The 
Rapallo agreement, signed between Soviet Russia and Germany in 
April 1922, reflected an attempt by both countries, isolated from 
their immediate neighbours, to provide themselves with a measure 
of joint security and a greater degree of international manoeuvra-
bility than either had previously been able to achieve.5  
The founding of the League of Nations, with its aims of eliminating 
the type of secretive diplomacy characteristic of previous decades 
and advancing the cause of national self-determination and the 
rights of national identity for minority peoples, had initially been 
seen in many quarters as signalling a new direction in post-war 
European politics. The fact, however, that the League had been 
founded on virtually solely Western initiative and that the 
defeated countries were only gradually accepted as members, and 
Germany, the last, only in 1926, gave the new international 
organisation an unambiguously Western bias at odds with its 
impartial independent aspirations. The League failed, as a result, 
to develop into a forum capable of injecting any significant degree 
of balance into relations between the victors and the defeated, or 
one willing to review the peace treaties drawn up at the end of the 
war. It was further weakened in its potential to influence events by 
4. Carr II 1952, pp. 273-9, 292-317; Deutscher 1978, pp. 194-5. 
5. Fischer 1960, pp. 176-82, 196-7; Kennan 1961, pp. 209, 222-8; Deutscher 
1978, pp. 334-5. 
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the fact that both the United States and the Soviet Union remained 
outside its activities. 
The 'Sturm and Drang' period immediately following the end of 
the war lasted until about the end of 1921, by which time, although 
the major post-war problems remained far from finally settled, the 
overall international situation had nevertheless calmed appreci-
ably.6 It was not until 1924, however, that a new stage in European 
political developments, particularly in the western half of Europe, 
one representing a new departure in thinking on the question of 
international relations and symbolised in large part by the Geneva 
protocol proposal, can really be said to have begun. The latter, 
approved by the assembly of the League of Nations in the autumn 
of 1924 on the initiative of the British and French Prime Ministers, 
Ramsay Macdonald and Edouard Herriot, condemning wars of 
aggression and calling for the use of mediation and international 
arbitration in solving interstate conflicts, failed, despite the high 
hopes it evoked, however, to be ever implemented, largely because 
of the opposition of Britain's subsequent Baldwin-led government. 
Despite its failure, the protocol proposal, by virtue of its content, 
nevertheless continued to have an indirect influence on future 
developments. 
Similar ideas to those in the Geneva proposal had been central in 
the Dawes plan drawn up shortly earlier in the spring of 1924, 
covering the organisation of German war reparations. The success 
of this represented a victory for the attempts of Ramsay Mac-
Donald's government to reduce the gulf existing between the 
victorious Allied powers and the defeated countries, and a blow to 
advocates of the type of hard-line politics represented by the then 
French government under Poincare. When the latter was replaced 
in May 1924 by a new administration under Herriot, it became 
possible to talk of a significant and extensive change in the 
European political climate. 
After a solution had been reached on the thorny reparations 
question amenable to the United States, important because of 
America's central role in granting large loans to Germany, it 
became possible to begin discussions between the Western powers 
and the German government on political issues. These eventually 
6. Bracher 1975, pp. 59-63, 85-7; Borkenau 1938, p. 221. 
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led to the Locarno agreements of the autumn of 1925, in which 
Germany, under the foreign policy leadership of Gustav Strese-
mann, recognised as permanent the post-war borders running 
along the Rhine between Germany, France and Belgium. The 
signing of the Locarno agreements also opened the way for the 
acceptance of Germany as a member of the League of Nations, 
which took place in the autumn of 1926.' 
The Locarno agreements were to have far-reaching implications 
in contributing to a further stabilisation of the political situation in 
Western Europe and, more indirectly, in underpinning the prestige 
and influence of the League of Nations. No comparable agree-
ments, however, proved forthcoming concerning Germany's 
relations with her eastern neighbours. No formal recognition or 
international guarantees were agreed regarding the permanence of 
these eastern borders, beyond an affirmation by the respective 
countries to use arbitration and negotiation to guarantee the 
peaceful solution of interstate conflicts. This lack of symmetry 
between the diplomatic solutions arrived at in the East and West 
was closely linked to Stresemann's aim of ensuring the immuta-
bility of Germany's western borders, but at the same time leaving 
the door open, as he saw it, to future possible modifications of 
those in the East.8 Largely as a result of Stresemann's western-
orientated foreign policy, Germany was able to resume an active 
role on the European political scene from the mid-1920s onwards. 
The signing of the Locarno Pact agreements also contributed to 
the creation of a certain Locarno spirit, the proponents of which 
argued that, with the gulf between the victors and the defeated in 
Europe narrowing, the danger of renewed open conflict had been 
significantly reduced. This development, however, was restricted 
to Western Europe and excluded the Soviet Union. From the 
Soviet point of view, the Locarno agreements represented 
something of a set-back to its own policies, as in Soviet thinking 
they were considered to be part of a wider, more general attempt to 
create a common front against the Soviet Union.9 Since Rapallo, 
Soviet policy had continued to be primarily focused on ways of 
protecting the Soviet state from any possible delayed 
7. Walters 1960, pp. 262-76. 
8. Maxelon 1972, pp. 195-206. 
9. Fischer 1960, pp. 443-4; Kennan 1961, pp. 278-9. 
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repercussions of earlier Western interventionist policies, and 
consolidating its relations with the outside world, as in the case of 
its offers of non-aggression treaties to the Baltic republics and 
Finland. 
The period from the mid-1920s onwards has often been 
described as marking one of an almost idyllic calm in European 
politics, to underline the change that occurred in the area 
following the conclusion of the immediate post-war years and 
which was most obviously evident in the process of stabilisation 
which took place in Western Europe and the position of the small 
states. Parallel to this, the strengthening of the status of the League 
of Nations in European minds saw the question of disarmament 
brought increasingly to the fore and become the subject of 
extensive debate and diplomatic activity. Much of this focused 
around the contentious question of whether the consolidation of 
general security was the major necessary prerequisite for disarma-
ment, or whether disarmament itself was the key to increasing 
collective security. The debate and disagreement surrounding 
these ideas were the cause of much argument and dispute, and 
prevented practical progress on the whole issue, both inter-
nationally and within Europe in particular.10 Characteristic both 
of these difficulties and the general will to achieve some form of 
international accord typical of the latter half of the 1920s was the 
Kellogg-Briand pact outlined between the United States and 
France. Formally condemning the use of war as a tool of 
diplomacy and a way of advancing national interests, the pact was 
ratified by some fifty states between its first promulgation in the 
autumn of 1928 and the end of the decade.11  
2. Domestic tensions 
The years surrounding independence had seen Finnish society 
experience a period of major transformation, one which had 
embraced not only the gaining of national independence but also 
the political and social upheavals of the Civil War, and a long 
10. Walters 1960, pp. 143-5, 217-30, 363-76. 
11. Ibid., pp. 372-3, 384-7. 
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period of wrangling over the inter-related questions of the shape of 
the country's new constitution and the direction of future foreign 
policy. This transition period, although relatively short, was to 
have a powerful influence on political and social developments 
during the 1920s and throughout the whole of the inter-war years. 
The various widely conflicting and often highly selective inter-
pretations put on the events surrounding independence by the 
different political parties played a significant part in deepening the 
divisions within society which had gained such prominence 
during 1917 and 1918, and for long prevented the emergence of 
any real sense of national unity or political consensus. 
As a result of her peripheral role in the First World War, Finland 
had been spared the type of severe economic disruption which had 
affected those countries more directly involved in the conflict. 
Even the Civil War, despite its wide geographical extent, had seen 
only Tampere and Viipuri suffer any real material destruction. 
The main body of the country's industrial infrastructure had 
remained largely untouched by the troubles. Industrial activity in 
southern Finland outside Tampere and Viipuri had only been 
partially disrupted, even at the peak of the conflict.12 Post-war 
reconstruction, therefore, was of a relatively small order. The 
major changes which had taken place in Finland's foreign trade 
nevertheless saw the economy put under some strain, as it came to 
terms with the challenges brought by the country's new foreign 
markets. 
The early years of the 1920s saw the introduction of a quantity of 
important new domestic legislation, affecting compulsory 
education, the freedom of religion, military service and land 
reform, as part of the process of remoulding the country to fit its 
new independent status. The school system, in line with the 
extension of compulsory education, expanded with the spread of 
elementary schools into rural areas. The number of secondary 
schools, including private coeducational schools, also grew 
substantially. In the realm of higher education, Helsinki University 
was joined in the early years of independence by two new private 
universities, the Swedish-language Abo Akademi, founded in 
12. Suomen Virallinen Tilasto XXXII. Sosiaalisia erikoistutkimuksia I — Marras-
kuun lakko 1917 ja kapina v. 1918. 
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1919, and the Finnish-language Turku University, founded a year 
later.13 The most important social reforms enacted in the years 
following independence covered the question of rural land 
ownership. In an effort to eliminate some of the most obvious 
social problems surrounding the land question and which had 
played such a part in exacerbating tensions in the period prior to 
the Civil War, a law enabling leasehold farmers to purchase the 
land they worked was passed in the autumn of 1918, and resulted 
in the establishment of over 100,000 independent smallholdings 
replacing earlier leasehold farms during the 1920s. This reform 
was subsequently complemented by an additional piece of 
legislation known as the Lex Kallio, passed in 1922, designed to 
further ease the acquisition of additional land by new 
smallholders. 
No significant social reforms, however, were introduced 
covering the industrial sector or the conditions of the industrial 
labour force and labour relations, despite the relatively 
underdeveloped nature of legislation in the field compared, for 
example, to that existing in neighbouring Sweden. Labour 
relations in industry and other sectors of the economy remained 
heavily weighted in favour of employers, who tended to exercise 
an often patriarchal style of management. In many senses, 
nineteenth-century traditions, both in management and labour 
legislation, continued virtually unchanged. While a number of 
larger employers did provide social benefits, such as company 
housing, for their employees out of their own pockets, this 
departed relatively little from the traditional, noblesse oblige-
coloured approach to social issues typical of previous generations, 
bypassing officially legislated and negotiated social policy. 
The size of the civil service and administrative machine 
inevitably grew during the early years of independence, partly as a 
result of the new responsibilities covering the country's defence 
and foreign policy, which had been previously in Russian hands 
and which now fell to the Finnish authorities to handle, and partly 
as a result of a general increase in governmental administrative 
activity and the expansion of education. Levels of pay within the 
civil service nevertheless soon fell to below that enjoyed by 
13. Suomen Kulttuurihistoria III, pp. 113-4, 139-40. 
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officials during the nineteenth century, a fact which contributed to 
a general fall in the status of government employees within 
society, and one which was marked by a growth in popular 
opposition to what was seen as the dead hand of government. This 
was particularly evident on the Left and within the Agrarian Party, 
encouraged in the former by class conflict thinking and in the 
latter by traditional rural resentment towards the upper classes 
and urban-based authority. The major change which had taken 
place within the structure of local government following the shift 
towards more democratic representative methods and away from a 
centrally-nominated form of regional administration as a result of 
the 1917 law on universal suffrage for local government elections, 
went some way to tempering the most radical aspects of this anti-
government sentiment. The more open form of local government, 
based on locally-elected town and rural councils, which emerged 
in the 1920s not only brought democracy closer to the people, but 
also encouraged wider popular participation in local issues. 
There was, however, little escaping the mass of social tensions 
and political and ideological divisions inherited from the pre-
independence and immediate post-independence periods, all of 
which continued to engender and reinforce a network of rigid and 
uncompromising social and political attitudes stretching across 
virtually the whole of society. The division of society into 'whites' 
and 'reds' and the political rhetoric which went with it, inherited 
from the time of the Civil War, proved particularly persistent, and 
remained a feature of political debate and comment throughout 
much of the 1920s. Extending beyond politics to affect everyday 
attitudes and social interaction, it served to deepen the gulf 
already existing between the two halves of society, creating 
widespread political and social suspicion and mistrust. 
Every effort was made by the Right, both in print and in public 
speeches made on such occasions as Independence and Army Day, 
to underline the role the White army had played in securing 
independence against the threat which had been posed by the 
'Bolshevik-inspired' rebels. The White victory was also 
consistently described, from a more international perspective, as 
having marked a brake on the spread of revolution into Europe and 
as having been instrumental in saving Scandinavia, in particular, 
from the ravages of social upheaval. A large amount of literature 
on the 'War of Liberation', as the Civil War was referred to on the 
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Right, appeared throughout the early 1920s. Restricting its interest 
more or less exclusively to the events of the spring of 1918 and 
avoiding any real analysis of the earlier stages of the conflict or its 
origins, this concentrated on lauding the achievements of the 
Whites and emphasising the view of the Civil War as primarily one 
of liberation from the threat of Communism and Russian 
hegemony. Less enthusiasm for the more extreme aspects of this 
style of interpretation of recent history was evident from within 
the centre parties which, although agreeing in principle with the 
value of the White victory, tended to fear that, taken too far, these 
views would seriously undermine the policy of national 
conciliation and compromise they advocated. 
The Right's continued identification of the White victory with 
the consolidation of independence was bitterly resented through-
out the Left, despite the split which existed among its ranks 
towards the wisdom of the socialists' actions in 1918 in deciding 
on a policy of social revolution, as only serving to reinforce class 
divisions and ultimately intended to prevent the Left from 
achieving any real measure of political respectability. While the 
moderates within the labour movement tended to restrict 
themselves to arguing for a more conciliatory and united approach 
to recent history and the ending of political discrimi-nation against 
the Left, the more radical elements on the Left, with their closer 
sympathies with the actions of the Red leadership in 1918 and 
greater commitment to a future popular uprising, remained 
significantly more hostile towards conservative interpretations of 
the Civil War and critical of the hold they gained over much of 
society. 
The Right, with its continual emphasis on the importance of 
maintaining the values and ideals which had been secured by the 
White victory in the Civil War, stressed what it saw as its own 
central role in maintaining the existing political and social balance 
against what was seen as the labour movement's commitment to 
undermining, if not actually destroying the status quo. The Right 
showed itself particularly susceptible to fears of a second uprising 
masterminded by the Left; in fact, almost any activity by the Left 
involving significant numbers of participants tended automati-
cally to be interpreted as presaging social unrest and potential 
revolution. Political agitation was divined at every turn and seen 
as being inspired, if not directed by the Bolshevik authorities 
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across the border. Little attempt was made to connect unrest with 
internal domestic social conditions or popular dissatisfaction with 
the development of Finnish society. This encouraged a belief in 
the importance of keeping a close watch on potential trouble spots 
and subversive activity in order to prevent their spreading and 
posing a wider threat to society.14 Defence of the country's 
independence and internal social structure came to be seen on the 
Right, in the light of the experience of the Civil War, as closely 
inter-related issues. This resulted in questions of a party's or 
individual politician's political 'reliability', on both domestic and 
foreign policy issues, coming to be assessed largely exclusively in 
terms of their domestic political loyalties.15 Despite their 
relatively small representation in Parliament, amounting to some 
50 seats at the 1919 elections shared between the National 
Coalition and Swedish People's Parties, right-wing views gained 
added strength and influence from the fact that the country's 
administration, army, Civil Guard and major economic and 
cultural institutions were all strongly conservative in nature and 
outlook. 
The defeat of its much-advocated idea of a monarchy in favour of 
a republican constitution had come as a bitter blow to the Right. 
The decline in conservative political influence this appeared to 
symbolise had only been reinforced by the failure of Mannerheim 
to be elected as the country's first President and Ståhlberg's 
election in his stead. While a number of leading National 
Coalition Party politicians proved relatively quickly willing to 
come to terms with the new republic, among them J. K. Paasikivi, 
who publicly expressed his loyalty and acceptance of Ståhlberg at 
the beginning of August 1919, Rafael Erich and Lauri Ingman, 
there remained a number of leading figures on the Right who 
refused to drop either their sharp criticism of the ideal of 
parliamentary democracy or of the new political establishment.16 
These included many of those who had been prominent on the 
political scene in earlier years and particularly during the spring 
of 1918, and who now considered that they had been unjustly 
passed over. Finnish society had traditionally reflected a strong 
14. See for ex. G. v. Bonsdorff 1947, pp. 38-42, 50-1. 
15. Paasivirta 1966, p. 73. 
16. US 6.8.1919. 
239 
respect for social status and academic achievement favourable to 
political and social élitism, and against this background it was 
only natural that there was strong resistance in certain circles to 
the whole concept of modern democracy, with its emphasis on 
equality of rights and opportunities. Much of this critical reaction, 
which was most evident within the ranks of the National Coalition 
Party and the Swedish People's Party, was directed against the 
new mass parties, not only on the Left but also in the Centre. 
The National Coalition Party itself, however, was far from 
internally united, with an increasing gulf emerging between the 
older and younger wings of the party, one especially highlighted at 
party conferences over policy on language and national issues. 
The older generation, under the leadership of E. N. Setälä, 
typically advocated a policy of moderation on the heated language 
issue and the position of the country's Swedish-speaking minority, 
while the younger generation tended to favour more radical 
demands for a more avowedly nationalist Finnish-speaking state. 
Despite the often loud criticism of the latter group, however, the 
established moderate party line was maintained for much of the 
decade until the 1927 party conference, when more radically 
conservative elements within the party were able to gain 
significant ground. 
For those occupying the political middle-ground, the continued 
division of society between an uncompromising Left and Right 
represented a trend which was seen as ultimately destructive to 
the positive development of Finnish society. For all their 
condemnation of the 'Red Rebellion', as the Civil War continued to 
be referred to by those in the Centre, and for all their concern not to 
downplay its continued influence on Finnish society, the overall 
trend of liberal policies, with few exceptions, was based on the 
underlying theme of the need for national conciliation and the idea 
that the elimination of internal hostilities and conflicts was of 
central importance in establishing a more stable and secure future. 
The National Progressive Party's close association with the 
republican ideal during the decisive months of 1919, and which 
had closely matched the mood of the time, had represented the 
party's strongest card. Following the conclusion of the debate over 
the constitution and the acceptance of a republican form of 
government, the party was deprived of its major vote-catcher, and 
lost a significant proportion of its support in the 1922 elections as a 
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result. Its number of seats fell from 26 to 15, with the departure of 
those who, while supporting the republican ideal, had never felt 
any great sympathy towards liberalism in its wider sense. The 
Progressives were handicapped by their lack of identification with 
any particular interest group capable of guaranteeing their political 
base and their inability to look to support from any powerful 
institutions or organisations comparable to that enjoyed by the 
Right." The party lost further ground in the later 1920s, 
particularly in East Finland, to the expanding Agrarian Party. 
Despite this drop in their popularity, the Progressives were 
nevertheless able to retain an important parliamentary position as 
a result of the proportional voting system and the need for 
coalition governments, given the inability of any single party to 
command an absolute parliamentary majority. 
The number of Agrarian Party members in Parliament grew 
slowly but steadily during the 1920s, from a total of 45 seats in 
1922 to 52 seats in 1927. The party's growth from being a minor 
party of smallholders to a major party of independent farmers was 
closely linked to the changes in the composition of rural society 
brought about by the new land reform legislation introduced in the 
early 1920s, and the improvements it ushered in in the conditions 
of the rural electorate. From the very first years of independence, 
the Agrarian Party came to occupy a virtually continuous place in 
government. This strengthened both the party's parliamentary 
significance and the confidence of the party's leadership, and 
made the party the subject of much political courting by various 
interest groups. On the negative side, however, it also created 
some tensions and difficulties for the relatively inexperienced 
party leadership.18 The other non-socialist parties had little choice 
but to come to terms with the new power and influence wielded by 
the Agrarians. The prevailing atmosphere of the period, with its 
emphasis on rural peasant values as the cornerstones of Finnish 
identity, and rural society as the ideal type of Finnish society, also 
served to consolidate the overall position of the Agrarians. In the 
eyes of Agrarian politicians and party supporters, the other non-
socialist parties tended to be seen, in line with traditional rural 
17. G. v. Bonsdorff 1947, pp. 61-6. 
18. Mylly 1978, pp. 41-52. 
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attitudes towards government and the political establishment, as 
representing essentially urban values and as being sympathetic to 
the traditional ruling élite, and less than fully committed to the 
creation of an avowedly Finnish society and national iden-
tity.19 
The Right, in making its declared intention that of defending the 
values secured by the Civil War and the defeat of socialism it 
symbolised, was not slow to use its demand for the need for 
uncompromising politics in attacking the centre parties, which 
were consistently criticised for their lack of determined resistance 
to the Left. Even such essentially liberal papers as Turun Sanomat 
and Karjalan Aamulehti were not infrequently described in the 
more right-wing press as having betrayed the non-socialist cause. 
These outbursts by the Right were typically interpreted by 
moderate opinion as clear indications of the former's fundamental 
hostility towards the whole fabric of parliamentary democracy, 
and were often countered by references to the Right's earlier 
commitment to a monarchial constitution, a policy about which 
the Right had become increasingly sensitive, and wished forgot-
ten.20 
A strong emphasis on national values and national identity, and 
linked with it a tendency to see the interests of the Finnish-
speaking and Swedish-speaking populations as essentially incom-
patible, played a particularly visible part in the early years of 
independence. This powerful stress on national identity was a 
common feature typical of the growing pains experienced by many 
of the newly-independent states of Europe, such as Poland and 
Czechoslovakia. Overall developments in many of the new small 
states of Europe, in fact, exhibited surprisingly similar trends, 
despite the very local nature of the individual historical and 
political strands going to make up each country's sense of national 
and ethnic identity. 
The various attempts made to underline a sense of Finnish 
identity to complement national independence, and stress the 
importance of the Finnish language as the ideal medium of 
expressing that identity, were linked to the feeling of self-confi- 
19. Ibid., pp. 35, 186-7. 
20. HS 28.9.1924; US 5.10.1924. 
242 
dence which had been born out of the gaining of independence. In 
defending the virtues of a particularly Finnish view of the world, it 
was often argued, either directly or indirectly, along lines first 
broadly put forward by Snellman in the nineteenth century, that 
only a linguistically homogeneous people, one speaking the same 
national language, could really be assured of finding a strong sense 
of national purpose, while bilingualism in any form spelled 
dangerous compromise. A strong internal national identity, it was 
thought, would also have the effect of presenting a powerful and 
united Finnish profile to the outside world.21  
The renewed activity these ideas inspired in some sections of 
opinion to reinforce Finnish identity and the dominance of the 
Finnish language at the expense of Swedish led many Swedish-
speakers to conclude that the position of the Swedish-language 
minority was becoming increasingly threatened, and that to 
survive the community would need to fight more actively to 
protect its rights. This was particularly unsettling to the Swedish-
speaking establishment as, despite its small overall numbers, it 
had enjoyed a dominant position in the country's administration 
during the nineteenth century, and had been and continued to be 
highly influential in the country's economic and cultural life. The 
parliamentary reform of 1906 and the introduction of a 
parliamentary democracy in 1919 had both contributed to making 
Swedish-speakers, despite the constitutional guarantees that had 
been made endorsing Finland's bilingual status, increasingly 
sensitive to feeling themselves threatened by the newly-assertive 
Finnish-speaking majority and the possibility of future social 
changes likely to undermine their position.22 
At the same time as the Swedish-speaking leadership in Helsinki 
began concentrating its efforts on consolidating and further 
guaranteeing the community's position, it began to become 
increasingly evident, and particularly from the beginning of 1919 
onwards, that it was gradually losing its traditional authority over 
the Swedish-speaking population. This development, far from 
being restricted only to the Aland Islands, whose population had 
21. Aitosuomalainen 3/1924, 6/1925, 24.2.1928. 
22. On the debate over the Swedish People's Party's policy approach, see the 
discussions at the 1923 party conference held in Kristiinankaupunki (Nord-
ström 1946, pp. 49-54). 
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for some time pursued their own strongly regional policies, 
extended in particular to Swedish-speaking population centres in 
southern Ostrobothnia. Feeling themselves geographically and 
otherwise isolated from their linguistic cousins further south, 
these began to press for a more independent line. In its most 
extreme form, this had emerged in the hints which had begun to 
appear as early as December 1918 in a number of Swedish-
language papers in Ostrobothnia about the possibility of annexing 
the area to Sweden, along similar lines to those proposed by the 
Aland Islands population. Supporters of these ideas backed them 
up with appeals to the right of minorities to national self-
determination, and called for a local referendum to gauge the 
strength of local opinion on the issue.23 
The growing internal conflicts within the Swedish-speaking 
population were further highlighted at the special council of 
representatives from Swedish-speaking southern Ostrobothnia 
which was convened in Vaasa in January 1919. At this meeting, 
Ernst Estlander and Eirik Hornborg, both leading figures in the 
leadership of the Swedish People's Party, argued strongly that all 
extreme proposals, such as that covering the possible annexation 
of the area to Sweden, could only harm the interests of the 
Swedish-speaking community and would be likely to lead to 
charges of treachery and to provoke further and dangerous 
political discrimination against the Swedish-speaking population 
throughout the country. Thanks largely to the efforts of Edvin 
Sundqvist, one of the leading moderates opposed to the adoption 
of extreme policies, the Vaasa meeting finally limited itself to 
demanding what were termed as international guarantees for the 
region's Swedish-speaking population, referring only in the most 
general terms to the possibility of holding a local referendum on 
the region's future.24 
The national conference of representatives from the whole of the 
Swedish-speaking community held in Helsinki in May 1919 
responded to these developments in the regions by approving a 
new outline programme on political and linguistic issues. This 
new programme put forward the idea of establishing a separate, 
23. Kaskö Tidning 11.12.1918; Pedersöre 24.12.1918; Syd-Österbotten 24.12.1918. 
24. G. v. Bonsdorff 1950, pp. 115-6; Hämäläinen 1968, pp. 57-8; Wasabladet 
8.1.1919; Hbl 10.1., 18.2.1919. 
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autonomous regional form of government to administer the whole 
of Swedish-speaking Finland, with the country's various and 
geographically disparate Swedish-speaking areas grouped together 
as a federation of canton-type regions. Various other admini-
strative changes designed to secure the integrity and future of 
Swedish-speaking communities were also proposed, such as the 
setting-up of a Swedish-speaking diocese, a separate department in 
the National Schools Board devoted to administering Swedish-
language schools, and the founding of separate Swedish-language 
military units in the army.25 Perhaps not surprisingly, this plan 
was never carried out in its entirety, not only because it would 
have proved highly complicated to implement, but also because it 
would have undermined national unity at a time when the country 
could least have afforded it and Finnish-speaking politicians were 
least willing to compromise. Many of the plan's more modest 
individual proposals nevertheless did win favour with the 
country's political leadership, and a number were approved. 
The leadership of the Swedish People's Party remained united in 
its opposition to the idea of the Aland Islands being transferred to 
Sweden. The possible loss of the Islands to Finland was con-
sidered likely to destroy the country's geographical unity and 
further weaken the overall position of the Swedish-speaking 
population elsewhere, in addition to reducing its overall size. 
There was strong support, however, for demands for a wide 
measure of local autonomy to be granted to the Islands. The 
demand which had been put forward in Vaasa for special inter-
national guarantees as a means of securing the position of the 
Swedish-speaking population as a whole was rejected as un-
realistic by many of the party's leaders. The idea advanced by 
some Swedish-speaking politicians that the party should only 
agree to defending the Finnish case for sovereignty over the Aland 
Islands if approval proved forthcoming over the bulk of the 
Swedish-speaking community's other demands was also ruled out 
as likely to be detrimental to the community's case.26 
Swedish-speaking politicians often found themselves isolated 
from the bulk of the rest of public opinion during the early years of 
25. G. v. Bonsdorff 1950, pp. 164-84; Hämäläinen 1968, pp. 70-2. 
26. Hbl 6.3.1919. 
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independence. Their opposition to a number of major political 
developments, such as the approval of a republican constitution, 
Ståhlberg's choice as President and the ratification of the Tartu 
peace, consistently found them at odds with the mainstream of 
political opinion. The thorny question of whether they would be 
best advised to advance the interests of the Swedish-speaking 
population by refusing to make any compromises and thereby 
remain isolated, or whether it would be better to attempt to 
develop links across the linguistic divide with the rest of Finnish 
society, proved a major source of contention within the Swedish-
speaking political camp. This was particularly evident in the 
heated argument on the issue which took place at the 1923 
conference of the Swedish People's Party. The conciliatory view 
put forward by the likes of Professor G. G. Rosenqvist and summed 
up in his statement that, 'A Swedish-speaking community and 
identity which, to preserve its continued existence, needs to erect 
walls and moats around it and which fears outside influence, is 
condemned to destruction', nevertheless failed to win the 
conference's whole-hearted support.27 
In Parliament, the party often found itself holding the balance of 
power. This created its own difficulties, as antipathies were felt 
towards both the Left and the Right, most strongly nevertheless 
towards the Left, which tended to be identified by those behind 
party thinking, in typical conservative fashion, as the major 
potential source of social disruption and division. On the other 
hand, both the moderate Finnish-speaking centre parties and the 
more conservative Right, with their commitment to various forms 
of a specifically Finnish-language nationalism, were seen as 
posing a direct, if possibly long-term, danger to the linguistic 
identity and continued existence of the Swedish-speaking 
community, and thus also as unattractive partners in any political 
alliance. Without the support of the Swedish People's Party, 
however, the non-socialist parties lacked a parliamentary majority, 
and by skilful use of this position the party leadership hoped that 
it would be able to gain additional political influence and at the 
same time be in a position to prevent the passing of what was seen 
as the most threatening of the legislation directed against the 
27. G. G. Rosenqvist 1920, p. 18. 
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Swedish-speaking minority.Z8 
The steady, if somewhat uneven development of radical Finnish 
sentiment and its growing influence, both in the wider body of 
society and in the Finnish-speaking non-socialist hierarchy, 
during the mid-1920s only served to fuel the Swedish-speaking 
community's growing sense of being under threat.29 The establish-
ment of the Tanner-led Social Democrat minority government in 
December 1926 was greeted by Hufvudstadsbladet, in sharp 
contrast to the hostile attitude of much of the rest of non-socialist 
opinion as reflected in the challenging tones adopted by the 
National Coalition parliamentary party towards the new admin-
istration, with a muted, but not entirely dissatisfied response.3° 
Experience had shown Swedish-speaking commentators that the 
Social Democrats were moderate on the language issue and 
generally condemned the more extreme forms of radical Finnish 
nationalism. The difficult political situation in which the Swedish 
People's Party found itself in as a result of, on the one hand, its 
traditional conservative leanings and, on the other, its opposition 
to the radical nationalism gaining ground within Finnish-speaking 
non-socialist opinion, however, presented its leadership with a 
continuing problem. This was well reflected in the dispute which 
blew up over the question between R. A. Wrede, a leading party 
figure, and the party secretary, Rafael Colliander, following the 
former's publication of a pamphlet in which, in tones reminiscent 
of the most uncompromising attitudes current in the immediate 
aftermath of the Civil War, he described the Social Democrats as 
enemies of society and as a threat to social order. Colliander 
countered Wrede's argument, pointing out that it ran against the 
interests of both the country's Swedish-speaking and Finnish-
speaking populations. In observing that elsewhere in Scandinavia 
social democratic parties were now a powerful and respected 
political force and that the importance of contacts with 
Scandinavia to newly-independent Finland could not be ignored, 
Colliander stressed that Swedish-speaking politicians would do 
well to follow the Nordic lead and adopt a more constructive 
28. Lindman 1937, pp. 61, 121, 223-5, 267, 319, 324-5. 
29. Nordström 1946, pp. 54-8. 
30. Hbl 12.12.1926; AU 11.12.1926; Wikman 1926, pp. 114-5. 
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attitude to their socialist colleagues. No conclusive settlement of 
the problem was reached, however.31  
The labour movement's potential for effective political activity and 
for achieving a meaningful role in political decision-making 
remained small well into the 1920s, as a result of the after-effects of 
the Civil War. This served to mark Finland off from developments 
in much of the rest of Europe, where the labour movement had 
emerged as a major political force to be reckoned with. Two 
factors, however, served to reanimate the Finnish movement, both 
ideologically and more practically in organisational terms, and 
give it renewed vigour; the split within the European Left into 
separate social democratic and communist wings, and a domestic, 
critical reassessment of the Finnish movement's involvement in 
the Civil War. 
For those left-wing activists who had moved to Soviet Russia at 
the end of the Civil War and been associated with the founding of 
the new Finnish Communist Party, the events of 1918 in Finland 
were unambiguously seen as part of the historical international 
class struggle. The reasons for the socialists' failure to gain a 
victory in 1918 were thoroughly discussed, as in 0. W. Kuusinen's 
pamphlet entitled 'The Finnish Revolution. An evaluation and 
self-criticism'. Although sharply critical of the movement's failure 
and drawing attention to the latter's various shortcomings and 
miscalculations, much of Kuusinen's argument focused, in fact, on 
the possibility of a renewed uprising. Kuusinen's views, in line 
with the general optimism of the time within the communist 
movement as a whole, reflected a strong belief in the likelihood of 
rapid and radical social change taking place in the near future in 
Finland, despite the setback experienced in 1918. Kullervo 
Manner's speeches on the issue similarly predicted the imminence 
of a general day of reckoning, taking the form of an irresistible tide 
of European-wide revolution.32 
Within Finland itself, the Social Democrats tended to consider 
the events of 1918 against the background of a much less 
31. See Rafael Colliander's letter of 4.1.1927 to Wrede (Wrede collection); Wrede 
1926, pp. 41-5. 
32. Paasivirta 1957, pp. 311-5; Folkets Dagblad Politiken 16.11.1918. 
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optimistic view of future developments and to view the role and 
actions of the labour movement prior to and during Civil War in a 
generally more critical light. While social and economic develop-
ments prior to 1918 were largely blamed for having virtually forced 
some form of uprising on the country, the previous leadership of 
the party also came in for sharp criticism for having allowed the 
situation to develop as it did. Some care was taken nevertheless, 
for political and ideological reasons, to avoid laying the blame for 
what had happened at the door of the masses themselves.33 This 
style of self-critical analysis reached perhaps its most extreme 
form in the view put forward by Väinö Tanner that the rebellion 
had been little less than the labour movement's greatest single 
misjudgement.34 The overall negative tone reflected in Tanner's 
and others' assessments came to dominate the party's official 
interpretation of the events of 1918, and proved instrumental in 
the party leadership's decision to openly reject the path of violent 
revolution as the way forward for the labour movement, in favour 
of parliamentary politics. This conscious realignment of the party 
and the movement behind working within, rather than outside the 
political system as it existed in post-1918 Finland, and which 
included sharp condemnation of the revolutionary tenets of 
Bolshevism and the more radical Left, was essentially aimed at 
securing adequate political breathing-space for the party to 
regroup and regain a degree of effective political influence.35 
By the autumn of 1919, however, a new radical wing had begun 
to emerge within the slowly reactivating labour movement 
disassociating itself from the more moderate line adopted by the 
majority, and whose supporters, in describing themselves as left-
wing socialists, claimed that they, rather than the official party, 
were the true inheritors of the radical traditions of the pre-1918 
movement. Emphasising their loyalty to all those who had fought 
on the Red side during the Civil War, these radical socialists called 
for the Left to continue to adhere to the doctrine of absolute and 
uncompromising class struggle, and refused to recognise the 
legitimacy of the White victory, the new republican form of 
33. H. Ryömä 1918, pp. 42-6, 58-63; E. Huttunen 1918, pp. 96-102. 
34. Tanner 1956, pp. 14, 72-3. 
35. H. Soikkanen 1975, pp. 338-43. 
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government, or the choice of a leading non-socialist politician as 
the country's first president. The new party leaders were labelled 
as 'turncoats' and described as having betrayed the real labour 
movement and the working class it represented.36 
With the movement heading towards a state of open internal 
conflict following the emergence of this breakaway radical faction, 
the party's moderate leadership decided to call a party conference 
in December 1919, in an effort to clear the air and neutralise the 
threat to its position. The conference was the scene of a heated and 
bitter struggle over the movement's future policies and ideology. 
The radicals, who were able to call on about a third of the 
representatives present for support, strongly attacked the Tanner-
led party leadership, condemning its policy of working through 
the existing parliamentary system as having outlived its usefulness 
and as having proved ultimately ineffectual in advancing working 
class interests. The speeches of the group's leading figures, Eino 
Pekkala and Sulo Wuolijoki, reflected a firm belief, similar to that 
evident among those associated with the new Communist Party 
which had been formed across the border in the Soviet Union, in 
the inevitability of European-wide revolution.37 
Rather than working against the labour movement's interests, the 
Tanner-led moderates argued, however, that the parliamentary 
system offered every hope of achieving better political and social 
conditions for the working population and of strengthening the 
influence and power of the labour movement. In stressing the 
continuity of their policies with those of Western socialist parties, 
Tanner and his fellow moderates hoped to make a clean break with 
any hint of association with Bolshevism and to underline their 
view that social conditions in Finland, differing as they did from 
those in Russia, necessarily required a different approach from that 
which had been adopted by the Bolsheviks, a view which drew its 
inspiration from a nationalist rather than an internationalist 
interpretation of socialist philosophy.38 
The argument put forward by the leadership and its supporters 
of the need to work within the terms of the country's parliamentary 
36. SS 19.10.1919; Suomen Työmies 16.10., 23.10., 3.12.1920. 
37. SDP:n puoluekokous 1919, ptk., pp. 20, 127-87. 
38. Ibid., pp. 3-6; SS 12.9.1918; Demokraatti 20.12.1919. 
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system, and for political legitimacy to be the basis of future labour 
movement policy, was finally approved by the conference by a 
two-thirds majority. Some concession to the radicals was 
nevertheless made in restating the party's continued commitment 
to the importance of the class struggle, together with the reserved 
attitude taken on the question of possible participation in future 
coalition governments. This was also reflected in the slightly more 
uncompromising ideological stance adopted as a whole, compared 
to that which had been seen a year earlier at the special party 
conference held in the immediate wake of the Red defeat.39 
Despite its nine days of debate, however, the conference made 
little direct reference to wider ideological questions, or the party's 
long-term future social aims. Participants mainly concentrated on 
more immediate issues. The 1919 conference, with its victory for 
the forces of moderate, Tanner-inspired social democracy, came to 
be decisive in shaping the future direction of the labour movement 
in Finland for a number of years to come. 
Aware that it had lost the battle for the soul of the Social 
Democratic Party, the radical wing of the labour movement found 
itself at a political crossroads. While the potential of the exiled 
Communist Party across the border in Russia, acting through its 
underground representatives, was recognised by radical leaders, 
few felt sure enough of the party's strength, operating as it did 
isolated from day to day developments in Finland, to consider 
basing their future political effort on it alone. The labour 
movement's relatively weak position, together with the radicals' 
own hostility towards what were seen as the dubious intentions of 
the Tanner-led moderates, led instead to the setting-up at the 
beginning of 1920 of an independent radical coordinating 
committee and to plans being put in hand to found a new broadly-
based, mass party committed to campaigning on behalf of 
revolutionary socialist policies.4o 
A significant part was played in these developments by 0. W. 
Kuusinen, in Finland in secret at the time laying the groundwork 
for the preparations for what the emigre Communist leadership 
39. SDP:n puoluekokous 1919, ptk., pp. 188-9, 213-7; H. Soikkanen 1975, pp. 
366, 371; Tuomioja II 1982, p. 45. 
40. Hodgson 1967, p. 98; Upton 1970, p. 36. 
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hoped would be a successful future revolution. Kuusinen's first-
hand experience of the state of the Finnish Left and Finnish 
society as a whole, however, seems to have led him to the 
conclusion that, operating as it was forced to do underground, the 
emigre party was in no real position to lead the working class in a 
future revolution, and that the best route for radical activity lay in 
the creation of an official mass party committed to radical goals 
within Finland itself. Working together with radical activists 
within Finland, Kuusinen gave his support to the setting-up of 
such a party and assisted in drawing up its political programme.41  
This meant in practice abandoning, at least temporarily, the 
policies and approach adopted at the founding conference of 
Comintern in March 1919, which had been based on the 
assumption of a rapid and worldwide wave of revolution taking its 
lead from the Bolshevik example. 
The Finnish Socialist Labour Party was founded in Helsinki in 
the early summer of 1920. Although committed in the long term to 
radical social revolution, its initial programme carefully avoided 
aligning the new party behind the course of violent revolution, 
emphasising instead, in contrast to the official Communist Party 
programme issued in the autumn of 1918, its intention of carrying 
through its political struggle within the framework of bourgeois 
democracy, alongside the wider trade union movement. The days 
of the capitalist system were nevertheless seen as clearly 
numbered, its place to be taken by a society based on workers' 
soviets and an 'international federation of soviet republics'.42 The 
relatively restricted conditions imposed on the party by the 
authorities, suspicious of its obvious ideological ties across the 
border and which were seen as a potential, if not actual threat to 
the security of the new Finnish state, were highlighted in the 
police's intervention during the debate at the founding conference 
in May on the question of affiliating the new party to Comintern, 
effectively breaking up the meeting. A follow-up conference was 
held in Helsinki in June to finally set the seal on the founding of 
the party, but this time the possibility of joining Comintern was 
not broached.43  
41. Sosialistinen Aikakauslehti 1.10., 1.12.1919. 
42. Borg 1965, pp. 156-7; Suomen Työmies 11.12.1920. 
43. Upton 1970, p. 38; Hakalehto 1966, pp. 160-1. 
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The split within the labour movement was thus absolute. 
Despite the greater power enjoyed by the moderates, the radical 
wing of the movement nevertheless proved surprisingly able to 
hold its own, as indicated by the support it received from the 
newly reconstituted Central Trade Union Confederation (SAJ) at 
the latter's conference in June 1920 and from the Workers' Athletic 
Union (TUL), which had been founded at the beginning of 1919 
and was generally sympathetic to radical policies.44 
The underground Communist Party, enjoying a role which a 
number of other parties and the Right in particular were prone to 
claim was significant, remained for long in the state of virtual 
permanent flux which had affected it since its foundation. 
Grouped around the opposing figures of Kuusinen and Manner, 
debate constantly flared over the likely pattern of reaction to the 
spread of the communist ideal, with those sympathetic to Manner 
dominating party policy-making and tenaciously clinging to the 
idea of a rapid spread of revolution outside Russia, including 
Finland. This belief was only really shaken by the second 
Comintern congress held in August 1920, which had to admit that 
international events pointed to a much slower spread of world-
wide revolution than had been initially envisaged. The increasing 
tensions between the different factions within the party, and 
which reached something of a violent peak with the murder of 
various party members in Petrograd at the end of August 1920, 
appeared only to deepen as the hope of a rapid revolution to 
redress the Left's defeat in the Civil War began to fade. The Tartu 
peace negotiations for their part pointed the way towards a 
consolidation of official relations between bourgeois-controlled 
Finland and Soviet Russia.45 Some progress towards resolving 
these conflicts was made at the party conference held in Petrograd 
in 1921, which also decided to sanction the setting-up of a secret 
coordinating body within Finland itself in Helsinki to help 
improve the effectiveness of the party's underground activities 
which, it had begun to be more widely recognised, could no longer 
be effectively directed from across the border. The latter body, 
44. SAJ:n ed. kokous 1920, ptk., pp. 149-58, 173; Ala-Kapee et al 1982, pp. 518-
20. 
45. Hakalehto 1966, pp. 44-6; SKP:n päätöksiä II, pp. 61-6. 
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although subordinated to the party central committee in Petrograd, 
was entrusted with a relative degree of independence in coordi-
nating the setting-up of party cells.46 
The parliamentary elections of 1922 marked an important stage 
in the struggle between the various wings of the labour movement. 
Despite the radicals' success in gaining ground within the unions 
and at the political grass roots, the moderate Social Democrats 
were able to out-manoeuvre them on the national political scene, 
winning almost twice as many parliamentary seats and beating the 
radicals into second place by a majority of 53 to 27. The 
stabilisation of the international situation also undoubtedly played 
a part in favouring the moderate politicians.47 The moderates' 
hand was also helped by the government's decision to move 
against the Socialist Labour Party in August 1923, imprisoning a 
large number of its leading figures, including the entire parliamen-
tary group, members of the party's various organising committees 
and journalists of papers associated with the radicals, in an effort 
to prove once and for all that the organisation was little more than 
a cover organisation for the emigre Communist Party. This the 
move failed to do, however, but together with the court cases that 
followed it did succeed in dealing the party's activities a powerful 
blow.48 The government's determination to act against the party 
also prompted a shift in the policies of the Central Trade Union 
Confederation towards a more moderate line, thereby further 
undermining the basis for radical political activity. 
The elections of 1924 saw the position of the Social Democrats as 
the largest socialist party only strengthened. This growth in 
political influence also served to increase discussion on party 
policy towards participation in possible future governments and 
on the options open to the labour movement to break out of the 
virtual parliamentary political limbo it found itself in and reassert 
its political muscle. The example of the Scandinavian and British 
labour movements assumed an important place in Finnish social-
ist thinking, alongside that of the German movement which had 
traditionally played an important part, as a source of political and 
46. Hakalehto 1966, p. 25; Hyvönen 1968, pp. 166-91. 
47. H. Soikkanen 1975, pp. 395-7. 
48. Mäkelä 1980, p. 146; Tanner 1966, pp. 22-6; Hakalehto 1966, pp. 187-8; 
Hyvönen 1968, p. 296; Upton 1970, p. 73. 
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ideological inspiration at a time when social democratic or labour 
governments, although admittedly minority administrations, were 
in power in Sweden, Denmark and Britain. When discussion 
within the Finnish party began to get under way in earnest on the 
question of possible participation in a future coalition government, 
virtually the whole of the party leadership from Tanner down-
wards came out in favour of the idea, with even Wiik, otherwise 
known for his uncompromising attitudes, tacitly supporting the 
plan.49 As memories of the Civil War and the confrontationist 
politics which it had spawned faded, attitudes on the Left towards 
political compromise and cooperation with the non-socialist 
parties began to appreciably soften. 
The formation of a minority socialist government under the 
prime-ministership of Väinö Tanner in December 1926 confirmed 
the party leadership's decision to test out the possibilities of 
achieving social and economic reform through the government 
process, and at the same time provided the party with an 
opportunity to show its opponents that it was capable of assuming 
governmental responsibility. The radical socialists roundly 
condemned the Social Democrats' decision, describing it as 
reflecting the bourgeois nature of moderate social democracy. The 
National Coalition Party, although arguing from fundamentally 
different grounds, was equally condemning of the move, seeing it 
as a challenge to the continuity of society. 
The tensions within the labour movement and over its attitude 
towards cooperating with the movement's non-socialist opponents 
were also closely reflected in the troubled pattern of labour 
relations typical of the 1920s, and which proved a particular 
source of confrontation between Left and Right. Little quarter was 
given on either side. Employers made little effort to change their 
established patriarchal and heavy-handed approach, while the 
radical left-dominated trade union movement barely concealed its 
commitment to exploiting strike action as a means of increasing 
the influence and bargaining power of the workforce and 
advancing the radical Left's political goals aimed at the eventual 
49. H. Soikkanen 1975, pp. 446-7; Tuomioja II 1982, pp. 85-6; SS 5.10., 
21.12.1925, 28.9., 8.10.1926. 
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overthrow of bourgeois society. The various governments of the 
period aligned themselves fairly and squarely behind the 
employers, resorting to a number of means, including the police, to 
check the activities of the unions, both at leadership level and 
among rank and file members, and to try and uncover the political 
machinations sensed behind much of the strike action that took 
place. This attitude was reflected in the banning early on in the 
decade in 1922 of a union mainly made up of dock workers and 
forest industry workers for its alleged connections with illegal 
activities.5o 
During the latter half of the 1920s, encouraged by the favourable 
development of the economy and the world market, the trade 
unions began an extensive campaign of strike action, beginning in 
heavy industry in 1927. The employers replied with widespread 
lock-outs, leading to the calling of a national dock strike in June 
1928. The latter, which had a number of international reper-
cussions and which at its peak involved a total of some 12,000 
men, started as a result of the employers' partial rejection of a set of 
joint proposals put forward by the seamens' and dockworkers' 
unions for new working agreements, improved conditions and 
increased pay, in agreeing only to raise seamens' wages but not 
that of dockworkers. The Transport Workers' Union organising the 
dispute received significant strike assistance from abroad, both 
from East and West, mainly, however, from Western sources, 
particularly the Scandinavian countries, in contrast to the earlier 
series of strikes in heavy industry, where assistance had been most 
forthcoming from the East. In a bid to neutralise the strike's effect, 
employers made wide use of an independent strike-breaking 
organisation, Vientirauha, which had been set up in 1920 to 
provide a source of alternative labour to employers embroiled in 
difficult labour disputes, replacing striking dockworkers with 
large numbers of unskilled workers brought in from rural areas. 
This pool of non-unionised labour, lacking the appropriate skills 
and entailing substantial recruitment and transport costs, proved 
an expensive solution, however, for the employers, raising labour 
costs some 150%.51 Following the series of disruptive strikes 
50. Siipi 1967, pp. 46-8; Mansner 1981, pp. 244-5, 253-6. 
51. Lastauttajain Liiton hallituksen ptk., 26.6., 27.8.1928 and Vuosikertomus 1928 




which had affected heavy industry the previous year, the 
employers were nevertheless determined to deal organised labour 
a blow which would destroy its strength and future potential to 
mount similar wide-scale strike action. With their massive 
injection of specially-recruited scab labour, the employers were in 
fact successfully able to keep the harbours open. 
Throughout the course of the strike, the employers were able to 
count on the virtually united support of the non-socialist press, 
which consistently condemned the strike and its instigators as 
posing a threat to social stability and as being, for the major part, 
politically-inspired. The Transport Workers' Union was alleged, 
despite its demands for improved working conditions and a 
curtailment of the use of casual labour, to be motivated by 
revolutionary ideals, and committed to supporting Soviet timber 
exports to Western markets at the expense of Finnish exports.52 
The strike, which lasted for over ten months, only finally came to 
an end in April 1929 following a substantial wage offer from the 
employers, raising wage levels for a number of workers quite 
appreciably compared to pre-strike levels. Weakened by the 
length of the dispute, the Transport Workers' Union was, however, 
unable to secure any real progress on improved conditions or 
contractual agreements. The strike left a deep imprint on labour 
relations and created a groundswell of bitterness amongst the 
labour force, which found a partial outlet in the violent clashes 
which took place between the established workforce and those 
strike-breakers kept on by employers after the dispute was over. 
3. Domestic attitudes to Finland's links abroad 
A general re-evaluation of attitudes to the outside world took place 
throughout Finnish society in the period immediately following 
the country's gaining of independence. The latter had brought an 
diplomats stationed in Helsinki; see for ex. those sent by the French Legation 
to Paris dated 9.6., 30.6., 10.7.1928 (AAEF Europe 1918-40/Finlande). 
52. For the general background to the dock strike, see Mansner 1981, pp. 389, 395; 
Ala-Kapee et al 1982, pp. 723-9; Koivisto 1956, pp. 31-8. See also Internatio-
nal Transport Federation 1928-29. Amsterdam 1930, pp. 73-5; Suomen 
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opening-up of Finland's links with Europe and beyond on a 
hitherto unknown scale, but had also seen the severance of a 
number of established traditional ties and those with Russia in 
particular, and the souring of Finnish-Swedish relations as a result 
of the Aland Islands dispute. For many, international problems 
came to be seen, perhaps naively, in terms of their relation to 
concepts of absolute justice and absolute political and moral 
values rather than their more immediate contexts. Foreign and 
domestic policy issues were often allowed to shade into one 
another, with little attempt being made to distinguish between the 
two, and attitudes towards a number of international questions, 
particularly in the case of conservative opinion, became power-
fully coloured by the domestic experiences of the Civil War of 
1918 and its aftermath. 
The strongly assertive, nationalist style of thinking which 
increasingly came to dominate the more influential sections of 
non-socialist opinion drew much of its strength from the growing 
and deepening sense of national confidence which developed in 
the wake of independence and from the widely-felt need to 
emphasise the value of everything perceived as quintessentially 
Finnish. The major weakness of this nationalist approach lay in its 
narrow self-complacency, which tended to identify things Finnish 
with solid and dependable traditional values, and by extension 
with conservative attitudes. At the same time, it encouraged a 
wary, almost hostile attitude to the outside world and all things 
foreign. Instead of being seen as capable of providing useful 
sources of new ideas, everything international and cosmopolitan 
tended to be seen as posing actual or potential threats to the basis 
of national identity. 
Post-independence nationalist thinking drew much of its 
inspiration from the ideas associated with Finland's Finno-Ugrian 
ethnic and linguistic background, together with the expansionist-
minded nationalist sentiment which they had spawned. The latter 
had, in various forms, played a part in Finnish cultural life for 
much of the latter half of the nineteenth century, but only assumed 
the aspect of a more concrete political goal, involving the 
annexation of Finnic-related peoples to Finland to form a united 
ethnic entity, following independence. The sudden upswing in 
expansionist sentiment typical of the immediate post-indepen-
dence years also owed its origin, in part at least, to the post-war 
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international balance of power and to the dominance of anti-
Bolshevik sentiment, which led to Russia being seen not only as 
politically weak but also as potentially likely to succumb to a 
gradual process of disintegration. Expansionist hopes in the East, 
which were defended by appeals to the rights of minority 
nationalities to national self-determination, were mainly, although 
not exclusively, focused on East Karelia. Contacts were also 
established by activists with the Ingrian population living in the 
area around Petrograd and with the Finnish-speaking population 
living along the Gulf of Bothnia in northern Sweden. 
A number of new organisations were set up in the early 1920s to 
advance the expansionist cause, including the Karelian Citizens' 
Federation (Karjalan Kansalaisliitto), the Ingrian Federation 
(Inkerin Liitto) and the Academic National Club (Akateeminen 
Heimoklubi).53 Many of these offered organisatorial and other 
assistance to the various Finnish expeditionary forces and 
volunteer groups which took part in military action across the 
border in the early years of independence. A new stage in the 
growth and consolidation of expansionist-minded opinion was 
marked by the founding of the Academic Karelian Society 
(Akateeminen Karjala Seura, AKS) in the autumn of 1922. Initially 
founded in the aftermath of the failure of Finnish attempts at 
intervention across the border in Karelia to assist those refugees 
who had moved to Finland, the AKS soon grew into a wider, more 
general forum for students and the young educated classes 
interested in the themes revolving around the Greater Finland 
idea. 
Changes in the political climate in mid-decade, however, caused 
a shift within the organisation and within the activities of the 
Finnish-speaking student body in general away from issues across 
the border to ones closer to home, most particularly to the 
campaign for strengthening the position of the Finnish language 
and Finnish-language culture against what was seen as the 
continuing over-dominance of the country's Swedish cultural 
inheritance. This shift was, in part, a reaction to the significant 
growth which had taken place in the numbers of Finnish-speaking 
students entering higher education and Helsinki University, in 
53. Nygård 1978, pp. 65, 109, 123. 
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particular, where Swedish-speaking traditions were especially 
strong. There was a natural sympathy among this new generation 
of students, particularly those coming from rural homes, towards 
the nationalist ideals advanced by the AKS and its commitment to 
challenging the position of the remaining strongholds of Swedish-
speaking influence and power.54 
For those on the Right, Soviet Russia appeared as the dominant 
problem affecting the security of the new Finnish state. While 
estimates of its military potential varied widely and the durability 
of its social system was continually held up to question, its 
potential as a powerful and aggressive ideological threat was never 
doubted. Opinions within the National Coalition Party, the main 
bastion of conservative opinion, towards the Russian question, 
however, were far from united. This was in large part due to the 
different and in some respects conflicting political traditions 
which had found a home in the party. Old Finns, such as Lauri 
Ingman and Ernst Nevanlinna, tended to favour a cautious 
approach, making due allowance for the fact of the Soviet Union's 
great power status. Those party members who had been associated 
with the activist movement, in contrast, tended to favour a more 
direct avowal of the gulf which they saw separating Finland from 
the Soviet Union, and a more active policy of sounding out 
possible allies to strengthen the country's hand in the event of any 
future crisis in Finnish-Soviet relations.55 
The Right, particularly as a result of the bonds forged during the 
latter stages of the Civil War, had developed strong sympathies 
with Germany and shared German dissatisfaction with the terms 
imposed on Germany by the Allies at Versailles and a number of 
the other post-war changes in Central Europe. Many of the 
developments which had taken place in post-war Germany, 
however, including the rise of the Centre and the Social Democrats 
to positions of dominance and governmental power, had 
inevitably proved less attractive to Finnish conservatives, pointing 
as they did to the weakening hold of conservative ideas over the 
German political scene. They nevertheless failed to eliminate the 
54. Klinge IV 1968, pp. 16-19, 79-84; Saukkonen 1973, pp. 54-6; Alapuro 
1973, pp. 115, 123; Rasila—Jutikkala—Kulha 1976, pp. 136-7; Kirby 1979, p. 
66. 
55. Rommi 1974, pp. 14-20; Ylä-Närvä 1983, pp. 142-6. 
260 
overall goodwill felt towards Germany and German interests.S6 
The debt of gratitude felt among right-wing circles in Finland 
towards Germany, or rather the old pre-republican Germany, for 
her assistance rendered during the Civil War was also linked to the 
historical role which Germany had traditionally enjoyed in 
Finland from the 1800s onwards as a major source of social, 
economic and political ideas. 
In line with the Right's overall attitudes on European security 
issues and the balance of power in Europe, distinct reservations 
were felt towards the League of Nations, which tended to be seen 
very much as a tool created to advance the policies and aims of the 
Allies. The Western powers, with their different ideological and 
political traditions and commitment to parliamentary democracy, 
were in fact looked on with some suspicion on the Right. The 
same coolness was also evident in conservative attitudes towards 
Sweden and the rest of Scandinavia. The conflict over the Aland 
Islands and what was seen as Sweden's thinly-veiled attempt to 
woo the Islands away from Finland in the spring of 1918 had 
created a sense of hostility extending down to the grass roots of 
right-wing opinion. This reserved attitude towards Sweden on the 
Right was only reinforced by the shift which took place within 
Sweden towards the Left and social democracy.57 
Attitudes among Progressive Party politicians to developments 
in Europe, although not completely homogeneous, were markedly 
different from those of their more right-wing colleagues. A number 
of leading liberal figures were keen to underline the European and 
Western nature of Finland and Finnish society. The liberal view of 
the League of Nations and the value of the international system of 
justice it represented was generally positive, even though the 
League failed to be given as much prominence in Finnish liberal 
pronouncements, as a result of Finland's political and geographi-
cal position, as was typical among liberal opinion in many 
Western countries. For the liberals, as for much of non-socialist 
56. US 25.2.1919, 29.12.1922; Iltalehti 2.1.1923; Karjala 16.11., 21.11.1918. See 
Rantakari's letter of 31.1.1920 to Danielson-Kalmari (Danielson-Kalmari col-
lection 5), Harri Holma's letter of 20.12.1920 to Eino Suolahti (Eino Suolahti 
collection), and Ossian Donner's of 19.9.1923 to Kai Donner (Kai Donner 
collection). 
57. US 14.6.1924; Iltalehti 8.9.1925; Ylioppilaslehti 7.2.1925. 
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opinion, it was Russia which continued to be seen as the major 
problem area facing Finnish security. Views on ways of 
countering the Russian problem varied. A number of liberals 
argued the case for pursuing a foreign policy directed towards 
looking for allies and partners among the other border states along 
Russia's western frontier, while others, comprised mainly of those 
who had previously been sympathetic with the Entente cause, 
stressed the value of links with Britain and the importance of 
keeping Finnish foreign policy in line with that followed by 
Britain. The latter continued to occupy a particularly favoured 
place in the liberal view of the world as the traditional stronghold 
of parliamentary values.58 
In the case of the essentially inward-looking Agrarian Party, with 
its emphasis on national rural values and relatively narrow 
political outlook, international questions remained largely little 
discussed in any real sense. Attitudes towards Russia were 
significantly coloured by memories of imperial policies during the 
latter years of the Tsarist regime and by a strong ideological 
antipathy to communist philosophy. With its stress on things 
Finnish, the party was also highly critical and suspicious of the 
continued power and influence of the Swedish-speaking minority 
within Finland, and of the intentions of Sweden itself. This 
negative reaction, both to the Swedish-speaking minority and to 
Sweden, reflected the traditional social hostility of the rural lower 
classes, especially those living far away from the political centre, 
towards the Swedish-speaking upper class. The more general 
animosity felt towards Sweden was reinforced for Agrarian 
supporters, as it was for those of a number of other parties, by the 
anger at what were seen as Sweden's continued attempts to claim 
the Aland Islands for herself and encourage local separatist 
sentiments in the area.59 
A distinct widening of interest in international issues in the 
Agrarian Party press, however, was caused by Finland's new 
export effort directed towards Western markets. Britain, in 
particular, received favourable coverage in these reports, being 
seen as a country which had achieved an enviable record of steady 
58. Kunttu 1980, pp. 82-4. 
59. Mylly 1978, pp. 79, 128-9. 
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progress and development, and as an international power with a 
positive and flexible style of foreign policy.60 This increased 
interest in what was going on outside Finland's borders also 
extended to the new independent states of the eastern half of 
Europe, in all of which peasant or rural-orientated parties, very 
much in the Agrarian Party's own mould, had managed to carve 
out important political positions for themselves since 1919, and 
where land reform, as in Finland, had been one of the major issues. 
Indicative of this interest and the sympathy felt with develop-
ments in the region was the party's decision to join the coordi-
nating body set up in Prague in the 1920s, sometimes referred to as 
the 'green international', uniting Eastern European agrarian parties 
in a loose form of cooperation and debate.61  
Finland's links with Sweden played a special role in the 
thinking of the country's Swedish-speaking politicians and the 
Swedish-speaking minority as a whole. Much hope was attached 
to the possibility of independence allowing closer contact between 
the two countries, following the elimination of the need to take 
Russian concerns into account. The attraction of closer links with 
Sweden and the rest of Scandinavia was further pressed home for 
the Swedish-speaking community as it became increasingly aware 
of its minority position in Finnish society and fearful that it would 
be subject to growing cultural isolation and assimilation. The 
tense atmosphere existing between Sweden and Finland, largely 
caused by the disagreements over the fate of the Aland Islands, 
however, weakened and in some cases temporarily broke the 
Swedish-speaking population's ties westwards. The decision of 
the Swedish-speaking political establishment to align itself with 
the Finnish majority in arguing for the continuance of Finnish 
sovereignty over the Islands proved the source of some annoyance 
in Sweden. While the peak of this tension soon burned itself out, it 
inevitably left some rancour on both sides. 
The major concern of Swedish-speaking political and cultural 
figures in maintaining and developing political links with Sweden 
revolved, for the major part, around the community's anxieties 
about the language question within Finland and the community's 
60. Ibid., p. 241. 
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overall future in Finnish society, and its attempts to keep Swedish 
opinion abreast of these issues and sympathetic to its interests. 
Attention was focused on two major targets in Sweden, the aca-
demic community and the press. The former, it was hoped, would 
be able to act as a respectable form of pressure-group, highlighting 
linguistic developments in Finland and drawing public attention 
to the threat to the position of Swedish-speakers. A similar, but 
decidedly more partisan role was envisaged for the Swedish press. 
Among those prominent in the early 1920s in developing these 
links with Sweden were the academic Gunnar Landtman and the 
secretary of the Swedish People's Party, Rafael Colliander. The 
fact of a shared language also helped the growth of contacts 
between the two communities at the more informal leve1.62 
The Social Democrats had been prominent in welcoming the fall 
of the old European monarchies and the growth in the influence 
and authority of the international labour movement in the wake of 
the widespread acceptance of parliamentary democracy. Develop-
ments in Finland, on the other hand, in comparison with the 
generally positive trend in the rest of Europe, had been seen by the 
party as giving much less cause for optimism. The Social 
Democrats were also among those most critical of the harsh terms 
imposed by the Versailles peace and many of the other treaties 
negotiated at the end of the First World War, which they saw as 
reflecting a significant measure of Western imperialist self-interest 
and a desire on the part of the West to hamper the recovery and 
future well-being of the defeated countries of Europe and restrict 
the potential of their new political leaderships.63 
In terms of its relations with the wider socialist world in the 
period following the end of the war in Europe, Finnish social 
democracy continued to draw the bulk of its inspiration from the 
German labour movement. The sharp struggle within the German 
movement over the direction of future policy, together with events 
such as the spartacist uprising in Berlin in January 1919, however, 
caused a certain amount of re-evaluation of the Finnish move-
ment's international links and of ideas within the party itself. 
While the more moderate elements within the party expressed 
62. Nya Argus 1.7.1920; StT 9.11.1920. 
63. SS 10.12.1918, 17.5., 30.6.1919, 4.1.1923. 
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their doubts about what would have happened to the newly-
formed German parliamentary republic if the uprising had been 
successful, the more radical elements within the Left concentrated 
on the human losses of the uprising, including the deaths of Rosa 
Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht.64 
Nearer home, the Finnish party had established contacts with its 
fellow socialist parties in the three Baltic republics in 1919. Joint 
discussions between the four parties on the common political 
problems facing the newly independent states in the region, and 
attended by leading figures of the Finnish party leadership, were 
held in Riga for three consecutive years following this initiative. 
The Finnish party soon found itself restricted, however, by the 
limitations of being tied to a purely Baltic axis and increasingly 
keen to gain access to a wider perspective on socialist issues than 
could be provided by the small Baltic parties. This led to a 
decision, made plain at the Riga conference in 1921 by Tanner, to 
pursue links with Sweden and the other Scandinavian countries.65 
Sweden, in particular, served as a powerful example to Finnish 
socialist leaders of the potential of the labour movement to achieve 
a significant position of influence and power in a small state 
broadly comparable with Finland, and as proof of social 
democratic politicians' ability to handle governmental responsibil-
ity. As the after-effects of the Civil War began to diminish and its 
immediate memory fade, the Finnish party leadership began to 
take an increased interest in the Swedish experiment and the 
possibilities of the Finnish party itself assuming a role in 
government. The leadership went to some pains to assert its 
moderate ideas and its commitment to working through parlia-
mentary democracy along the lines of the Swedish example.66 
The Social Democrats' attitude towards the Bolshevik-led Soviet 
Union, in contrast, remained ambiguous. While the importance of 
developing peaceful bilateral relations was stressed, especially 
after the signing of the Tartu peace, the party not only criticised the 
violent means favoured by the Bolsheviks, but also, on a more 
64. SS 30.1., 10.3., 12.3., 23.10.1919; Suomen Työmies 9.11.1920; Työn Oikeus 
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fundamental level, even went so far as to question whether Russia, 
as an economically and socially backward country, was really 
ideally suited to the kind of large-scale social experiment which 
the revolution had initiated. The more industrialised Western 
European countries were, it was argued by the party's new ideo-
logists, marshalling Marx' own theories in defence of their view, 
ultimately more suited to taking the major role in realising the 
more ambitious aims of the labour movement, an argument which 
only gained added weight following the introduction of the NEP in 
the Soviet Union.67 There were a number of those in the social 
democratic leadership at the beginning of the 1920s who feared 
that communism in Russia would eventually collapse. Others 
preferred to assume that the post-revolutionary political system in 
Russia would eventually shift towards a more western-style of 
government, giving other non-Bolshevik political groups, and 
especially the other socialist parties, more of a concrete say in 
developments. The internal wrangling within the Soviet 
Communist Party after the death of Lenin in 1924 only seemed to 
strengthen the general argument behind these views, held by 
Sventorzetski and others, that the Soviet Union continued to be a 
country far from fully recovered from either the effects of the First 
World War or the Russian Civil War.68 
In strong contrast to the Western leanings of the Social 
Democrats, the political ideas of the breakaway radical socialists 
were decidedly more pro-Soviet and favourable towards the 
Bolsheviks. Hopes for the future, both with regard to Finland and 
to the development of socialism internationally, were focused on 
the prospective success of the Soviet experiment of socialist 
construction and with it the spread of communism elsewhere. 
Their ideological concerns were unashamedly internationalist. 
The Karelian Workers' Commune founded in Karelia was 
especially close to the radicals' hearts as an example of the new 
social system in action, while the leading role played by Finnish 
emigre socialists, Edvard Gylling, who had fled across the border 
at the end of the Civil War, among the most prominent of them, in 
its genesis added to its emotional appeal.69 It seems clear that 
67. SS 7.11.1922; Sosialisti 7.11.1922; Kansan Työ 4.8., 9.11.1922, 14.7.1924. 
68. SDP:n puoluekokous 1926, Alustukset pp. 34-5. 
69. See for ex. Suomen Työmies 7.11.1922. 
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something along parallel lines was eventually hoped for for 
Finland in radical socialist circles. Particularly indicative of the 
radicals' faith in the Bolshevik cause is the fact that while the in-
fighting that followed Lenin's death in the Soviet Union was given 
prominent coverage in both the non-socialist and social demo-
cratic press, Tiedonantaja, together with the other radical papers, 
refrained from analysing the issue until the struggle for power had 
been resolved and Stalin finally taken over leadership of the party. 
Thereafter, the radical press consistently supported the victorious 
section of the party, dealing out criticism to the defeated, 
including Trotsky.70 
A similar difference in approaches between Right and Left to 
matters of international relations was also evident in the widely 
diverging attitudes taken by employers' organisations and the 
trade union movement towards the moves made during the 1920s 
on the international arena to expand the embrace of international 
cooperation on labour issues. 
Finnish employers, in the shape of the Central Federation of 
Employers (STK), proved consistently uninterested in the 
possibility of international collaboration in the handling of labour 
market questions. The Finnish federation's membership of the 
international employers' organisation based in Brussels was, to all 
intents and purposes, largely nominal, and its participation in the 
congresses and work of the International Labour Organisation was 
of a similarly low order. Employers preferred to maintain their 
traditional independence of action, proving reluctant to let 
themselves get embroiled in any international commitments likely 
to tie them to participation in or implementation of industrial 
relations reform and internationally-agreed developments on such 
things as working conditions and terms of employment, beyond 
those strictly necessary for the efficient handling of foreign trade.71  
Although generally hostile to the overall principle of international 
cooperation on industrial relations questions, Finnish employers' 
organisations did maintain some links with similar organisations 
in Sweden. Contacts between the two countries were in fact 
70. Salin 1977, pp. 17-24. 
71. Mansner 1981, pp. 442-5. 
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relatively good, allowing a constant exchange of information back 
and forth on current events in the labour field and wider social and 
economic developments. Despite the relative closeness of these 
ties, however, labour market politics in both countries remained 
far apart from each other, particularly over the question of formal 
terms of employment, a matter which was viewed more favourably 
by the Swedish federation than by its Finnish counterpart.72 
In contrast to the low international profile favoured by 
employers during the 1920s, the Finnish trade union movement 
took a much more positive approach to the question of inter-
national cooperation, although this, as in the case of a number of 
other issues, was often overshadowed and complicated by the split 
in the movement between its Social Democrat-controlled and 
Communist-controlled wings. The ideological gap between these 
two groupings was especially highlighted in the debate which 
developed over the question of the Central Trade Union Confeder-
ation (SAJ) joining either the communist trade union international 
Profintern, based in Moscow, or the more social democrat-inspired 
equivalent organisation based in Amsterdam. The radical 
leadership of the SAJ organised a ballot of the federation's 
members on the question of joining Profintern in 1922, which 
resulted in a majority in favour of joining. The fact, however, that 
the great majority of members, some 70%, did not even bother to 
vote, indicating the low level of interest on international matters in 
general among the rank and file members of the movement, made 
the leadership hold back on making any decision to apply for 
immediate membership of Profintern.73 At the back of the radical 
leadership's mind was also the fear that, with the SAJ's 
membership politically split, any move towards joining the 
Moscow-backed organisation might well result in the withdrawal 
of the Social Democrats altogether, further adding to the decline in 
membership figures which had taken place during the whole of the 
early 1920s, from a peak of some 100,000 to only some 60,000 
members. This fear was also compounded by the misgivings felt 
about how the authorities might react to any move further 
72. See for ex. the SAF memorandum of 19.6.1928 to the STK (SAF archive). 
73. Internationale Presse-Korrespondenz 6.12.1921; Ala-Kapee et al 1982, pp. 
546-64. 
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underlining the federation's ties with Moscow. The memory of 
the response to the founding of the Socialist Labour Party in the 
spring of 1920 was still fresh in people's minds.74 
In line with the overall political stance of its radical leadership, 
the SAJ refused to recognise the legitimacy of either the League of 
Nations, which was condemned as a tool designed to advance the 
interests of the capitalist great powers, or that of the Western-based 
ILO, to whose conferences it refused to send any official delegates. 
Maintaining a Finnish trade union presence at ILO meetings was 
left to Social Democratic union leaders. It was only towards the 
middle of the decade that the SAJ's uncompromising attitude 
softened somewhat, as a result of the generally weaker position 
enjoyed by organised labour.'' The decision by the SAJ to sign the 
Copenhagen agreement between Soviet, Finnish and Norwegian 
trade union delegates in 1928 nevertheless indicated the 
leadership's persistent loyalty to its radical ideals. This agreement 
was largely a Soviet-inspired attempt to establish closer 
cooperation between the three trade union movements and, in the 
longer term, to pave the wave for a possible unification on Soviet 
terms of Profintern and the Amsterdam-based social democrat-
backed organisation. This move, linking the two most radical 
Scandinavian trade union federations, naturally excluded the 
Swedish federation (LO), which was securely in social democrat 
hands. The social democratic minority wing within the SAJ, 
which maintained its own independent links with the Swedish 
LO, however, came out in opposition to the Copenhagen 
agreement, which finally remained unratified by the SAJ at its 
conference in May 1929.76 
74. Kertomus SAJ:n toiminnasta v. 1922, pp. 35-6; SAJ:n edustajakokous 1923, p. 
82. 
75. Ala-Kapee et al 1982, pp. 498-501, 675. 
76. Ibid., pp. 736-42. See also K. A. Fagerholm's letters of 2.1.1927 and 29.9.1928 
to A. Thorberg, the head of the Swedish LO organisation (LO archive). 
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4. A new army, a new foreign ministry 
In addition to its many other wider social and political reper-
cussions in post-independence Finland, the Civil War also had a 
decisive impact on the shaping of the country's armed forces and 
on attitudes throughout much of the inter-war period towards the 
military establishment, and on the activities, attitudes and overall 
thinking typical within the armed forces themselves. A 
particularly problematic issue was the fact that Finland's new 
armed forces had, out of necessity, to be organised exclusively on 
the basis of the hastily-assembled White army units which had 
been operative in the Civil War, a fact which only served to 
perpetuate memories of the conflict, accentuate social tension, and 
distort internal military development strategies. 
The work of providing the armed forces with an infrastructure to 
replace the highly improvised command and administrative 
structure developed during the Civil War only really got under 
way at the end of 1918 following the departure, along with the 
remainder of von der Goltz' expeditionary force, of the German 
officers under Colonel von Redern who had up until then been 
entrusted with the task of organising the new army's structure. 
During his brief secondment, von Redern had had little real 
opportunity to get to grips with the problems inherent in the task 
of creating an effective national army. 
Aside from these problems deriving from purely internal 
difficulties, those planning the shape and structure of the armed 
forces were also faced with the more general problems posed by 
the unsettled international situation and the uncertainty it bred as 
regards the specific tasks the armed forces would be called upon to 
fulfil, both in potential conflict situations and in peacetime. More 
specifically, effective organisation of the armed forces was held 
back by the lack of an existing established military base on which 
to build, following the disbandment of Finland's own independent 
military units on Russian insistence some twenty years previously 
in 1901. This was particularly evident in the case of the officer 
corps, drawn as it was from soldiers who had been trained under 
two very different regimes and owing allegiance to two different 
military traditions; the German, Prussian-dominated one in which 
the volunteers had been trained and the Tsarist Russian army 
tradition, in which a number of Finnish officers had made success- 
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ful careers for themselves, not least among them Mannerheim 
himself. The training received by the Jäger volunteers in Germany 
had been brief and concentrated on field command skills, while 
ex-Tsarist Army officers often had a much longer and richer spread 
of experience." 
Their period of service as active officers in the White army 
during the Civil War was for the great majority of this essentially 
disparate group the only real piece of experience of working 
together in fighting units any of them shared. Even then, the roles 
of the two officer groups had been clearly differentiated, with Jäger 
officers typically serving in front line command positions, while 
their Russian-trained colleagues had largely served as staff officers 
and in the upper echelons of the command structure. More 
importantly, this experience, based as it had been on an internal 
conflict directed against internal enemies rather than at an external 
threat, and fought by rapidly-organised units pursuing largely 
improvised tactics, bore little relation to the type of combat 
situations likely to be encountered by a national army. 
The work of creating the new national army was further 
hindered by the sense of exhaustion which affected units 
following the Civil War and its follow-up, and which took some 
time to dissipate. Added to this, the army's deficiencies in its early 
years were only exaggerated both by the many changes taking 
place in the rest of society and particularly in politics, and by the 
innumerable internal personnel changes which took place in the 
upper command echelons, and the persistence of the internal 
differences of views and military ideas affecting the officer corps. 
The organisation of the army's supreme command structure, 
embracing the various roles of the commander-in-chief and his 
personal staff, the General Staff and Defence Ministry, was initially 
based on plans drawn up during 1919 under the direction of 
Mannerheim, in his role as Regent, and implemented in September 
of the same year after Ståhlberg had been elected as President.78 
Their essential weakness, however, lay in the fact that they were 
designed on the assumption that the head of state would also be an 
77. For the general background to the problem, see Finska Kadettkåren 1812-
1912 and its Supplement; Puolustusvoimiemme upseeristo (1933); Suomen 
Jääkärielämäkerrasto (1975). 
78. Terä-Tervasmäki I 1973, pp. 83-5; Asetus 8.9.1919. 
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army officer. In the case of a civilian acting as commander-in-
chief, the otherwise unsubordinated and overlapping tripartite 
command structure had little chance of working effectively and 
only encouraged competition between those involved over 
ultimate control over developments and decision-making. This 
was further complicated by the lack of any clear definition of the 
areas for which the three levels of command were responsible, and 
by the fact that the command structure of the paramilitary Civil 
Guard, which came under the direct orders of the head of state, 
was completely separate. 
The problems contained within the tripartite command structure 
were well reflected in the dispute which developed over the efforts 
of General Bruno Jalander, who served as Minister of Defence 
between 1920 and 1923, to strengthen the power and position of 
his office in relation to the rest of the command structure. Jalander 
was instrumental in outlining a parliamentary bill which would 
have subordinated the country's entire defence forces to the 
Minister of Defence, acting under the President. The widespread 
opposition which this proposal provoked and which took as its 
major argument the short-sightedness of giving supreme command 
to the defence minister who, as a member of government, naturally 
changed with every change of administration, however, saw to it 
that it was shelved. General Enckell, for his part, who had strongly 
defended the role of the General Staff of which he was Chief, 
responded to Jalander's idea by proposing the setting-up of a 
defence council to serve as a coordinating body and source of 
specialist knowledge on military questions.79 Some progress was 
made in rationalising the upper echelons of the armed forces' 
command structure following the abandonment in the spring of 
1924 of the three-tier division of responsibility and the decision to 
subordinate the General Staff, which up until then had enjoyed 
relative independence, to the commander-in-chief, and the 
amalgamation a year later of the commander-in-chief's modest 
personal staff with the General Staff.80 
The major defence concerns in the early years of independence 
79. See 'Luonnos (2.1923) ... sotaväen ylimmästä komentovallasta ja hallinnosta' 
(Ståhlberg collection 83); US 23.2.1923; Hbl 24.2.1923; Oscar Enckell: PM 
ylimmän johdon järjestelystä (Ståhlberg collection 83); Iltalehti 30.6.1924. 
80. Terä-Tervasmäki I 1973, p. 102. 
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revolved around fortification, mobilization and training issues. 
The use of permanent fortifications in the East as a means of 
consolidating the country's defence potential was particularly 
favoured at a time when there was severe doubts about the new 
army's combat abilities, particularly in mobile operations, given 
the lack of sufficient well-trained officers. General Enckell, 
working on the basis of the strategical ideas that had been 
developed during the early stages of the army's existence, took 
charge of the outlining of the fortification plans along the Finnish-
Russian border on the Karelian Isthmus. Supplementary specialist 
technical advice was provided by a group of French fortification 
officers. Enckell's final plans, diverging somewhat from the 
original proposals, called for creating permanent defensive lines 
some way inside the Finnish border to give the army adequate time 
in a crisis to fully mobilise.81  
In drawing up an overall strategy for general mobilization in the 
early 1920s, military planners under General Enckell chose to 
station the majority of the army's peacetime units, which 
amounted to three infantry divisions and a brigade of light 
infantry, in the south and south-east of the country, areas which 
enjoyed good logistical and transport connections with the eastern 
border zone from which any enemy attack was assumed to be 
likely to originate. The mobilization process itself was planned to 
take place on a unit basis, with peacetime contingents reinforced 
with reservists serving as the operational backbone of an expanded 
army. Further supplementary combat units would be made up of 
reservists. The necessary additional arms and other equipment 
which would be required were to be held in store by peacetime 
units.82 
Built around full-time units rather than military districts, these 
mobilization plans were largely similar to the arrangements which 
had been used by the Imperial Russian Army, in which General 
Enckell had gained his military experience. As Chief of the 
General Staff, Enckell's main strengths lay with his good 
understanding of overall planning needs, but against this he 
tended to have an uncertain grasp of detail and of the special 
81. Arimo 1981, pp. 19-22. 
82. Terä-Tervasmäki I 1973, p. 92. 
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features of Finnish conditions. This nevertheless proved of less 
significance on the question of mobilization, as the initial division 
of command responsibilities between the army and the Defence 
Ministry gave the latter the task of dealing with the majority of 
detailed questions covering the deployment of personnel, 
transportation and logistics. In the case of the latter, however, 
neither the ministry nor the army itself seems to have had a very 
clear idea of the material at the country's disposal.83 
The question of military training was of central importance to 
the future development of the army. The army's new Officer 
Training School, which began operations in January 1919, became 
the base for training new officer recruits. The courses in its first 
few years of activity were well populated with the sons and 
grandsons of previous generations of officers who had attended the 
Hamina Military Academy during the nineteenth century. This 
was accompanied by the dominance of Swedish-speaking recruits 
in the academy's early years and their high numbers in the 
academy's intake up until mid-decade.84 
The heterogeneity of the officer corps, which showed some 
similarities with that found in the new Czechoslovak and Polish 
armies, continued to be a cause of problems for some years after 
independence.85 The very diversity of training backgrounds, 
ranging from the Jäger volunteer battalion and the Imperial Army 
to the new Finnish Officer Training School and the short basic 
officer courses arranged in Viipuri in 1918 and at the Lappeenranta 
Artillery School in 1919, typical within the officer corps inevitably 
made the job of creating integrated and efficient command 
structures difficult. A number of problems were also encountered 
in matters of promotion, as a result of the difficulties in weighing 
the merits of candidates possessing such different service 
backgrounds and levels of experience.86 
From the autumn of 1919 onwards, a number of Finnish officers, 
typically young officers of captain and lieutenant rank, together 
with a few Jäger-trained men, were sent to military academies in 
83. Ibid., pp. 89, 92. 
84. Franck 1969, p. 19; Kylkirauta 1935, p. 22; Erik Ulfsson 22.11.1978. 
85. Information provided by Colonel W. Kozaczuki, 5.6.1979. 
86. Suomalainen upseerikoulutus 1779-1979, pp. 111-5, 120-4; Päiväkäsky 
24.5.1919 (Ylipäällikön päiväkäskyt 1919/SA). 
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France and Italy for additional training, mainly at the suggestion of 
General Enckell. Taking advantage of the new freedom given by 
Finland's post-war policies to do this, Enckell probably hoped that 
it would act as a counterbalance to the otherwise strong German 
bias in officer training which had developed as a result of the 
dominance of the volunteer tradition. Older officers above the 
rank of major who had been trained in Germany were excluded 
from this programme, although a few did attend courses at the 
Swedish Military Academy in the mid-1920s and later.87 Training 
for higher ranks was complemented by a special arrangement, 
sponsored from private financial sources, which allowed some 20 
officers to participate in a two year staff officer training course in 
Germany in the early 1920s, initiated by General von der Goltz. It 
is perhaps typical of the period that President Ståhlberg only 
probably became aware of the existence of this programme some 
time after it had begun operation, by which time there was little to 
be gained from halting it, although he considered it as conflicting 
with Finland's official foreign policy.88 
Officer training was finally put on an organised national footing 
with the founding in 1924, after much pressure from the army's 
German-trained officers, who otherwise feared for their future 
promotion prospects and military careers in the event of the 
country relying on training abroad, of the National Military 
Academy in Helsinki. This had initially been opposed by General 
Enckell, who had favoured the continuance of training abroad, 
which he thought fully capable of providing adequate, competent 
young officer material, before he later came to accept the idea of a 
temporary Finnish academy. General Nenonen, in contrast, had 
actively supported the founding of a Finnish academy from the 
outset, arguing that it would allow the development of a Finnish 
officer corps in line with the needs of the Finnish army and the 
country's military capabilities.89 Reliance on foreign military 
academies had been particularly criticised among those arguing for 
a national academy because of their inappropriate focus, from the 
Finnish point of view, on providing a military education and 
87. Seppälä 1974, pp. 12-13; A. E. Martola 12.4.1979. 
88. Hersalo II 1966, pp. 218-25; Suomalainen upseerikoulutus 1779-1979, p. 
311; Paavo Susitaival 23.2.1979. 
89. Seppälä 1974A, pp. 13-14; Alajoki 1975, pp. 116, 262-66. 
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strategic and tactical planning skills appropriate to the military 
requirements of countries quite different from Finland. 
The training of conscripts, as with officer training, was similarly 
handicapped by the lack of established and well-tried domestic 
military traditions. This problem was at its worst during the early 
1920s when, for lack of adequate alternatives, those running 
courses for new infantry recruits had access to little else than the 
German training manuals which had been translated into Finnish 
for use with the volunteer battalion during the First World War. 
Basic training tended as a result to be approached and practiced in 
widely different ways in different units, a situation which often 
resulted in unit commanders dictating their own style of training.90 
Formal training, marching drill and strict discipline were central 
features of the basic training given to conscripted recruits, who 
served 12 months in infantry units and 15 months in specialised 
branches of the army from 1922 onwards, compared to 18 months 
earlier. This was thought sufficient and little effort was made to 
provide training in field operations or combat, partially no doubt 
because of the lack of suitable training personnel. Former Jäger 
officers made up the bulk of instructors in infantry units, while ex-
Russian Army officers were more prominent in field and coastal 
artillery units. Both groups of officers, despite their coming from 
very different military backgrounds, were unanimous in extolling 
the virtues of strict discipline and a tough military life. While a 
proportion of conscripts called up for service were trained as non-
commissioned officers, it was only in the early 1920s that con-
scripts also began to be trained as reserve officers. This initially 
took place somewhat haphazardly and without the benefit of any 
overall structured planning, largely as a result of the general view 
then current of the low level of need for reserve officers.91  
Overall attitudes in the rest of society towards the armed forces 
were sharply divided from the very first years of independence 
onwards. The whole concept of a national army was clouded for 
many by memories of the recent past and the association of the 
army with the White army of the Civil War. This affected both 
90. Österman 1955, pp. 38, 51. 
91. Mikola 1961, pp. 34-5. 
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conservative opinion, which felt close ties to the army and 
favoured a strong defence force, and socialist opinion which, 
attracted to the idea of pacifism, tended to identify the new army 
with the force which had been instrumental in breaking Red 
resistance in 1918. 
These problems surrounding popular attitudes towards the 
defence forces seem to have been little discussed or registered by 
the military leadership. Something of the tension which existed, 
however, was nevertheless obliquely recognised in the wording of 
the military oath, which obliged those serving to defend both their 
country and the legitimate social order. For many professional 
serving officers during the 1920s, in fact, the idea of the enemy 
within was a very real part of their outlook. This was particularly 
reflected in the introduction of special selection procedures, 
taking account of known or assumed political views, in the 
selection of potential officer and non-commissioned officer ma-
terial. Part of the emphasis on strict discipline typically imposed 
on conscripts lay in the view current among higher ranking officers 
that it offered an effective way of eliminating, or at least 
neutralising any revolutionary opinions or other unacceptable 
attitudes among the lower ranks.92 
The continued existence of the Civil Guard as a voluntary militia 
force long after its original role had disappeared remained 
something of an anomaly, although not one unparalleled else-
where, as similar organisations also existed in Estonia and Latvia. 
From a purely military point of view, the Civil Guard represented a 
substantial and useful trained reserve force, amounting to the 
equivalent of some four to five annual intakes of conscripts into 
the regular army. At the same time, however, the Guard, by virtue 
of its close associations with memories of the Civil War and the 
White army, acted as a divisive social institution standing in the 
way of the development of a sense of national consensus. The 
Right, which saw in the Civil Guard an important guarantor of 
internal national security against any revolutionary forces active in 
society and a useful pressure group safeguarding traditional social 
values against the policies pursued by the Ståhlbergian centre, 
92. Hersalo II 1966, pp. 90-5. Also see Prime Minister Ingman's speech in Parli-
ament on 4.10.1924 (VP 1924 ptk., p. 409). 
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proved particularly keen to preserve the organisation's relatively 
independent standing alongside, but separate from the regular 
army. 
The tension existing between the Civil Guard and Ståhlberg 
came to a head in the dispute which developed following the 
publication during 1921 of a number of comments critical of 
official foreign policy by General Paul von Gerich, the commander 
of the Helsinki Civil Guard, which provoked the government, 
considering them inappropriate for an officer in his position, into 
demanding his resignation. This, together with the government's 
pressure on the organisation's overall commander to similarly 
resign, provoked a strong counter-reaction within the Civil 
Guard.93  
Liberal opinion tended to consider the Civil Guard a necessary 
institution and a useful and low-cost way of providing the army 
with a trained reserve, a point particularly stressed by Agrarian 
politicians. Liberals were nevertheless caught in a difficult 
position, as while recognising that attitudes within the Guard 
favoured the Right and that, as an organisation, it was committed 
to opposing moderate republican opinion of the type pursued by 
Ståhlberg, their opposition to the Left made it equally difficult for 
them to come out too clearly in opposition to the Guard's 
continued existence. Karjalan Aamulehti, a paper close to this 
section of opinion, did nevertheless express some doubts about the 
wisdom of its continued activities.94 Opposition to the Guard was 
understandably most forthright within the labour movement. Its 
existence only seemed to confirm and reinforce the political 
discrimination that the movement had felt itself to be under since 
the Civil War and before. Attitudes for and against the Guard also 
came to the fore at local government level, with non-socialist town 
councils, including those in Helsinki and Turku, for example, 
regularly granting financial assistance to the Civil Guard, and 
socialist-controlled Tampere and Kotka consistently refusing to 
countenance any such moves. The split between Left and Right in 
Finnish society affecting both urban and rural areas was 
93. Blomstedt 1969, pp. 418-20; Meinander 1980, pp. 49-50. Also see the 
Swedish envoy's report to Stockholm dated 1.7.1921 (UD HP1Af). 
94. Karjalan Aamulehti 7.9., 10.9.1919, 9.7., 12.7.1921; Huttunen VI 1968, p. 342; 
Mylly 1978, pp. 193-6. 
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particularly bitter in the hostility which characterised relations at 
the local level between the Civil Guard and the trade unions and 
the Social Democrats.95 
Military thinking in the early 1920s was severely handicapped by 
the lack among both the General Staff and the Defence Ministry of 
any adequate overall development programme designed to 
coordinate planning and investment across the whole spectrum of 
the armed forces. Some progress, however, was made in a few 
areas, such as the fortification of the Karelian Isthmus and in 
outlining a long-term development strategy for the artillery, 
including an equipment procurement policy designed to guarantee 
adequate capability in the event of mobilization, the latter the 
work of a special committee convened in 1921 with General 
Nenonen's backing.96 The Hornborg defence review committee, 
which sat between 1923 and 1926, was intended to provide this 
missing overall survey of the state of the country's armed forces. 
Made up of a mixture of military officers and party politicians and 
working in something of the way of a modern parliamentary 
defence committee, it was entrusted with the task of providing a 
thorough analysis of Finland's military, political and geographical 
situation and a review of general military developments abroad 
and their impact on Finnish security policy. 
The committee approached its brief by initiating a survey of the 
arms and equipment both stockpiled and in use by the armed 
forces, and attempting an analysis of some of the more general 
themes raised by the defence question, including the issue of the 
ideal size of force that should be available on mobilization. It was 
generally assumed in these projections that Finland would be 
solely responsible for the defence of Finnish territory and would 
be unable to call on the assistance of any outside forces. The 
committee came to the conclusion that a suitable force to guarantee 
military effectiveness would require 13 army divisions, in addition 
to naval and air force units, and it was on this projection that the 
committee's long-term programme for future defence planning was 
95. Tervasmäki 1964, pp. 62-5; Huttunen VI 1968, pp. 346-7; Tanner 1966, pp. 
90-2. Also see the speech made in Parliament by the Minister of Defence, K. 
Heinonen, on 27.9.1927 (VP 1927 ptk., pp. 340-2, 344-6). 
96. Alajoki 1975, pp. 231, 236-7. 
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based.97 A shortened version of the committee's findings was 
published in 1926 covering the then state of the country's armed 
forces, but excluding the committee's ideas on overall defence 
planning and its detailed estimates of manpower and logistics 
requirements.98 This decision to exclude part of the committee's 
ideas from its published report was responsible, at least in part, for 
the fact that the committee's thinking failed to have any significant 
influence on overall attitudes towards defence needs. The calm 
which had descended over Europe after the storm of the war years, 
and which had had the effect of pushing defence-related questions 
out of the focus of public and political interest, also contributed to 
the modest response which greeted the report. 
At the same time as the Hornborg committee was absorbed with 
the problems of outlining a general future strategy for the armed 
forces, tensions within the army itself, and more specifically 
between the German-trained and Russian-trained officers within 
the officer corps, had risen dangerously high. Their prominent 
role in the years preceding independence and in the activist 
opposition to the Russian administration had given the young 
generation of Jäger officers a self-confident sense of purpose, 
which contrasted sharply with the lower-key approach typical of 
the older generation of generally higher-ranking officers who had 
served in the Imperial Army, and whose background often made 
them the target for attacks from the more extreme elements of 
nationalist opinion. A programme of demands tacitly aimed at 
improving the position of the Jäger officers and exploiting this 
psychological imbalance appeared in the early spring of 1924, 
produced by a group of Jäger officers, including Lt. Col. J. W. 
Hägglund and Major Paavo Talvela among the most prominent of 
them, with the assistance of E. E. Kaila. In addition to advocating 
such relatively neutral aims as a detailed and thorough review of 
the mobilization issue and the setting-up of the proposed national 
military academy which had yet to be approved, the programme 
also included demands for the army to be purged of high-ranking 
Russian-trained officers, who were labelled as incompetent and 
unsuitable for service in a national army. Especial doubts were 
97. Puolustusrevisionin mietintö (11.1.1926), pp. 76, 116-8, 130, 147 (SA). 
98. Suomen puolustuskysymys (1926), p. 76. 
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voiced about the competence of Generals Wilkama and Enckell 
and a number of others, with the notable exclusion of General 
Nenonen, all of whom were subjected to bitter personal attacks and 
described as politically unreliable.99 These criticisms closely 
paralleled the revelations made in the report produced by the 
Holman committee, which had appeared a little earlier, about the 
shortcomings in the defence force and its internal organisation, 
and which had indirectly pointed the finger of blame at the very 
same high-ranking former Russian army officers. 
The threats of mass resignations of commissions made by Jäger 
officers to back up their demands that followed soon after only 
strengthened the hand of those opposed to both the Russian-
trained officer élite and the political centre. President Ståhlberg 
was well aware that, despite his wide support in Parliament, he 
failed to enjoy comparable respect within the army and was unable 
to rely on it for support. Although circumstances had forced him 
to rely on ex-Imperial Army officers, despite the fact of their 
historical association with a form of government which had had 
little sympathy for and even less in common with his own liberal 
ideals, he was unwilling to have his hand forced on the issue. That 
Ståhlberg nevertheless sensed he would find himself with little 
option but to accede to the Jäger demands is reflected in his 
decision, at the most critical stage of the crisis in May 1924, to 
announce that he would not seek re-election at the end of his term 
of office at the beginning of March the following year.10° 
Although not personally involved in the events surrounding 
these issues, Mannerheim kept himself well-informed of the 
debate on the Jäger demands. Mannerheim's return to a central 
commanding role in the army was strongly advocated by General 
Hannes Ignatius, who pulled no punches in his criticism of the 
army's existing commanders, and particularly of General Wilkama 
and the various defence ministers which had served since 
independence, whom he described as having been the cause of 
99. See Kai Donner's speech of 25.2.1924 made in Helsinki and reported in US 
26.2.1924 and HS 27.2.1924. Also 'PM puolustuslaitoksessamme nykyisin 
vallitsevasta tilanteesta' (Ståhlberg collection 83); Karttunen 1970, pp. 15-
17, 21-9; Oscar Enckell 2.5.1952. 
100. US 7.5.1924. 
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many of the army's shortcomings.10' He also proposed leaving the 
job of weeding out all unsuitable and unpatriotic elements from 
the army to the future commander-in-chief, rather than any body 
set up by the government to handle the issue. 
The most concerted political support for the Jäger officers' 
demands came from the Agrarian Party and from Agrarian Party 
papers such as Ilkka and Maakansa, which both took an active part 
in the debate.702 Opinion on the issue within the right-wing 
National Coalition Party, however, was more divided, with a large 
number of members backing the demands, but with a group 
centred around Paavo Wirkkunen defending Wilkama.103 The 
main body of opinion within the Swedish People's Party was 
favourable towards the Jäger officers, although this too was 
tempered by an element of support for the ex-Tsarist officers in 
question. The Progressives, together with Helsingin Sanomat, 
were less certain about the justification of the Jäger-inspired 
criticisms, which were seen as being, at least in part, political in 
intention and aimed at undermining Ståhlberg's position.104 
Something of a similar view was taken by the Social Democrats 
who, although feeling no real sympathy for the officers at the 
centre of the criticism, were willing to recognise their leadership 
and other qualities and saw the attempt by the Jäger officers to 
push through what amounted to a partisan reorganisation of the 
army on the Jägers' own terms as a case of pure politics aimed at 
opposing the Centre's increasingly powerful position.105 
The threat of mass resignations of commissions made by the 
Jäger officers finally proved successful in producing some changes 
in the military leadership and beyond. Colonel Lauri Malmberg, a 
leading Jäger, was appointed Defence Minister in the new Ingman 
government which was formed in June of 1924 and promptly set in 
process a shake-up of top army posts, affecting both General 
Wilkama, who was despatched in August on a long fact-finding 
trip abroad, and General Enckell, who resigned. This was followed 
101. US 25.5.1924. 
102. Mylly 1978, pp. 193-5; Ilkka 30.4.1924. 
103. US 24.4.1924; Iltalehti 20.2.1924; P. Virkkunen 1954, pp. 232-44. 
104. Hbl 27.4., 4.5., 11.5., 14.8., 12.10.1924; HS 29.2., 27.4., 1.5., 12.8., 7.9.1924. 
105. SS 2.5., 7.5., 9.8.1924, 18.12.1925. See also Väinö Tanner's speech in Parli-
ament on 8.5.1924 (VP 1924 ptk., p. 53). 
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up by a concerted policy of encouraging a number of lower-ranking 
ex-Tsarist officers to resign their positions, internal transfers, and 
voluntary and semi-voluntary resignations of commissions. The 
pressure for change within the army did not stop here, however. 
Further demands for a purge of the officer corps of what were seen 
as unreliable elements emerged later the same year, this time 
directed against Swedish-speaking officers. These were much 
more limited, however, and supported only by Ilkka and a few 
other Agrarian Party papers and the nationalist Aitosuomalai-
nen.106 These calls were also opposed from within the ranks of the 
Jäger officers themselves, among which those who had achieved 
highest rank were virtually entirely Swedish-speaking. 
Jäger officers' chances of promotion to high rank continued to 
remain low, however, throughout the period of Ståhlberg's term of 
office and General Nenonen's as acting commander-in-chief. Only 
with the election of Relander as President in March 1925 did the 
situation improve and the route to the upper reaches of the 
command structure finally open up. Lt. Colonels Harald Ohqvist 
and Hugo Osterman were appointed divisional commanders in the 
summer of 1925 and soon promoted to the rank of full colonel. Lt. 
Colonel Erik Heinrichs, who had served as Chief of the General 
Staff, was replaced by Lt. Col. K. M. Wallenius, who was also 
promoted to the rank of colonel. This swing in favour of ap-
pointing young Jäger officers, typically in their mid-thirties, 
reached its peak in 1926 with the appointment of Aarne Sihvo at 
the early age of 36 as the acting commander of the army, following 
the dismissal of Wilkama, and his promotion to the rank of Major-
Genera1.107 
The resolution of the internal crisis within the army through the 
forced resignation or voluntary stepping aside of a large number of 
prominent ex-Tsarist officers, with the exception of General 
Nenonen and a few others, in favour of Jäger officers was widely 
106. See Malmberg's letter of 30.5.1924 to Ingman (Malmberg collection). Kai 
Donner: Anteckningar 8.7., 10.10., 27.11., 18.12.1924. Also the letters from 
A. Almqvist (31.12.1924), Hj. Söderman (28.3.1925) and Aarne Sihvo 
(18.7.1924) to K. Wilkama (Wilkama collection II/VA). Mylly 1978, p. 197; A. 
J. Alanen 1975, pp. 305-6, 311; Aitosuomalainen 3/1924; Hbl 23.10.1924; 
AU 22.10.1924; Wbl 31.10.1924. 
107. Suomen Jääkärielämäkerrasto (1975). 
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described by those who had argued for the shake-up as a victory for 
patriotic national values. With the benefit of hindsight, one can 
see that it was far less positive than its advocates claimed at the 
time. By radically promoting young officers over their older 
colleagues, the army lost an important fund of experience and 
detailed technical knowledge which would have benefited its 
development, while the concentration on Jäger appointments also 
served to reinforce the dominance of the infantry in strategic and 
tactical planning at the expense of the other arms. Although not 
lacking in the virtues of youthful energy and dynamism, the new 
young generation of commanders did have their limitations, 
among the most obvious being their lack of experience in the 
workings of the General Staff and the leadership of large units. 
Of those officers past over in the army's reorganisation pro-
gramme, General Enckell was undoubtedly the most prominent. 
Despite his relative young age, he had had an exceptionally 
successful career in the Imperial Army, reaching the rank of 
colonel at the age of 34 in 1912 and serving as the head of Russian 
military intelligence. The Jäger demands calling for a reshuffle of 
commanding officers, however, had particularly singled out 
Enckell, describing his comprehensive defence plans for the 
Karelian Isthmus, based on defence in depth, as unreliable and 
betraying a poor awareness of defence needs.108 
Tension within the army was nevertheless far from completely 
eliminated following the implementation of the reorganisation 
programme, and open arguments over promotion and command 
issues continued to flourish, albeit in muted form and largely 
restricted to sparring between different sections of the Jäger officer 
corps.109 
The middle years of the decade saw the armed forces and 
defence-related issues receive relatively wide coverage in the 
press, partly as a result of the wranglings which surrounded the 
army's internal organisation and partly as a result of the army's 
role as a symbol of the country's new independent status, coverage 
which met with some satisfaction within the military establish- 
108. Arimo 1981, pp. 19-20. 
109. Sihvo II 1956, pp. 183-6; Hbl 19.11.1927. For general coverage of the 1928-
9 period, see Relander II 1968. 
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ment. This did not, however, provoke any significant divergence 
within the defence forces from the overall policy of jealously 
protecting their internal affairs as much as possible from the public 
gaze which had been adopted during the early years of 
independence. No great need was felt from within the army's 
ranks to keep society informed of military affairs and much 
emphasis was put on the confidential nature of information 
concerning the defence forces. Eirik Hornborg's decision to grant a 
press interview following the completion of his committee's report 
reviewing the defence forces was greeted with accusations that in 
doing so he had revealed confidential information, and the case 
was even taken to court.110 Similarly indicative of the armed 
forces' sensitivity to public exposure was the reception given to 
Pentti Haanpää's collection of short stories, 'Kenttä ja kasarmi' 
(The Barracks and the Field), published in 1928. Haanpää's 
criticism of the harsh style of discipline favoured in the army and 
of the gulf existing between regular officers and recruits, based on 
his own experience of military life, was condemned by both the 
military establishment and much of conservative opinion as 
undermining the very existence of the army and its role in Finnish 
society, as well as the existing social order. This criticism 
effectively helped prevent further publication of his work for some 
time subsequently. 
The creation of an adequate administrative department to handle 
foreign affairs and Finland's international relations had proved a 
thorny problem ever since the declaration of independence, both 
in terms of developing the necessary infrastructure and in 
recruiting suitable and competent personnel. Throughout the 
previous century, Finnish politics, as those of an autonomous 
grand duchy under the wing of the Russian Empire, had been 
virtually solely concerned with internal affairs. Familiarity with 
developments abroad and foreign issues in general had been 
extremely limited and restricted to the academic community and 
those sectors of the business world involved in foreign trade. Little 
was known about the intricacies of international politics and 
diplomacy and what knowledge that did exist by 1918 had largely 
110. Hbl 28.2., 3.3., 13.3.1926. 
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been acquired through force of necessity during the tense first 
months of independence. 
The first steps taken towards establishing a government 
department responsible for foreign affairs took the form of a series 
of snap, rapidly-improvised decisions taken in response to new 
areas of interest and concern as they arose, resulting in a rather 
erratic and unorganised pattern of development and expansion for 
the new department. The first real administrative decision in the 
field was taken in July 1918, with the founding of a new ministry 
to coordinate foreign policy planning and administration. For all 
its small size, with an initial staff running to only some 8 to 9, it 
nevertheless represented an important step forward in creating a 
base for future expansion.1" 
The close linkage of ministry policy on establishing legations 
abroad with the various swings in foreign policy within the 
government during this early period was reflected in the 
prominence and expansion of the legation in Berlin headed by 
Edward Hjelt during the period of the dominance of pro-German 
foreign policy in 1918, and in the fact that it was only after the First 
World War had ended that legations were set up in other Western 
capitals to supplement the work of the legation in Stockholm, 
which had up until then carried much of the burden of ensuring 
communications with Western and Central Europe. Following the 
wider international recognition of the country's independence 
which took place in the spring of 1919, attention turned to the 
question of Finland's overall level of need for diplomatic 
representation abroad. Opinions varied as to how extensive a 
coverage was required by a small country of Finland's standing, 
although there was wide agreement that the total number of 
legations and consulates would be relatively small, following the 
rapid abandonment of the idea of establishing some form of 
representation in every national capital in favour of a more 
realistic, selective approach. In planning the shape of the future 
foreign ministry and diplomatic service, the government drew 
heavily on the Swedish example, both in the area of general ideas 
and on the question of deciding the scale of an adequate 
diplomatic corps. Long-term planning strategies were hindered, 
111. Paasivirta 1968, pp. 54-7. 
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however, by the strong sense of caution which existed in many 
political circles in the early years over the whole question of 
diplomatic representation abroad at legation level in peacetime 
and its ultimate necessity. Significantly more agreement existed 
on the need for a network of consular representation abroad, which 
was seen as more directly assisting and protecting Finnish 
commercial interests.12 
Finland initially established legations abroad only in the capitals 
of the great powers and in neighbouring countries in Scandinavia 
and the Baltic states. Despite Finland's lack of any professional 
diplomats in many of the newly-independent states of Europe such 
as Czechoslovakia, Europe nevertheless dominated the Finnish 
diplomatic effort during the early years of independence, with the 
country's only legations outside the region in the United States 
and Japan. This clear bias towards a European-based diplomacy 
went hand in hand with the limited nature and extent of Finnish 
foreign trade typical of the period. This largely dictated, for 
instance, why Finland lacked any permanent diplomats in the 
whole of Latin America throughout the early 1920s. In comparison 
with Sweden's diplomatic presence abroad, Finland's was some-
what more modest, both in absolute numbers and extent.13  
Although Sweden served as the most immediate source of ideas 
and comparison for the architects of Finland's new diplomatic 
service, it was to France and French diplomacy which they looked 
for their major inspiration. This was particularly reflected in the 
Foreign Ministry's keenness to recruit staff with a good command 
of French and well versed in the French way of doing things to 
handle protocol affairs. Overall recruitment in the early stages of 
the ministry's existence was essentially unsystematic and geared 
largely to fulfilling immediate needs rather than satisfying more 
long-term requirements. A number of people were recruited on the 
basis of their past experience of working abroad for the volunteer 
movement and the independence cause during the war years and 
before, their appointments being sometimes little more than 
thinly-veiled rewards for past services. Some of those recruited in 
112. Paasivirta 1961, pp. 245-7; Paasivirta 1968. pp. 48-50, 67, 137-40, 153, 
225-6. 
113. Paasivirta 1968, pp. 147, 184, 301. 
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this way often proved less than ideal diplomats, hampered by their 
typically strong personal convictions and habit of operating 
independently, which sometimes conflicted with government 
interests and requirements. Recruitment in this early stage also 
focused on individuals known to possess in-depth knowledge on 
foreign issues, linguistic or other relevant skills. Among these, 
academics and those in the upper reaches of the business 
community and in Swedish-speaking, rather than Finnish-
speaking society were particularly prominent. As the Foreign 
Ministry consolidated its position and became a more attractive 
career prospect, however, a wider range of applicants began to 
apply and be accepted. Unlike those who had begun their careers 
earlier, these new recruits were largely Finnish-speaking, a fact 
which fairly rapidly led to Finnish-speakers assuming the majority 
in the ministry.14 
Given this background, it is not surprising therefore that perhaps 
the largest single problem facing the Foreign Ministry in its early 
years lay in the lack of experience affecting virtually all of its staff 
in Helsinki and the country's diplomats abroad. Appointments 
nevertheless had to be filled quickly and new legations set up to 
take on the task of representing the country abroad, and many new 
appointees found themselves despatched abroad with little 
advance preparation for their new responsibilities. It took some 
time for the custom of regular periods abroad interspersed with 
postings in Helsinki and a policy of providing diplomats with a 
steady variety of responsibilities to be established and begin to 
create a body of experienced diplomats. Also typical of the period 
was the tendency for the younger generation of diplomats to be 
concentrated in the Foreign Ministry itself, with the older, more 
experienced generation dominating posts abroad. 
	 While 
undoubtedly making the best use of the limited personnel 
resources to hand, this practice also inevitably contributed to 
creating an underlying friction between legations abroad and the 
ministerial hierarchy in Helsinki. This tension between the 
generations also made itself felt in the political disagreements 
which surfaced within the ministry in the early days of Ståhlberg's 
presidency in the shape of some of the older generation of 
114. Paasivirta—Mylly 1969, p. 96. 
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diplomats' difficulty, if not unwillingness, to come to terms with 
the republican, moderate values which the new President 
represented and which were often quite at odds with their own 
ingrained, conservative view of the world. Conflicts and tensions 
also later emerged between conservatives who had supported 
monarchist plans and more liberal elements within the ministry.115 
It would be idle to pretend that the establishment of a foreign 
ministry and diplomatic corps virtually from scratch and with 
inadequate financial and personnel resources did not take an 
inevitable toll on the Finnish diplomacy which was pursued 
during the early years of independence. This took the shape of an 
underlying uncertainty and caution in all the activities of both the 
ministry in Helsinki and Finland's legations and consulates abroad 
for much of the 1920s. Something of the essentially conservative 
and cautious nature of Finnish diplomacy during the 1920s was 
reflected in its adherence to the tenets of traditional, established 
diplomatic practice which emphasised political questions almost 
to the exclusion of other issues, to an extent which was no longer 
common in the rest of the post-war world. This proved particu-
larly disadvantageous on commercial issues, which often 
remained a relatively alien domain for many Finnish diplomats of 
the period. This underestimation of commercial questions, 
coupled with the general growing pains affecting the Foreign 
Ministry and Finnish diplomacy as a whole, only served to further 
limit both the ministry's and the country's diplomats' potential to 
improve and expand Finland's network of international relations. 
5. In search of a foreign policy 
The post-war political map in the Baltic area exhibited a number of 
contrasts to that which had prevailed prior to the First World War. 
Helped by the military defeats suffered by Russia and Germany, 
five new independent states, Finland, the three Baltic republics 
and Poland had emerged in the region, raising the total number of 
states with a Baltic coastline from four to nine and making the 
115. See Ståhlberg's letter of 15.12.1920 to Wrede (Wrede collection). K. Holsti 
1963, p. 222. 
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Baltic itself a sea dominated, if not politically then at least 
geographically, by a majority of small states.116  The weakening of 
the power and influence of the established great powers in the 
region and the corresponding rise of the small states encouraged 
politicians in a number of countries in the area, including Finland, 
to put forward various plans aimed at declaring the Baltic a neutral 
zone and thereby guaranteeing great power non-involvement in 
the future, and at ensuring regional stability through a process of 
cooperation and common agreement. The general desire was to 
consolidate the already existing low level of arms build-up in the 
region and prevent possible attempts by any one power to gain 
clear military superiority. 
Within the Finnish camp, these plans were seen from something 
of a dual perspective. While Rudolf Holsti, the Foreign Minister, 
emphasised their value as a means of countering the threat posed 
by the Soviet navy, Rafael Erich, Prime Minister between 1920 and 
1921 when these ideas first took real wing, tended to see in a 
neutral Baltic the possibility of opening up a wider measure of 
positive cooperation between the small states of the area.1 ' The 
question of whether these plans should include an attempt to close 
the Danish straits to naval shipping soon emerged as an important 
issue as discussion on the project developed. Any move of this 
type would have affected the interests, of both the Soviet Union, 
attracted by the possibility of closing the Baltic to Western naval 
interference, and those of the Western powers, Britain because of 
her interest in the Aland Islands and France because of her desire 
to ensure the continuity of maritime communications with Poland. 
The inability of the states in the region to come to any form of 
agreement on a common plan, together with the multitude of 
problems surrounding the practical aspects of implementing and 
supervising the maintenance of a neutral zone in the Baltic, 
gradually, however, served to push the issue out of the forefront of 
the minds of politicians in the region and finally to bury it 
altogether. 
Following the stabilisation of the situation in the Baltic during 
the early 1920s, which took place despite the failure of the 
116. Kalela 1971, pp. 38-9. 
117. Lönnroth 1959, pp. 57-9; Kalela 1971, pp. 40-1. 
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neutrality zone idea to really get off the ground, attention in 
Finland returned in large part to the country's own security 
problems and continuing uneasy relations with Russia and the 
fears and uncertainties which they generated, and which the 
successful signing of the Tartu peace treaty failed to dispel. While 
there was a strong desire to consider the whole Russian question as 
resolved, few of those involved in foreign policy planning could 
ignore the fact that much remained to be done in developing a 
more secure border with Russia. This was further highlighted by 
the fall-off which took place in the overall level of Western interest 
in the Baltic area after peaking in the period immediately 
following the end of the First World War, and marked by the 
departure of the Royal Navy squadron which had been present 
since the end of the war from the Baltic during the course of 1921 
and the increasingly reduced presence of French naval units in the 
area."8 The unease felt over future Finnish-Soviet relations was 
matched to some extent by that colouring Finnish-Swedish 
relations. The unresolved fate of the Aland Islands, in the hands of 
the League of Nations by common agreement, served to maintain 
cool relations between the two countries. 
There was relatively little enthusiasm among the Finnish 
leadership at the beginning of the 1920s for the adoption of a 
policy of national neutrality, largely because such a policy was 
generally thought incapable of satisfying Finland's major security 
needs or providing the country with satisfactory relations with 
Finland's neighbours. Foreign policy thinking had begun instead 
to increasingly concentrate on the possibility of developing ties 
and closer contacts with the border states. Sharing a common 
origin in the break-up of the Russian Empire and together forming 
something of a geographical continuum, Finland and the three 
Baltic republics all possessed superficially broadly similar 
security needs. Historically, however, many factors divided the 
four countries, with Finland in particular differing from the Baltic 
republics in the length of her political traditions and by virtue of 
her more peripheral geopolitical location and close links to 
Scandinavia. Poland to the south, the other new state in the 
eastern Baltic, represented even more of an exception, with foreign 
118. Marcus Peltier 21.5.1977. 
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and security policy problems focused much more firmly along a 
purely Soviet-German axis. Despite the common desire for joint 
discussions covering regional problems and for exploring ways of 
coordinating national policies in response to them, the hoped-for 
common approach failed to materialise during the early stages of 
contact between the four countries during 1919, as a result of 
disagreements over a possible common response to Soviet pro-
posals for peace negotiations, mainly due to Finnish resistance to 
the various ideas put forward. 
The stabilisation of the political balance in the Baltic area 
brought by the signing by Finland and the three Baltic republics of 
separate peace treaties with the Soviet Union, however, saw a 
renewed enthusiasm for joint talks. Particular hopes were 
attached to the possibility of discussions on ways of cooperating 
on adopting a common policy strategy towards the Soviet Union 
and on developing a system of joint consultation on issues coming 
up for consideration at the League of Nations. The discussion 
process was given added momentum by the agreement reached at 
the conference held in July 1921 in Helsinki between the foreign 
ministers of the border states to continue and develop a regional 
dialogue. Background impetus to this decision was undoubtedly 
provided by the Soviet Union's occupation shortly previously of 
independent Georgia. Estonia and Latvia were particularly active 
in advocating the idea of a border states federation.119 
The proximity of Finland to the Baltic countries was an import-
ant factor for Finland, making for a number of shared interests and 
encouraging support for increased economic ties between Finland 
and the border states and the development of closer cultural 
relations. On the question of developing closer political cooper-
ation between the four countries, however, there was much less 
unanimity, although the continued independence of the Baltic 
countries was nevertheless widely perceived as being in Finland's 
interests. The idea of a defensive alliance between the border 
states found most favour among members of the Progressive and 
Agrarian parties. The concern felt in these circles at the possibility 
of a strengthening of Russian power and of a potential closer 
Russian-German relationship was well brought out in the public 
119. Schauman 1962, p. 134: K. Holsti 1963. p. 178: Ingman: Politica 21.5.1921. 
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statements of the Foreign Minister, Rudolf Holsti, and the 
commentaries which appeared in Helsingin Sanomat on the issue. 
In these, the Baltic republics, together with Finland, were seen as 
forming a barrier, capable, it was hoped, of preventing the 
development of any significant alliance between Russia and 
Central Europe. As such a barrier was seen as likely to be as much 
in the general interest of the West as that of the immediate Baltic 
region, hopes were also high for possible Western support for a 
closer alliance between the border states.12° 
Following the agreement of a peace treaty with the Soviet Union 
and the acceptance of Finland as a member of the League of 
Nations, both of which served to consolidate Finland's internatio-
nal position, Finnish foreign policy attention returned to the 
question of achieving a favourable solution to the Aland Islands 
issue.121 
Official policy stressing Finland's right of sovereignty over the 
Islands had come to enjoy an increasingly wide measure of support 
within political opinion by the end of 1919, while those opposing 
it had consistently lost ground, even in Swedish-speaking 
southern Ostrobothnia, where sympathy for the Aland Islands' 
population's secessionist aims had previously been prominent. 
This shift was underwritten by the decision of the Swedish 
People's Party and the Social Democrats to come round to backing 
the official position, a move which effectively eliminated any 
remaining mainland support which those among the Aland Islands 
population advocating secession from Finland and annexation to 
Sweden might still have hoped for. 
An important fact in shaping opposition to any secession of the 
Islands among the country's overall Swedish-speaking community 
lay in the traditionally dominant role played by national interests, 
as distinct from regional or local interests, in determining the 
policies promoted by the community's political leadership. The 
respect enjoyed within the Swedish-speaking community by the 
activist movement and its uncompromising nationalist ideals also 
indirectly acted to concentrate attention on the importance of 
120. HS 14.12.1920. 
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safeguarding national interests. Opposition to any changes in the 
country's territorial integrity was further strengthened in the case 
of the Aland Islands question by the fact that, was the area to be 
transferred to Sweden, Finland would lose an important Swedish-
speaking region entirely and the Swedish-speaking community 
itself a significant part of its population. Such a loss would also 
have amounted to a dangerous body blow to the continuing 
dynamism of the rest of the Swedish-speaking community in 
Finland, as some commentators were quick to point out.122 Fears 
were also expressed that, unchecked, the separatist views of the 
Aland Islands population might easily foster increased suspicion 
among the Finnish-speaking majority towards the whole of the 
Swedish-speaking minority and lead to the latter's patriotism 
being increasingly questioned, thereby strengthening the hand of 
the more extreme elements within the nationalist movement. 
While not supporting the local population's separatist aims, the 
mainland Swedish-speaking community was nevertheless not 
slow to argue the importance of granting a wide measure of local 
autonomy to the Aland Islands. There was also widespread 
concern that continuing tension and indecision over the issue 
could only serve to further sour relations between Finland and 
Sweden. 
The Social Democrats, despite their support for the concept of 
national self-determination as a general democratic ideal, were 
unable to come to any clear formulation of their attitude to the 
Aland question for much of 1919. A number of leading figures 
within the party supported the idea of holding a referendum to 
decide the fate of the Islands, although only at a later date after 
tempers had had time to coo1.123  It was only at the party congress 
in December 1919 that it was finally decided, in line with the trend 
which had come to dominate non-socialist opinion, that retaining 
sovereignty over the Islands was ultimately in the nation's best 
interests. This decision, for all the closeness of the vote, came to 
determine future pronouncements by the party on the issue. Like 
the Swedish People's Party, the Social Democrats, however, also 
122. AU 23.5.1919; 2.8.1920. 
123. SS 5.4.1919; Sosialisti 22.3.1919. See also Väinö Wuolijoki's and J. W. Keto's 
speeches in Parliament on 28.10.1919 (VP 1919 ptk., p. 1242, 1250). Also H. 
Soikkanen 1975, p. 349. 
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favoured the granting of local self-government to the Islands.124  
The tension which had built up between Sweden and Finland 
over the Aland Islands finally broke out into an open crisis in the 
early summer of 1920, following the Finnish Parliament's approval 
of legislation giving the Islands local autonomy. In appearing to 
bury once and for all any possibility of realising local hopes aimed 
at transferring the Islands to Swedish jurisdiction, this legislation 
gained little real support on the Islands. Local efforts along these 
lines had reached their peak the previous year when a delegation 
under Julius Sundblom had travelled to Paris to put the local 
population's case to the Western powers and a special petition had 
been presented to the Allies calling for the Islands to become part 
of Sweden.125 The failure of these appeals to produce any 
movement on the part of the West had served to unsettle local faith 
in the possible role to be played by the great powers in deciding 
the fate of the Islands along the lines of the 1856 international 
agreement on non-fortification of the Islands, and which had been 
inspired in large part by the West's more recent advocacy of the 
principle of national self-determination. 
This disappointment was only reinforced when the Allies 
decided towards the end of 1919 to transfer responsibility for 
deciding the fate of the Islands from the Paris peace conference to 
the League of Nations. The seeming impossibility of achieving a 
rapid and favourable decision through these international means 
prompted local leaders on the Islands to turn back to Sweden in 
the hope of getting a more sympathetic hearing for their cause. 
Although aware that any final decision over the issue was not for 
Sweden to make, they nevertheless appealed directly and publicly 
to the Swedish King and government for assistance in resolving the 
issue in their favour by putting renewed diplomatic pressure on 
Western governments. By openly appealing to the Swedish 
authorities, however, local leaders made the prospect of conflict 
with the Finnish government a virtual certainty.126 
An offer of talks on implementing the new law on local self- 
124. See Väinö Voionmaa's speech in Parliament on 28.10.1919 (VP 1919 ptk., p. 
1255). Also SDP:n puoluekokous ptk., pp. 155-8 and appendix to the 
previous pp. 147-63, and SS 24.11.1920. 
125. Paasivirta 1961, pp. 174-6; Salminen 1979, p. 83. 
126. Salminen 1979, pp. 104-15. 
295 
government made by a Finnish government delegation under the 
leadership of the Prime Minister, Rafael Erich, on a visit to the 
Islands' capital Mariehamn at the beginning of June 1920 was 
defiantly rejected by the two main local political leaders, Julius 
Sundblom and Carl Björkman, earning both a prison sentence and 
a transfer to Turku. A heated exchange of notes between the 
Swedish and Finnish governments resulted, with the latter 
particularly incensed at what were seen as Swedish attempts to 
ferment unrest on the Islands, finally reaching its peak in 
Sweden's decision to recall her envoy from Helsinki.127 
In response to the crisis, Britain proposed in the early summer of 
1920 the beginning of discussions on the Aland issue at the League 
of Nations. Faced with the overall instability affecting the Baltic 
area, including the continuing Soviet-Polish conflict and the still 
unresolved Soviet-Finnish peace treaty, however, the proposal 
amounted to little more than a holding move by the British 
government, designed primarily to pacify tempers in the dispute, 
instead of marking any real British desire to finally achieve a 
solution to the problem. As a result of the British move, the 
Council of the League of Nations decided on 12 July to set up a 
special committee to review the whole problem and the League's 
potential role in resolving it. In concluding that the question 
clearly had implications extending beyond those of a solely 
internal Finnish affair and was essentially international in nature, 
the committee formally confirmed the League's desire to exercise 
its powers of arbitration in the dispute.128 
A further committee was duly appointed by the League on 20 
September to consider possible political solutions to the question. 
The appointment of this new body, again partly as a result of 
British diplomatic efforts, meant in effect a further postponement 
of any final resolution of the issue. Members of the new committee 
visited Stockholm, Helsinki and Mariehamn to gauge the strength 
of opinion among the three sides involved.129 The report produced 
by the committee in April 1921 was to prove decisive. In it, the 
127. Ibid., pp. 115-6; Rafael Erich: Päiväkirja 8.6.1920. 
128. Gihl 1951, pp. 422-4; Barros 1968, pp. 266-7, 281, 293; Rafael Erich: 
Päiväkirja 10.9.1920. 
129. Gihl 1951, pp. 424-6; Barros 1968, p. 296; Birger Johansson 28.6.1961. 
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committee argued that the Islands belonged to Finland and that 
they should be demilitarised and an international agreement, 
along the lines of the previous nineteenth-century one barring all 
fortifications in the area, be drawn up for signing by the great 
powers and the Baltic states. 
The committee's findings were generally welcomed in Finland, 
being seen as finally bringing the prospect of a solution to the long-
running dispute into sight and as upholding the basis of the 
Finnish case for continued sovereignty in the region. In Sweden, 
in contrast, they were understandably greeted with rather more 
muted enthusiasm.130 Tension in the rest of the Baltic region had 
by the time of the publication of the League's findings substan-
tially subsided, following the signing of a Soviet-Polish peace in 
Riga in March 1921 and an agreement between Finland and the 
Soviet Union in October 1920. These effectively removed, in the 
League's view, as well as that of the British diplomats who had 
played such an instrumental role in leading the international effort 
on the issue, the last remaining obstacles to an agreement over the 
Islands. 
The final decision by the League of Nations on the Åland case, 
taken on 24 June 1921, closely followed the committee's view 
supporting the legitimacy of Finland's historical, territorial and 
economic claims to sovereignty over the Islands. Finland was 
nevertheless recommended to reinforce the already approved 
legislation allowing for local self-government in the region with a 
set of separate guarantees specifically designed to protect the long-
term status of Swedish as the local language. A new international 
agreement was proposed to cover the area's demilitarised status, in 
line with the arrangement arrived at in 1856.131 
 This agreement, 
providing for the Islands' demilitarisation and declaration a 
neutral zone, was finally signed in November 1921 by the Western 
powers and the states around the Baltic, with the exception of the 
Soviet Union, which refused to endorse the plan. Finland was 
given responsibility for ensuring the first-line defence of the area 
against any possible attack in the event of the Islands being 
130. Barros 1968, pp. 312-8, 320-1; HS 20.4., 23.4.1921; US 20.4., 23.4.1921; Hbl 
20.4.1921; SS 19.4.1921. 
131. Gihl 1951, p. 429; Barros 1968, pp. 327-33. 
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threatened at a time of international crisis. In the case of such a 
crisis continuing, the treaty provided for the League of Nations, 
with the assistance of the signatory powers, to take further action 
to guarantee the Islands' defence.132  
The League of Nations' judgement, for all its predictability 
following the organisation's previous statements on the dispute, 
came as a heavy blow to the local population on the Aland Islands 
themselves. The sense of local disappointment was only inten-
sified by the fact that the leading paper on the Islands, Aland, had 
consistently led its readers to believe that the islanders' case 
enjoyed considerable sympathy in the West. The clearly pro-
Finnish nature of the League's final judgement provoked a wave of 
strong dissatisfaction and hostility towards the international body 
and the great powers associated with it and, above all, towards 
Britain, which was considered as the major mover behind the 
decision, for having betrayed local hopes.133 There was little 
bitterness towards Sweden in contrast, which tended to be seen by 
the Islands' population as having done everything it could to 
advance their interests. All that remained for many islanders was 
a vague hope that the future would see justice, as they saw it, 
ultimately prevail. 
Although powerless to change the League's pronouncement, 
local political leaders on the Islands remained faced with the 
problem of how to react to a situation in which, by international 
agreement, the Islands had been granted, not the total secession 
they had called for, but little more than the self-government which 
Finland had been willing to provide, with or without the League's 
intervention. The latter proposal had been rejected to all intents 
and purposes at the time of the visit of Erich's delegation the 
previous summer. As much as local leaders' instincts told them to 
refuse to accept the League's judgement, it was difficult for them to 
remain completely passive to events and refuse any form of 
cooperation with the Finnish authorities. There was always the 
danger that, by adopting a policy of non-cooperation, the local 
population could possibly lose all chance of handling its own 
affairs, even if it was to take place only within the framework of the 
132. Gihl 1951, pp. 432-3. 
133. Åland 18.3., 30.7., 17.10.1921. 
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Finnish form of local autonomy. Unable to ignore this political 
reality and unable to look to further Swedish support, local 
politicians and the local population as a whole had little choice in 
the final analysis but to come to terms with the situation and try 
and make the new system work to their best advantage. 
The issue of closer contact between Finland and the border states, 
which had been so prominent in Finnish foreign policy debate 
during 1920 and 1921, gradually came to assume an increasingly 
central part in foreign policy thinking at the beginning of 1922, 
pointing towards the possible development of a more formal 
alliance relationship. Developments in this direction were 
accelerated by the emergence of an open crisis in Finnish-Soviet 
relations following the outbreak of a minor peasant uprising in 
northern East Karelia in November 1921 and the dispatch of a 
small Finnish volunteer force numbering some 500 men, led by a 
number of those who had participated in past interventions across 
the border, to assist the rebels. The rebellion was quickly 
condemned by the Soviet authorities as having been engineered by 
Finnish agitators and as aimed at threatening the security of the 
Murmansk railway. A strong show of force in response was 
decided on, and some 13,000 troops were sent to quell the uprising 
and a number of additional divisions concentrated along the 
Soviet-Finnish border further south on the Karelian Isthmus to 
forestall any further Finnish moves and put pressure on the 
Finnish government.134 An exchange of strongly-worded notes 
between the two governments followed, with both sides disputing 
the cause of the uprising and the events that had surrounded it, 
and the possible consequences it held for future bilateral relations. 
The uprising and the Finnish intervention also provoked an 
extensive and impassioned debate within Finland itself, reopening 
many of the old disagreements on foreign and domestic policy 
going back to the years immediately before and after indepen-
dence. Much attention was given to the question of whether the 
Soviet Union had complied with the terms of the Tartu peace 
agreement in granting a reasonable measure of local self-
government to the Karelian region. Virtually all parties, except for 
134. Jääskeläinen 1961, p. 92; Korhonen I 1966, p. 59. 
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the extreme Left, were united in arguing that it had not. This near 
unanimity allowed some sections of the Right to mount a renewed 
attack on the peace treaty itself, which was supposed to have 
guaranteed Karelian rights and which had been opposed by the 
Right before its signing as being prejudicial to Finland's, and by 
inference, Karelia's best interests. The main brunt of this criticism 
was directed at the centre parties and their moderate brand of 
foreign policy, together with the Vennola-led Progressive and 
Agrarian-based government, all of which were attacked for their 
lack of determination in standing up for Finnish rights on the East 
Karelian issue.135 
The Social Democrats, while joining the non-socialist parties in 
criticising the Soviet authorities' attitude towards the question of 
local autonomy for the Karelian region, were quick, however, to 
make plain their opposition to armed intervention across the 
border, demanding that the Vennola government do everything in 
its power to prevent illegal border crossings and maintain a neutral 
stand on the uprising. The socialists feared that the events in East 
Karelia could lead to serious difficulties in Finnish-Soviet 
relations likely to undermine Finland's overall national interests, 
as they made plain in Parliament during December 1921.136 
Further to the Left, the Socialist Labour Party, in contrast both to 
the Social Democrats and the rest of Finnish political opinion, saw 
the uprising in the Uhtua area as potentially likely to overshadow 
the future of the recently-established communist Karelian 
Workers' Commune, and aligned itself behind the Soviet interpre-
tation of events. A public appeal by the party leadership calling 
for the defence of Soviet Russia against those committed to its 
overthrow was only made in mid-January 1922, however, when 
the uprising was drawing to a close. It proved sufficient 
nevertheless for the leadership of the party to be imprisoned on the 
orders of the Minister of the Interior, Heikki Ritavuori. The latter 
action, however, was not enough to prevent Ritavuori, who had 
been the butt of much right-wing criticism for some time and now 
became the subject of a number of particularly sharp attacks for his 
uncompromising attitude towards closing the eastern border 
135. Hautala 1979, pp. 8-9, 16-21. 
136. SS 8.12.1921; Kansan Työ 23.12.1921. 
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against refugees from Karelia, from being assassinated shortly 
afterwards by a right-wing extremist.137 
Holsti's enthusiasm for exploring the possibilities offered by 
closer links between the border states was reinforced during 1921 
and 1922 as a result of his belief that such ties could provide 
Finland with a way out from the crisis which had developed over 
East Karelia, and which he saw as likely to heighten the problem of 
Finland's isolation. His assessment of the situation was also based 
on the assumption that the Western powers would be willing to 
support the signing of an alliance agreement between the various 
border states.138 Within government circles, Holsti's proposed 
initiative was met with initial cautious support from Ståhlberg and 
Ritavuori, although both resisted linking any such arrangement too 
directly with the crisis with the Soviet Union. In deciding to put 
his weight behind this approach, Ståhlberg stressed the cultural 
and political dynamism of the newly-independent Baltic republics 
and the potential that existed for exploiting this in some form of 
closer regional cooperation.139 Vennola also cautiously aligned 
himself behind the idea and worked to gain it greater support. 
Active interest along similar lines had also been evident from the 
late autumn onwards in Poland. The overall aim of Polish foreign 
policy, as it emerged from 1919 on, had been focused on the idea of 
developing a loose alliance directed against possible future Soviet 
and German expansion, embracing as wide a number of the smaller 
states in Eastern and Central Europe as possible and running north 
to south across the Continent. Finland was envisaged as the 
northernmost potential member of any such grouping.140 The 
extent of backing existing for a joint policy of this type was 
sounded out at the end of 1921 by Colonel Posjerski during a visit 
to Helsinki. Colonel Yrjö Elfvengren, linked to the Russian emigre 
leader Boris Savinkov, was also active at around the same time in 
trying to establish contact with the Finnish military establish-
ment.141 
137. Suomen Työmies 17.1., 18.1.1922; Hautala 1979, pp. 55-7. 
138. K. Holsti 1963, pp. 160-2; Ingman: Politica 10.1., 25.1.1922. 
139. K. J. Ståhlberg 25.4.1952. 
140. See Boris Gyllenbögel's reports from Warsaw dated 15.2. and 18.10.1920 (UM 
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Progress on developing the border states policy initiative proved 
slow in Finland, however. It was held back by the lack of complete 
unanimity towards it within the government itself and the 
difficulties the latter encountered in assembling sufficient parlia-
mentary backing for any such alliance. Support was most 
forthcoming from the two centre parties making up the 
government coalition, the Progressives and the Agrarians. Among 
the non-socialist opposition parties, opinions were more divided. 
The National Coalition only finally aligned itself behind the 
proposal with reluctance, stressing the need for the government to 
beware of over-committing Finland, while the Swedish People's 
Party remained split on the issue.142  
General Mannerheim, an important figure on the Right, although 
no longer directly involved in politics, declared himself 
sympathetic to an alliance with Poland, but against one with the 
three Baltic republics. This was in line with his view expressed 
back in the autumn of 1919 that the Baltic countries would be 
unlikely to be able to maintain their sovereignty against the more 
powerful interests of the larger powers surrounding them.143 
Departing from some of their earlier statements on the issue, the 
attitude of the Social Democrats towards an active policy of 
cooperation with the border states, and in particular the possible 
signing of a treaty of alliance, became increasingly hostile as time 
went on. This shift was largely motivated by the strong suspicions 
felt within socialist circles towards what was seen as the 
adventurist style of politics being pursued by Poland, coupled 
with fears that any alliance between the border states might 
possibly be used in Finland as the basis for aggressive operations 
directed against Russia.144  
It was against this background of somewhat fragmented, but 
nevertheless relatively extensive support for his initiative, and a 
commitment by the government to back a possible defensive 
alliance should one materialise, that Holsti took part in the joint 
negotiations held between representatives of the border states in 
142. K Holsti 1963, pp. 186-91; Kalela 1971, pp. 62-3; Hautala 1979, pp. 107-
22; Wrede 1923 II, pp. 264-5. 
143. Hautala 1979, p. 103; Ingman: Politica 8.2.1922. See also a telegram from 
Paris dated 21.10.1919 (Hugo Suolahti collection 2). 
144. Hautala 1979, pp. 126, 131, 147; SS 24.1., 31.1.1920, 20.3.1922. 
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Warsaw in mid-March 1922. Holsti's personal enthusiasm for 
such an arrangement nevertheless continued to raise a number of 
political hackles among those less convinced of the policy's 
overall wisdom. The negotiations between the Finnish, Estonian, 
Latvian and Polish delegates in Warsaw, however, failed to 
produce the defence treaty Holsti and others had hoped for. The 
outcome was an ordinary alliance agreement, restricting military 
issues to a clause allowing for discussions between the signatory 
states on joint action in the event of one of them becoming the 
object of hostile military aggression. 
The publication of the draft agreement in Finland provoked an 
extensive debate of its possible benefits and disadvantages, 
reflecting the far from unanimous support the border states policy 
as a whole enjoyed. Much of both party political and individual 
criticism focused on the dominant role which had been taken by 
Holsti in advocating such an agreement. While the centre parties 
maintained their support for the government's decision to align the 
country along a border state axis, the Right stressed that the 
Warsaw agreement offered Finland inadequate security guarantees 
against the threat posed by Soviet Russia, and might contribute to a 
worsening of Finland's friendly relations with Germany. The 
Social Democrats largely repeated their earlier criticism of the 
wisdom of entering into any alliance relationship with the border 
states and their fears that any such treaty might possibly drag the 
country into unwanted conflicts and thereby undermine Finland's 
overall long-term international position.145 
Opposition to the proposed agreement also made itself felt 
within certain elements of the Finnish diplomatic corps, which 
moved with surprising alacrity to try and prevent its ratification. 
Ossian Donner in London and Carl Enckell in Paris worked 
together in a joint attempt to find evidence of Western resistance or 
scepticism towards the agreement to forward to the Foreign 
Ministry in Helsinki. The Finnish envoy in Berlin, Harri Holma, 
privately contacted the leadership of the National Coalition Party, 
already concerned at the possibilities the agreement held for 
bringing Finland into future conflict with Germany, to communi-
cate the German Foreign Ministry's dislike of the agreement and of 
145. K. Holsti 1963, pp. 195-7; US 6.4.1922; SS 22.4.1922. 
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the other moves proposed for closer Baltic cooperation.146 
The collapse of the uprising in East Karelia in February 1922 and 
with it the elimination of the crisis which it had precipitated in 
Finnish-Soviet relations, followed by the signing in mid-April by 
the Soviet Union and Germany of the Rapallo pact, however, put 
something of a new complexion on the whole border state question 
for the Finnish authorities, forcing them to rethink their earlier 
position. The Rapallo pact, marking as it did a clear sign of 
renewed activity by the Soviet Union and Germany and one 
promising further initiatives from both countries in the future, 
raised a number of question marks over the direction of future 
Finnish foreign policy. In particular, Rapallo opened up a number 
of hitherto unforseen possible scenarios unfavourable to the 
signatories of the Warsaw agreement, especially Poland, the most 
exposed of the five countries and, to a lesser extent, the small 
Baltic republics. It was feared that the pact might mark a prelude 
to a restoration of the historic relationship which had existed 
between Russia and Germany prior to 1914, thereby effectively 
taking the carpet out from underneath the recently agreed Baltic 
alliance. 
The Vennola government's view that the changed situation 
provided the border states with even more reason to intensify their 
joint cooperation failed to convince Parliament. When it came to a 
vote, Parliament refused to ratify the Warsaw agreement, even 
despite a last-minute backdown by the government on inclusion of 
the article covering military consultations. The Social Democrats 
and the National Coalition joined forces at the beginning of May to 
push through a vote of no-confidence in Rudolf Holsti, who had 
played such a prominent part in developing the border states 
policy, which was accepted by a majority of 96-62, causing the 
government to resign and effectively marking the end of the policy 
which had led up to the Warsaw initiative. 
The period following its rejection witnessed a tacit reassessment 
of foreign policy priorities. The aggressive tone which had been 
taken by some sections of political opinion with regard to foreign 
146. See the memoranda referring to the visits to the French Foreign Ministry by 
the Finnish envoy C. Enckell on 28.2. and 8.3.1922 (AAEF, Finlande 16). 
Also Harri Holma's letter of 7.3.1922 to Eino Suolahti (Eino Suolahti collec-
tion). 
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policy issues and which had focused around a determination to 
underline Finland's new independent role in the world, and in the 
Baltic region in particular, fell off appreciably as it began to be 
more widely accepted that Finland's interests might be best served 
by maintaining a low international profile. A major background 
factor in shaping this development undoubtedly lay in the general 
shift taking place in the international situation in Europe at the 
time, as the 'sturm and drang' period, which had followed the end 
of the First World War and the consolidation of the post-war 
balance of power, drew to a close. European attitudes towards the 
Soviet Union were also changing, with the latter beginning to be 
seen, as time went on, as much less the threat to European society 
that it had appeared to be to many Western observers in the 
immediate wake of the Revolution. The adoption of the NEP 
policy and the internal party struggles which emerged after Lenin's 
death in 1924, together with the reduced attention given to 
Comintern, were widely interpreted as indicative of a shift in 
Soviet interests towards a more domestic orientation and away 
from one focused on propagating an aggressive revolutionary 
message. Finnish fears of the threat posed by the Soviet Union to 
the country's continued independent existence similarly receded, 
in line with this general readjustment of Western views. Although 
the ultimate ideological threat posed by Bolshevism was not 
ignored, it did tend increasingly to be pushed into the background. 
The sense of relative freedom felt by Finnish policy-makers 
following the stabilisation of the general situation in Europe was 
especially welcomed as it marked a substantial break with the 
previous period, when the country had enjoyed very little real 
room for manoeuvre. The sense of relief it inspired and the 
prospect of increased flexibility it held out was, however, allowed, 
in part at least, to distract attention from the need to clarify the 
overall direction of future foreign policy and consolidate Finland's 
relations abroad. This was particularly evident in the case of 
relations with the Soviet Union and in the inability of Finnish 
policy-makers to develop a definite foreign policy towards the 
Soviet state. Following the formal establishment of diplomatic 
relations between the two countries, which had given Finland a 
legation in Moscow and a consulate in Leningrad, no real attempt 
was made to develop diplomatic links beyond what was 
considered strictly necessary. There was much support for the 
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view that Finland would be best guided in her relations with her 
eastern neighbour by the general trend of international attitudes 
towards the Soviet Union. The proponents of this view stressed 
that Finland would be unwise to commit herself to any diplomatic 
initiatives which went beyond those of the Western powers and 
the Baltic republics and Poland.14' 
Following the abandonment of the Warsaw agreement and the 
wider border states policy it was a part of, the overall trend of 
Finnish foreign policy thinking shifted towards non-alignment 
rather than strict neutrality. In practice, this essentially relatively 
vague policy approximated to a compromise between the earlier 
pro-border states policy and a pro-Scandinavian approach, with a 
slight bias towards the latter. Despite the rejection of the Warsaw 
agreement, contact with the border states, far from disappearing 
altogether, continued, albeit in a more muted form than previous-
ly. Regular meetings between the foreign ministers of the border 
states continued to take place for a few years and joint discussions 
on common foreign policy problems were similarly maintained. 
Efforts were also made in the direction of ensuring some measure 
of policy coordination at the League of Nations. The idea of a 
Baltic alliance did not completely disappear and resurfaced at 
intervals over the following few years, but it failed to generate any 
significant interest or lead to any long-term progress towards 
closer political ties between the countries in the region. Dis-
cussions increasingly tended to focus around smaller-scale, 
specific issues, such as bilateral trade and cultural relations.148 
In the area of Finland's relations with Sweden in the post-1922 
period, political initiatives and discussion about their develop-
ment generally proved most forthcoming from the political parties 
than from government sources. Since 1919, the Swedish-speaking 
community in Finland had systematically emphasised the value of 
developing closer relations between Finland and Sweden, but this 
had found little favour among a wider section of political opinion 
at the time of the tension over the Åland Islands, or later, following 
the swing towards developing ties with the border states.149 Voices 
147. Paasivirta 1968, p. 82. 
148. Kalela 1971A, p. 238. 
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arguing for a more active policy towards Sweden had nevertheless 
been raised within the Social Democratic Party, amongst them that 
of the party leader, Väinö Tanner. The latter had underlined his 
view at the conference of Baltic social democratic parties held in 
Riga in September 1921 that Finland was not a purely Baltic 
country in the same sense as the Baltic republics. The party 
leadership saw links with the Baltic countries as unlikely in the 
long term to serve the interests of expanding Finland's contacts 
abroad. Tanner's next move in this effort to focus Finnish interest 
on the Scandinavian countries came in an interview he gave to the 
Swedish paper Arbetet in May 1922 designed to persuade the 
Swedish Social Democrats to put their political weight behind a 
closer relationship. Tanner argued that closer ties would bring 
benefits to both countries on the basis of their shared interests, and 
strengthen the neutral cause in Scandinavia. He was careful to 
make plain, however, that he was not proposing any type of formal 
alliance.150 Tanner's position was later reinforced by J. W. Keto, 
who argued that closer links with Scandinavia would provide a 
secure alternative to the more dangerous border states policy.151 
Within conservative opinion, there were still those, chiefly 
associated with the activist tradition, who continued, even after 
the failure of Holsti's earlier policy initiative, to advocate some 
form of military alliance between the border states as the best way 
forward for Finnish foreign policy. Others were more favourable 
to developing ties with the Scandinavian countries. Some 
suggested that a defensive alliance along the lines of the rejected 
Warsaw agreement with Sweden might be a realistic option.152 A 
further variation combining these two major threads was 
represented by the proposal put forward by E. N. Setälä in June 
1922 for closer links in the foreign policy field between the 
Scandinavian countries, Finland and Estonia.153 
The bulk of Swedish opinion proved lukewarm at best to any 
suggestion of military ties with Finland. This was forcibly brought 
home to those Finnish politicians advocating some form of joint 
Finnish-Swedish security arrangement by the reaction in Sweden 
150. Bruno Kalnins 29.3.1973; Arbetet 10.5.1922. 
151. SS 16.3., 21.7.1923; Kalela 1971, p. 143. 
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in the autumn of 1923 to the idea of a defensive alliance between 
Sweden and Finland put forward by the Swedish Foreign Minister, 
Carl Hedenstierna. The outright rejection of the latter's proposal 
by all the major political parties reflected the continuing strength 
of support for Sweden's established policy of neutrality.154 
Hedenstierna, in fact, was forced to resign over the issue, and the 
whole sequence of events served to show that closer links between 
the two countries would have to be restricted to non-security 
questions. 
Following the resolution of the Aland dispute and the 
dissipation of the worst aspects of the tension that it had generated 
in Swedish-Finnish relations, the way was open for a stabilisation 
and normalisation of relations between the two countries. 
Movements in this direction continued to be hampered, however, 
by the residue of mutually hostile attitudes which remained on 
both Swedish and Finnish sides, inherited from the time of the 
Finnish Civil War or linked to the continuing language conflict 
between the Finnish and Swedish-speaking communities in 
Finland. Finland was, all the same, able to move somewhat closer 
towards more direct membership of the Scandinavian community 
in a number of fields, becoming a member of the Norden 
organisation in 1924, admittedly somewhat later than the other 
members, and a member of the Scandinavian parliamentary 
union.155  Resistance towards any closer ties with Sweden was 
nevertheless evident within the very highest echelons of the 
political hierarchy in Finland, the result both of the continuing 
knock-on effect of earlier Swedish policy towards the Aland 
Islands, coupled with a more general cautious attitude towards the 
whole question of the development of bilateral relations. 
Ståhlberg's reluctance to visit Sweden was particularly symbolic 
of this, as was his conviction that a number of influential figures in 
Stockholm continued to find it, as he put it, 'difficult to accept 
Finland as a state on an equal footing with Sweden'.156 
154. Lönnroth 1959, pp. 66-8; Tingsten 1964, pp. 155-9; Paasivirta 1968, p. 83. 
155. Norden — Förening för nordisk samarbete 1924-1934, pp. 10.13. Also see 
Yrjö Hirn's letter of 19.5.1923 to Werner Söderhjelm (Söderhjelm collection). 
156. See Ståhlberg's letters of 4.11.1921, 20.10.1922 and 12.5.1923 to Söderhjelm 
(Söderhjelm collection). Also, the memorandum sent to Stockholm on the 
issue by the Swedish envoy in Helsinki (UD HP1Af). 
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Following Ståhlberg's replacement by Relander as President, 
official attitudes in Finland somewhat softened, with reciprocal 
state visits being arranged in the summer of 1925. While official 
relations between the two countries did improve and more effort 
was made to forget old arguments, no real progress was made on 
developing closer bilateral relations at a more fundamental level. 
Although the value of friendly relations with Sweden had begun to 
be recognised by an increasingly wider section of opinion in 
Finland, there was still a degree of resistance to setting the seal too 
firmly on a policy of closer ties when no one seemed sure of what 
benefit such a policy might bring, in either the short or long term. 
Some interest also remained within a small section of Finnish 
opinion, mainly within circles close to the armed forces, in the 
possibility of a bilateral defence alliance between Sweden and 
Finland. This was counter-balanced to some extent by the critical 
attitude towards Sweden common in conservative circles, fuelled 
by what was seen as Sweden's continuing interference in the 
language issue in Finland and a number of other issues. Many of 
those on the Right came to see Sweden, particularly after the 
significant reduction in the Swedish defence budget passed in 
1925, as an increasingly weak and ineffectual political force.157 
With his more flexible approach to foreign policy issues, 
Relander represented quite a contrast to the somewhat slow-
moving, ponderous style of his predecessor Ståhlberg. Relander's 
state visits to Sweden and the other Scandinavian countries and 
the Baltic republics represented a new style of political initiative 
and a raising of the country's international profile. The continuing 
caution evident in Finnish policy towards the Soviet Union, while 
contrasting to the gradual opening-up taking place towards 
Scandinavia, was in line with that typically favoured by much of 
Western Europe at the time. 
Finland's early years of membership of the League of Nations, 
apart from the temporary prominence achieved during the time of 
the Aland Islands dispute, were typified by a relatively low-key 
approach to international issues. Domestic support for Finland's 
activity within the League was restricted, with few exceptions, to 
the centre parties and the Social Democrats. The latter were 
157. US 3.10.1925; Iltalehti 13.10.1925. 
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particularly encouraged by the discussions in the League's General 
Assembly of the Geneva protocol proposal, covering the institution 
of a system of international mediation and arbitration, which took 
place in the autumn of 1924, and its finally approval the same 
October. It was precisely this type of international cooperation 
which had been hoped for in these circles and it was seen as 
potentially opening up the way for more positive developments in 
the international field.158 The Right, in contrast, remained 
sceptical of the practical value to a small country of the security 
guarantees offered by the League. The League itself was often seen 
in these quarters as tending to favour the interests of the major 
West European powers at the expense of the smaller states in the 
region.159 Following the stabilisation of relations between the 
Western powers and Germany which took place with the reso-
lution of the reparations dispute and the signing of the Locarno 
agreements and Germany's acceptance as a member of the League 
of Nations, opinion on the Right, however, swung more definitely 
behind Finland's official policy stance towards the organisation. 
This extended even to the hard core of conservative opinion 
traditionally associated with pro-German attitudes.16° 
The Finnish decision to accept the country's nomination as a 
member of the League's Council in the autumn of 1927, following 
Sweden's step-down after a three-year term of membership, was a 
clear indication of the more favourable overall attitude towards the 
organisation which had emerged in Finland, and of the increased 
level of confidence in the country's standing in the international 
arena. The adoption of a more active role in the League also 
reflected Finland's general desire to avoid becoming politically 
isolated, even at a time when no direct crises threatened. The 
major political leaders of the time generally appear to have had 
substantial faith, in line with many Western political figures, in 
the League and its potential to change the face of international 
relations and to maintain peace and the international order in 
Europe. Finland's own proposal on financial aid to guarantee 
economic assistance to member states subject to attack, while 
158. HS 13.9., 8.10.1924; SS 14.7., 31.7., 2.8., 27.8.1924. 
159. US 19.2., 22.9.1925; Iltalehti 5.9., 29.9.1925; Suunta 13.9.1924. 
160. US 19.8., 29.8., 31.12.1924, 9.9.1926; Iltalehti 15.10.1925; Hbl 6.9.1926. 
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generating a lot of discussion, failed to result in any concrete 
policy on the subject.161  The seal was set on Finland's more active 
role in the League's activities when the then Foreign Minister, 
Hjalmar Procope, was appointed the chairman of the organi-
sation's General Assembly for the autumn session in 1928. 
On the question of Finnish-Soviet relations, Finnish policy-
makers, despite their continued suspicion over the Soviet Union's 
long-term political aims both in relation to Finland and the wider 
world, strove towards achieving a consistent, if low-key approach 
aimed at stabilising ties. Particular attention was reserved for 
security issues, which were seen as requiring Finland to maintain 
a clear distance from the Soviet Union. In this, as in other issues, 
there was a desire to follow the general policy approach adopted 
by the majority of Western states. In its response to a Soviet 
proposal for discussions on a bilateral non-aggression treaty made 
in the spring of 1926, the Finnish government was careful to avoid 
committing itself to anything which could possibly weaken the 
security guarantees linked to Finland's membership of the League 
of Nations, or otherwise serve to isolate the country from its 
contacts with the West.162 Joint discussions on a possible treaty 
did not get far, with little common ground being found on the 
question of agreed forms of mediation in the event of a sudden 
upswing in Finnish-Soviet tension. The Finnish side was 
particularly sensitive to any hint of an arrangement which could 
be interpreted as subordinating Finnish interests to Soviet ones, 
which it was felt a non-aggression treaty with the Soviet Union, 
however carefully worded, was likely in effect to mean. Great 
power influence, such as that wielded by Britain for example, 
appeared much less harmless from the Finnish perspective, as it 
was considered more easily parried, while that exercised by the 
Soviet Union consistently tended to be seen as potentially much 
more dangerous and likely to grow. The unwillingness of either 
side to compromise on the terms of a possible treaty finally led to 
the collapse of the talks. 
161. Broms 1962, pp. 152-3. 
162. Korhonen I 1966, p. 144. 
311 
Those in charge of shaping Finnish foreign policy during the first 
decade of the country's independence, and particularly after 1922, 
strove to develop an approach which they liked to look on as 
independent. Their main aim was to avoid committing the 
country to any binding agreements or clear affiliations. The role 
desired for Finland, summed up by the Foreign Minister, Hjalmar 
Procope, in the later 1920s, was one of a 'Western, Scandinavian 
and Baltic state'. Central to this Finnish policy was the assump-
tion that Western respect for Finnish independence ultimately 
went deeper than Soviet respect. While the West was seen as less 
optimistic about the future fate of the three Baltic republics than 
that of Finland, Soviet attitudes, although placing Finland one 
rung above the Baltic countries, were assumed to include definite 
reservations about the independence of all four countries. This 
was reflected in the Finnish decision, alone among the border 
states, to adopt a delaying attitude to the Soviet Litvinov initiative, 
designed to offer a counter to the Western-inspired Kellogg pact on 
collective security and arbitration in international disputes. 
Although ratification of the latter had begun slowly, Finland 
hoped nevertheless to sign. Finnish leaders feared that the 
Litvinov agreement was aimed at establishing a Moscow-led and 
directed power bloc, likely to undermine Finland's desire to 
establish a closer Scandinavian linkage.163 Policy-makers empha-
sised the need to safeguard the country's freedom of movement in 
foreign affairs issues. Unanimity on foreign policy objectives was 
far from being absolute, however, and critics tended to see in what 
was described as Finland's independent approach to foreign 
relations a toothless policy of no particular merit and one only 
reinforcing the country's 'splendid isolation'.164 
6. Foreign trade relations 
The problems and tensions typical of the post-war transitional 
period in Europe cast an inevitable shadow over Finnish foreign 
163. Ibid., pp. 186-94. 
164. Ibid., p. 187. Also Procope's letters of 26.6., 31.12.1928 and 31.10.1929 to 
Ingman (Ingman collection III). 
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trade during the early years of the 1920s. Despite the relative 
success that had been achieved in establishing a steady flow of 
timber and paper exports to the West, significant uncertainty 
remained in many Finnish exporters' minds over future market 
prospects. Regaining the admittedly slender pre-war Finnish 
share of the Western market and expanding it to provide new, 
significantly more substantial export opportunities was seen as a 
make or break question for the overall development of the 
country's economy. Uncertainties continued to exist over the 
degree of future Finnish access to the once important Russian 
market, even after the ratification of the Tartu peace treaty. 
Memories of the two previous failures to restart trade with the East, 
following the collapse of expectations focused on the Ukrainian 
market during the summer of 1918 and of those which had been 
built on exploiting possible Western intervention during 1919, 
remained fresh in everyone's minds. 
Finnish industry had initially assumed that the post-war 
reconstruction boom in Western Europe would create a significant 
demand for timber and timber-related products. Demand in fact, 
however, failed to match this projection, held back by the internal 
disorder and instability affecting the economies of the region. This 
saw a steady decline in prices for timber products from the latter 
half of 1920 onwards. Despite this weak market development, 
Finnish exports did not suffer as much as they might have done, 
thanks to the benefits brought by the continuing fall in the value of 
the Finnish mark on the international market typical of the late 
1910s and early 1920s, and which contrasted with the strong 
performance of the Swedish crown, the currency of Finland's 
major Scandinavian competitor.165 
 The development of Finland's 
overall trading relations with the West was, however, hindered to 
some extent by the persistence of doubts in a number of Western 
countries over the long-term permanence of Finland's indepen-
dence. These suspicions over Finland's reliability as a trading 
partner, fuelled in part by the memory of the Civil War and in part 
by the continuing question mark hanging over Finland's relations 
with the Soviet Union, indirectly served to benefit Swedish export 
industries. Awareness of this lack of international confidence 
165. Ahvenainen 1972, pp. 82-3. 
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served to reinforce in many Finnish industrialists' minds the need 
for a greater export promotion effort and for more adequate and 
efficient dissemination of information on Finnish affairs abroad, 
designed to create an image of Finland as a Scandinavian, rather 
than a border state. By aligning the country with the Scandinavian 
tradition, it was hoped to develop a picture of Finland as 
possessing a developed and diverse economy and as enjoying 
stable independence.166 
The first major post-war slump in Finnish exports occurred in 
the early half of 1921. Its effect on the economy was heightened by 
a number of other additional factors, which together contributed to 
a temporary critical balance of trade problem. The decision by 
France shortly previously to significantly increase tariffs on 
imports of Finnish paper and timber, and similar moves by Britain 
to introduce protective tariff barriers on paper and timber imports, 
had served to seriously undermine market stability for Finland's 
major exports. This convinced the Finnish government of the need 
to aim for official trade agreements, capable of providing a stable 
framework for future commercial relations, with the country's 
major trading partners. The first of these agreements was made 
with France in 1921 and provided Finland with preferred nation 
status in tariff issues, which consolidated her position with regard 
to her competitors in the timber and paper sector and went 
towards removing much of the uncertainty which had previously 
hampered Finnish export efforts.167 These balance of trade 
problems, which had only been further exacerbated by the freeing 
of imports into Finland the same spring, proved short-lived, 
however, and exports in the latter half of the year rose sharply, 
resulting in the virtual elimination of the first half's gaping deficit. 
The economic difficulties being experienced in a number of other 
countries nevertheless served to maintain a mood of caution in 
Finnish business and government circles with regard to this 
apparent improvement in Finnish prospects. 1922 saw the 
country's balance of trade show a clear surplus for the first time 
since independence, achieved partly as a result of a rise in timber 
166. Suomen Paperi- ja Puutavaralehti 15.9.1919. 
167. On the trade agreements with France and Spain, see Kauppalehti 9.4., 28.5., 
30.6.1921; Hbl 16.7.1921, 11.12.1923; SvPr 26.1.1922. 
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and paper exports and partly thanks to the first signs of growth 
shown by the export of agricultural products, which had otherwise 
expanded slowly in the immediate post-war years.168 This positive 
development in the trade balance encouraged renewed attempts to 
stabilise the value of the mark. 
Despite the removal of the formal brake on Finland's traditional 
trade with Russia as a result of the Tartu peace, no great upswing 
in trade with the East proved forthcoming. While the paper and 
metal-working industries, both traditionally well-represented in 
trade with Russia, welcomed, if mutedly, the potential opening-up 
of the Russian market this offered, there was a good deal of 
suspicion, some of it verging on hostility in some cases, in other 
sectors of the business community towards the whole question of 
trading with the Soviet Union. The reasons behind this were 
partly political and partly the result of the terms of the Tartu 
agreement. The latter had resolved the problem of Finnish 
property remaining in the Soviet Union and Russian property 
remaining in Finland by declaring the two to be notionally equal 
and thus precluding, at least in theory, any compensation by either 
side for lost assets. The enthusiasm that existed within Finnish 
business for expanding Finnish-Soviet trade was also tempered by 
the problems affecting the Soviet economy in the wake of the 
disruptions caused by the revolution and the civil war, and which 
had seen Russian consumer demand and the level of Russian 
foreign trade fall dramatically, in the case of the latter to only some 
1% of 1913 levels in 1920.169 
Against this background of economic dislocation, many indus-
trialists in Finland, like their colleagues in Sweden and Britain, 
which had both signed trade agreements with the Soviet Union, in 
1920 and 1921 respectively, were sceptical about the overall 
potential of Western exporters to gain a foothold on the Soviet 
market, and uncertain about how the small market that might be 
accessible would be split between Western companies.17o 
Developing trade with the new Soviet state also required adjusting 
to the centralised style of foreign trade administration which had 
168. Halme 1955, p. 174. 
169. Haataja (ed.) 1978, pp. 27-8. 
170. Kauppalehti 6.4., 9.4., 11.4.1921. 
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been instituted in the post-revolutionary period. Following 
Sweden's lead in establishing, subsequent to the Soviet-Swedish 
trade agreement, a coordinating body representing the interests of 
the major exporting companies to handle trade between the two 
countries, a number of joint sales organisations covering heavy 
industry, paper producers and food exporters were set up in 
Finland at the beginning of 1921 to coordinate trade with the 
East."' 
The visit of a Finnish trade delegation to the Soviet Union in the 
summer of 1921 resulted in a contract for Finnish producers to 
supply a small shipment of newsprint, which was generally 
welcomed in Finland as hopefully presaging larger future con-
tracts. The discussions held between the two sides proved less 
fruitful, however, in producing contracts for other sectors of the 
Finnish economy, lending further support to those sections of 
opinion doubtful about the real economic value of the Tartu 
agreement.12 Trade relations between the two countries received 
an early setback in November 1921, with the Soviet decision to 
break off trade with Finland as a result of the crisis over East 
Karelia. Trade was only restored the following spring, when a 
further shipment of newsprint was negotiated. Discussions on the 
signing of a general trade agreement between the two countries 
continued throughout 1922 and 1923, but without result. Trade 
between the two countries remained very modest, hampered by 
the Soviet Union's lack of purchasing power. Encouraged by the 
improvement in trade links with the West which developed as the 
decade wore on, however, less attention came to be paid in Finnish 
business circles to access to the Russian market than earlier. 
Opinion within the business community on the general state of 
the country's foreign trade and overall economic development 
during the early years of independence varied, sometimes widely, 
but was often critical of the government's role in shaping the 
country's economy. A number of commentators of the time liked 
to argue that Finland's relative success in having established her 
place in the world was much more the result of the activities of the 
country's export industries than of official diplomacy.173 
171. Mercator 29.4.1921; T. v. Wright 1928, p. 29. 
172. Kauppalehti 2.9.1921. 
173. AU 25.2.1923. 
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Government policy also came in for attack by those critical of 
official monetary policies and their apparent inability to stabilise 
the country's monetary system, still only slowly recovering from 
the after-effects of the First World War. Particular criticism was 
directed at the inefficient planning practices, unrealistic desire for 
reform, and general political blustering, which was seen as typical 
of official handling of the economy. The Bank of Finland and its 
currency policies came in for regular criticism as part of this 
assault against the government's role. Events eventually led to the 
resignation of its director, Otto Stenroth, in 1923 and the 
appointment of Risto Ryti as his successor.14 Among those who, 
in contrast, saw many of the difficulties and challenges facing the 
post-independent Finnish economy as ultimately resulting from 
the sudden shift in trade from East to West which had been forced 
on the country as a result of independence was J. K. Paasikivi, a 
prominent politician and a leading figure in banking circles. If 
Finland was to succeed in international competition and eliminate 
the gap existing between herself and her Scandinavian neighbours 
in terms of national income per head of population and levels of 
foreign trade, Paasikivi argued, the country would need to make a 
substantially more concerted effort to develop her industrial and 
agricultural resources.15  
The mid-1920s saw the Finnish balance of trade again move into 
surplus, with the country's level of foreign trade exports and 
imports combined exceeding pre-war levels in volume terms.176 
Timber exports reached an all-time record in 1925, amounting to 
over a million standards, with paper exports also rising signifi-
cantly. The overall share of timber and paper products, the 
country's major export-earners, amounted to some 85% of the 
country's total exports between 1924 and 1926, marking a clear 
increase over their share of the pre-war export market, which had 
amounted to 73% in 1913. The share of paper products also 
increased over the same period, from 18% in 1913 to 28% in the 
mid-20s. Finland continued to remain behind Sweden, however, 
174. Mercator 28.6.1921. 
175. See Paasikivi's speech on 29.11.1921 to the Finnish Business Association, as 
reported in Mercator 2.12.1921. 
176. Halme 1955, p. 174; Mercator 30.1.1925, 22.1.1926; Suomen Puunjalostus-
teollisuuden Keskusliiton toimintakertomus, 1924 and 1925 (SMKL). 
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in her level of exports of higher value-added wood-based products. 
Despite the rise in butter exports to stand at 132,000 tons in 1925, 
exceeding pre-war levels, the overall share of food exports as a 
proportion of total Finnish exports decreased by some seven 
percentage points between 1911 and 1926, from 19% to 12%. 
Heavy industry's share of the export cake, however, fell the most 
over the same period, from 7% in 1913 to a mere 1% in 1926. 
Britain and Germany emerged as Finland's most important post-
war trading partners. The pattern of Anglo-Finnish and Finnish-
German trade nevertheless differed widely. While Finnish exports 
to Britain during the 1920s represented on average nearly 40% of 
the country's total exports, British exports to Finland amounted to 
less than 20% of Finland's total imports. In Germany's case, the 
situation was reversed, with Finnish-German trade running in 
Germany's favour, with Germany's share of Finnish imports at 
over 30% and Finnish exports to Germany taking under 20% of the 
total Finnish export effort. The dominance of Britain and Germany 
in Finnish foreign trade during the mid-1920s was emphasised by 
the virtual disappearance of Finland's once extensive trade with 
Russia. For all its scale, the disruption and readjustment that this 
loss caused for Finnish foreign trade and the economy as a whole 
during the early years of independence nevertheless proved only 
temporary, and by the middle of the decade the Finnish economy 
had achieved relative stability. Heavy industry and textiles bore 
the brunt of these changed market conditions. Both had 
previously been particularly prominent in Finnish-Russian trade 
and now had to come to terms with a greatly reduced role in 
Finnish exports and slim-down their operations in line with the 
requirements of the domestic market. 
The dominance of Germany and Britain in Finnish foreign trade 
also inevitably saw much of the rest of Europe, such as Southern 
and Eastern Europe, including the Danube basin, come to play 
only a minimal part in Finnish trade. The first major extension of 
Finnish trade relations outside Europe took place in North 
America. Exports of timber and paper products to the United 
States got under way in 1919. Trade links were also opened up to a 
smaller extent during the 1920s with South America, with 
Argentina and Brazil emerging as the country's main trading 
partners in the region. Shipping and trading links were also 
extended to other parts of the southern hemisphere, although 
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Finland continued to lag well behind the more established trade 
links enjoyed by her Scandinavian competitors, Sweden and 
Norway.17  
The importance, in theory at least, of active cooperation between 
the Foreign Ministry and its diplomats abroad and export 
industries in promoting foreign trade had not been lost on the 
business community or government. This had been reflected early 
on in the setting-up in 1919 of a permanent joint trade agreement 
committee, made up of ministry and industry representatives, 
responsible for preparing the groundwork for future bilateral trade 
discussions with Finland's trading partners. Leading indus-
trialists consistently stressed the importance of developing a 
diplomatic corps capable of adequately handling and advancing 
the country's commercial interests. They also proposed that, in 
appointing envoys and consulate officials, the government should 
take account of the views and opinions of the business community 
itself.178 Criticism was quickly forthcoming from industrialists and 
business figures and the business journal Mercator of what was 
seen as the reluctance on the part of the Foreign Ministry to recruit 
candidates with a commercial or industrial background to diplo-
matic appointments, and the tendency to select academics in their 
stead.179 
The deepening dissatisfaction felt within the business commu-
nity towards government policy in this field, together with the 
general recognition of the country's lack of experience in foreign 
affairs, contributed to the setting-up of a special committee under 
L. Åström and including a number of leading businessmen in the 
spring of 1921. The committee's brief was to study the problems 
surrounding the country's diplomatic representation abroad and 
the question of securing Finnish commercial interests overseas, 
and to provide suggestions for improving relations between 
government and industry.180 The committee's report contained a 
number of proposals aimed at developing the number of posts for 
specialised commercial attachés within the diplomatic service and 
177. Mercator 16.12.1927. 
178. Kauppalehti 18.3.1921. 
179. Mercator 24.11.1919. 
180. Kauppalehti 2.4.1921; Mercator 8.4.1921. 
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for coordinating the dissemination of information on commercial 
issues, and ensuring that the interests of the country's export 
industries were more efficiently served by the diplomatic corps. 
Implementation of these findings, however, was hampered by the 
general reluctance of Parliament to agree to providing the 
necessary extra funds to develop the diplomatic service once its 
main structure had been established. Some changes aimed at 
improving efficiency were nevertheless made in reorganising 
administration within the Foreign Ministry, with a separate 
commercial department and information office being set up within 
the ministry in 1923.181 
Discussion on the country's commercial representation abroad 
and the best way of organising it to serve both industrial and 
national interests nevertheless continued, both in business circles 
close to the problem and, to a lesser extent, in the press. A particu-
lar problem area singled out for criticism was the inadequacy and 
lack of coordination of government and industrial efforts aimed at 
disseminating information about Finland abroad, generally 
advancing Finnish commercial interests and building up 
knowledge of foreign markets. A number of commentators pointed 
to the experience of Sweden and Norway, where the need for some 
form of single centralised coordinating body charged with looking 
after commercial interests abroad to avoid duplication of effort and 
a waste of scarce personnel and financial resources had already 
been realised.182 A significant factor complicating any solution to 
the problem, however, lay in the resistance of the timber and paper 
industries to subordinate their sales efforts to any joint body and 
their preference for maintaining their independent approach. 
Some minor progress was made on the problem from 1924 
onwards on the basis of increased funds granted by Parliament and 
the introduction of separate budget appropriations for supporting 
Finnish exports abroad. A number of commercial and agricultural 
attachés were appointed to Finnish legations abroad.183 While 
indicating the government's awareness of the problem, these 
moves brought little significant practical progress, however. 
181. Åströmin komitean mietintö (UM 58 E I); Paasivirta 1968, pp. 207-8. 
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Cooperation between government and industry was also hampered 
during the mid-1920s by the low level and coolness of contacts 
which existed between the Foreign Ministry and leading managers 
in the timber and paper industries. Finnish diplomats abroad were 
often seen by many leading figures in the industry, such as Axel 
Solitander, as simply unequal to the task of advancing Finnish 
commercial interests and helping Finnish industry gain new 
markets or consolidate established ones, because of their lack of 
interest and experience in commercial matters and over-concen-
tration on purely political and military issues. The appointment of 
Hjalmar Procope, known for his interest in commercial questions, 
as Foreign Minister in 1927 served to improve relations between 
the ministry and industry, and inspired the latter to produce a 
number of concrete proposals for improvements in the handling of 
commercial affairs by the government and the country's 
diplomats.184 
7. Post-war cultural relations 
The pressure on Finland as a newly independent state to assert her 
national and cultural identity and establish a distinct national 
profile fuelled a strong, introspectively nationalist atmosphere 
during the early post-independence years and subsequently. This 
had the effect of reducing interest in international cultural 
developments and forging and maintaining international contacts. 
In its most extreme forms, it promoted a conscious avoidance of 
anything considered modern and international and, by extension, 
likely to undermine national self-identity and Finnish culture. 
Attention tended to be turned inwards at things Finnish, rather 
than outwards towards developments in the wider European 
arena. This attitude, with its exaggerated emphasis on what were 
conceived of as purely and quintessentially Finnish values, 
reflected both a general cultural insecurity and the continued 
underlying sense of inferiority felt towards the past cultural 
dominance of Sweden and Finland's own Swedish-language 
tradition. 
184. Ibid., pp. 209-212. 
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There were some variations in emphasis within this conservative 
mainstream, however. While agrarianist-inspired nationalists 
concentrated full-square on domestic values, many conservatives 
preferred to concentrate on highlighting Finland's role as a bastion 
and outpost of the West against the East. In this, they drew on the 
anti-Russian sentiment and sense of ethnic superiority which had 
grown up, particularly among the Swedish-speaking intelligentsia, 
during the nineteenth century, and which was now adapted to the 
cause of anti-Bolshevism. More expansionist-minded nationalists 
focused on Finland's Finno-Ugrian cultural background. 
The Civil War of 1918 had left Finnish society divided down the 
middle into two hostile opposing camps and this division was 
closely reflected in the arts, and indirectly permeated into the 
country's cultural contacts abroad. This schism was particularly 
forcefully felt in the literature that appeared during the early years 
of independence which, instead of fulfilling the role of a powerful 
force underpinning national identity, as was typical in many new 
nation-states, often served in the Finnish case to perpetuate and 
aggravate social tensions and cleavages. 
Among those writers to emerge most uncompromisingly com-
mitted to celebrating the victory of conservative national values 
represented by the White army's triumph were V. A. Kosken-
niemi and Maila Talvio. Koskenniemi, in his short verse study 
'Nuori Anssi' (Young Anssi), which appeared in the immediate 
wake of the conflict, for example, chose to virtually completely 
ignore its social aspects, preferring instead, in his assertion of the 
justice of the White cause, to focus on the Reds as having betrayed 
their country and as having been in virtual league with the 
Russians. A similar interpretation was followed by Maila Talvio in 
her novel 'Kurjet' (1919: The Cranes), in which the struggle was 
portrayed as a trial of strength between good and evil, with the 
losers dismissed as little better than worthless. Both Koskenniemi 
and Talvio were keen to describe the Civil War as having been a 
battle against Bolshevism on behalf of Western culture. With such 
excellent conservative credentials and given the overall 
dominance of nationalist sentiment which extended throughout 
much of the following decades, it was no surprise that 
Koskenniemi went on to become an important cultural figure in 
the inter-war period, developing close contacts with the 
conservative political hierarchy. A similar approving attitude 
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towards the White role in the Civil War to that found in the work of 
writers such as Koskenniemi and Talvio was also prominent 
among that of many authors writing in Swedish, Bertel Gripenberg 
being among the most enthusiastic of these. 
In contrast to the extremes of the views espoused by the likes of 
Koskenniemi and Talvio, a number of other writers, such as F. E. 
Sillanpää, Joel Lehtonen, Juhani Aho and Volter Kilpi adopted a 
calmer, more contemplative approach to the events of 1918 in their 
attempt to go deeper beneath the surface of events and reassess 
national values in the post-independence period. In his novel 
'Hurskas kurjuus' (1919: Meek Heritage), Sillanpää, although 
treating the Civil War theme only indirectly through the 
vicissitudes affecting his main character, attempted to provide a 
consciously more even-handed view of the conflict than that found 
among his more conservative colleagues, and one sympathetic to 
the defeated and critical of the brutality that had marred some of 
White activities. Lehtonen concentrated on the human conse-
quences of a conflict which had seen fellow countrymen set 
against each other, while Aho focused on the extremes of fear, 
uncertainty and exultation which had been generated by the 
struggle within liberal opinion. Eino Leino too, despite his various 
shifts of sympathies, argued for the need for national reconcili-
ation.185 Within Swedish-language literature, it was left to figures 
such as Jarl Hemmer and Elmer Diktonius to highlight the more 
tragic aspects of the events surrounding the conflict.186 
Domestic tensions surrounding attitudes towards the Civil War 
and such things as the language conflict came, by virtue of their 
very intensity, to play a prominent part in shaping the nature of 
Finland's international cultural relations, both in determining the 
people selected to represent Finnish culture abroad and in de-
termining the cultural influences from abroad that gained a foot-
hold within Finland itself. Conservatism proved able, not only to 
retain its strong hold on the main core of Finnish cultural life, but 
also to reinforce its position. The conservative figures which came 
to dominate intellectual opinion and the arts in general, however, 
185. Leino IV 1962, pp. 170, 286. 
186. Laitinen V 1965, pp. 345-8; Warburton 1951, pp. 66-9, 182, 237. 
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ultimately shared little in common, in terms of their social ideas, 
with those dominant within the major political parties. 
For all the major changes which had been brought about by the 
First World War and its aftermath, the strong latent weight of the 
country's essentially conservative cultural traditions prevented 
any comparable thorough-going change in the arts and cultural 
life. Symbolically indicative of this was the continuing position of 
German as the major foreign language taught in secondary schools. 
Its dominance was even indirectly reinforced following the virtual 
elimination of Russian from foreign language teaching. English, 
despite its association with the victorious Allies, continued to be 
little taught, being typically available only as an optional language 
in the higher grades. 
The labour movement, largely taken up in the period following 
1918 with domestic issues and forced to concentrate the bulk of its 
efforts on its struggle to break out of its political limbo, was in no 
real position to extend its activities to embrace the arts, least of all 
to try and influence the country's international cultural contacts. 
The movement's own contacts were similarly limited throughout 
much of this period. An exception to this was the Swedish-
speaking socialist federation, Finlands Svenska Arbetarförbund, 
which maintained relatively close, if low-key contacts in the arts 
field with Scandinavia, particularly Sweden. 
Independent organisations and individuals dominated the 
management and direction of cultural relations during the early 
years of independence, with the government and government-
sponsored agencies playing very much a minor role. The Ministry 
of Education lacked any staff capable of handling international 
cultural relations and had to rely on personnel from its press 
department to look after cultural affairs and other forms of interna-
tional exchange. Much of the real work involved in disseminating 
information about Finnish literary and artistic developments, and 
expanding Finnish familiarity with developments abroad, was left 
up to the various established associations and societies operating 
in the cultural and arts field. The Finnish Literature Society 
(Suomalaisen Kirjallisuuden Seura) developed links and publi-
cation exchange ties with Estonia and Hungary and with a number 
of departments involved in Finno-Ugrian studies in European 
universities. The equivalent body devoted to Finland-Swedish 
literature, Svenska Litteratursällskapet, developed similar ties 
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with the Scandinavian countries.187 The Union of Finnish Writers 
(Suomen Kirjailijaliitto) and its Swedish-language sister 
organisation, Finlands Svenska Författarförening, founded in 
1919, also developed their own links abroad. 
Academic links abroad were largely in the hands of national 
scientific and academic associations, which maintained contact 
with similar organisations abroad through their periodicals or 
serial publications. The country's universities lacked any 
adequate administrative infrastructure to deal with maintaining 
and developing international links. This lack of administrative 
back-up characteristic of the Finnish academic world during the 
1920s also often meant that international contacts in many 
research fields became concentrated in the hands of a few 
prominent individual scholars, such as the linguist E. N. Setälä, 
the folklorist Kaarle Krohn, and the anthropologist Edvard Wester-
marck. This naturally gave these figures a powerful measure of 
influence in determining the level and focus of academic contacts 
abroad. Within Finland itself, they were often in a position to 
virtually dictate the nature of research in their fields. This 
arrangement had the disadvantage that, in the event of death or 
illness, links could temporarily break down altogether. 
Prior to the First World War, Finnish cultural ties abroad had been 
largely focused on Sweden, Germany, France, Estonia, and to a 
lesser extent Russia. The limited knowledge of foreign languages 
typical of the period, together with the small number of languages 
known, had restricted the nature of these contacts. The linguistic 
isolation imposed on the Finnish-speaking majority, Finnish 
lacking any closely-related cousins among the major European 
languages, had only reinforced this fact. Linguistic isolation had 
been much less of a problem for the country's Swedish-speaking 
minority which, sharing a common language with Sweden, had 
easy access to virtually the whole of the Scandinavian cultural 
area. Something of a similar pattern of links, although obviously 
modified by the pressures and requirements brought by 
187. See the general correspondence of the Finnish Literature Society from 1919 
onwards, and the minutes of the meetings of its Swedish-language sister 
organisation, Svenska Litteratursällskapet. 
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independence, emerged in the post-1918 period. Linguistic and 
ethnic links encouraged ties with Estonia and Hungary, historical 
traditions, ties with the Scandinavian countries, and established 
academic and cultural links, continuing ties with Germany. 
Contacts with France and Britain occupied a less important 
position. 
The strong sense of a common cultural inheritance with Estonia 
and Hungary served to accelerate development of cultural ties with 
these countries. The fact that, what common cultural inheritance 
there was, was largely based on purely linguistic associations, and 
in the case of Hungary really quite distant and slim ties, did not 
dissuade those most committed to developing Finnish-Estonian 
and Finnish-Hungarian contacts. This enthusiasm for developing 
ties with what were seen as the country's cultural cousins was also 
influenced by the desire of a large proportion of nationalist 
opinion among the student community and the young academic-
ally-educated to redraw the country's relations with Sweden and 
eliminate the remaining cultural bias towards Sweden existing 
within Finland. 
The extent of this enthusiasm was reflected in the decision taken 
in 1919 by a number of young Finnish academics, including the 
linguist Lauri Kettunen and the archeologist A. M. Tallgren, to take 
up professorships at the University of Tartu in Estonia. This was 
welcomed by the Estonian authorities as a temporary stopgap 
measure to prevent a return to the German-dominated traditions 
which had prevailed during the nineteenth century. Such an 
arrangement was seen as providing Estonia with a breathing-space 
to allow the training of a new generation of Estonian academics 
capable of transforming the university into a solely Estonian 
institute of higher education.188 Estonia's geographical proximity 
to Finland, together with the relative linguistic similarity between 
Estonian and Finnish, made Estonia especially attractive as a 
country with which to establish closer cultural and other ties. 
Initial post-independence cultural contacts between the two 
countries were largely biased towards the academic world, with 
linguistics and folklore studies in particular taking a prominent 
188. Kettunen 1948, pp. 67-75, 84-93. 
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part.189 Links nevertheless gradually assumed a wider and more 
organised nature as time went on, with regular Finnish participa-
tion in the Estonian national song and choir festivals beginning in 
1922 and permanent ties later being established between both 
countries' student organisations.19° 
Links between Finland and Hungary did not achieve the same 
relatively wide extent as those with Estonia, for the simple reason 
of the geographical distance separating the two countries. The 
very different nature of the two languages in their modern forms 
also provided its own difficulties. A modest level of contact was 
nevertheless established during the 1920s, focused mainly on 
academic exchanges and visits, and the activities of the more 
nationalist elements within Finnish society who particularly 
sympathised with the fate of post-Trianon Hungary.191 The 
exchange visits organised between Finnish and Hungarian 
members of parliament in the 1920s, sponsored by nationalist 
groups in both countries, caused some political argument in 
Finland and resulted in socialist and Swedish-speaking politicians 
refusing to meet members of the Hungarian National Assembly 
when they visited Helsinki in 1925. The Left was particularly 
critical of the visit, condemning the authoritarian conservative 
Horthy government and the restrictions it had imposed on the 
Hungarian labour movement. The proposal for a return visit by 
members of the Finnish Parliament in 1928 provoked a similar 
division of opinion.192 Less furore was generated by the first 
congress of Finno-Ugrian scholars held in Helsinki in 1921, which 
was followed by similar conferences in Tallinn in 1924 and 
Budapest in 1928. In addition to their more immediate aim of 
providing academics working in the same field with a chance to 
meet their opposite numbers, these conferences also fostered 
wider cultural contacts between the participating countries. 
Typical of this was the wide range of subjects, embracing 
educational, economic, literary and artistic topics, in addition to 
189. Ibid., pp. 107-24, 146-56; M Haavio 1972, pp. 411-67, 597-602. 
190. On the Estonian song festivals, see Särkkä 1973, pp. 7-10; US 8.7.1928. For 
student contacts, see Klinge IV 1968, pp. 105-6; J. Haavio 1973, pp. 215-7; 
Iltalehti 9.10.1925; Suomen Heimo 30.9.1926, 15.4.1928, 15.4.1929. 
191. US 5.7.1928. 
192. HS 31.3.1928; US 31.3.1928. 
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Finno-Ugrian related subjects, introduced at the Budapest 
meeting.1s3 
Closer contacts with Hungary and Estonia were regularly jus-
tified by their advocates as central to maintaining and fostering the 
shared historical inheritance seen as binding all three countries 
together in a single cultural family. This notion of a common 
inheritance, ultimately based on the distant common proto-
language assumed to have preceded the emergence of Finnish, 
Estonian and Hungarian as separate independent lan-guages, was, 
however, largely a romantic one, lacking a sound base in 
contemporary culture. Independence had provided scholars 
working in Finno-Ugrian linguistics and related fields in Finland 
with new inspiration and enthusiasm in developing their ideas. It 
had at the same time, however, also deprived them of their links 
with the various scattered minority nationalities belonging to the 
Finno-Ugrian family spread across northern Russia, which had 
been the subject of extensive field trip visits during the nineteenth 
century, leaving them with access, to all intents and purposes, 
only to Estonia and Hungary. 
Cultural contacts were also maintained between Finland and the 
border states. These were consolidated when student organi-
sations in Finland and the three Baltic republics established a 
coordinating body, given the acronym SELL after the first initials 
of the four countries involved, at a joint meeting held in Tartu in 
1923, to foster closer links across a broad spectrum of activities.194 
Participation in SELL served to compensate Finnish-speaking 
students for their relative lack of ties with Swedish and other 
Scandinavian student organisations. Compared to direct contacts 
with Estonia and Hungary which took place under the Finno-
Ugrian umbrella, however, activities within SELL, which used 
German as its lingua franca, never came to hold the same 
attraction. Academic contact between Finland and the more 
southerly Baltic states was also similarly less active, maintained 
193. Ylioppilaslehti 5.2., 10.4.1921; US 19.6.1924; Ilkka 1.7., 3.7.1924; US 
12.6.1928. 
194. See the speeches of Y. 0. Ruuth and Väinö Auer at the 'Konferenz der 
Studentenschaften Finnlands, Estlands, Lettlands und Litauens am 10-
11.4.1923 in Tartu' (SELL collection/VA). Also Ylioppilaslehti 21.4.1923, 
12.3.1927; Suomen Heimo 26.10.1925. 
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mainly through the efforts of individual scholars such as the 
folklorist A. R. Niemi, who had wide contacts in Latvia and 
Lithuania, and the philologist J. J. Mikkola, who had close contacts 
with Poland. 
Cultural contacts between Finland and Sweden were very much 
divided between those sponsored at a national level and those 
created and maintained by the country's Swedish-speaking 
minority. Cultural links between the two countries had a long 
history, but since the mid-nineteenth century they had been 
increasingly overshadowed as a result of the tensions generated by 
the language struggle within Finland. Ties with mainland Sweden 
had always been valued by the Swedish-speaking population in 
Finland and they gained further significance in the community's 
eyes during the 1920s when the increasing fierceness of the 
internal struggle between the Finnish-speaking majority, keen to 
consolidate its new-found dominance, and the Swedish-speaking 
minority, made the latter ever more sensitive to what appeared 
to be its threatened position. Links with Sweden offered the 
Swedish-speaking population an escape valve for their frustrations 
and fears. Many of the leading figures in the Swedish-speaking 
community were also sensitive to the danger they saw posed by 
post-revolutionary Soviet Russia and Finland's own socialists. 
Against this background, contacts with Sweden were seen as 
helping to bind Finland more firmly to the rest of Scandinavia and 
to Scandinavian constitutional and political values, and the wider 
Western cultural inheritance. This tendency among Swedish-
speaking observers in Finland to identify Sweden, and by exten-
sion the rest of Scandinavia, with traditional values, being as it 
was very much a product of their reaction to Finland's own prob-
lems, did not entirely match the modern reality of Sweden. Far 
from being the static type of society it had been for much of the 
nineteenth century, Sweden was in fact going through a period of 
significant and rapid social change, which was creating a country 
very different from that which persisted in the minds of conserva-
tive Swedish-speaking Finland. 
While seeing nothing wrong in their own eagerness to actively 
develop and foster cultural links with Sweden, some figures in the 
Swedish-speaking intelligentsia were critical of attempts by their 
Finnish-speaking colleagues to develop contacts with Estonia, 
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Hungary and the Baltic countries, which were often described as 
representing a less advanced level of Western civilization than the 
Nordic area.195 
The fact of independence and the ending of centuries of foreign 
rule in Finland nevertheless raised the question for the Swedish-
speaking minority of whether it too would not be wise to stress the 
independence of its cultural inheritance, not only from the 
dominant Finnish tradition, but also from that of mainland 
Sweden. This revived debate on Freudenthal's hypothesis put 
forward in the previous century that the Swedish-speaking 
population in Finland lacked an independent identity and was 
little more than the eastern branch of a single Swedish people. 
Freudenthal's ideas found little real favour, however, in the 
Finland of the 1920s, with the exception of a few figures like Hugo 
Ekhammar, for whom the sense of belonging to a single united 
Swedish family was especially close. They were unable to 
seriously undermine the majority view held among Finland's 
Swedish-speakers that, by virtue of their separate history and in 
spite of their having benefited from close contacts with mainland 
Sweden, they represented an independent and dynamic commu-
nity in their own right.196 
Above and beyond the special interests of the Swedish-speaking 
minority, a need was felt in a number of other sectors of society to 
develop contacts with Sweden which, although not much larger in 
population than Finland, had proved singularly more accessible to 
general European influences and continued to serve as a result as a 
source of ideas, if not direct inspiration, for developments in 
Finland. A pattern of regular contacts and communication be-
tween the Scandinavian countries and Finland did in fact emerge 
in a number of fields. This was reinforced by the various confe-
rences which began to be organised in a number of academic fields 
from the early 1920s onwards, and which offered Finnish scholars 
a good opportunity to gain access to wider international develop-
ments. In some areas, such as historical research, contacts with 
Sweden were often a virtual necessity as the Swedish National 
195. Hbl 6.7.1922; SvPr 20.1.1922; Västra Nyland 25.4.1922; Borgå bladet 6.5.1922: 
Det Nya Sverige 1920, p. 194. 
196. H. Ekhammer 1922, pp. 1-2. 
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Archive in Stockholm contained the bulk of documentary material 
relating to the period of Swedish rule in Finland. 
Academic publications devoted to the natural sciences and 
medicine often made use of one of the major European languages, 
mainly German at this stage, and were as a result relatively easy to 
disseminate to the wider world, Scandinavia included. The vir-
tually exclusive use of Finnish in publications in the humanities 
and social sciences, however, radically restricted the size of their 
possible audience. Swedish-speaking academics in the latter 
fields enjoyed a significant in-built advantage over their Finnish-
speaking colleagues through writing in what was the lingua franca 
of the whole of Scandinavia, and were often instrumental in 
communicating the fruits of Finnish research to the wider 
Scandinavian audience unable, because of the language barrier, to 
read much of it at first hand. Study abroad by Finnish academics 
was relatively rare in the 1920s, with few scholarships available 
and travel hampered by the long distances involved to the major 
European university centres. The general scarcity of scholarship 
funds and Finland's geographically-isolated position also 
adversely affected the ability of those in the arts to travel abroad.197 
Various attempts were made by the Finnish authorities to en-
courage cultural exchange and improve the overall level of cultural 
contacts between Finland and Sweden during the mid-1920s. The 
response they received from their Swedish counterparts was 
largely sympathetic. The potential value of the arts in developing 
bilateral relations, particularly by virtue of their relative neutrality 
in relation to political issues, was appreciated at a time when there 
was a strong desire in both Finland and Sweden to reduce the 
tension and mutual hostility, much of it dating from the dispute 
over the Aland Islands, which still coloured relations between the 
two countries. A key part in these moves was played by the 
Finnish envoy in Stockholm, Werner Söderhjelm, who prior to 
becoming a diplomat had himself been a prominent figure in the 
Finnish academic world and was well known for his moderate 
views on the vexed language question. As part of his general 
efforts to improve the Swedish press' coverage of literature and the 
197. HS 29.5.1919; Nya Argus 16.6.1919. 
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arts in Finland and extend it to embrace material produced by the 
Finnish-speaking community, Söderhjelm organised a joint 
journalists' seminar in Stockholm in 1924.198 This coincided with 
the holding of the second Scandinavian writers' congress in the 
Swedish capital, which was attended by some of Finland's leading 
writers from both linguistic communities, and was reported 
widely in both the Finnish and Swedish press.199 
The newly-founded Swedish-language university in Turku, Abo 
Akademi, played an important part during the 1920s in shaping 
links between Finland's Swedish-speaking minority and mainland 
Sweden. Its position as the only Swedish-language university 
outside Sweden was particularly emphasised by its supporters and 
it benefited from a steady flow of bequests from Sweden, as well as 
a substantial flow of prominent Swedish academics coming as 
visiting lecturers.200 Swedish-speaking academics in a wide variety 
of fields in Finland enjoyed good links with their colleagues in 
Sweden, sharing as they did many areas of interest in common. 
Typical of this was the Swedish-language congress devoted to 
philological and historical research on Scandinavian topics 
organised in Helsinki during the summer of 1922, which attracted 
a large number of participants from both countries.201 This 
commonality of interest and approach in the Swedish-speaking 
academic world was also evident in the attitudes of Swedish-
speaking literary scholars in Finland and their colleagues in 
Sweden proper to Finland's major Swedish-language poets of the 
nineteenth century, Runeberg and Topelius. Both tended to be 
considered almost as much Swedish as Finnish, and were the 
subject of much debate in visiting lectures and correspondence 
between the two academic communities.2°2 
That attitudes within the two communities towards shared 
198. See Söderhjelm's letters of 8.6. and 19.6.1924 to Procope (Procope collection) 
and his letter of 20.11.1923 to Hugo Suolahti (Hugo Suolahti collection. Also 
Söderhjelm: Anteckningar 17.6., 12.12.1925 (Söderhjelm collection). 
199. US 18.6., 6.7., 13.7.1924. See also Koskenniemi's letter of 12.6.1924 and 
Sillanpää's of 10.4.1926 to Söderhjelm (Söderhjelm collection). 
200. Nordström 1968, pp. 145-6. 
201. See the commentary on 'Svenska filolog- och historikermöte i Helsingfors 
den 17-19 augusti 1922' in SSLF CLXVII/FU 36. 
202. See the correspondence between Gunnar Castrén and Prof. Martin Lamm 
during the 1920s (Gunnar Castrén collection). 
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cultural traditions were not completely without their problems, 
however, was shown by the difficulties which had developed 
within the Swedish-language theatre world in Finland. The latter 
had been dominated during the war years by a dispute over the 
need of the Swedish Theatre in Helsinki to maintain a separate 
part of its activities devoted to mainland Swedish productions. 
This had only been resolved in December 1918 with the 
appointment of Nicken Rönngren as the theatre's new director and 
the decision to concentrate artistic energies on home-bred 
productions and theatrical traditions and the work of Finland-
Swedish authors.203 This change caused major upheavals, both in 
the workings of the theatre itself and further afield. Following the 
Helsinki example, the Swedish theatre in Turku also began 
productions of Finland-Swedish drama. The Swedish theatre in 
Vaasa, in contrast, decided to retain its mainland Swedish 
actors.204 
Swedish-speaking student circles in Finland had actively 
worked towards establishing wider contacts with their Swedish 
counterparts since the early months of independence. The 
Scandinavian student congress held in Loviisa, near Helsinki, in 
August 1922 marked an important milestone in these efforts. Plans 
were made at this meeting to enable bodies representing both 
Swedish and Finnish-speaking students to take part in joint 
Scandinavian activities.205 Differences in outlook among the vari-
ous representatives and sensitivity over language issues, however, 
served to prevent any closing of the Finnish ranks in the cause of a 
united approach to Scandinavian student cooperation.206 
Information travelled quickly and relatively painlessly between 
the two Swedish-speaking communities. The Swedish-language 
Helsinki papers Hufvudstadsbladet and Svenska Pressen enjoyed 
a privileged position in communicating news about Finnish 
affairs, including the intricacies of such issues as the language 
dispute, to the Swedish audience. This privileged access to the 
Swedish media and to Sweden as a whole enjoyed by Swedish- 
203. M. Liichou 1963, pp. 32-50. 
204. N. Liichou 1960, pp. 9-11. 
205. Studentbladet 1.10.1922; Ylioppilaslehti 30.9.1922; Uppsala Nya Tidning 
15.8.1922. 
206. Klinge IV 1968, p. 120. 
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speaking journalists, politicians, academics and others over their 
Finnish-language colleagues, however, was to prove something of 
a problem for Finland in developing cultural relations with 
Sweden. Above all, it encouraged the feeling among a number of 
figures within the Swedish-speaking community that they had a 
right, by virtue of their linguistic and to a lesser extent also their 
social and historical background, to have a dominant say in the 
handling of bilateral cultural relations. 
A radically different approach to cultural issues, and to relations 
with Sweden in particular, to that favoured by Abo Akademi came 
to be adopted by the Finnish-language university in Turku. The 
latter made every effort to underline its status as an exclusively 
Finnish-language institution, in contrast to the bilingual nature of 
the country's major academic centre, Helsinki University. Its 
policies from the mid-1920s onwards were shaped in large part by 
the nationalist sympathies of its rector between 1924 and 1932, the 
writer and literary scholar V. A. Koskenniemi. The latter consist-
ently advocated the need for Finland to concentrate on direct links 
with the major European centres in preference to relying on 
Sweden as an intermediary, as had often previously been the case, 
and for increased teaching of the major European languages in 
Finnish schools instead of Swedish.207 
While the Swedish-speaking community focused on the major 
Swedish-language poets such as Runeberg, nationalist opinion 
looked to Snellman and his brand of nationalist philosophy for its 
inspiration. A large proportion of the young Finnish-speaking 
academic generation of the 1920s professed itself indifferent to 
Runeberg, who up until then had been considered the country's 
national poet, arguing instead for removing him altogether from 
his over-exalted pedestal. Students at Turku University even 
went so far as to decide in the late 1920s to work towards getting 
Runeberg's national anthem replaced by an alternative penned by 
Koskenniemi, suggesting that the change would better serve the 
needs of an independent Finland and more fully represent 
national aspirations.208 The proposal, however, found little favour 
207. US 2.9.1925; Aitosuomalainen 4/1925. 
208. Ylioppilaslehti 12.5.1928; Suomen Heimo 15.10.1928; Aitosuomalainen 
26.10.1928. Kaarlo Lausti 1.11.1978. 
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with Finnish-speaking student circles in Helsinki, who in any case 
far outnumbered those at the still fledgling Turku University and 
for whom Runeberg's words represented part of their own 
university traditions and remained liked and respected. 
These developments were closely followed, and criticised, in the 
pages of the Stockholm papers. Criticism of the more extreme 
aspects of Finnish nationalism was also particularly strong from 
among the country's own Swedish-speaking population. R. A. 
Wrede and other leading figures in the Swedish-speaking 
community consistently argued that, left unchecked, nationalist 
opinion, aiming as it did at a virtually unilingual state and at 
ridding Helsinki University of any vestige of Swedish-language 
instruction, would eventually destroy the country's traditional 
cultural ties with Sweden and the other Scandinavian countries 
and lead Finland away from her rightful place within the Western 
cultural community, finally reducing the country to the status of 
what Wrede described as a 'semi-civilised border state'.209 
Despite the importance attached to ties with Scandinavia by the 
more moderate elements within the academic community, both 
Finnish and Swedish-speaking, the German university world and 
German scholarship, which had traditionally occupied an import-
ant place in Finland, continued to play a major part in shaping 
much of Finland's exposure to European academic developments. 
The post-war political transformation of Germany had little real 
impact in changing this. Although few Finnish cultural figures 
appear to have visited Germany in the immediate post-war years of 
1919 and 1920, by the following year the flow of academics and 
writers had somewhat resumed.210 This was paralleled by the 
restoration of many of the traditional academic links in a wide 
variety of fields, a number of which dated back to the 1860s, which 
had been disrupted during the war years. German scholarship, 
research methods and library resources had been held in high 
esteem in Finland since the formative latter years of the nineteenth 
century. Academic ties between Finnish and German universities 
were further fostered from the mid-1920s onwards following the 
209. See Wrede's letter of 20.5.1928 to Ingman (Ingman collection III). 
210. Viljanen 1935, p. 188; Iltalehti 1.8.1921. 
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decision by the Humboldt Foundation, founded on the initiative of 
the German Foreign Ministry in 1925, to begin annually granting 
scholarships to Finnish researchers and post-graduate students. 
The continuing lack of scholarship funding available from Finnish 
sources forced Finns wanting to study abroad to make use of all 
possible means of financing, including, in the case of students of 
German philology, that of applying for posts as Finnish language 
lectors at German universities, such as Berlin and Greifswald. In 
addition to providing scholars with the opportunity to pursue their 
own studies, these lectorships also allowed them to establish 
personal contacts with leading German academics in their fields, 
contact which often proved of benefit in their later academic 
careers and research.'" 
In addition to traditional academic contacts, a new set of German 
cultural influences in literature and the theatre also made them-
selves felt in post-independence Finland. Those aspects of post-
war German literature reflecting a break with the traditional 
admiration of Prussian militarist values found a ready audience 
among the young generation of Finnish writers and critics. A good 
example of this is the anthology of German poetry translated by the 
poet Uuno Kailas entitled 'Kaunis Saksa' (Germany the fair), which 
appeared in 1924.212 A number of Finland-Swedish writers, among 
them Edith Södergran, Hagar Olsson and Elmer Diktonius, were 
also influenced by expressionist trends from Continental Europe, 
and Germany in particular. Their enthusiasm for adopting 
European influences brought them, however, together with Ultra, 
the short-lived bilingual literary journal most identified with 
championing their cause, much criticism from the conservative 
literary establishment in Finland and, conversely, positive recog-
nition in more liberal Sweden.213  Berlin was a powerful centre for 
experimentation in the theatre and attracted many leading Finnish 
directors. A striking result of this contact with the mainstream of 
European modernism was the emergence of German-style 
211. For example, Emil Öhmann served as a lector at Berlin University between 
1922 and 1924, and A. Rosenqvist at Greifswald between 1921-25 and at 
Berlin from 1925 to 1933. 
212. Saarenheimo 1966, p. 90. 
213. 0. Enckell 1946, pp. 186-93; Warburton 1951, pp. 218-33. 
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expressionism in the Finnish theatre, especially evident in the 
productions of the Tampere Workers' Theatre under Kosti Elo.214 
During the early 1920s, Finnish architecture began to move away 
from its former adherence to national romanticist styles and open 
up to the classicist influences from Sweden and Italy which began 
to make themselves felt around this time.215  Towards the end of 
the decade, attitudes gradually began to turn against classicism in 
favour of modernism, with new ideas and influence mainly 
coming from the German school and from architects working in 
France and Holland. This shift closely reflected the overall trend 
in European architecture away from established traditions, aided 
and abetted by the pattern of wider social development and change 
affecting the Continent, towards the rectilinear forms and 
rationalist philosophy of the functionalist school. 
The breakthrough of this new functionalist style identified with 
the likes of Le Courbusier came in 1927, with the holding of a 
major housing exhibition in Stuttgart, which served to consolidate 
the new movement's position as the dominant school in modern 
architecture. Functionalist influences soon began to be evident in 
the work of young Finnish architects, such as Alvar Aalto and Erik 
Bryggman, who had visited Stuttgart. International functionalist 
ideas were combined in the work of the Finnish modernists with a 
desire to develop independent forms of expression and uses of 
materia1.216  Despite the undeniable impact these new architectural 
ideas had in Finland, at least among the younger generation of 
architects, there still remained a number of the older generation, 
including such prominent figures as Lars Sonck, who retained 
their attachment to essentially national romantic styles. For these 
architects, foreign influences played a much smaller part in their 
development than for the younger generation, and they were often 
restricted to providing little more than a slightly modernistic 
surface colouring to their established architectural styles. 
Germany's role, as a heavily industrialised country with strong 
214. Orasmaa 1976, pp. 55-6, 134, 191. 
215. J. Siren's Parliament building, together with a number of Erik Bryggman's 
and Alvar Aalto's early projects, amongst others, for example, are essentially 
classical in inspiration. 
216. P. Blomstedt 1928, pp. 26-7; Ringbom 1978, pp. 320-1. 
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manufacturing traditions, in influencing developments in Finland 
was also particularly evident in industry and technical education. 
Independence had brought with it a new set of pressures and 
challenges for industry and technological research. The latter in 
particular, restricted during the first wave of industrialisation in 
the late nineteenth century by the small size of the domestic 
industrial base and a lack of adequate facilities and educated 
manpower, had for long failed to keep up with major develop-
ments abroad. Some improvement in the situation had been 
brought with the founding of the Technical University in 1908, 
created on the base of its more modest predecessor, the Poly-
technical Institute. The new university proved instrumental in 
improving contact with foreign developments, modernizing the 
technical and economic base in Finland and in encouraging home-
grown innovation. Teaching and research at the Technical 
University drew heavily on the German Fachhochschule tradition 
of technical education, helped by the similarity of German and 
Finnish technical standards. Contact in the technical and 
industrial fields was, in fact, largely dominated by Germany, with 
Finland enjoying virtually no contact with France and only 
minimal ties with Britain, as a result of the fact that German was 
the major, and often the only foreign language widely spoken by 
Finnish engineers and technical researchers. Contact with 
Sweden in this field was, for obvious reasons, nevertheless also 
relatively close and particularly evident in the heavy and electrical 
industries. 
Interest in French culture, and Paris in particular, was well 
established in certain circles in Finland. This gained new life in 
the early 1920s with the visits to Paris of a wide spectrum of 
Finnish artists, writers and performers, including such figures as 
Juho Rissanen, Emil Cedercreutz, L. Onerva and Anna Hagel-
stam.21  Paris continued to exert the special, almost romantic 
attraction which it had done in the nineteenth century. Among the 
younger generation of Finnish writers of the period, Koskenniemi, 
Mika Waltari, particularly in his first novel 'Suuri illusioni' (1928: 
The Grand Illusion), and Arvi Kivimaa, were particularly affected 
217. Hbl 29.5.1921. 
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by their contacts with the city.218 All in all, however, the absolute 
numbers involved nevertheless remained relatively small. 
The central role of Paris as a place of study and pilgrimage for 
artists remained prominent after the ending of trips to Russia 
following the Revolution and the decline which took place in the 
popularity of travelling to Britain.219 The range of coverage and 
awareness of developments abroad in the visual arts, which had 
significantly expanded and diversified in post-independence 
Finland, served to make artists less dependent than they had been 
previously on individual trips to European artistic centres. 
Magazines and the leading newspapers increasingly devoted space 
to the visual arts and a growing amount of literature on the fine arts 
also appeared, helped by improvements in the quality of printing 
and reproduction. This all served to open up a wider range of art, 
both to the artistic community and to the general public as a 
whole. 
The artistic community during the 1920s was largely split into 
two major groupings, the Septem and Marraskuu groups, both 
dating back to pre-independence days. The latter of the two 
represented a clear break with national traditions and a more open 
attitude towards adopting and exploiting international influences, 
with artists belonging to it favouring expressionist styles and, to a 
lesser extent, cubist ideas. The Septem group, which by the 1920s 
had passed its peak of activity, was closer to Impressionism and 
subsequent French movements such as Fauvism.22° Many modern-
ist artists, however, were subject to sharp criticism, part of it 
clearly and unashamedly politically-motivated, by conservative 
critics and commentators for their break with the national 
tradition. Their ideas and work were disparagingly labelled as 
revolutionary and as amounting to a form of 'cultural Bolshevism' 
undermining the basis of Finnish society.221  
French drama and the Paris theatre world, in line with German 
drama, which had for long had a significant impact in Finland, 
played an important part in developments in the Finnish theatre 
218. Itsenäinen Suomi 1.6.1926; Viljanen 1935, pp. 171-7; Kivimaa 1974, p. 73: 
M. Waltari 1978, pp. 58-62. 
219. See Suomen Kuvataiteilijat. Elämäkerrasto (1962). 
220. Ringbom 1978, pp. 230, 235-40; Okkonen II 1945, pp. 233-4, 252-3, 299. 
221. Ajan Sana 24.10., 8.11.1930. 
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during the 1920s. Visits to Paris and other foreign centres by 
Finnish directors had an important role in shaping theatre 
repertoires and influencing decisions on which foreign plays 
would be translated. Contact with trends abroad also exposed 
those working in the theatre in Finland to foreign styles of 
direction, acting, stage design and lighting, many aspects of which 
could be picked up without a detailed knowledge of local 
languages, a fact which made up for the restrictions otherwise 
imposed by the sometimes limited linguistic skills of Finnish 
actors and directors. French drama, and Moliere in particular, was 
prominent in the repertoire of the National Theatre under the 
directorship of Eino Kalima, alongside the established classics, 
such as Shakespeare, Schiller, Goethe and the Greek masters.222 
Wider interest in the French, as well as the British arts, was 
nevertheless restricted in Finland by the powerful position of 
German culture and the wide knowledge of German among the 
intelligentsia and the upper classes, coupled with the typically 
widespread lack of knowledge of any other major West European 
languages. French, it is true, had traditionally been spoken and 
used to some extent among the upper classes, but by the 1920s it 
was little taught in most schools with the exception of some girls 
schools, being restricted to the position of an optional language in 
the higher grades. The position of English was even worse, with 
only a very small proportion of the population able to use or 
communicate in it. 
The small overall numbers of those actively interested in 
developing Finnish relations with France and Britain, and the 
relatively low level of public interest in these two countries in the 
immediate wake of the ending of the First World War, had been 
reflected in the decision to found a single joint association to foster 
interest in the two countries, the Cercle Franco-Anglais, rather 
than two independent societies. This soon failed, however, to 
satisfy those more interested in French culture, who began to push 
for a separate organisation solely devoted to French affairs similar 
to that which had existed prior to the war. The Societe Franco-
Finlandais was finally founded in 1924 under the guidance of 
Professors Axel Wallenskiöld and Yrjö Hirn and the academic and 
222. Koskimies 1972, pp. 54-7; Kalima 1968. 
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translator Jean Perret.223  Cultural links with France were also 
further helped by the programme of scholarships designed to assist 
Finns to study in France which was introduced by the French 
government at the beginning of the 1920s, perhaps the first such 
arrangement independent Finland enjoyed with a foreign power. 
A particular characteristic of the late 1920s, and one not really 
seen before on the same scale, was the attempt by a number of 
young Finnish writers to systematically develop a better awareness 
of cultural currents and developments affecting the mainstream of 
European culture as a whole, rather than any one particular 
country. This desire to shake off what was seen as Finland's 
backwoods inheritance and to prevent the country from remaining 
cut off from the forefront of modern European developments in 
industry, technology, communications and transport, was 
particularly prominent among the loose association of young 
writers known as the Tulenkantajat group (The Fire Bearers). In 
analysing the reasons behind Finland's traditional isolation from 
the rest of Europe, this group identified the country's Swedish-
language traditions as partly to blame, and called for Finland to 
aim for closer direct ties with Continental Europe bypassing 
Sweden. This desire to broaden Finnish social and cultural 
horizons was directed virtually solely towards Western Europe 
and embraced a strong antipathy towards Communism, which was 
seen as posing a direct and real danger to small countries like 
Finland.224 
Olavi Paavolainen, one of the main figures in the short-lived 
Tulenkantajat group, wrote in glowing terms of the modern 
movement in Europe committed to redrawing established views of 
the world in the arts and related fields, as in his travelogue 
'Nykyaikaa etsimässä'(1928: In Search of the Modern). The 
collection of poetry entitled 'Valtatiet' (Highways), produced in 
collaboration by Waltari and Paavolainen which appeared in 1929, 
and which in its celebration of all that was modern and European 
summed up the neo-romantic cosmopolitanism typical of the 
223. On the development and activities of the Cercle Franco-Finlandais during the 
1920s, see the association's archive (Ranskalainen koulu, Helsinki). Also see 
the report of the French envoy in Helsinki sent to Paris dated 2.3.1924 
(AAEF, Finlande). 
224. Tulenkantajat — Albumi 1927, p. 10; Tulenkantajat 30.11.1928, 3.1.1929. 
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Tulenkantajat group as a whole, also highlighted the contrast 
existing between the modernists and the sympathies and aims of 
the more conservative, nationalist sections of opinion, as 
represented by organisations like the Academic Karelian Society 
(AKS).225  The uncompromisingly internationalist nature of the 
modernists grouped around the Tulenkantajat, together with their 
powerful belief in the rightness of what they felt they stood for, 
was the cause of much bitter and aggressive debate and made them 
a number of enemies. Thanks to them, however, and to a number 
of other developments, Finnish cultural life in the latter half of the 
1920s had a distinctly more international outlook to it than during 
the early half of the decade. 
Finland possessed few established cultural ties with Britain 
compared to those existing with Germany and France. The 
restricted knowledge of English typical of Finnish society of the 
time and which extended into the universities, together with the 
lack of a scholarship system similar to those maintained by France 
and Germany, only reinforced this. Unlike the German 
universities, no Finnish lectorships existed at British universities, 
although plans were made at the end of the 1920s to remedy this by 
setting up a post at London University. Characteristic of the 
relatively low level of interest existing in the Finnish academic 
world towards British scholarship was the case of Uno Lindelöf, 
who, although serving as Professor of English at Helsinki 
University during the 1920s, mainly concentrated on his other 
interest, German linguistics, and devoted little time to British 
subjects.226  Academic contacts between Finland and Britain were 
largely concentrated around the group of sociologists specialising 
in the study of non-European peoples working under Edvard 
Westermarck, who held professorships at both Åbo Akademi and 
London University. Apart from the few links which existed 
between Finnish and British economists, there seems to have been 
little communication between the two academic communities in 
225. Tulenkantajat — Albumi 1927, p. 33; Enäjärvi 1928, pp. 46-80; Saarenhei-
mo 1966, pp. 211-14. 
226. On the plans for a Finnish lectorship at London University, see A. H. Saasta-
moinen's communication of 11.3.1928 to Hugo Suolahti (Hugo Suolahti 
collection). 
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the natural sciences, medicine or applied engineering.227 
Despite the language problem, British literature was relatively 
well known as a result of the wide number of translations 
available, embracing a spectrum extending from Kipling and 
Bernard Shaw to Somerset Maugham and a large amount of light 
fiction. Kersti Bergroth and Alex Matson, both of whom kept in 
close touch with developments in the arts in Europe as a whole, 
published a periodical entitled 'Sininen kirja' (The Blue Book) 
during the late 1920s especially devoted to broadening popular 
familiarity with British literature.228 The founding of a separate 
association for Franco-Finnish interests in 1924 to replace the 
shared Cercle Franco-Anglais deprived Finnish Anglophiles of a 
forum capable of coordinating activities aimed at widening 
popular awareness of British culture and developing linguistic 
skills, forcing them to rely on the small British Library in Helsinki 
until the founding of the Finnish-British Society in 1926 provided 
them with a replacement.229 The new society drew its main 
members from among those working in the export world and the 
cooperative movement and, unlike the Societe Franco-Finlandais, 
lacked members from the arts and academic worlds, again 
reflecting the latter fields' general lack of ties with Britain.23o 
A number of new associations modelled on ideas from the 
English-speaking world, and particularly from Britain, emerged 
during the 1920s, for all the general lack of ties between Finland 
and Britain and America. A branch of the PEN Club, the 
international literary organisation founded in Britain in 1921, was 
set up in Helsinki in 1928 to foster contacts between Finnish and 
foreign writers.231 The Rotary movement found its way to Finland 
in the latter half of the 1920s, but initially achieved only a modest 
impact, with no more than two local associations being founded 
during the decade, in Helsinki and Turku. Freemasonry was 
revived, after a long period of having been banned by the Russian 
227. On the Westermarck school, see Alapuro et al 1973, pp. 64-78. The 
economist Bruno Suviranta studied in London between 1920-1. 
228. Varpio 1971, pp. 16-17; Kivimaa II 1977, pp. 27-8. 
229. The Finnish-British Society, Helsinki 1926-1976, p. 4. 
230. Professor Westermarck was among the very few academics belonging to the 
Society. 
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authorities, in the early 1920s, this time the impetus coming not 
from Britain but from Sweden and the United States. The role of 
the latter countries was reflected in the decision of the Swedish-
speaking lodges to join the Stockholm Grand Lodge, and in the 
particular part played by American freemasonry in shaping the 
ideas of the founders of the Finnish Grand Lodge, founded in 
1924.232 
Cultural relations between Finland and the Soviet Union, like 
those between Finland and Britain, were similarly restricted by 
linguistic problems, but also suffered as a result of the strong and 
widespread political antipathies felt towards Soviet Russia in post-
independence Finland. These latter owed their origins to the 
characteristic anti-Russian and anti-Bolshevik opinion typical of 
the period in Finland and to the partly self-imposed and partly 
forced isolation from outside contacts of the Soviet Union itself. 
Despite these factors, a number of pre-revolutionary Russian 
classic authors such as Dostoevsky, Chekhov and Tolstoy 
continued to have an influence on literary circles and the public as 
a whole. Russian traditions in a number of other areas, such as 
popular music and Gypsy music, also remained well to the fore, 
despite the political disaffection between the two countries.233  
Traditional Russian motifs featured strongly in much of the 
Finnish popular music produced during the early independence 
years, before they began to be displaced as the decade wore on 
with the rise in popularity of influences from Germany and the 
United States and, to a lesser extent, Sweden. Western influence 
only really achieved a breakthrough in the following decade, 
however. 
Russian performing artists, popular musicians, singers and 
dancers appeared sporadically in Helsinki during the early 1920s, 
but these were emigres in the main. Soviet artists began to appear 
during the latter part of the decade, but only in small numbers.234 
Something of the hostility felt within nationalist circles, even to 
232. Viisikymmenvuotias Suomen V. ja 0. M. Suur-Loosi (1974), pp. 16-32. 
233. Toivo Kärki 12.1.1982. 
234. See the coverage of visits by foreign performers contained in Suomen Kuva-
lehti 1922-26. 
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this low level of contact, was indicated in the debate on the subject 
which appeared in the pages of the student newspaper Ylioppilas-
lehti in the mid-1920s, and which gave prominent coverage to the 
uncompromising view that no place for things Russian or Soviet 
existed in independent Finland. More liberal voices, like those of 
Professor Arvid Grotenfelt, predicted that extreme nationalism of 
this sort would prove fateful to Finland, and condemned the 
almost mindless hostility towards the Soviet Union encouraged by 
it, but to no real avail.235 
In an effort to introduce the Finnish public to Soviet culture, the 
radical socialists sponsored publication of an illustrated weekly 
magazine entitled Itä ja Länsi (East and West), which began 
appearing from 1924 onwards. Following the tenth anniversary 
celebrations of the October Revolution in Moscow, the idea was 
floated by a number of Finnish left-wing radicals who had 
attended of founding an organisation or association devoted to 
fostering cultural relations between the Soviet Union and Finland, 
to follow up the work of Itä ja Länsi.236  Not surprisingly, however, 
given the prevailing political atmosphere of the time, the idea 
failed to gain any wider support outside of this narrow circle. 
Finland's linguistic isolation presented a major problem in 
hampering the promotion and success of Finnish culture abroad, 
although less so for those sections of the arts which did not rely 
directly on the spoken word. Finnish music, in fact, enjoyed 
reasonable popularity abroad and was performed relatively widely 
in London, Berlin and Vienna. Sibelius, in particular, was well 
known and liked in Britain, the United States and the Scandi-
navian countries, in part through the efforts of such Finnish 
conductors as Georg Schneevoigt and Armas Järnefelt, who 
worked extensively abroad.237 Finnish architecture, in contrast, 
remained very much in the position of a receiver, rather than an 
exporter of influences at this stage. Eliel Saarinen's move to the 
United States, where he was to enjoy considerable success, at the 
235. Klinge IV 1968, pp. 62-4; Ylioppilaslehti 3.3., 10.3.1923; Hbl 7.2.1924. Sven 
Krohn 4.1.1979. 
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beginning of the 1920s, was very much an exception to the general 
trend. Finnish art was known abroad largely only in Scandinavia. 
A joint exhibition of work by a dozen or so Finnish artists was held 
in Gothenburg in Sweden in 1923, and a large exhibition of work 
by Magnus Enckell in Stockholm in 1925. An extensive survey of 
work by over an hundred modern Finnish artists, including Wäinö 
Aaltonen, Eero Järnefelt, Pekka Halonen and Alvar Caw6n, was 
shown in Stockholm in 1929.238 
Finnish culture, and Finnish literature in particular, probably 
enjoyed its greatest success abroad in Estonia, with translations of 
Finnish literature especially prominent. Estonia, together with 
Sweden, accounted for the majority of translations of Finnish 
literature which appeared during the 1920s.239 Finland's cultural 
profile in Sweden and Scandinavia was inevitably powerfully 
shaped by the country's Swedish-speaking artists, writers, critics 
and academics, who generally enjoyed a significant head-start over 
their Finnish-speaking colleagues in promoting Finnish work in 
the Nordic area. Internationally, however, it was the latter who 
mainly dominated, as in the academic world, where precisely 
those scholars involved in fields with a strong basis in Finnish-
language material, such as Finno-Ugrian linguistics, folklore and 
ethnography, probably achieved the greatest international 
recognition of any Finnish academics.24° 
In common with the literatures of many small states, Finnish 
literature encountered a multitude of difficulties in acquiring a 
readership outside its domestic market and in establishing a steady 
flow of translations across a reasonable spread of international 
languages. This was not helped by the tendency of translators of 
the time to favour a narrow section of writers and books, including 
such classics as Aleksis Kivi's 'Seitsemän Veljestä' (Seven 
Brothers), which appeared in both German and English during the 
1920s, and the folk poetry-based epic, the 'Kalevala', which had 
238. The exhibitions in question were 'Nordisk konst. Jubileumutställningen' in 
Gothenburg (1923), 'Magnus Enckells utställning' in Stockholm (1925) and 
'Finlands nutida konst' in Stockholm (1929). 
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lish-language title, most of the series' contents were in German. 
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been widely translated ever since its appearance in the nineteenth 
century. Of more recent fiction, Johannes Linnankoski's romantic 
novel 'Laulu tulipunaisesta kukasta' (The Song of the Blood Red 
Flower) and F. E. Sillanpää's 'Nuorena nukkunut' (The Maid Silja 
or Fallen Asleep While Young) both achieved considerable success 
abroad and were translated into a number of languages.241  
8. Finnish sport's international breakthrough 
Sport had played something of a special role in opening up 
Finland's international contacts during the latter years of auton-
omy, with Finnish teams taking part in international competitions 
in their own right enjoying a good measure of success abroad. The 
last pre-independence Olympics held in Stockholm in 1912 
marked a particular achievement on the part of the large Finnish 
team which took part, and saw Finland take her place among the 
leading athletic nations of the time. This was only partly 
overshadowed by a minor, but at the same time symbolic 
disagreement between the Finnish and Russian teams over a 
Finnish attempt to unfurl the flag of a Helsinki sports club during 
the opening ceremony to supplement the team's original modest 
banner marking the Finnish section off from the rest of the Russian 
team.242 
Although independence saw the ending of the restrictions on 
Finnish participation abroad previously imposed by the Russian 
authorities, it did not bring a complete end to the troubles affecting 
Finnish sport. The years of political upheaval immediately 
preceding independence, and above all the events of 1918, came to 
have a deep and divisive impact on the pattern of post-war 
sporting activities. 
Organised sports activities had got under way on a wide scale 
following the founding of the Finnish Athletics Federation (SVUL) 
in 1906, but what sense of unity there was within the organisation 
had soon given way to internal wrangling, as tensions between 
working class and other local sports associations intensified from 
241. Haltsonen—Puranen 1979. 
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1913 onwards.243  The quantity and bitterness of these politically-
motivated internal disputes led to a number of calls from within 
the socialist-controlled clubs for the setting up of a separate and 
independent central federation along the lines of similar 
organisations abroad. Although a separate socialist sports paper, 
Työväen Urheilulehti, began to appear from the summer of 1917 
onwards, no real moves were made at this stage towards creating 
the proposed new federation.244 
 The decisive step towards 
splitting the sports movement did not take long in coming, 
however. The initiative was taken by the governing body of the 
SVUL itself, in the shape of a decision to expel the clubs of 
sportsmen who had supported or taken part in the Civil War on the 
Red side from the Federation in the latter half of November 1918. 
The uncompromising stand taken by the Federation's leadership 
on the expulsion issue led to the setting up of a new sports 
federation, the Workers' Athletic Union (TUL), in January 1919 by 
the expelled clubs, laying the ground for a deepening of hostilities 
between the two groups. 
The tension between these two competing organisations 
inevitably spilled over into the debate which developed over 
Finland's possible participation in the summer Olympics of 1920 
to be held in Antwerp, already highly politicized as a result of the 
International Olympic Committee's decision to bar Germany and 
her wartime allies from participating. Despite the wide awareness 
of the significant role sport and the Olympics in particular had 
played in the pre-war period in making Finland known abroad, 
there were many, given the background of continuing strong pro-
German opinion in the country, who were reluctant to support 
Finland's participation in any games at which German participants 
and those from her past allies would be excluded from taking part. 
The debate which developed from the summer of 1919 onwards 
within the SVUL and the press over Finland's possible 
participation at Antwerp reflected the sharply opposing battle 
lines which had already developed over the issue. Aksel Ek, the 
chairman of the SVUL's organising committee, described the 
Antwerp Games in a newspaper interview as likely to be a second- 
243. Lauri Pihkala 29.10.1972. 
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rate Olympics if major national teams were to be excluded. Lauri 
Pihkala, a leading sports commentator and organiser, considered 
the choice of Antwerp to stage the Games an unfortunate one and 
only likely to reopen the wounds of the recently concluded war.245 
An appeal was issued at the beginning of October the same year by 
those opposed to the Antwerp Games calling on the country's 
sportsmen not to compete in any Olympics at which participants 
from Germany and her wartime allies would be barred.246  Instead, 
it was suggested that a separate Olympics between sportsmen from 
the neutral countries could be held in Stockholm to coincide with 
the official Antwerp Games.247 
A combination of a number of non sport-related factors, how-
ever, eventually served to take the wind out of the sails of the 
campaign for a Finnish boycott of the Antwerp Games. Prominent 
among these was the general need felt among the country's 
leadership to exploit all the available means of reinforcing 
Finland's new, independent national identity; the Olympics were 
seen as an ideal forum in this respect. Within the sporting 
community itself, participation in the 1920 Games was seen by 
many as particularly important, both after the dispute that had 
surrounded Finland's role in the previous Stockholm Games and 
as a means of further consolidating Finland's standing in inter-
national sport. With the plans for an alternative Games failing to 
make much headway in gaining wider support, Finland in any 
case was faced with the real possibility of remaining completely 
out in the cold. At the end of March 1920, the SVUL leadership 
bowed to the inevitable and announced its decision to support 
Finland's participation in the Antwerp Games. Not forgetting its 
earlier pro-German sympathies, however, and in the light of the 
prospect of Germany's remaining barred from taking part, it was 
also decided to propose a visit by the entire Finnish Olympic team 
to Berlin, to take part in a friendly competition with a German 
national team, after the Antwerp Games, as in fact happened.248 
The attitude of the Workers' Athletic Union to the Antwerp 
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Olympics had been cautious from the start, deriving in part from 
the tense events surrounding the Federation's founding. The 
status of the new organisation as a national umbrella federation 
coordinating working class sports activities had also yet to be fully 
established. In addition, the TUL leadership feared that the 
pressure within society to choose sportsmen with uncontroversial 
character backgrounds for the national team could easily be used 
to discriminate against sportsmen belonging to clubs affiliated to 
the TUL, by labelling them as politically or socially unsuitable to 
represent their country abroad.249 Some fierce criticism was 
directed against the Western allies, which were described as 
making the Olympics an event 'celebrating the victory of imperi-
alism'.250 Remembering the close links which existed between the 
TUL and the left wing of the labour movement, this was probably 
as much a condemnation of the West's inter-ventionist and 
economic blockade policies directed against the Soviet Union as a 
protest against the Games themselves. 
For all the disputes preceding the actual Games, the relatively 
small Finnish team which eventually participated enjoyed 
considerable success in Antwerp, embracing good results in 
wrestling as well as in the track and field events which had 
become Finnish athletes' forte. In fact, the 1920 Finnish team 
proved even more successful than that which had taken part in the 
pre-war Stockholm Games. Hannes Kolehmainen, who had been 
one of the most successful Finnish athletes at the Games eight 
years before, now won the marathon and was joined as one of the 
leading participants by the young Paavo Nurmi, who made a 
spectacular first appearance, winning two gold medals and one 
silver. In a medal table headed by the United States, Finland 
achieved a very respectable fifth place overa11.251 One cloud over 
the result, however, was represented by the fact that the Finnish 
team participating in Antwerp received no financial support from 
the government and had to rely entirely on funds provided from 
voluntary contributions. The popularity of the Games with the 
public at large was reflected in the wide coverage they were given 
249. Työväen Urheilulehti 30.6.1920. 
250. Työväen Urheilulehti 15.2., 30.4.1920. 
251. Nygren—Siukonen 1978, p. 170. 
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in the press of the time.252 
In the years that followed, the SVUL was successful in 
establishing a network of international sports contacts, enabling 
the holding of Franco-Finnish athletics competitions from 1922 
onwards and numerous competitions with the Scandinavian 
countries, particularly Sweden, which had previously only taken 
part in regular joint meetings with her western neighbours, 
Norway and Denmark. Prominent among these latter joint Scandi-
navian events were the games held in Gothenburg in Sweden in 
1923, which served as a run-up for the 1924 Olympics, and the 
regular Finnish-Swedish athletics meetings held every other year 
from 1925 onwards. 
The Paris Olympics of 1924 brought Finland even greater 
athletic success than had the Antwerp Games, and went a long way 
to further establishing the country's reputation as a leading 
athletics nation. A number of individual Finnish competitors 
became the subject of international attention. Paavo Nurmi, who 
managed to win five gold medals, two on the same day, gradually 
began to take on the proportions of an athletics legend, while Ville 
Ritola's reputation as a long-distance runner also began to spread. 
The exceptional success of the Finnish team in Paris was the cause 
of particular celebration in Finland, celebration which had a 
number of indirect repercussions beyond the narrow confines of 
sport itself.253  For a relatively isolated country on the periphery of 
Europe, international sporting success, and on the scale seen at the 
Paris Games, served as a welcome fillip to national self-confi-
dence. Much play was made of the extent of the Finnish success 
given the small population of the country compared to her 
competitors.254 
At the same time as sportsmen were elevated to the status of 
virtual national heroes, sport as a whole acquired an exceptionally 
252. On the financial problems surrounding the Finnish team, see US 2.4.1920; 
Suomen Urheilulehti 4.5.1920. For coverage of the Games themselves, see HS 
15.8.-24.8.1920; US 15.8.-24.8.1920; Hbl 16.8.-23.8.1920; SS 16.8.-
25.8.1920; Suomen Urheilulehti 14.9.1920; HS 4.9.1920. 
253. The circulation of the sports paper Suomen Urheilulehti rose, for ex., during 
1924 from around 8,000 to some 24,000. 
254. HS 6.7.1924; US 12.7.1924; Hbl 15.7.1924. For coverage of the Antwerp 
Games, see SS 7.7.-14.7.1924, 22.7.1924. 
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pronounced role as a form of popular recreation. This was in 
marked contrast to the popularity of sport and attitudes towards 
sporting achievements in Finland's closest neighbour Sweden, 
where sport tended to be seen very much as a private hobby or 
form of recreation, lacking the aura of earnest commitment and 
nationalist flavour more typical of Finnish attitudes.255  In the 
enthusiasm born out of the country's successes at the various post-
war Olympics, there was a tendency for observers in Finland to 
draw over-positive conclusions about the degree of international 
impact the publicity surrounding the Games had in raising the 
level of international awareness of Finland. Many people failed to 
realise that those circles abroad interested in sport were not 
necessarily the same as those which were important in making 
political, diplomatic or commercial decisions affecting Finland, 
and that mere knowledge of Finnish sporting achievements or the 
names of leading Finnish sportsmen did not guarantee any wider 
awareness about any other aspect of Finland or Finnish society. 
Finland's international sporting success continued at the 1928 
Amsterdam Olympics, which also saw the participation of a 
German team and an increased number of teams from countries 
outside Europe. In track and field events, the 1928 Finnish team 
enjoyed even greater success in relative terms than the team which 
had competed four years earlier in Paris, given the fact that a 
number of long-distance events at which the Finns had proved 
themselves especially able had been removed from the events 
programme in the interim.256 
In contrast, the level of Finnish sporting success at the two 
Winter Olympics held during the 1920s never reached that 
achieved at the summer Games. A number of Finns did never-
theless manage to make some impact, among them Clas Thunberg, 
who virtually dominated the speed skating events at the winter 
Games in 1924 and 1928, and Julius Skutnabb, who excelled in the 
long-distance events. No one proved able to challenge the 
Norwegians in the skiing events, however.257 Norway, Finland and 
Sweden all enjoyed reasonable success, but none dramatically 
255. Edwin Wide 21.11.1979. 
256. Nygren—Siukonen 1978, pp. 189-91, 204. Sulo Kolkka 4.10.1979. 
257. Nygren—Siukonen 1978, pp. 668-70. 
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more so than any of the others. In non-Olympic competition, 
Finnish skiers scored particular success at the Holmenkollen 
Games in Norway in 1922, with the double victory of Anton Collin 
and Tapani Niku in the 50 kilometre cross-country event. Good 
results also began to emerge in skiing events at the Salpausselkä 
Games, which began to be held in Finland from 1923 onwards.258 
The Finnish success at the Paris Olympics, together with the 
steady increase in sport's overall popularity typical of the period, 
encouraged the leadership of the Workers' Athletic Union, which 
had in the meanwhile developed its own network of international 
sporting contacts with parallel organisations in Central Europe, 
Norway and Estonia and Latvia, to select a TUL team to take part in 
the first workers' international sports meeting to be held in 
Frankfurt am Main in the summer of 1925. Here too, Finnish 
sportsmen enjoyed considerable success, winning a number of 
victories in track and field events and wrestling.259 The number of 
countries competing in these games, however, was relatively small 
and the level of results fell well short of that achieved at the Paris 
Olympics. 
The internal unity of the TUL was severely undermined during 
the course of the 1920s as a result of various disputes which 
emerged within the organisation. These mainly owed their origin 
to the split which had taken place in the international workers' 
sports movement between the socialist sports international 
founded in 1920 and based in Lucerne, and the communist-backed 
sports international based in Moscow founded the following 
yew 
 26° Some disagreement had made itself felt at the time of the 
decision over participation in the Frankfurt Games organised by 
the Lucerne-based socialist organisation, but a head-on confron-
tation was avoided. The gaining of a majority by the Social 
Democrats at the TUL conference in 1927, however, saw the 
question of the possible participation of a TUL-sponsored team in 
the Spartakiad Games, to be held the next year in Moscow, develop 
into a major dispute. The bulk of the TUL leadership, in line with 
the view adopted by the Lucerne-based socialist sports inter- 
258. Eljanko—Kirjavainen 1969, pp. 123-4, 320. 
259. Nygren 1968, pp. 40-1 and appendix. 
260. Ibid., pp. 10-14. 
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national, came out against taking part. This did not, however, pre-
vent some TUL members taking part in the Moscow games, a move 
which came to represent the prelude to a major parting of the ways 
for the labour sports movement. The leadership's reaction to the 
latters' participation took the form of a decision to expel them all, a 
total of some 70 to 80 sportsmen, from the Union, together with 
their clubs as well if they refused to abide by the ruling. The 
opposition refused to take this lying down, and the rebel clubs 
thus expelled retorted by organising themselves into a separate, 
breakaway national workers' sports federation (TYK). A number of 
individual sportsmen who had taken part in the Moscow games, 
such as Volmari Iso-Hollo and Gunnar Bärlund, however, left the 
workers' sports movement altogether to join the non-socialist 
SVUL.261  
9. Foreign perspectives on Finland during the 
1920s 
Finland's gaining of independence had been seen in Sweden as a 
significant step forward, not only for Finland herself, but also 
indirectly for Sweden as well, thanks to its beneficial impact on 
Sweden's own international position. Increasing concern, how-
ever, began to be expressed as 1918 receded at the slow rate of 
Finland's recovery from the turmoil of the years immediately 
surrounding independence and the persistence of the legacy of 
internal disputes and social conflicts which had been inherited 
from that period. Particular attention was drawn to the slowness 
of Finnish moves directed towards coming to a peace agreement 
with Soviet Russia, and to the degree of Finnish enthusiasm over 
the East Karelian issue. The latter was seen across a broad 
spectrum of the Swedish press, including a number of the major 
non-socialist papers, as little short of dangerous political advent-
urism. Most commentators argued that Finland would be well 
advised to abandon all her expansionist aims in the East. Little 
sympathy was similarly felt towards Finnish attempts to develop a 
261. Hentilä I 1982, pp. 210-14, 219-20, 254-7; Nygren 1968. p. 64. 
354 
closer relationship with the Baltic republics, which tended to be 
looked upon in Sweden as culturally and politically distant and as 
possessing, at best, an uncertain future.262 
Closer Swedo-Finnish relations proved difficult to achieve 
during the early years of Finnish independence, mainly as a result 
of the lengthy Aland Islands dispute. The stance taken by the 
League of Nations in its final decision on the issue in Finland's 
favour was seen in Sweden as amounting to a major defeat for 
Swedish diplomacy and the Swedish position overall, as well as 
for those politicians, Hjalmar Branting among the most prominent, 
who had worked towards achieving a solution favourable to 
Sweden. In putting the Swedish case over the Islands to the 
League, Branting, whose sympathies during the war years had 
been very much with the Allies and who had been encouraged by 
the West's championing of the cause of national self-determina-
tion, had directly appealed to the need to implement the principle 
in the case of the Aland Islands. By acceding to the Finnish case, 
Branting suggested, the League had undermined the very basis of 
its ideals and in a way likely to reduce future international 
confidence in the organisation.263 
Branting's dismay at the League's decision was echoed in the 
comments of Nya Dagligt Allehanda on the issue, which under-
lined the continuing slender measure of influence in European 
affairs exercised by the small nations of the region and what was 
seen as the incongruity between the high ideals espoused by 
Western leaders and what they amounted to in practice.264 
Svenska Dagbladet and Stockholms Dagblad, both sharing similar 
right-wing sympathies to Nya Dagligt Allehanda, also underscored 
the setback for Sweden contained in the League's decision. At the 
same time, they emphasised Sweden's continuing loyalty to the 
League and its ideals.265  Criticism of the League's decision was 
more muted among the liberal Swedish papers, which tended to 
point to its positive aspects, such as the international agreement 
covering the Islands' demilitarisation and the ban on fortifications, 
262. Kalela 1971, pp. 57-8, 69-72. Also see the report of the Swedish envoy in 
Helsinki to Stockholm dated 3.11.1922 (UD HP1Af). 
263. Gihl 1951, pp. 429-40; Soc-Dem 1.7.1921; Le Temps 2.7.1921. 
264. NDA 25.6.1921. 
265. SvD 26.6.1921. 
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and the guarantees covering the local population's continued use 
of Swedish. Dagens Nyheter stressed the necessity of coming to 
terms with the new situation and the importance of working 
towards improving Finnish-Swedish relations. Göteborgs 
Handels- och Sjöfartstidning, while describing Finland's overall 
position as having been strengthened by the diplomatic victory she 
had won at Geneva, focused on Finland's possible future isolation, 
which it saw as likely to spell danger forSweden.266 
The rapid disappearance of the Aland question from public 
debate in Sweden after June 1921 has been seen as indicating that 
the country's official policy on the issue lacked significant support 
from the mass of public opinion.267 Whatever the case, developing 
better relations with Finland was quickly adopted as a general aim 
of Swedish foreign policy in the period that followed. The general 
resistance which surfaced towards the idea of a bilateral defensive 
alliance between the two countries, put forward by the Swedish 
Foreign Minister, Hedenstierna, in 1923, however, served to show 
the essentially limited extent of Swedish interests in the question. 
The majority Swedish view favoured a normalisation of relations 
between the two countries, rather than any form of closer 
association. Sweden, in fact, wanted to avoid any direct foreign 
policy or other political ties with Finland that might undermine 
her policy of neutrality, one which continued to enjoy wide 
support, particularly in the light of the obvious benefits it had 
brought Sweden during the First World War. While willing to take 
part in the activities of the League of Nations, Sweden wanted to 
avoid involving herself in any other international commitments 
which might conceivably restrict her overall room for manoeuvre. 
This was made succinctly plain in a statement made by the 
Swedish Prime Minister, Hjalmar Branting, in October 1922 in 
which he laid out Sweden's attitudes to Finland and the Baltic 
republics: 'It is a long step from expressing our sympathy towards 
these countries and our affirmation that their independence is of 
considerable benefit to us, to committing ourselves to militarily 
intervene in their defence.'268 
266. DN 26.6.1921. 
267. Tingsten 1964, pp. 146-7. Also see Werner Söderhjelm's letter of 26.6.1922 
to Ståhlberg (Ståhlberg collection 31). 
268. Kalela 1971, p. 109. 
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Swedish attitudes towards Finland and developments in Finnish 
society during the 1920s varied widely between different 
commentators and political groupings. In the case of the language 
dispute and the wider language question which lay behind it, 
which had traditionally been the subject of some interest and 
concern within the wider spectrum of Swedish opinion, although 
most pronouncedly on the Right, interest became increasingly 
restricted to non-socialist circles. The continuing concern felt 
towards the position of the Swedish-speaking community in 
Finland was closely reflected in the choice of Finnish issues 
covered in the majority of the Swedish press of the time, and in the 
tone of its editorial comment on developments in Finland, much of 
which was critical of the Finnish-speaking majority. The more 
extreme and uncompromising aims of the Finnish nationalist 
movement were identified as especially dangerous to the future of 
the Swedish-speaking minority.269 For the Swedish labour 
movement, in contrast, the Finnish language question proved of 
little overall interest. The arguments and disputes surrounding the 
status of Swedish as a language of instruction and administration 
at Helsinki University were seen as largely irrelevant to the 
Swedish working class, although this did not prevent the appear-
ance of some adverse comment directed against the more radical 
expressions of Finnish nationalism which surfaced as part of this 
dispute. 
What did command the interest of commentators writing for the 
social democratic press was the continuing shadow the Civil War 
and its aftermath cast on Finnish society and, in particular, over 
the position of the Left in Finnish political life. Everything which 
pointed to the continuing oppressed position of the labour 
movement provided popular copy for papers like Social-
Demokraten, which was particularly critical of the decision by the 
Finnish authorities to institute official bans on communist activity 
as part of their campaign against the radical Left in August 1923. 
The political trials of communists held at the same time were also 
criticised in the Swedish social democratic and left-wing press. 
Moral support was widely forthcoming for Georg Branting, who 
269. See Werner Söderhjelm's report of 14.6.1928 to the Foreign Ministry in 
Helsinki (UM 5 C 2). 
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served as a defence lawyer in the political trials held in 1924 and 
who also published a critical pamphlet on his experiences.270 
Developments indicating the strengthening of moderate parlia-
mentary democratic policies within the labour movement in 
Finland were greeted with satisfaction. Among Finnish conserva-
tive figures, Mannerheim remained the subject of continued 
criticism and suspicion. 
Despite the relative coolness of much of Swedish opinion 
towards Finland, there were nevertheless some sections of opinion 
which continued to be especially favourably disposed towards 
Finland, but these were quite limited in extent. Among these was 
the group centred around the Samfundet Sverige-Finland 
association, led by General Ernst Linder and Sven Palme, an 
organisation which had been prominent in advocating providing 
Swedish aid to the White army in Finland during 1918. The views 
and attitudes of those associated with this organisation were 
nevertheless distant from those directly responsible for shaping 
Sweden's official policy towards Finland. They maintained their 
attachment to the White cause all the same, however, and in 1928, 
as part of their wider attempt to gain recognition for Sweden's part 
in helping the White forces' struggle ten years previously, 
sponsored a number of publications on the theme to commemorate 
the anniversary of the Civil War.27 Sympathies with the Finnish 
authorities' struggle against the Left, and Finland's stance towards 
the Soviet Union, were also evident to a limited extent within the 
Swedish army. Some contact was established by the Swedish High 
Command from the mid-1920s onwards with the Finnish General 
Staff, largely on intelligence questions. A number of groups within 
the Swedish officer corps also debated the possibility of deve-
loping a wider measure of military cooperation between the two 
countries' armed forces to prepare for what was seen as possible 
future military activity by the Soviet Union.272 
Against the background provided by the activities of these 
conservative groups, which often occupied a surprisingly visible 
270. See Georg Branting's pamphlet 'Rättvisan i Finland. Några dokument med 
kommentarer'. Also Soc-Dem 7.8., 7.12.1923. 
271. See A. Douglas: Kriget i Finland 1918 (Stockholm 1928); Den svenska insat-
sen i Finlands frihetskrig (Stockholm 1928). 
272. Ehrensvärd 1966, pp. 74-5. 
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place in Swedish society, despite the restricted numbers of those 
involved, Sweden's official foreign policy towards Finland, with 
its stress on maintaining good neighbourly relations but at the 
same time carefully avoiding over-close bilateral commitments, 
often seemed to slip from view. Stability above all else was 
perhaps the virtue official policy-makers in Sweden wanted 
Finland most to acquire, one which would see Finland avoiding 
any reattempt to develop a close association with the Baltic 
countries and yet maintaining correct relations with the Soviet 
Union. 
From the German perspective, the Finland that emerged during the 
1920s tended to be seen in relatively positive terms as a rapidly 
developing Scandinavian country firmly in the Western sphere. 
Independent Finland had first come to major prominence in 
Germany in the spring of 1918, with the dispatch of German forces 
under General von der Goltz to assist the White army in the Civil 
War. Participation in the latter conflict had been associated in 
many German minds with the more general Western struggle 
against the spread of Bolshevism, a fact which also contributed to 
creating and maintaining a stereotyped and essentially conserva-
tive view of Finnish politics. The pattern of Finland's domestic 
politics during the 1920s, with its numerous changes of 
government and shifting political allegiances, was sufficiently 
distant to the average German that it proved only of interest to 
those otherwise interested in Finnish affairs. Finnish politics, as a 
result, remained largely anonymous to the German public, and few 
Finnish political names were known in Germany. An exception to 
this general rule, however, was Mannerheim, who was remem-
bered for his links with the White Russian cause and for the 
leading role he had played in the early months of Finnish 
independence. 
German foreign policy thinking for much of the 1920s focused on 
the problems of redeveloping relations with the major Western 
powers and recovering from the setbacks imposed by the German 
defeat. The problems surrounding compliance with the terms of 
the Versailles agreement were a major concern. Interest in the 
eastern half of Europe was largely limited to hopes of possible 
future adjustments to Germany's eastern borders, and did not 
really extend to including any clear ideas on developing relations 
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on a wider scale with countries in the region. Exceptions to this 
were the Soviet Union and Poland, both of which were the objects 
of some considerable German interest. Germany signed the 
Rapallo Pact with the Soviet Union in 1922. 
In the wake of the closer diplomatic ties which developed 
between Berlin and Moscow in the 1920s, something of a shadow 
fell over the Baltic states and, to an extent, Finland as well, in 
terms of the latter's security policy options. With German interest 
firmly concentrated along the Russo-German axis, Finland came to 
occupy a position of marginal importance in German priorities.273 
Despite her new independent status, Finland actually declined in 
significance in many respects in German eyes during the post-war 
years, to much the same level as she had occupied prior to 1914. 
Germany appears to have lacked any definite policy towards 
Finland at this stage, above and beyond a general desire to 
maintain cordial relations with what was seen as a friendly 
country. Even if Finland failed to interest those in the German 
Foreign Ministry, she did nevertheless play quite a significant role 
in German foreign trade. This fact owed its origin to the 
established trade relations between the two countries which had 
been developed in the pre-war period, and to the importance 
which Baltic trade came to assume for Germany during the 1920s 
at a time when the terms of the Versailles peace restricted the size 
of German merchant ships, effectively preventing Germany from 
engaging in ocean-going trade. 
Variations in attitudes among the Western powers towards 
independent Finland during the 1920s were for the most part 
relatively minor, although as the decade wore on some differences 
did begin to emerge between the British and French positions. 
Finland's earlier pro-German foreign policy during 1918 had left 
an element of caution towards Finland in the minds of political 
leaders in both France and Britain, which in the case of France was 
particularly slow to dissipate. The adverse effect of Finland's past 
pro-German sympathies on Western opinion was also reinforced 
by what appeared, in the eyes of a number of Western figures, to be 
the aggressive expansionism which had characterised Finnish 
273. Ilvessalo 1959, pp. 104-9, 125. 
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policies over intervention in East Karelia and in the dispute with 
Sweden over the 'land Islands.274 The reserved stand adopted 
towards Finland by government circles in London and Paris, and 
also to some extent within the League of Nations, had a knock-on 
effect in shaping attitudes towards Finland in a number of other 
countries. Finland, in common with many of the other new states 
which had been born out of the war, was implicitly criticised for 
her slowness in adapting to the post-war European balance of 
power. Compared to countries such as Poland and Yugoslavia, 
Finland was nevertheless generally considered a less problematic 
case. Among the newly-independent states of the Baltic region, 
Finland represented a relatively clear-cut geographical and 
national entity, a fact appreciated in both London and Paris. In 
this sense, Finland was seen as standing in something of an 
intermediary position, between Scandinavia on the one hand and 
the Baltic republics on the other. Looked at in terms of the region's 
relation to Russia, a viewpoint particularly favoured in post-war 
French thinking during the early 1920s, although less so later, 
Finland was also nevertheless considered as essentially belonging 
to the Baltic regional grouping. Finland's long national traditions, 
together with the continuity and stable development of the 
country's political infrastructure, marred only by the set-back 
caused by the Civil War, and history of close association with 
Scandinavia, served all the same to anchor the country firmly 
within the Nordic sphere in the minds of many in the West. 
Finland's essentially positive political image in the West was 
steadily consolidated during the course of the 1920s, despite the 
relative uneventfullness of Finnish political life during the decade, 
in terms of issues of interest to observers in Western Europe, 
compared to the upheavals of previous years. This latter fact was 
reflected in the steep reduction of coverage of news about Finland 
which took place in the leading British and French papers from the 
period of Ståhlberg's presidency onwards.275 
Conditions in Finland in this regard contrasted strongly with 
Western impressions of those in a number of other newly-inde- 
274. Paasivirta 1969, pp. 19-20. 
275. In its coverage of Finland, The Times tended to concentrate on stories 
relating to Russia or relations between Finland and the Baltic republics rather 
than domestic Finnish issues. See for ex. The Times 31.10.1929. 
361 
pendent European states. Following the rise to power of 
dictatorships in Lithuania and Poland in the mid-1920s, Finland 
and Czechoslovakia came to be seen by many Western politicians 
as perhaps the best examples among the new European states of 
the successful implementation of liberal, democratic ideals. 
Czechoslovakia's position as a model was, it is true, overshadowed 
to some extent by her difficult minority nationality problems. The 
attention of observers in Western and Central Europe was 
especially drawn to the fact that, despite their identification with 
the losing side in the Civil War, the Social Democrats were never-
theless able to form a minority government in 1926. This served to 
strengthen the steadily growing view abroad that internal conflicts 
and tensions in Finland were well on the way to being resolved.2'6 
Compared to a country like Hungary, which had experienced 
broadly similar political upheavals in the final stages of the First 
World War and which during the 1920s came under the rule of the 
authoritarian Horthy regime, the situation in Finland appeared to 
give every cause for optimism. 
The general weakening in the position and influence of Russia 
and Germany in the Baltic area, which took place in the aftermath 
of the First World War, allowed Britain to exert more influence in 
the area. Continued access to the Baltic for British warships and 
the maintenance of the demilitarised status of the Aland Islands 
were dominant issues for Britain. While Finland's independent 
status was considered largely secure and the overall situation in 
the Baltic similarly stabilised, Foreign Office circles remained 
decidedly less sanguine about the position and future of the three 
Baltic republics. In discussions with Finnish diplomats, clear 
doubts were expressed about the long-term viability of these 
countries' independence. Finland, as a result, was advised to 
avoid over-close contact or involvement with them.27  
As long as the possibility of Western-backed intervention had 
remained open, France had had a general interest in all the border 
states along Russia's western frontier, including Finland, but when 
this passed the focus of French security policy interest narrowed 
in Eastern Europe. Poland emerged as the main focus of French 
276. The Times 13.12.1926; Le Temps 13.12.1926; Frankfurter Zeitung 13.12., 
15.12.1926; Vorwärts 16.12.1926. 
277. 0. Donner 1926, pp. 145-9. 
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attention and as the northernmost pillar in the French alliance 
system introduced in the region. Like Britain, France was also 
interested in maintaining maritime access to the Baltic, but mainly 
only as a means of safeguarding a route to allow assistance to 
Poland in the event of an international crisis, particularly one 
sparked off by renewed German military activity. When the 
question of the signing of a military agreement between Finland, 
Poland, Estonia and Latvia came up in the early spring of 1922, 
Poland was careful to sound out beforehand the opinions of her 
French ally to any such agreement. Marshal Foch's statement, 
given to the Polish General Staff on 4 March in response to Polish 
enquiries, stressed France's view that Poland should not agree to 
any military commitment likely to undermine her military 
preparedness to counter any threat from Germany. Foch's view 
was that Poland would be unlikely to benefit from any border state 
alliance and that she would be well advised to negotiate no more 
than a bilateral agreement with Finland covering political cooper-
ation on matters relating to the Soviet Union.278 French hostility to 
a wider military linkage between the Baltic countries would 
appear to have led to the reluctance of the Polish negotiators at the 
meeting of border state ministers held in Warsaw in mid-March 
1922 to consider the possibility of a military agreement, and their 
preference instead for a purely political agreement. 
The Scandinavian countries, Finland included, were ultimately 
largely peripheral to French interests and concerns, as was France 
to Scandinavia. The widespread fear of Germany felt in France 
during the 1920s nevertheless sometimes caused French attention 
to be drawn to events in Finland, in as much as they related, even 
distantly, to German issues. French diplomats in Helsinki kept a 
close watch on the state of Finnish-German relations. The negative 
reactions in Finland to the occupation of the Rhineland by French 
forces, the visit of General von Goltz to Helsinki, and the 
indications of possible military contacts between the Finnish and 
German armies were all carefully followed by the French Embassy 
in Helsinki.279 
278. See Marshal Foch's memorandum of 4.3.1922 to the French Foreign Ministry 
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Finland's steadily expanding presence on Western markets in 
the post-1919 period gave the country a relatively distinct profile 
in the field of international commerce. Compared to Sweden and 
Norway, both of whose timber resources had been significantly 
depleted as a result of earlier industrial exploitation, Finland 
tended to be seen by those involved in the international timber and 
paper trade as virtually virgin territory. Coupled with Russia's 
slow re-emergence as a timber exporter on the Western market, 
which only really got under way in 1924, this served to improve 
Finland's position as a potential trading partner in the eyes of a 
significant section of the business community in Western Europe. 
Overall, Finland was considered by Western industrialists and 
politicians alike, a peripheral but essentially viable, progressive 
small state. 
Beyond political and commercial issues, there was only a 
minimal level of knowledge and interest in Britain and France 
concerning other aspects of Finnish society, such as literature and 
the arts. One of the main limiting factors was Finland's small size 
and the modest scale of her input into the mainstream of European 
culture, which often led to Finland being written off as a cultural 
backwater with little to contribute to the major European 
countries. The language barrier, working in both directions, only 
reinforced this isolation. The efforts that were made to improve 
European awareness of Finland and to increase the flow of 
information, both from Finland to Europe and from the latter to 
Finland, were not helped by the fact that Sweden and Swedish-
speaking circles in Finland enjoyed an influential, if not at times 
dominating role in mediating these contacts. This often resulted in 
a situation in which the Western European audience was often 
significantly more aware of Finland and Finnish affairs as reflected 
in the activities of the country's Swedish-speaking minority, than 
through those of Finnish-speaking Finland. Information about the 
latter tended to find its way abroad on a much more sporadic basis. 
This imbalance in the exposure of the two linguistic groups abroad 
did, however, increasingly even itself out as time went on. 
Of the new independent states with which Finland had any 
significant dealings during the 1920s, Poland was particularly 
prominent during the early part of the decade. Under Pilsudsky, 
Poland embarked on a policy aimed at creating a powerful Polish 
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state along the lines of the Greater Poland which had existed 
during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, capable of a 
significant measure of independence from both Russia and Ger-
many and linked to a chain of friendly allied states, over which 
Poland exercised some measure of political influence. By creating 
a corridor, which was ultimately envisaged as stretching from the 
Baltic to the Black Sea, it was believed that Poland would be able 
to hamper closer future contacts between Russia and Germany, or, 
at a minimum, restrict and neutralise any negative effects they 
might have on the Polish position.280 It was also believed that a 
powerful Poland would be an attractive ally to France in Eastern 
Europe. 
The pattern of events in the immediate post-war years, including 
the Polish withdrawal from their occupation of Kiev in the 
summer of 1920 and the series of Polish reverses culminating in 
the Red Army offensive against Warsaw, repulsed with the help of 
French military advisers, marked a significant set-back to Poland's 
grand policy plans, even despite the fact that Poland acquired non-
Polish territory in the East at the Riga Peace of 1921. The failure of 
the Warsaw agreement to be ratified by its various signatories 
during the spring of 1922, together with Estonia's and Latvia's 
efforts to disengage themselves from too close an association with 
the Polish sphere of influence, also served to limit the expansion of 
Polish influence northwards. Although the Polish resolve to 
maintain an active foreign policy role and pursue an independent 
line towards the great powers remained, the scale of the country's 
foreign policy problems served in the long run to weaken her 
potential for influencing other countries in the Baltic region, 
including Finland, during the 1920s. 
Hungarian interest in Finland developed appreciably in the post-
war period, spurred not only by the sense of shared cultural 
inheritance linking the two countries, but also by the fact of 
Hungary's new political position and, above all, her deepening 
sense of isolation following the Peace of Trianon. Far from 
clutching solely to the straw held out by identification with the 
Finno-Ugrian inheritance and the ethnic solidarity it promised, 
however, there was an attempt to develop a dual cultural inheri- 
280. Korzek 1979, pp. 435-56. 
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tance theory. Eventually coming to possess the stamp of semi-
official approval, this stressed the dual nature of Hungary's 
historical and cultural affiliations, embracing the Turkic-Tartar 
peoples, as well as the Finno-Ugrian linguistic and cultural 
grouping.281 Despite the interest felt in Hungary towards Finland, 
it proved difficult for Hungary to develop contacts at the political 
and foreign policy levels, and links between the two countries 
ultimately tended to concentrate themselves in the field of 
literature and the arts. 
Estonia, in contrast, found in Finland her closest neighbour. 
Finland had played a direct part in Estonia's gaining of indepen-
dence through the volunteers sent to assist nationalist forces. 
Hopes in certain sections of Estonian opinion had initially focused 
on the possibility of the establishment of a political federation 
between Finland and Estonia, before events made all-out national 
independence a more attractive and viable option.282 
 Cut off 
linguistically from her Baltic neighbours to the south, Estonia 
found in Finland, a country owing allegiance to the same shared 
cultural background, a useful point of cultural reference and a 
source of ideas and influence in a wide variety of fields. For 
Finland, the relationship was ultimately more distant. 
Soviet attitudes towards Finland have to be seen against the 
background of the new foreign policy developed by the Soviet 
leadership. This was shaped not only by the requirements of 
communist ideology, but also by the turbulent period following 
the October Revolution and the deep impact it had on Soviet 
society and opinion. Western intervention in events within Russia 
and the isolation of Soviet Russia during its first years of existence 
inevitably coloured the development of foreign policy ideas and 
planning. The signing of a peace with Finland at Tartu in 1920 
was an important achievement in Soviet eyes, marking a 
significant stage on the way to securing the overall security of the 
Soviet Union's western border and towards freeing the country 
from isolation, and creating a viable defensive buffer zone.283 
281. Gragger 1921, pp. 157-60. 
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Finland's status as a new independent state, however, was 
viewed with some suspicion and misgiving by the Soviet govern-
ment during the early years of independence. Finland's historical 
links with Germany and the role assumed by German forces during 
the Finnish Civil War of 1918 played a prominent part among 
these concerns. Although Finland had not participated in Western 
intervention, her essentially hostile attitude to Soviet interests had 
been made plain in Soviet eyes through her enthusiasm for 
expansionist policies directed towards East Karelia and her 
backing of unofficial military intervention in the area. All of this 
undoubtedly contributed to reinforcing the view, typical of the 
Soviet position throughout this period, that the policies followed 
by small states in general, Finland included, were determined in 
large part by outside forces and that the independence they might 
claim for their actions was largely illusory.284 With regard to 
Finland, Soviet suspicions during the 1920s focused particularly 
on British influence and Finland's economic dependence on 
Britain as a major trading partner. An unwelcome dependence on 
the Western great powers was also detected by Moscow in the 
policies followed by the Baltic countries. 
Soviet fears concentrated on the possible expansion of the West's 
potential to isolate the Soviet Union, particularly through the 
activities of the League of Nations and exploitation of the Locarno 
Pact. By offering non-aggression treaties to its western neighbours, 
the Soviet Union hoped to be able to reduce to a minimum the 
West's potential for joint action directed against Soviet interests. 
At base, the overall Soviet position on foreign and security policy 
issues was ultimately defensive rather than aggressive, although 
for ideological reasons and largely as a result of the role played by 
Comintern, Soviet intentions were typically seen in the West as, 
for the most part, actively hostile. In their policy and attitude 
towards Finland, the Soviet authorities were motivated by a desire 
to see Finland avoid close ties with the Baltic countries and, above 
all, with Poland.285 
The failure of the Left in the Finnish Civil War, together with the 
various interpretations put on this, also powerfully shaped the 
284. Paasivirta 1969, p. 22. 
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overall nature of Soviet views of Finland. The long-term potential 
of Finland's parliamentary system to meet the challenges of 
independence and the radical Left became the source of much 
Soviet speculation as the 1920s wore on. The Finnish Socialist 
Workers' Party, with its avowedly revolutionary ideals, enjoyed a 
greater measure of popular support than any of the equivalent 
parties active in the Soviet Union's other western neighbours. 
Added to this, a significant group of Finnish emigre communists 
were also active in Leningrad and Moscow. These latter, together 
with their Hungarian emigre colleagues, were the only non-
Russians within Russia to have had experience of revolution in 
their own countries. This no doubt fed Russian hopes of a future 
possible change of government, resulting in one more amenable to 
Russian interests one day taking place.286 
Given the small scale of Soviet foreign trade during the 1920s 
and the country's low purchasing power, it was inevitable that the 
level of Finnish-Soviet trade during the period should also have 
been modest. Soviet commercial interest during the NEP period, 
and even more so during the course of the first five-year plan, 
focused on negotiating trade agreements with the larger European 
economies capable of satisfying Soviet requirements in such areas 
as capital goods, rather than on developing links with the smaller 
European countries. While the Baltic republics, and the Latvian 
capital, Riga, in particular, came to occupy an important position 
as through-shipping areas for trade between Soviet Russia and the 
West, the fact of Finland's more northerly geographical position 
prevented the latter from developing into a similar bridge for 
Soviet exports. The modest scale of the Finnish economy and 
domestic market also militated against encouraging any significant 
Soviet economic initiative. The most Soviet planners probably 
envisaged from Soviet-Finnish trade was a limited border trade 
embracing the Leningrad area. 
286. Paasivirta 1969, pp. 22-3. 
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VI Finland During the 
Tense Depression Years 
of the Early 1930s 
1. The changing face of world politics and the 
spread of the international recession 
The closing years of the 1920s were marked by a number of 
attempts, many of them emanating from the League of Nations, 
aimed at underpinning the peaceful future development of Europe 
and eliminating the remaining tensions left by the Great War. 
Despite the efforts that were made, little of substance was achieved 
on the basic issue of reducing tension and creating the basis for a 
more stable and secure international order, in spite of the relative 
calm which had reigned in Europe for much of the decade and 
which had otherwise contributed to encouraging a greater mood of 
optimism. No real progress in developing collective security in 
Europe, or in erecting credible barriers against possible future 
outbreaks of international aggression, proved forthcoming fol-
lowing the failure of the 1924 Geneva protocol to be widely 
ratified. The Kellogg-Briand Pact initiative proposed in 1928, 
condemning the use of violent means in the resolution of disputes, 
lacked any means of enforcement and amounted in the final 
analysis to little more than a declaration of good intentions, rather 
than any concrete step towards guaranteeing peaceful coexistence. 
European politics continued to be dominated by the seemingly 
intractable division existing between the victors and the defeated, 
between those countries which had benefited from the peace 
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treaties imposed at the end of the First World War and those 
which, as defeated countries, had suffered significant losses as a 
result of the peace, or those, like Italy, whose territorial and 
political aspirations had, despite their wartime allegiance to the 
Allies, nevertheless failed to be fulfilled. This split was reflected 
in the pattern of tension and friction which came to characterise 
relations between those countries committed to preserving the 
post-war status quo and those determined to redress what they saw 
as the imbalance in European relations institutionalised in the 
post-1918 division of power.' 
These tensions were well illustrated in the development of 
Franco-German relations during the latter half of the 1920s. The 
latter were dominated by the two partially interrelated questions of 
reparations and Germany's economic and political recovery. In 
failing to stipulate the final amount Germany was to pay in 
reparations, the 1924 Dawes Plan proved the source of persistent 
dispute between the two countries. Similar friction was generated 
by the efforts of Germany's long-time Foreign Minister, Gustav 
Stresemann, to work for the revision of the terms of the Treaty of 
Versailles and of a number of the other restrictive arrangements 
imposed on Germany after the war. It took until virtually the end 
of the decade to see any real progress on reducing Franco-German 
tension. The agreement reached between Germany and the 
Western powers in June 1930, on the basis of the Young Plan, on 
the reparations payments question, bringing with it a number of 
concessions to German interests and the ending of the Allied 
occupation of the Rhineland five years ahead of schedule, marked 
something of a reconciliation in relations between the West and 
Germany, and an easing of tension in Western Europe as a whole.2 
This essentially positive development came to be overshadowed, 
however, by the dramatic upheaval in the Western economic 
world set in motion by the crash on the New York Stock Exchange 
in October 1929. 
The period leading up to the crash had, ironically, been one of 
powerful economic growth in the Western world, during which 
overall industrial production in Europe, excluding the Soviet 
1. Renouvin VII 1957, pp. 340-6; Marks 1979, pp. 100-1. 
2. Carr 1973, pp. 126-8; Hiden 1977, pp. 58-9. 
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Union, had risen some 20-25% between 1925 and 1929, and that 
in Germany 10-20% above 1913 levels. The wide-ranging 
economic optimism typical of the time in Western Europe drew 
much of its inspiration from the dynamic recovery which had got 
under way in the immediate post-war period and the hopes this 
aroused of overcoming the after-effects of the First World War. 
The stabilisation of the international currency market and the 
widespread adoption of the gold standard in the mid-1920s had 
contributed to encouraging the expansion of international trade. 
Parallel to these developments, however, Europe had become 
increasingly economically tied to the United States and to 
fluctuations in the American economy as a result of the scale of the 
loans contracted with America, both during the war years and 
after. Countries affected included America's wartime allies 
anxious to reconstruct their war-torn economies, Germany bur-
dened with heavy reparations payments, together with Germany's 
wartime allies, as well as many of the new independent countries, 
such as Finland.3 
A foretaste of the recession to come was provided by the 
extensive international agricultural crisis, caused by steep falls in 
agricultural commodity prices spurred by over-production, which 
set in from 1928 onwards, severely affecting the farming 
populations of many East European countries and much of Latin 
America and Australia.4 It was the upswing in industrial pro-
duction which had been instrumental in revitalising the Western 
world's international economy, together with the upward price 
spiral it had generated, however, which was to be the main factor 
behind the crash itself. As a result of the close inter-relationship of 
international trade and financial markets that had developed, the 
effects of the American crash, far from being restricted to the North 
American market, quickly extended to Europe. The rush by 
American banks to foreclose on their European loans in the wake 
of the collapse on Wall Street, followed by the various large-scale 
movements of capital which took place within the European area 
itself, rapidly and seriously undermined the economies of many 
European countries, paving the way for a whole series of national 
3. Montgomery 1954, p. 175-7. 
4. Baumont 1967, p. 396; Grouzet 1969, pp. 114-5; Ruck 1945, p. 259. 
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currency crises. The general currency upheaval in Europe, further 
fuelled by the financial upsets which developed in Austria, and 
which began to bite in earnest from the summer of 1931 onwards, 
led to Britain's decision to leave the gold standard on 21 
September and to devalue sterling's international value by 30%. 
Britain's move was followed by a number of other countries in 
Northern Europe, which followed suit in devaluing their 
currencies and abandoning the gold standard.' 
It did not take long for the widespread recession set in train by 
the New York debacle to be felt in the shape of a sharp decline in 
the level of industrial output in the United States and the 
industrialised countries of Western Europe.' The reduction in 
German production between June 1929 and July 1932, for example, 
amounted to some 38%. Linked to this fall-off in output there was 
a general decline in prices and wages, which in turn contributed to 
a drop in overall purchasing power. Unemployment grew 
dramatically, rising in the United States to a figure of 11.4 million 
in 1932 and in Germany in mid-1931 to over 5 million, and in 
Britain in January 1931 to 2.6 million.' Among the Western 
countries, only France was able to avoid the worst effects of this 
development, with her unemployment statistics showing only a 
mild increase over the same period. Britain too, where wage levels 
never fell significantly, managed to escape some of the problems 
affecting her neighbours.' The combined effects of the dislocations 
affecting the industrial and agricultural sectors in much of Europe 
also inevitably resulted in a major reduction in the scale of the 
region's foreign trade from what it had been in the peak years of the 
late 1920s. 
The recession had a particularly severe effect on the German 
economy, which during the pre-1929 boom years had experienced 
a period of extensive expansion, funded largely by injections of 
foreign and particularly American loan capital. 1927 and 1928 had 
seen Germany contract foreign loans to a value five times that of 
the country's war reparations payments. Based as the German 
5. Baumont 1967, pp. 396-7; Grouzet 1969, pp. 111-2. 
6. Lundberg 1953, p. 37. 
7. Grouzet 1969, pp. 114, 116; Wood 1965, p. 413. 
8. Grouzet 1969, pp. 115-6. 
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economic recovery thus was, in large measure, on an essentially 
insecure foundation and prone to fluctuations in the international 
money markets, the withdrawal of American capital which began 
in the autumn of 1929 had a disastrous effect on German economic 
fortunes. The sharp fall which took place in German economic 
output and the parallel rapid rise in unemployment which 
followed made it virtually impossible for the German authorities to 
keep a hold over the country's balance of payments, which in any 
case had only been kept in some sort of order with difficulty prior 
to the slump.9 Germany's position became only more fraught 
following the steady worsening of domestic stability which took 
place from the autumn of 1930 onwards, until events finally led in 
January 1933 to Hitler's National Socialists being accepted into 
government. 
Despite the international nature of the depression ushered in by 
the 1929 New York crash, surprisingly little was achieved in the 
area of international cooperation to combat its impact on the world 
economy. Among the few exceptions to this were the efforts of the 
three Scandinavian countries, which established the Oslo group in 
1930, and those of Belgium and Holland, which held extensive 
joint talks on economic issues and ways of coordinating their 
response to the crisis, and those of the Commonwealth nations, 
which discussed the possibility of setting up a common customs 
union at their economic conference held in Ottawa in 1932. The 
countries in the Danube basin, however, failed in their attempt in 
August 1930 to establish an European pricing agreement for 
agricultural products designed to protect European agricultural 
producers from American competition.10 For its part, the United 
States was forced in 1931, as a result of the continuing European 
economic crisis, to grant its European debtor nations a year-long 
moratorium on repayments of their loans held with American 
banks. As part of a joint effort to stem the German economic slide 
and to finally resolve the German war reparations question, an 
agreement was drawn up in Lucerne in July 1932, on the basis of 
the earlier Young Plan, limiting further German reparations 
commitments to no more than a single payment of 150 million 
9. Montgomery 1954, pp. 208-14. 
10. Wood 1965, p. 413; Marks 1979, p. 93. 
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pounds.11 With little sign of any let-up in the recession, however, 
one European country after another decided that it had no option 
but to terminate its loan agreements with the United States. By 
1933, Finland remained the only European country which 
continued its annual repayments on its loan obligations to the US. 
This breakdown was only compounded by events at the world 
economic conference held in London in June 1933, which 
represented something of a peak in the series of failures to find a 
common response to the slump, eventually breaking up with 
nothing of significant import achieved.12 
In contrast to events in the Western economies, developments in 
the Soviet economy had followed their own largely independent 
course. The country's first five-year plan was introduced in 1929. 
This embraced an ambitious programme aimed at extensive 
industrialisation across the whole breadth of the country and, in 
particular, the creation of a viable heavy industrial base and 
communications network. The economic thinking behind the five-
year plan structure depended on keeping consumption and living 
standards at a low level to release capital to fund the country's 
industrialisation programme. Parallel to this intensive programme 
of industrialisation, a system of collective agricultural production 
was also introduced to replace the system of smallholding-
dominated production, based on private land ownership, which 
had been accepted as part of the earlier compromise NEP policy. 
The large-scale economic restructuring this involved led to a 
powerful concentration of power and control at the centre and, by 
extension, in that held by the party secretary, Joseph Stalin. In line 
with this increasingly centralised planning infrastructure, the 
emphasis on ideological issues also deepened, accompanied by a 
renewed campaign against religious belief and the influence of the 
Church.13 
While developments in the East during the early years of the 
1930s saw an increasing reliance on an integrated, centrally-
coordinated economic and social base, those in Western Europe 
continued to be typified by a fragmented approach to the challenge 
11. Carr 1973, pp. 141, 147. 
12. Ibid., pp. 149-50; Baumont 1967, p. 421. 
13. Carr 1979, pp. 164-72; Deutscher 1978, pp. 237, 275, 294-6. 
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of countering the negative effects of the economic slump. There 
was little desire or determination, at least among the major 
economies of the region, for developing a commonly-agreed set of 
responses to the problems facing the Western market. Following 
the seeming failure of free market forces to offer any adequate 
remedy for the effects of the recession, many governments 
abandoned the bulk of their earlier laissez-faire ideas and instead 
embarked on policies of introducing high import tariffs to protect 
their domestic industries and agricultures, combined with various 
systems of export support and devaluations of their currencies. 
Within a relatively short space of time, the whole notion of free 
trade was virtually completely abandoned and replaced by 
protectionism, with the result that the international economy 
became increasingly destabilised and fragmented into a collection 
of protectionist national economies dominated, to a great or lesser 
extent, by attempts to develop economic self-sufficiency. 
This spread of protectionist philosophy was paralleled in many 
countries affected by the depression by a growing level of political 
concern and discussion surrounding nationalist issues and 
questions of how best to defend national interests and maintain 
national cohesion against a background of increasing international 
uncertainty. Whilst this development was typical of a number of 
European states, it was particularly prominent in Germany and in 
the newly-independent countries of Eastern and Central Europe, 
many of which had suffered from political and economic 
instability throughout their post-war independence. This growth 
in nationalist attitudes brought increasingly loud demands for the 
introduction of new nationalist-based governments. The ideals of 
democracy and parliamentary government, which had previously 
enjoyed a wide measure of respect and currency in the post-
Versailles world, began to be increasingly questioned, and their 
supporters forced on to the defensive. The growing influence of 
the great powers in European affairs and the reduction in the 
overall freedom of manoeuvre available to the small states of the 
region represented additional related problems. 
In an attempt to stem the worst effects of the recession, many 
governments in Western Europe, both those of the parliamentary 
democracies and the authoritarian dictatorships in the region, 
were forced to intervene in economic issues to a degree previously 
unprecedented in peacetime. The bulk of these interventionist 
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policies relied on traditional liberal economic ideas and were 
characterised by a dependence on measures to reduce overall 
levels of wages and prices. In Germany, the deflationary economic 
policies introduced by Briining's government from 1930 onwards 
were followed, and particularly after Hitler's rise to power in 1933, 
by tight regulation of the economy, aimed at guaranteeing 
Germany a greater measure of economic self-sufficiency and 
concentrating trading on a clearing basis. Attention generally 
tended to be focused on attempting to save the established 
economic system, rather than on any efforts to formulate new types 
of economic initiative. Per Albin Hansson's Social Democrat 
government in Sweden concentrated much of its efforts, in 
addition to those directed at underpinning the country's export 
effort, on an extensive programme of public works, designed to 
maintain consumption levels and stimulate economic activity in 
the private sector and manufacturing industry. America too opted 
for an interventionist style of government. Roosevelt's New Deal 
programme, instituted after he entered office in 1933, allowed for a 
substantial federal government involvement in the American 
economy, combined with wide-scale reform of the fiscal system. 
The thinking behind the New Deal had a powerful influence on 
European attitudes towards ways of combating the recession and 
reinvigorating Western economies, paralleling that enjoyed by 
John Maynard Keynes' theories on public deficit spending. 
Much of Europe nevertheless remained divided and at a loss as 
to how to respond to the failure of the free market system to react to 
a recession of its own making, following the undermining of 
confidence in traditional solutions. Many politicians were 
hampered by their resistance to the whole notion of state 
intervention in economic issues. Given the divergence of opinion 
as to the most effective approach to the problem, the major 
difficulty facing many of the parliamentary democracies crys-
tallised around the problem of uniting sufficient political forces 
around a minimum programme. Many social democratic parties 
found themselves in the thankless position of having to come to 
terms with compromise economic solutions in order to maintain 
public credibility in the multiparty system. The importance of this 
task was only highlighted by the increasing power being gained by 
the Right and the mounting attacks being made by right-wing 
parties, both in and out of power, not only against the threat of 
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international Marxism, but also against what was seen as the 
ineffectiveness and lack-lustre performance of liberal democracy 
in tackling the economic challenge represented by the recession. 
For all the economic problems affecting the West, there was no 
real let-up in the level of criticism directed against the Soviet 
Union and the Communist movement by the majority of non-
socialist and social democratic parties throughout Europe. 
Particular objects of criticism were Stalin's increasingly dictatorial 
style of leadership, collectivisation and the programme of agricul-
tural reorganisation instituted under the five-year plans, and the 
revived campaign against the Church. Attention was also drawn to 
the low standard of living then typical of conditions in the Soviet 
Union. It was difficult to ignore the fact, however, that despite the 
slump affecting the Western world, the Soviet Union, in the midst 
of its extensive programme of economic construction, had 
managed to avoid the scourge of unemployment. 
The imminent prospect of the capitalist world entering a period 
of major upheaval had been widely discussed at the sixth congress 
of Comintern held in 1928. The emphasis given to the imminence 
of the capitalist collapse, together with a number of other factors, 
had contributed to a hardening of the ideological line pursued by 
Comintern and an increased emphasis on the need for an uncom-
promising struggle against social democratic parties. National 
communist parties were advised to prepare for possible revo-
lutionary action. A direct consequence of this increasing shift 
towards expectation of impending radical change in the West were 
the purges, directed against eliminating what were seen as rightist 
elements, instituted in a number of national communist and 
affiliated parties.14 
In addition to encouraging the spread of nationalist thinking in 
various parts of Europe, the deepening of the international 
recession also triggered a general decline, both in Europe and 
elsewhere, in the level of optimism regarding the possibility of 
maintaining peace. This was particularly evident in the increased 
doubts which came to be voiced about the League of Nations and 
its role as a peacemaker. The Japanese occupation of Manchuria in 
September 1931, although only of limited consequence to the 
14. Borkenau 1938, pp. 337-43, 346-9. 
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outside world, represented a major setback to attempts to 
consolidate peaceful international development and a challenge to 
the authority of the League of Nations. The seeming inability of 
the League to function as an effective international forum in 
working towards its avowed aims, such as disarmament, was also 
reinforced in the eyes of its critics by the small measure of progress 
made by the special disarmament committee set up by the League 
in 1927. 
The upheavals on the international scene in the years that had 
followed its setting-up had, however, through no fault of the 
League itself, served to undermine the credibility of all ideas 
aimed at some measure of arms reduction, and contributed to 
reinforcing resistance to any proposals which could be interpreted 
as potentially weakening the national defence capabilities of 
individual member states. As increasing criticism and doubts 
began to be expressed about the continued viability of the peace 
treaties concluded at the conclusion of the First World War, so 
further demands came to be heard calling for their amendment. 
The sharp splits within the international community over security 
questions, combined with the lack of overall international 
confidence, only further reduced the room for manoeuvre allowed 
the specially-convened disarmament conference held between 
1932 and 1933. The failure of the conference to produce any solid 
results, together with the departure of Germany and Japan from the 
League in 1933, pointed to the emergence of a new stage in 
international politics.15 
2. The rise of the Finnish Right 
The end of the 1920s witnessed a marked increase in political 
activity at both extremes of the political spectrum, a development 
which came to seriously undermine the pattern of a distinct, if 
modest shift towards the Centre which had been observed within 
Finnish society during the earlier part of the decade. Within the 
labour movement, this change was most prominent in the trade 
unions, highlighted by the victory of the radical Left at the SAJ 
15. Carr 1973, pp. 175-88. 
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conference held at the beginning of 1929, aided by the renewed 
activities of the Finnish Communist Party, following the new, 
more aggressive policy adopted by Comintern in 1928. The Left's 
victory brought the withdrawal of the Social Democrats from the 
increasingly radical and uncompromising SAJ, and led to their 
establishing their own central federation. The Social Democrats 
were accompanied in their departure by a separate group of 
independently-minded radical trade union activists, who feared 
that the uncompromising stance taken by the Communists would 
lead to the status of the movement being badly undermined.16 
The parallel rise of radical influence on the Right owed its 
origins to an upswing in fears among conservative circles at what 
was seen as the increased threat to society posed by the 
communist-inspired Left, and to the build-up of conservative 
unease and dissatisfaction with the general trend of developments 
in Finnish politics and society, which had steadily taken place 
since the election of Ståhlberg as President and the signing of the 
Tartu Peace. Many of those who had taken an active part on the 
White side during the spring of 1918, and yet had failed to gain 
what they considered positions commensurate with their abilities, 
were particularly bitter. Their bitterness nevertheless went beyond 
that of simple personal rancour, extending to embrace a more 
deep-rooted disappointment and disaffection with the whole 
fabric of the republican form of government and pattern of post-
independence politics, which were seen as having little in 
common with the ideals they had fought for in the Civil War. 
Particular discontent was felt with the series of compromises seen 
as having been taken on many central questions affecting the 
country's future, and the apparent ease with which the Left, 
despite its defeat in the Civil War, was now allowed access to 
power and influence. It was from among this section of right-wing 
opinion that an increasing number of calls came to be heard for a 
final settling of accounts with those who continued to remain 
dedicated to the overthrow of society, and the completion of what 
had been left undone during the Civil War. These calls bore a 
disturbing similarity to those made a decade earlier by the more 
16. Hodgson 1967, pp. 122-33; Haataja et al 1976, pp. 163-5; Virtanen 1983, pp. 
13-24; Suomen Työmies 1.-6.1930; Hugo Ahokanta 16.12.1970. 
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extreme supporters of the rough justice meted out against the Red 
rebels in the wake of the Civil War.17 
The opening shot in the confrontation which developed between 
Right and Left took place at the end of November 1929 in Lapua, a 
small rural community in Ostrobothnia, at a gathering organised 
by the communist youth movement, which developed into a fracas 
between those attending and elements of the conservative local 
population. This symbolic disturbance, minor as it was, served to 
unite those strands of increasingly aggressive conservative opin-
ion, which had up until then lacked a shared cause, and led to the 
emergence of what became known as the Lapua movement and the 
setting-up of the Suomen Lukko organisation in March 1930 to 
coordinate a new, more forceful struggle against communism. 
From the beginning, however, the anti-communist movement 
contained two distinctive wings, which soon found themselves 
split over appropriate means to achieve their goal, and eventually 
over the very nature of that goal. The more moderate of the two, 
which reflected the wider aspirations of a significant proportion of 
non-socialist opinion, focused on the need to maintain law and 
order and social stability, and prevent outbreaks of communist-
inspired challenges to authority. The more extreme faction, 
identified with figures such as Vihtori Kosola, the self-styled 
leader of the Lapua movement, favoured more openly violent 
means, including the kidnapping of opponents and the exploit-
ation of extensive extra-parliamentary pressure. A peak in the 
activities of the latter grouping was reached in the peasants' march 
on Helsinki organised at the beginning of July 1930, in which some 
12,000 marchers took part in support of demands for the banning 
of all communist activity. 
Shortly prior to this, in mid-June, the government approved a 
measure, issued in the name of maintaining social stability, 
banning the publication of all newspapers and magazines by the 
radical Left, including the Communists. The four-party govern-
ment headed by Svinhufvud, a popular figure with the Right, 
which took office in July replacing Kallio's narrower coalition, 
presented Parliament with a legislative package designed to 
17. E. W. Juva II 1961, pp. 364-81; Wahlbäck 1968, pp. 124-9; Aktivisti 1.5., 
15.5., 1.6.1930. 
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outlaw communism altogether. This failed to win approval, 
however, and had to be postponed following the government's 
inability, as a result of Social Democrat opposition, to guarantee it 
the five-sixths majority needed. The government's victory in the 
elections called in the wake of the bill's rejection ensured that it 
was approved at the beginning of November by the new Parlia-
ment, with the majority necessary for the constitutional amend-
ments it required. Once on the statute books, it effectively served 
to retrospectively legitimise earlier government moves against the 
communist movement.18 
Following the initial success of its campaign against the Left in 
the shape of the passing of the anti-communist laws, however, the 
movement, to survive, was forced to move further to the Right. 
New, more radical demands aimed at modifying the nature of the 
political system were introduced, including ones for limiting the 
franchise and the replacement of proportional representation by a 
smaller number of single-member constituencies. Criticism of 
liberal parliamentary ideals was heavily stepped up. The notion of 
a strong government, capable of acting in the greater national 
interest and free of the sort of party squabbling which, it was 
thought, had up until then weakened the country's abilities to 
resist the threat posed by the Left, came to dominate thinking 
within the movement.19 The build-up in extra-parliamentary 
pressure which took place during the summer and autumn of 1930, 
embracing numerous kidnappings of political figures, such as the 
Social Democratic Vice-Speaker of Parliament, Väinö Hakkila, and 
former President K. J. Ståhlberg, together with the increasing level 
of violence surrounding Lapua movement-inspired action against 
the Left, ultimately told against the movement, however, and led a 
number of its hitherto supporters, both within and outside the 
organisation, to question its future. 
The growing belief that, following the elimination of what were 
considered as the worst aspects of the communist threat with the 
approval of the anti-communist laws in November, the Lapua 
18. E. W. Juva 1961, pp. 393-7; Huttunen VI 1968, pp. 431-44; Mylly 1978, pp. 
214-7; Kirby 1979 pp. 86-7. 
19. See Herman Gummerus: Dagbok 26.6.1939; Kai Donner: Muistiinpanoja 28.9., 
8.10.1930. 
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movement had largely served its purpose and that, if left 
unchecked, it could itself become a threat to the parliamentary 
system, led to members of the Agrarian and Progressive parties 
increasingly disassociating themselves from the movement. 
Similarly, within the Swedish People's Party, which had 
continued to support the movement as late as the peasants' march, 
opposition to it gradually began to get the upper hand as the 
violent means it employed came to be seen as potentially threaten-
ing the future position of the Swedish minority.20 Resistance to the 
Lapua movement among the Social Democrats was restricted by 
the party's isolated position and ability to call on only relatively 
small reserves of backing from within the wider labour movement, 
the activities of which had been severely curtailed as a conse-
quence of the banning of communist organisations in the summer 
of 1930. 
By the time of the presidential elections held at the beginning of 
1931, the disquiet felt towards the Lapua movement and its long-
term aims among the majority of conservative opinion, the 
Agrarians included, had become firmly established. The choice of 
Svinhufvud in preference to Ståhlberg, in large part as a result of 
the Agrarians' decision to back the former, was significantly 
influenced by a general desire to re-establish social stability and 
guarantee a return to the rule of law. Svinhufvud, while enjoying 
wide support on the Right, even on the extreme Right, was 
committed to the maintenance of the parliamentary system. 
Parliamentary democracy in Finland was maintained, in the 
final analysis, by the essentially moderate aims of the bulk of non-
socialist opinion, which, while willing to support restrictions on 
what was seen as left-wing agitation and the abuse of an over-
lenient system by the Left, never really called for the system's full-
scale modification. The Sunila-led government, again a four-party 
coalition, which sat between 1931 and 1932, reflected this general 
trend of opinion. The Mäntsälä incident, which took place in the 
early spring of 1932, provoked by right-wing activists, amounted to 
something of a desperate last stand by the weakened Lapua 
movement. By this point, it enjoyed little support in either 
20. Nordström 1946, pp. 72-5; Mylly 1978, pp. 218-9. Also see the report of the 
German envoy in Helsinki to Berlin (AA, Gesandschaft Helsinki, Politik 1930). 
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Parliament or the government for its calls for the banning of the 
Social Democratic Party, to which it had turned its attention after 
the passing of the anti-communist legislation the previous year. A 
central part in the failure of the attempt by those behind the 
Mäntsälä incident to achieve their aims was played by the 
widespread popular reaction which emerged against this display 
of a direct violent challenge to the authority of the government and 
the status quo. Aware of the desire within some sections of the 
military and the Right in Helsinki for a reorganisation of the 
country's power structure and their sympathies with those 
responsible for the incident, Svinhufvud ordered the army to seal 
off the Mäntsälä area to prevent trouble spreading and aid being 
sent to the rebels. The latters' final fate was sealed by a radio 
speech given by Svinhufvud calling for the end of disturbances 
and a return to order.21  
Although the failure of the Mäntsälä incident in the spring of 
1932 brought the banning of the Lapua movement, those on the 
radical Right soon rallied behind a new party, the People's 
Patriotic Movement (Isänmaallinen Kansanliike, IKL), which took 
over many of the political ideas previously identified with the 
Lapua organisation. While the latter's ideological emphasis had 
been strongly national and its programme born out of Finnish 
conditions, features which had allowed it to win a significant 
measure of mass popular support, the new party's style of public 
presentation and political programme were much more 
fundamentally shaped and influenced by ideas from abroad, 
particularly by the example of Germany's National Socialists and 
other fascist parties. Germany provided the major example for the 
organisation of the new party, although the military-style 
hierarchy characteristic of the Nazis was not introduced. Much 
was also learnt from the National Socialists in the use of 
propaganda. A number of attempts were made within the party for 
the establishment of a strong leadership based on the German 
model, but no agreement was reached among the various 
contenders, none of whom possessed the charisma called for in a 
true populist leader. In practice, the leadership of the party came 
to be split between a triumvirate, made up of Vihtori Kosola, Vilho 
21. Österman 1966, pp. 86-90; Paavo Susitaipale 23.2.1979. 
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Annala and Bruno Sundström (Salmiala). Some interest was also 
felt towards the Italian corporative system of organisation and 
outline plans for its implementation were drawn up, but no official 
IKL backing for it emerged.22 Outside its own ranks, the right-wing 
ideas which now found expression in the IKL only really proved 
capable of influencing opinion within the National Coalition 
Party. As part of an attempt to widen the latter party's appeal, its 
leadership decided in November 1932, at Edwin Linkomies' 
suggestion, to develop a more conciliatory approach towards the 
IKL.23 
Despite the swing away from the form of right-wing radical 
action typified by the Mäntsälä incident, which took place in its 
wake, conservative nationalist opinion remained, although not 
dominant, nevertheless a powerful factor in society. While the 
Social Democrats and the Centre aligned themselves behind 
policies aimed at reinforcing legitimacy and democracy, the 
extreme Right increasingly began to look to support for its ideals 
and political programme from the more extreme and authoritarian 
aspects of the White tradition, and from developments abroad. 
During the course of the run-up to the parliamentary elections held 
during the summer of 1933, the first waged by the new party, much 
emphasis was laid within the IKL on the celebrations held during 
the first half of the year on the occasion of the fifteenth anniversary 
of the White victory in 1918.24 
The Right, embracing both the more moderate National Coalition 
and the IKL, however, suffered a clear defeat in the 1933 elections, 
with its total number of seats reduced from 42 to 32, while the 
Social Democrats secured an increase of some ten seats on their 
previous standing, from 66 to 78. The Progressives enjoyed a mild 
upswing in their support as a result of their identification with the 
forces of legitimacy and association with Ståhlberg, but remained a 
minor force, far behind the Agrarians, who formed the second 
largest party. Looked at against an European perspective, the 
elections marked a clear shift for Finnish politics away from 
22. Bruno Salmiala 5.10.1979; Viljo Castrén 16.9.1980; Paavo Susitaipale 
23.2.1979. 
23. Uola 1982, pp. 151-2. 





sympathy with developments in Germany towards a more 
conscious alignment with those in Scandinavia. In domestic 
terms, the result consolidated the increasing unanimity which had 
developed on a number of policy issues between the Social 
Democrats, the Agrarians and the Progressives. 
The success of the Social Democrats in gaining almost as large a 
number of seats as the entire Left had won in the 1929 elections 
came as something of a shock for the emigre leadership of the 
Communist Party, particularly after it had aligned itself behind 
calls for non-participation in the elections earlier in the year, calls 
which were ignored to all intents and purposes by the radical Left 
within Finland.25 The scale of the setback provoked a wide-
ranging reassessment by the party leadership, now including 0. W. 
Kuusinen, of its policy, which had been adopted during the late 
1920s in line with then current Comintern thinking, with the aim 
of improving the party's influence across the border. This resulted 
in a fairly rapid decision taken in the autumn to encourage 
members in Finland to abandon the policy of non-cooperation 
with the rest of the labour movement and take part in the activities 
of organisations such as the Social Democrat-dominated Trade 
Union Confederation (SAK). The latter had effectively taken the 
place of the more radical SAJ, which had been banned for its 
communist associations.26 
Kivimäki's four-party minority coalition remained in office after 
the elections, with the backing of Svinhufvud and the tacit consent 
of the country's largest party, the Social Democrats, who saw the 
coalition as a lesser evil to a more right-wing alternative, possibly 
made up of the National Coalition Party and the IKL. Among the 
centre parties, some common ground emerged, but they remained 
divided on a number of questions, and little progress was made on 
bridging the gap existing between the socialists and non-socialists 
or in reducing the suspicions felt, particularly among the 
Agrarians, towards the Social Democrats. While the Centre and 
the Social Democrats were united against the more extreme aspects 
of the Right, the actual amount of leeway and influence allowed 
the labour movement remained consistently limited. 
25. SKP:n päätöksiä I, pp. 382, 386, 390, 394, 401. 
26. Ibid., pp. 417-8; Hyvönen 1971, pp. 240-1; Antti Hyvönen 14.2.1972. 
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3. Party political and popular attitudes to 
international developments 
The sharp ideological divisions and hostility between the Left and 
the Right typical of Finnish society during the early years of the 
1930s also found expression in attitudes towards Finland's 
neighbours and the wider European stage, and the country's 
foreign policy. Opinion was also influenced by international 
ideological and political developments, as they spread across 
Europe and filtered through to Finland. Particularly characteristic 
of the early years of the decade was a heightened emphasis on 
nationalist values and ideals. Widespread calls were heard for the 
strengthening of the defence of national interests against the threat 
of outside interference. In presenting national and international 
interests as inherently incompatible, nationalist-minded thinkers 
and politicians typically adopted an aggressively uncompromising 
stance. In the strongly anti-communist and anti-marxist atmos-
phere generated and fostered by the activities of the Lapua 
movement, all political ideas and parties existing to the left of 
centre came to be looked upon by the Right as communist-led or 
communist-inspired. A central pillar of conservative thinking of 
the time was the belief that the labour movement in its entirety was 
committed to undermining national interests, and that the socialist 
parties, moderate and radical, were little better than puppets of the 
various Socialist and Communist Internationals. Against this 
background, it was no surprise then that the Social Democratic 
leader Väinö Tanner, despite his obviously moderate policies, was 
often described by the right wing of the National Coalition, and the 
IKL in particular, as the communist movement's right-hand man in 
Finland.27 
Nationalist-minded ideologues were also strongly critical of 
liberal values and politicians, which were similarly seen as owing 
allegiance to an international, rather than a truly national political 
base. In its defence of the inviolability of political freedoms, 
liberalism was seen as assisting and encouraging the political ef-
forts of the Left. Liberalism was also readily labelled as a political 
philosophy lacking solid traditions and clear-cut ideals, and given, 
27. AS 29.8.1933. 
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by its very nature, to compromise what ideals it did stand for. 
Liberalism's apparent lack of resolution in the battle against 
Marxism regularly saw it described by the Right as defeatist and 
weak-willed. The necessity of this latter struggle convinced many 
on the Right, including such papers as Uusi Suomi, that the 
country might have to accept the sacrifice of some minor political 
and constitutional freedoms if Finland's continuing freedom from 
the socialist yolk was to be ensured. The identification of 
liberalism with weakness and lack of political resolve among 
conservative opinion led, in some nationalist interpretations, to 
Marxism and liberalism being looked upon as close ideological 
companions, united by a desire to lead the country away from 
secure national values and ideals. Criticism of this sort often 
indirectly assumed that the Right alone had a monopoly on 
safeguarding and advancing national interests.28 
Central features of conservative calls for changes to the country's 
political system included the introduction of a stronger executive, 
the unification of the country behind a national programme, and 
the abandonment of factional, class-based attitudes. In the 
increasingly nationalist atmosphere which developed during the 
1930s, the ideas surrounding Finland's Finno-Ugrian cultural 
inheritance, and the political and cultural ambitions they had 
given birth to and continued to encourage, gained added vigour. 
Although intentionally kept in the background by their supporters 
during the peak period of the activity of the Lapua movement, in 
order to allow the widest possible degree of unity within non-
socialist opinion during the anti-communist campaign, they soon 
re-emerged after the movement's demise. Typical of these 
ethnically-coloured nationalist ideas was a strong emphasis on the 
independence of the Finnish cultural identity, particularly with 
regard to Sweden, coupled with an increasing level of interest in 
the other Finno-Ugrian peoples and national groups, many of 
which lived in the Soviet Union. 
This latter aspect came out particularly strongly in the case of 
Ingria, where the introduction of collectivisation in the early 1930s 
and the resettlement of large numbers of the local population 
elsewhere in the Soviet Union aroused widespread and strong 
28. US 25.4.1932, 17.9., 22.11.1933; AS 16.8., 13.9., 20.9.1933; UA 28.6.1933. 
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criticism within Finland. Criticism was particularly forceful 
among the ranks of the AKS and similar organisations, the press 
and the Church. The latter was also concerned at the Soviet 
Union's intensification of its anticlerical campaign. Especial 
attention was drawn to what was seen as the Soviet government's 
flagrant disregard of its commitments, made at the time of the 
signing of the Tartu Peace, guaranteeing the rights of the local 
population in the area. Criticism of this aspect of Soviet attitudes 
towards the terms of the Tartu agreement also gave increased 
impetus to the wider criticism of the treaty which had developed 
on the Finnish Right during the 1920s, and which had existed in 
one form or another from its ratification onwards.29 
In addition to the Ingrian issue, interest also gravitated around 
the fate of other Finnish-related populations, among them that 
living in Northern Sweden. The position of this group had been 
the object of Finnish attention, mainly focused on the restrictions 
put on the use of Finnish by the Church and local schools, from the 
nineteenth century onwards. Interest in the question had been 
kept alive by the activities and efforts of the population in the 
hinterland along the Finnish-Swedish border and by students from 
the same area at Helsinki University, and the support given to calls 
for government pressure on the Swedish authorities by two of the 
leading papers in the north of Finland, Pohjolan Sanomat and 
Kaleva.30 The demands for a change in conditions across the 
border gained added impetus when they were taken up by the 
National Student Federation (SYL). The latter organisation 
prepared a special report on the position of Finnish in the region 
which, despite the opposition of the Foreign Minister, Hjalmar 
Procope, was also published in French in an attempt to draw 
international attention to the problem.31 Despite this flurry of 
activity during the early 1930s, however, by mid-decade the whole 
29. For the Church's reaction to developments in Ingria, see Kaila 1932, pp. 105-
8, and reports appearing in the Church paper Kotimaa in early 1930 and 1931. 
For attitudes on the Tartu peace, see Korhonen I 1966, pp. 212-3. See also K. 
J. Ståhlberg's letter of 29.11.1930 to Rafael Erich (Erich collection V 6). 
30. Viitanen 1917, pp. 81-7; Näsi 1928, pp. 48-59; Ilmari Turja 12.5.1979; Elsa 
Vuorjoki 12.5.1979. 
31. Klinge IV 1968, pp. 118-20; Ylioppilaslehti 29.9., 13.10., 8.12.1928. The 
pamphlet mentioned appeared under the French title of 'La question de la 
minorite finlandaise en Suede' (1930). 
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issue sunk quietly back into the background. Some interest also 
emerged over the fate of the tiny Livonian minority, numbering 
little more than 1,500, living in Latvia. Their cause was especially 
championed by the linguist Lauri Kettunen and the nationalist 
Suomalaisuuden Liitto organisation (The Finnish Federation), the 
latter appealing to the Foreign Ministry in the mid-1930s for 
diplomatic pressure to be put on Latvia to halt what was seen as 
the oppression of the Livonian-speaking population. Kettunen 
chose the more direct approach of appealing directly to the Latvian 
Ministry of the Interior in Riga, but found his case roundly 
declared as amounting to an attempt to interfere in Latvian internal 
affairs.32 
Finland's liberals, who had seen much cause for optimism 
during the previous decade as a result of what many took to be the 
victory of democratic and parliamentary values in post-war 
Europe, experienced the upswing in right-wing opinion and 
influence which took place during the early 1930s as a particularly 
bitter setback. This sense of disillusionment and growing isolation 
was only intensified as the Right steadily gained ground elsewhere 
in Europe and as many of the major European liberal parties, such 
as Lloyd George's British party and Staaff's Swedish party, 
succumbed to rapidly dwindling popularity. Some hope was 
provided by the example of the Scandinavian countries, which 
continued to remain identified in liberal opinion with democratic 
values and freedom under the law. Britain also continued to enjoy 
a respected position among liberals by virtue of her identification 
as the home of parliamentary government and liberal democratic 
ideals.33 
The increased emphasis on nationalist conservative values 
typical of the period was seen as particularly dangerous by the 
country's Swedish-speaking population, which considered the 
development as likely to isolate Finland from Sweden and the 
other countries of Scandinavia, and to undermine the future of 
their own community. The swing of Swedish-speaking politicians 
behind opposition to the Lapua movement as the latter increas-
ingly resorted to violent means to achieve its aims was paralleled 
32. Kyrölä 1979, pp. 8-13. 
33. Paasivirta 1968, p. 93. 
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by an increasing emphasis by these politicians on what were seen 
as the positive Scandinavian values of respect for the rule of law, 
political rights and personal freedoms.34 The continued strength of 
nationalist opinion within society in the post-Lapua period only 
strengthened the need felt within the Swedish-speaking commu-
nity for stronger links with Scandinavia, and made Swedish-
speakers particularly grateful for all the support for their case, 
which they were not slow in making known to the wider 
Scandinavian audience, which they received from Sweden and the 
rest of the Nordic area. A good illustration of this support, and 
of the Swedish-speaking population's ability to mobilise 
Scandinavian interest on issues linked to the survival of its role in 
Finnish society, was the address, arguing against the more extreme 
ambitions of those attempting to minimise the role of Swedish at 
Helsinki University and signed by academics from three 
Scandinavian countries, presented to the Finnish authorities in 
1934." 
Like the Progressives, the Social Democrats too saw much to 
depress and unsettle them in the pattern of international 
developments in Europe typical of the early years of the 1930s. 
Storm clouds presaging harder times ahead appeared to be 
gathering on the horizon, in the eyes of many party observers. The 
growing threat to parliamentary democracy in a number of 
European countries and the emergence in some of semi-
dictatorships, together with the unprecedented economic slump 
and increasingly tense international relations, were seen as major 
causes of alarm. A particular source of concern within the labour 
movement was the sharp drop in many European countries in the 
influence and power of the socialist cause from the peak it had 
achieved in the years immediately following the end of the First 
World War. Social Democrats had not only lost their role in 
shaping policies in many countries in Europe, but also often their 
seats in government as well. Faced with a powerful shift towards 
the Right and a tottering free market world economy, many 
European socialists found themselves increasingly forced to play 
34. Nordström 1946, pp. 80-3; v. Born 1954, pp. 203-6: Hbl 13.12.1933: SvPr 
14.12.1933. 
35. Mustelin 1981, pp. 15, 38, 51. 
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the part of defenders of the political status quo, instead of 
promoters of socialist reform. In the background loomed the 
possibility of the collapse of liberal democracy altogether and with 
it the labour movement, not only in Europe but in Finland as well, 
and its replacement by right-wing authoritarianism.36 
Left-wing discontent with developments in Finland during the 
early 1930s also found expression in a wave of clandestine 
emigration to the Soviet Union. This was encouraged in part by 
the rapid rise in unemployment in Finland typical of the time, and 
in part by the Soviet Union's need for extra manpower to help in 
constructing the extensive heavy industrial base envisaged in the 
first five-year plans. Spurred by the extensive coverage given to 
descriptions of the wide availability of work for those wanting it in 
the Finnish-language radio programmes broadcast from Leningrad 
and Petrozavodsk, this clandestine emigration reached its peak 
during 1931 and 1932. Only some of those who crossed the border, 
however, found work in Soviet Karelia, the main object of Finnish 
interest, working on such projects as the hydroelectric develop-
ment on the Svir river; many ended up further east in the Urals or 
in Siberia. 
The movement of would-be emigrants across the border appears 
largely to have halted by the end of 1932, caused not by any 
significant improvement in economic conditions in Finland, then 
still suffering the effects of the recession, but rather by the spread 
of unfavourable reports about the harsh conditions existing in the 
Soviet Union. In terms of numbers, the figure of those who 
decided to move amounted to between 10-15,000, as extrapolated 
on the basis of the number of those arrested at the border.37 The 
young age of many of those involved points to a certain element of 
adventurism as having motivated at least some, above and beyond 
political sympathies, and a desire to take advantage of the 
opportunities the Soviet Union appeared to offer in comparison to 
Finland. This wave of clandestine Finnish emigration to the 
Soviet Union took place at around the same time as the officially-
encouraged and more clearly ideologically-motivated emigration 
36. Gitermann 1939, pp. 353-6. 
37. See interviews with Toivo Aalto, Kaino Lehtonen and Kosti Öhman, 12.4.1983; 
TS 18.8.1932. 
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by Finnish Americans and Canadians to East Karelia to assist in 
the region's development.38 
Hitler's rise to power in Germany, followed by the rapid 
consolidation of his position in the first half of 1933, was the cause 
of much discussion and interest in political circles in Finland, 
much of it only serving, however, to further underline the 
divisions existing within Finnish opinion. The Right was quick to 
try and take advantage of this shift in German fortunes. Less an 
indication of any outright admiration of Hitler's political 
philosophy, right-wing interest reflected a fascination with the 
political and socio-economic potential contained in Hitler's initi-
ative for galvanising German development. The forming of Hitler's 
first government in January 1933 was described by Uusi Suomi as a 
victory for German nationalism, while Ajan Suunta saw the 
development as opening up the way for a true restoration of 
German confidence and of Germany's position in the world.39 
Those on the Right consistently underlined Hitler's role in 
eliminating the communist threat in Germany, and the benefit this 
held for the rest of Europe. Less attention was given to the 
uncomfortable fact that, in crushing Marxism, parliamentary 
democracy had also been abandoned. Hitler's role in establishing 
internal order in Germany after a long period of social unrest and 
instability found especial favour with both conservative and more 
moderate non-socialist opinion, a fact linked to the deeply-rooted 
attachment to the ideal of social stability felt in these circles, partly 
born out of the Civil War of 1918 and partly originating in more 
general conservative attitudes.40 The positive picture of Germany 
typical of non-socialist opinion was reinforced by the respect felt 
towards German culture, science and industry in general, mixed in 
with the debt of gratitude felt towards Germany for the assistance 
she had given the Whites during the Civil War. 
The rise in right-wing confidence following the apparent upturn 
in German fortunes brought by Hitler saw the Social Democrats 
again subjected to strong attacks by the Right, with increased 
efforts being made to question the wisdom of allowing the party to 
38. Kero 1983, pp. 28-42. 
39. US 31.1.1933; AS 31.1.1933. 
40. Paasivirta 1968, pp. 92-3. 
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remain active. Paavo Virkkunen, a leading figure on the Right, 
described the socialist movement as having suffered an historic 
setback as a result of its virtual collapse in the heart of Europe in a 
speech he gave in mid-April 1933, and claimed that socialism in 
Finland too was on its last legs.41 Demands were made in 
Parliament for the banning of the party, for its activities in 
undermining the country's independence and acting contrary to 
the spirit of the constitution. Edwin Linkomies, another leading 
conservative prominent on the right wing of the National Coalition 
Party, expressed a widely-felt fear when he criticised the Social 
Democratic party's membership of the Socialist International, an 
organisation which he saw as dictating the party's policy on 
foreign policy questions.42 These attempts to question the 
continued existence of the Social Democrats as a political party 
were, however, rebuffed by much of moderate non-socialist 
opinion, which stressed the potential unconstitutionality of 
attempts to ban the party. The pressure from the Right against the 
socialists nevertheless proved so strong that the socialist 
leadership felt forced to restate the nature of its membership of the 
Socialist International at the party congress held in Tampere in 
May 1933. Far from blindly following each and every decision 
made by the International, the party stressed that it followed its 
own judgement and assessments, as was undoubtedly in fact the 
case.43  
Despite the vocal nature of conservatives' claims that Finland's 
future lay with the Right, the obvious sympathy felt towards 
developments in Germany expressed in the pages of Uusi Suomi, 
Ajan Suunta and other similar-minded publications, reflected the 
views of only a limited number of opinion-makers, albeit 
prominent ones, and did not reflect those of much of the mass of 
the population. Overall public opinion in the wake of the 
41. See Paavo Virkkunen's speech in Kuopio on 17.4.1933, as reported in US 
18.4.1933. US 23.4., 23.6., 3.7.1933; UA 30.5.1933; AS 10.5., 16.5.1933. 
42. See Paavo Virkkunen's and other right-wing members' question in Parliament 
on 19.4.1933 (VP 1933 ptk., pp. 2771-3). Also, Edvin Linkomies' speech on 
7.5.1933 at the party conference of the National Coalition Party, as reported in 
US 8.5.1933. On attitudes within the IKL, see Uola 1982, pp. 180-1. 
43. SDP:n puoluekokous 1933 ptk., p. 83; H. Soikkanen 1975, p. 543; SS 27.4.1933; 
Hbl 8.6.1933. 
393 
Mäntsälä incident increasingly shied away from supporting the 
types of proposals aimed at modifying the country's political 
system put forward by both the far Right and more moderate right-
wing circles. There seems no reason to doubt that the great 
majority of the population had no wish to undermine the demo-
cratic system. Events in Germany ultimately failed to generate any 
significant swing in public opinion. The 1933 elections pointed 
instead to a modest shift to the Centre-Left. While internal 
political developments in Finland over the period 1930-1933 show 
some points of similarity with those in Germany, they were 
nevertheless, at base, quite dissimilar. 
For all the difference between the pattern of events in Germany 
and Finland, there is no denying, however, that Hitler's rise to 
power represented a heavy psychological blow to the Finnish 
Social Democrats. The disquiet it aroused on the Left was only 
intensified following the moves taken in Germany against 
organised labour and the socialist movement, which resulted in 
Germany's departure from the international socialist community, 
in which it had traditionally occupied an important place, both 
politically and ideologically. Similarly, the moves by the Austrian 
Chancellor Dollfuss during 1934, directed at banning the activities 
of the Austrian Social Democratic Party, together with the armed 
resistance it evoked, were also seen as further depressing evidence 
of the widening campaign against the Left increasingly typical of 
European politics.44 The loss of confidence these developments 
produced within the party was to an extent short-lived, however, 
as a result of the ideological support provided by the party's 
growing ties with Scandinavia. Inspiration was particularly taken 
from the example of the Swedish Social Democrats and what was 
seen as their demonstration of the political credibility of social 
democracy within a liberal democratic constitution. The joint 
committee of Scandinavian social democratic parties and trade 
unions, founded in 1933 and embracing the Finnish Social 
Democratic party and the Social Democrat-dominated SAK among 
its members, represented a clear example of the desire of the 
Scandinavian socialists to develop some measure of commonly- 
44. HS 13.2.1934; Hbl 14.2.1934; SS 14.2., 18.2.1934. 
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agreed alternative to the right-wing policies gaining ground in 
Europe.45  
The setback experienced by the Right in the 1933 elections 
sparked off a wide-ranging discussion within the National 
Coalition Party on the direction of its future policy, together with a 
review of past policy strategy, including the decision taken in 
November 1932 to pursue a line more sympathetic to the IKL. 
Calls for the party to disassociate itself from the People's Patriotic 
Movement were particularly prominent in the pages of Karjala and 
Aamulehti, calls which found a ready ear in the party's new leader 
J. K. Paasikivi, elected in 1934.46 A conservative of the old school, 
Paasikivi felt little sympathy with European fascism and was 
critical of the political changes which had taken place in Germany. 
Writing in a letter to a friend in early May 1933, Paasikivi 
expressed his doubts about how long Hitler, for all his obvious 
leadership skills, would in fact '... be able to keep the masses on his 
side without being forced to move ever further to the Left.'47 
Paasikivi's philosophy as party leader seems to have been based in 
large measure on a desire to guide the National Coalition away 
from its more right-wing associations towards becoming a more 
Scandinavian-style conservative party. The right wing of the 
party, with Edwin Linkomies and Paavo Virkkunen at its head, re-
mained committed, however, to a more uncompromising political 
philosophy. In 1934, a proposal was made by the latter for 
strengthening the power of the head of state through the 
introduction of presidentially-nominated ministers and an 
absolute right of veto.48 This idea, which shared clear points of 
similarity with the ministerial system adopted by President 
Hindenburg in Germany between 1930 and 1932, reflected the 
desire of Linkomies and others to significantly increase 
Svinhufvud's potential for shaping the pattern of the country's 
45. On the activities of the joint Scandinavian committee, see the organisation's 
minutes for the period 1933-39 (LO archive). 
46. Karjala 29.10.1934; Aamulehti 30.10.1934; Brummer 1934, pp. 66-77. 
47. See Paasikivi's letters of 2.5.1933 to Eino Railo and of 10.5.1933 to Hugo 
Suolahti (Railo collection SKS, Hugo Suolahti collection). 
48. See Linkomies' speech in Tampere on 21.1.1934, as reported in US 22.1.1934 
and Paavo Virkkunen's and other's proposal for a strenghtening of governmen-
tal authority made in Parliament on 12.2.1934 (VP 1934 Liitteet I, p. 8), 
reported in US 20.2.1934. 
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politics and, by so doing, reduce the influence of the otherwise 
numerically strong Social Democrats and Agrarians, and rebalance 
the Ståhlbergian-inspired liberal constitution in the direction of 
one more in tune with their own political sympathies. 
The uncompromising tone and fervour of attitudes within the 
IKL only intensified as the party found its feet. By June 1933, K. R. 
Kares, one of the movement's leading figures, was already warning 
Finland to prepare herself for what he described as a major 
political upheaval and one which he saw as likely to be echoed 
across the world. The struggle against Marxism in Europe had to 
be extended to embrace every corner of the Continent, IKL 
speakers continually underlined. With the emergence of a Soviet 
Sweden and a Soviet Denmark very real possibilities in the minds 
of IKL commentators, it was no surprise that Ajan Suunta de-
scribed Finland as Scandinavia's 'last bastion' against the 
advances of international Marxism. IKL thinkers appear to have 
put their hope in the emergence of a network of powerful 
nationalist movements spreading across Europe, sweeping away 
socialism once and for all.49 
The early 1930s saw the Agrarians forced to abandon their vision 
of an Europe in which rural-based parties would play a central 
role, in the face of the emergence of authoritarian regimes in many 
of the countries of Eastern Europe. When, in 1934, Estonia and 
Latvia also shifted away from democracy to forms of semi-
dictatorship, albeit with agrarian parties in both countries playing 
a central role in providing support for the change, the Agrarians' 
peasant ideals also began to crumble in the Baltic area. The net 
result of these developments was to refocus attention on areas 
elsewhere in Europe and force a general reassessment of party 
attitudes towards international developments as a whole. 
4. Finnish foreign policy during the early 1930s 
While successful in consolidating some aspects of Finland's 
international position during the course of the 1920s, Finnish 
foreign policy-makers experienced a number of difficulties in their 
49. AS 10.6.. 16.6.. 21.7.. 15.8., 2.9., 1.11.1933, 13.2., 31.3.1934. 
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efforts to develop a satisfactory security and alliance policy. 
Beyond their formal recognition of Finnish independence, none of 
the Western powers had proved willing to provide Finland with 
any guarantees of her new status. Similar resistance had been 
encountered with regard to Sweden, particularly after the wide-
spread rejection of Hedenstierna's defensive alliance proposal in 
1923. Little had come of moves aimed at a closer association with 
the Baltic countries, although the press occasionally carried news 
of renewed contacts between the four countries.50 Following the 
signing of the Rapallo Pact, Germany had emerged as a potential 
destabilising factor in the Baltic area. The Soviet Union, however, 
continued to be seen as the single largest threat to Finland's future 
security. Despite the modest improvement which had taken place 
in them by the end of the 1920s, Soviet-Finnish relations 
continued to remain decidedly cool. 
The rise in international tension during the early 1930s and the 
increasing doubts about Finland's long-term security, which up 
until then had been considered relatively unproblematic, which it 
brought with it, coupled with domestic upheavals, made the need 
for some form of policy reassessment unavoidable. The decline in 
the international situation was accompanied by a general 
weakening in the belief in the possibility of maintaining continued 
peace in Europe and in the potential of the League of Nations to 
fulfil all the expectations that had been placed on it. The blows to 
the League's credibility caused by the Japanese attack on 
Manchuria and the failure of the Geneva-based disarmament 
congress were noted with concern in Finland. The fall-off in 
confidence in the League in Finland was only accelerated fol-
lowing the ending of Procope's term as Foreign Minister in 1931.51  
Set against these developments, the implications of Finland's 
isolated international position began to be increasingly widely 
appreciated. During the optimistic atmosphere charac-teristic of 
the second half of the 1920s, the country's growing isolation had 
not generally been considered of any real significance. Being 
essentially unprepared for the change of events brought by the 
early 1930s, Finland proved slow to develop any policy or 
50. Hbl 1.12.1928; SS 26.11.1928. 
51. Selen 1974, pp. 54, 62-7. 
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concerted diplomatic initiative to counter the problem. 
The rise of the Lapua movement had a marked influence in 
injecting a new sense of tension into relations with the Soviet 
Union. The kidnappings of various figures carried out by the 
supporters of the movement, and which often also involved their 
victims being dumped across the border in the Soviet Union, led to 
the Soviet government presenting the Finnish authorities with a 
protest note in July 1930, demanding a halt to these illegal border 
infringements. No immediate Finnish response was forthcoming 
and it was not until mid-September that Svinhufvud's government 
finally answered, after repeated Soviet comments on the issue. 
The Finnish reply was uncompromising and somewhat sym-
pathetic to the actions of the Lapua extremists. A further Soviet 
note followed the same autumn.52 Press reaction to the 
government's attitude to the continuing series of kidnappings and 
to its response to the obvious Soviet disquiet they aroused was 
mixed. Uusi Suomi, in common with many other right-wing 
papers, attempted to lay the blame for the deterioration in relations 
between the two countries at the door of the Soviet government, 
while at the same time defending the Finnish authorities' 
relatively outspoken stance.53 Helsingin Sanomat and Hufvud-
stadsbladet, while defending the government, both emphasised 
the importance of maintaining peaceful and untroubled relations 
with the Soviet Union. Suomen Sosialidemokraatti did not spare 
its criticism of the Svinhufvud administration and considered it 
largely responsible for the tension which had developed in 
relations between the two countries.54 
Further friction was introduced into the Soviet-Finnish relation-
ship by the heated press discussion which developed within 
Finland on the position of the Ingrian population across the border 
in the area around Leningrad. The new Sunila-led coalition 
government which took office in the early spring of 1931 initially 
attempted to follow a policy of non-involvement in the debate on 
Soviet policy in the area. By May, however, the government 
acceded to the pressure which had built up on the issue and sent a 
52. Korhonen I 1966, pp. 203-9. 
53. US 4.10.1930. 
54. HS 12.10.1930; Hbl 5.10.1930; SS 11.10.1930. 
398 
note to the Soviet authorities in which it demanded the ending of 
all forced relocation of the Ingrian population. This quickly 
brought a Soviet rebuff and a further exchange of notes.55 The 
tension this generated proved short-lived, however, as a result of 
what seems to have been a tacit decision by both governments not 
to allow the issue to escalate. Following this cooling of govern-
ment tempers, the issue was quietly dropped by the majority of the 
Finnish press, until it eventually became restricted solely to 
radical nationalist publications.56 
A number of figures within the Foreign Ministry, the government 
and Parliament were well aware of the dangers for Finland in 
letting the events of the early 1930s distort attitudes towards the 
Soviet Union, and undermine what progress had been made in 
developing Finnish-Soviet relations since independence. The 
emergence of the Lapua movement and the upswing in right-wing 
influence it reflected tended to be seen within these circles as 
representing a short-lived aberration. The influence of this more 
considered approach to the question of long-term Finnish-Soviet 
relations was particularly evident when the question of a possible 
non-aggression treaty between the two countries was revived 
towards the end of 1931, at a time when other countries along the 
Soviet Union's western border were also reassessing their relations 
with the Soviet Union. France's decision to begin talks aimed at 
closer links with the Soviet Union led to Poland beginning efforts 
to improve her relations with her eastern neighbour, a develop-
ment followed by similar moves by the smaller border states. The 
Soviet Union, which saw developments in the Far East and Japan's 
increased military activity as likely to threaten Soviet interests on 
the country's eastern flank, was keen to underpin its security 
interests along its European frontier. The Finnish authorities for 
their part were becoming increasingly concerned about Finland's 
isolated position.57 In their attempts to come to an accord over a 
non-aggression treaty, there was thus a common interest on the 
part of both the Soviet and Finnish negotiators to prevent issues, 
such as the arbitration methods to be used in any dispute, 
55. Korhonen I 1966, pp. 214-6. 
56. HS 19.5.1931; Suomenmaa 20.5.1931; AS 19.5.1931. 
57. Korhonen I 1966, pp. 222-5. 
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developing into major stumbling blocks, as they had done during 
the previous joint discussions on a similar treaty held in 1926. 
Finnish efforts to try and have the agreement linked to a wider 
network of similar agreements with the other border states, 
however, failed. The final treaty, the result in large part of the 
personal efforts of the then Foreign Minister, Aarno Yrjö-
Koskinen, was signed at the end of January 1932 and ratified in 
July of the same year.58 
The importance of the treaty to the Soviet Union in clarifying 
Soviet-Finnish relations and relations between the Soviet Union 
and the rest of Europe, and thereby indirectly reducing Soviet 
isolation, was reflected in the Soviet decision to continue dis-
cussion at a time of severe domestic tension within Finland, and in 
spite of the resurgence of radical right-wing anti-Soviet opinion it 
embraced. From the Finnish point of view, the agreement 
represented a significant step forward in easing the immediate 
pressures surrounding the country's relations with what was 
generally considered her most potentially threatening neighbour. 
Although representing a victory for realpolitik, the treaty did not 
nevertheless mark any significant increase in the measure of 
mutual trust or confidence existing between Finland and the 
Soviet Union, or any real opening-up of bilateral relations between 
the two countries. 
The treaty's reception within Finland was mixed and far from 
universally positive. Among the Social Democrats, the agreement 
was considered a significant advance and as potentially capable of 
providing a good basis for improved bilateral relations. Within 
non-socialist opinion, with the exception of the far Right which 
had been opposed to concluding any agreement, the treaty was 
looked upon fairly positively as marking a stabilisation and con-
solidation of Finland's relations with the Soviet Union, although it 
was not considered as significantly improving Finland's long-term 
national security. Much informal discussion concerning the 
treaty's relative value to Finland took place within political 
circles, including a fair proportion which was openly sceptical of 
its benefits. Typical of the latter was President Svinhufvud's 
comment, contained in a letter written some time later to his old 
58. Ibid.. pp. 231-5. 
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friend R. A. Wrede, to the effect that: 'Treaties of this sort do not 
provide us with any protection against Russia.'S9 In contrast to this 
pessimism, the treaty was welcomed by some sections of the 
business community, which hoped that its signing would be 
followed by an opening-up of trade with the East, which had been 
at a virtual standstill since independence.60 The many problems 
encountered by the country's export industries as a result of the 
international recession only served to concentrate commercial 
minds on the possibilities offered by an expanded Finnish-Soviet 
trading relationship. 
Overall developments in Europe in 1933 and especially in 
Germany, together with the prospect of a new and more aggressive 
style of German foreign policy, led to increased international 
speculation and a growing sense of general uncertainty and 
instability, in Finland as elsewhere. Of particular interest to 
Finland in this fluid situation were the proposals put forward by 
Soviet diplomats from the autumn of 1933 onward concerning a 
possible security agreement embracing the whole of the Baltic 
region. In December 1933, the Soviet Union proposed a joint 
agreement to Poland aimed at making both countries responsible 
for guaranteeing security in the Baltic area, and in March 1934 a 
parallel arrangement was offered to Germany aimed at making the 
Soviet Union and Germany regional guarantors. Discussions also 
took place later the same spring between the Soviet and French 
foreign ministers, Litvinov and Barthou, as part of the closer ties 
developing between the two countries, on the possibility of 
instituting a Locarno-type agreement covering Eastern Europe and 
guaranteeing the region's status quo and balance of power.61 None 
of these ideas were particularly welcomed by the Finnish 
government, as there was no wish for Finland's security to be 
reliant on guarantees made between third parties, or on any 
protective umbrella agreement sponsored by the great powers. It 
was feared that, if the Soviet Union became the ultimate guarantor 
of Finland's international position, there would be little to prevent 
Finland becoming increasingly dependent on Soviet policy and 
59. Ibid., pp. 236-7; Mylly 1978, p. 232. See Svinhufvud's letter of 17.1.1934 to 
Wrede (Wrede collection). 
60. US 30.3.1932; Maakansa 3.4.1932; SvPr 24.3.1932. 
61. Vehviläinen 1966, pp. 188-91, 195-7; Duroselle 1979, pp. 105-11. 
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Soviet goodwill, providing the Soviet authorities with a ready 
opportunity to interfere in Finnish domestic affairs. Develop-
ments affecting the political balance between the major powers, 
and which ultimately saw both Germany and France effectively 
switching allies in Eastern Europe, progressed apace in Eastern 
and Central Europe. Poland, France's major ally in the East, signed 
a treaty of friendship with Germany in 1934, and the same year 
France herself made a treaty of alliance with the Soviet Union, 
which was extended the following year into a military treaty 
embracing Czechoslovakia.62 
While the Soviet plans for regional security in the Baltic area 
aroused relatively unanimous opposition within much of Finnish 
opinion, attitudes towards the new, more prominent role being 
played by German foreign policy in the region were less clear-cut. 
There was a large question mark in many Finnish observers' minds 
over whether the rise in German influence that was being 
witnessed merely marked a general strengthening of the German 
position and a controlled shift in the balance of power in Europe, 
or whether it presaged a period of heightened tension between the 
major European powers and, if the latter was the case, to what 
degree it was likely to have an influence over future Soviet 
attitudes towards Finland. 
The growing influence wielded by the major powers, and its 
implications for Finland's independence of manoeuvre with 
regard to foreign policy, led the Finnish leadership to focus 
increasing attention on the problem of developing a more effective 
foreign policy to counter the country's ever-deepening inter-
national isolation. Sweden, together with Scandinavia as a whole, 
came to be seen by many as an increasingly attractive potential 
ally. The Social Democrats and the Swedish People's Party, both 
possessing good ties with Swedish politicians and Swedish 
government circles, were keen to see the country's foreign policy 
more closely aligned with that of the Scandinavian countries. For 
all their relative parliamentary strength, however, neither of these 
two parties wielded significant influence in governmental 
decision or policy-making. Closer ties between Sweden and 
Finland were also overshadowed, as a number of leading non- 
62. Carr 1973, pp. 200, 204; Korhonen I 1966, pp. 34, 55, 61. 
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socialist figures such as R. A. Wrede and Lauri Ingman observed, 
by the tensions and emotions which continued to be generated by 
the language struggle, and the hostility towards Sweden, for what 
was seen as her tacit support of Swedish-speaking interests, still 
strong within the Finnish-speaking community.63  
A new factor, and one which was to prove significant in the 
longer term, was introduced into the foreign policy equation by the 
return of Mannerheim, who had been very much on the fringes of 
the political world during virtually the whole of the 1920s, to a 
prominent role in society during 1933 and 1934. This process had 
got under way in 1931, when he had been appointed chairman of 
the Defence Council. Subsequent to this, he had begun to take an 
increasingly public stand on both the general pattern of 
international political developments and individual issues. The 
Mannerheim that now emerged was, in many respects, signifi-
cantly different from the Mannerheim that had argued so strongly 
on the intervention question back in 1919. Although his focus of 
interest continued to be centred on the great powers, he now 
showed, in line with his acceptance of the Bolsheviks' hold on 
power in the Soviet Union and realisation that the communist 
authorities had taken over many traditional Russian attitudes on 
security issues, a much clearer concern for Finnish defence and 
security questions. In contrast to his earlier identification with a 
policy of actively involving Finland in international politics, 
Mannerheim now proved much more reluctant to see Finland 
involved in international disputes and international power 
politics, and keen instead to see Finland insulated as far as 
possible from the knock-on effects they might have in the Baltic. 
Speaking on foreign and security policy in July 1934, 
Mannerheim stressed Finland's position as an integral part of the 
Scandinavian community, and the importance of strengthening 
the defences of all the countries in the region. As part of this, he 
also proposed a reassessment of the treaty on the Aland Islands to 
allow Finland to ensure the area's defence at a time of crisis.64 In 
contrast to those sections of party political opinion favourably 
disposed towards developing Finnish-Scandinavian relations, 
63. T. Soikkanen 1983, pp. 25-6. 
64. Jägerskiöld IV 1973, pp. 314-5; Mannerheim II 1952. pp. 50-3. 
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however, Mannerheim's ideas also clearly envisaged the 
possibility of Finland and Sweden coming to a closer level of 
cooperation over joint defence policies. In the field of domestic 
politics, Mannerheim now adopted a more neutral position, 
contrasting with the rather ambiguous, if not openly partisan one 
he had embraced earlier in the decade at the time of the rise of the 
Lapua movement.65 
The Soviet Union's acceptance as a member state of the League 
of Nations in the autumn of 1934, coupled with Germany's 
departure from the League the previous year, highlighting the 
deepening division between these two powers, gave Finnish 
policy-makers added cause for concern and speculation. In 
consolidating the latters' desire to prevent the country from 
becoming dependent on great power guarantees covering the Baltic 
region, these developments increased the general attraction of a 
closer association with Scandinavia. The continuing strength of 
anti-Swedish opinion and the doubts existing over how far the 
Social Democrats and the Swedish People's Party, otherwise 
favourably disposed to Scandinavia, let alone the other parties, 
would be willing to go in practice in committing themselves to a 
more Scandinavian-oriented foreign and security policy, served to 
hamper progress on the issue, however, and prevent the 
formulation of any clear policy initiative.66 
5. The development of the armed forces 
Having overcome the initial difficulties encountered in estab-
lishing the basic framework for the country's armed forces by the 
mid-1920s, the defence establishment turned its attention to the 
problems involved in developing the overall capabilities and 
structure of the three services over the longer term. Central among 
these were the questions of a suitable system of organisation and 
logistical planning for mobilisation, improved training facilities 
65. See Mannerheim's electoral appeal of 30.9.1930, as reported in US 1.10.1930. 
Also Jägerskiöld IV 1973, p. 146; E. W. Juva II, p. 473. 
66. Kivimäki 1965, p. 94. See also Hackzell's speech in Parliament on 23.11.1934 
(VP 1934 ptk., pp. 2331-7). T. Soikkanen 1983, pp. 17, 37. 
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and methods, and the requirement for specialist units within the 
overall military structure. 
A novel plan calling for mobilisation to rely on a regional, rather 
than a more traditional unit-based system of organisation had been 
drawn up in the mid-1920s. The advantage of such an arrange-
ment, as argued by its proponents, lay in the potential it offered the 
High Command of being able to deploy a substantial quantity of 
conscript-based units at short notice to act as a covering force until 
reserve units could be fully assembled and put into the field. 
Major L. Grandell, who was mainly responsible for developing the 
idea and who had presented it to the Hornborg Committee on 
defence planning in 1924, had been partly inspired by the old 
Swedish regionally-based territorial army system once used in 
Finland, which had allowed for units to be locally recruited, and 
partly by similar ideas employed by the Norwegian Army.67 
Further development of the proposal, however, had been stalled 
following its failure to win the backing of the Hornborg Committee. 
It was taken up again in 1928 by the then Defence Minister Juho 
Niukkanen, who, in the hope of thus being able to reduce the 
period of service served by conscripts, directed Lt.Col. A. F. Airo 
to draw up a new report on the possibility of introducing a regional 
system of army organisation. Although coming to the conclusion 
that no reduction was feasible, Airo came out in favour of a form of 
organisation along the lines earlier proposed by Grandell. He also 
suggested the setting-up of separate units to be responsible for 
local call-up in each of the proposed military districts, rather than 
relying on local Civil Guard units, as had been proposed in 
Grandell's original outline.68 
An internal military committee, headed by General K. L. Oesch 
and including Col. Grandell among its members, established in 
1930 to assess the merits of the case for a regional system, similarly 
concluded that it would provide the best solution. As head of the 
section within the General Staff responsible for mobilisation plans, 
Grandell was subsequently instructed to begin work on detailed 
plans for the system's implementation and the redistribution of 
67. Grandell 1954, pp. 1-4; Raikkala III 1964, pp. 21-2. Also Grandell's 'Förslag 
till arméns organisation' (Puolustusrevisionin paperit/SA). 
68. Raikkala III 1964, pp. 24-8, 33. 
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army manpower and material resources it would require.69 
Discussions were also put in hand with the Civil Guard, with the 
result that it was finally decided not to integrate local Civil Guard 
units into the planned regional network and instead to rely on the 
regular army to handle conscription matters. While allowing the 
Civil Guard to maintain a certain measure of the independence it 
had sought so hard to preserve, the division drawn between the 
two forces proved in practice to be somewhat nominal. Following 
reorganisation, links between the commanders of regional Civil 
Guard districts and their opposite regular army numbers, although 
informal, were often close. Local Civil Guard units came in time to 
be organised, along similar lines to those employed in the regular 
army, into specialist infantry, artillery, signals and other 
detachments, to ease their integration into regional mobilisation 
plans.70 
Introduction of the regional system, which was begun in 1932, 
meant a major upheaval for the army's infrastructure. The country 
was divided into a total of nine military provinces, each designed 
to form the basis for a wartime division. Each of these was 
subdivided in turn into two or three military districts, as the basis 
for an equivalent number of wartime regiments and batteries when 
brought up to full strength. The conscript training programme was 
also overhauled in the light of the reform, to provide a wider range 
of trained manpower in line with the units called for in the new 
military districts and provinces. This inevitably put a consider-
able strain on training resources, calling as it did for a substantially 
larger number of specialist officers than previously to take charge 
of the new units created, and caused a significant temporary officer 
shortfall in other areas of the armed forces. In May 1934, when the 
new system had been fully implemented, the army's stockpiles of 
military equipment were also decentralised and split between the 
new military districts.77 
By the beginning of the 1930s, the basis of an integrated training 
programme had also been introduced, with increasing attention 
being directed towards ensuring that the overall level of training 
69. Ibid., pp. 38, 42. 
70. Ibid., pp. 36, 39, 74; Suojeluskuntien yliesikunnan vuosikertomus v. 1933, pp. 
3-4. 
71. Terä—Tervasmäki 1973, pp. 153-5; Seppälä 1974, pp. 115-8. 
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kept pace with technical and other developments. A significant 
step forward in the training given to conscripts had been taken 
with the completion of a large number of new and detailed training 
programmes at the end of the 1920s, a process which continued 
into the early 1930s.72 This marked the ending of the often 
uncoordinated training methods, sometimes varying from unit to 
unit, which had been in use previously, and a move towards a 
systematic pattern of training better suited to the needs of the 
various arms of the armed forces, as well as an improvement in the 
general level of training. The previous emphasis on drill disci-
pline and, in the case of infantry units, on closed order formation 
battle practice increasingly gave way to one focused on a more 
flexible style of combat training designed to prepare conscripts for 
a wider variety of operations and conditions, in line with the 
tactical training ideas developed at the Military Academy, and 
aimed at better matching Finland's defence needs and terrain. 
Officer training also came in for reform. The numbers of 
conscripts serving an extended period of service and given 
additional training for subsequent reserve officer duty had been 
raised substantially in the mid-1920s, to an annual total of some 
900. This was complemented with the introduction in 1927 of a 
new series of training programmes, based around developing 
specific specialist skills, at the army's Reserve Officer Training 
School. The training of reserve navy and coastal defence officers 
was begun at the Naval Academy in 1930, and that of reserve air 
force officers at the Air Force Academy in Kauhava in 1931. 
Training of naval cadets was transferred from the Officer Training 
School to the Naval Academy in 1930, and that of air force cadets 
to the Air Force Academy the following year.73 Improvements 
were also seen in the level of training given to both conscripted 
and regular army non-commissioned officers. 
Despite the attempt by the Hornborg Committee to establish the 
basis for a coordinated development policy covering all three 
services, much of the latters' actual development during the late 
1920s and subsequently, at least in terms of procurement policy, 
came to be determined, as a result of parliamentary resistance to 
72. Osterman 1966, pp. 61-5; Talvela I 1976, p. 69. 
73. Mikola 1961, pp. 60-8, 91-2; Kadettikoulu 1919-1969, pp. 54, 59. 
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defence budgets matching Hornborg's proposals, on the basis of a 
series of separate, independent policy decisions. Typical of this 
was the case of the navy. Opinions were divided from the outset 
over the type of vessels best suited to Finland's needs, with one 
lobby pressing for a force of lightly-armoured ships mainly 
designed for convoy protection duties, and another proposing a 
force made up of more heavily-armed vessels capable of mounting 
effective coastal defence operations and, in particular, of ensuring 
the maritime defence of the Aland Islands. The policy finally 
chosen and approved by Parliament in 1927 opted in large part for 
the latter of these two options, and made provision for the 
construction of a number of submarines, torpedo boats and two 
heavily-armed small cruisers. This decision, which had been 
accelerated by the activities of the Naval Association (Laivasto-
liitto), a pressure group with a large civilian membership com-
mitted to the idea of a strong navy as a guarantor of national 
security, provoked some opposition, particularly within the two 
other services. The latters' criticism that it was over-ambitious in 
relation to Finland's needs and would mean robbing the other 
services of much-needed funds for some time into the future was to 
no avail, however, once the bill had been passed.74 
Special problems were attached to the creation and development 
of the air force. The new service's officer corps, made up of ex-
army and navy officers, was faced with an uphill struggle in having 
to build up a force from scratch with no traditions other than those 
of the other services to rely on. The difficulty of the task was 
reflected in the slow and often disorganised and unsystematic way 
in which ideas on airborne tactics and appropriate aircraft to suit 
Finnish needs were developed. The net effect of this was the 
build-up of an unhealthily strong dependence on tactical ideas 
developed abroad and, particularly during the 1920s, on those 
current in the French and Italian air forces, both of which favoured 
an aggressive style of tactical planning making extensive use of 
bomber formations. Dependency on tactical ideas imported from 
abroad, and especially French and Italian ones, also inevitably 
shaped equipment ordering policy, and saw many orders going to 
French and Italian manufacturers. 
74. Suomen laivasto 1918-1968 I, pp. 143-7. 
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This attachment to tactical ideas borrowed from abroad and 
often designed for very different conditions to those likely to be 
encountered by a Finnish air force, and which was reflected in a 
tendency to favour purchases of bomber aircraft at the expense of 
other types, continued until well into the 1930s. As time went on, 
however, pressure grew within the air force and from the Air 
Defence Federation (Ilmapuolustusliitto) for resources to be 
redirected towards fighter aircraft, and for increased attention to be 
paid to the development of operational tactics designed to meet 
Finland's own needs.75 These ideas were nevertheless slow to gain 
ground and, with equipment expensive to buy and procurement 
programmes often stretching over a number of years, were slow to 
make themselves felt, either on the ground or in the air. Changes 
only really began to appear from the mid-1930s onwards, when 
increased efforts began to be made to come to grips with the 
impractically wide range of aircraft which had been built up, and 
which had severely hampered the development of an effective 
combat force and coherent training and maintenance programmes. 
Funding proved a major and continuing problem for all three 
services. The ambitious package of recommendations drawn up by 
Hornborg's defence review committee, in terms of overall defence 
capability and the levels of manpower and equipment it envisaged, 
was never taken up in anything like its final form by any govern-
ment. There was strong parliamentary resistance throughout the 
1920s and for much of the 1930s, particularly among the Social 
Democrats, whose 1930 defence programme, for example, aimed at 
a very modest level of expenditure, and to a lesser extent among 
the Agrarians, towards increasing the size of the defence budget to 
the levels implicitly proposed by Hornborg. What major 
expenditure that was sanctioned was usually approved on an 
individual project by project basis, which had the virtue of 
spreading the financial burden over a longer period than more 
traditional budget allocations. The armed forces had to wait until 
virtually the very end of the decade before government proved 
willing to seriously reassess defence spending and equipment 
purchasing policy. 
75. Pajari 1971, pp. 256-7; Uola 1975, pp. 197-8, 203, 243-7. 
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6. Finnish foreign trade in the grip of the 
depression 
Signs of a growing recession began to make themselves felt in 
Finland in 1928, prior to the international depression, quickly 
causing the economic expansion characteristic of the latter half of 
the 1920s to falter. Shortfalls in agricultural production caused by 
a bad harvest saw the country become dependent on food imports, 
while abroad, export prospects for Finnish timber began to fall off, 
reducing export earnings. Together with the continued expansion 
taking place in the construction industry and the rising amount of 
foreign loan capital being contracted, these factors contributed to a 
sudden and sharp deficit in the country's balance of trade, with 
imports outweighing exports to the tune of 1,768 million marks in 
1928 and 520 million marks in 1929.76 The problems affecting the 
timber exporting industry were only aggravated by the decline in 
world prices which took place during 1929, and which saw timber 
exporters facing major marketing difficulties by the summer of 
1930. Sweden and Norway, Finland's major Scandinavian com-
petitors on the international market, had now been joined by the 
Soviet Union, which had begun to expand its timber exports, a 
development which only further hampered Finland's export 
potential. Increasing difficulties were also experienced by the 
country's pulp exporters.77 At a time when the timber processing 
and paper industries accounted for some 85% of Finland's total 
export earnings, any downturn in these areas inevitably had a 
major effect on the health of the economy as a whole. This 
problem was only further highlighted as world prices for timber 
and related products tumbled to new lows during 1931 and 1932. 
The deflationary fiscal policies followed by the various 
governments of the period led to sharp falls in wage levels. With 
the trade union movement weak and unable to muster any 
effective resistance to the downward pressure on wages, these fell 
by as much as 30% in some sectors of the economy. Forestry 
workers and the unskilled and semi-skilled labour force were hit 
particularly badly, although those employed in the paper industry 
76. Halme 1955, pp. 252, 256. 
77. Ibid., pp. 234-7, 244-7. 
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were able to avoid the worst effects of the decline and suffered 
only small losses of earnings. Unemployment caused by the halt of 
the minor urban construction boom, fuelled by the earlier period of 
economic expansion, and by the fall-off in forestry work in rural 
areas, also rose. While Finland's relatively low level of industrial-
isation compared to many of her competitors served to restrict the 
extent of many of the knock-on effects of the depression, such as 
unemployment, it could not offer complete protection, as reflected 
in the short-term unemployment peak of 92,000 reached during 
the winter of 1931-32. Government reaction to this sudden rise in 
the number of unemployed was slow, consisting mainly of the 
introduction of a small number of public works projects designed 
to alleviate the worst effects of the problem; no system of publicly-
funded unemployment benefit payments existed.78 The depression 
also had far-reaching effects on the farming population, which 
suffered substantial economic hardship as a result of the downturn 
in timber sales, and felling and logging, which traditionally 
represented an important part of farmers' income. To counterba-
lance the effect of the general fall in international agricultural 
commodity prices and in an effort to maintain food exports, a 
system of export support payments, covering butter, cheese, bacon 
and eggs, which together had accounted for over 10% of the 
country's total exports during the latter half of the 1920s, was 
introduced to complement the increased tariffs on grain imports 
which had been imposed in 1929.79 
Against this background of severe export difficulties, the 
government was forced to consider radical action to improve the 
mark's international value and to ease the strain on the economy. 
Given the fact that some 40% of the country's exports went to 
Britain and that sterling was used as a reference currency in two-
thirds of the country's trading agreements, Britain's decision in 
September 1931 to abandon the gold standard and devalue 
sterling's value by some 30%, followed by the decision of the three 
Scandinavian countries a week latter to follow suit and leave the 
gold standard and significantly devalue their currencies, left 
Finland with little real choice but to decide on a similar move. 
78. Siipi 1967, pp. 83-7. 
79. Virrankoski 1975, p. 198. 
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Anything else would have given Sweden and Norway a powerful 
price advantage over Finnish producers on the timber and timber-
related market in Britain, and Denmark a similar advantage in the 
agricultural sector.80 
The slump also saw the emergence of a new emphasis in the 
handling of Finland's foreign trade relations, in the shape of a 
closer association between private industry and the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and the diplomatic service. Relations between the 
two had previously been relatively cool and distant. The 
depression, in fact, had a powerful impact on Finnish diplomacy 
and day to day diplomatic work. The rise in the importance of 
commercial questions and advancing Finnish commercial 
interests abroad, and the growing necessity of keeping abreast of 
the flood of new regulations and restrictions imposed by national 
governments in response to the slump, superceded many tradi-
tional diplomatic concerns.81 This did not prevent the diplomatic 
service, however, from feeling some of the chill winds of belt-
tightening imposed by the depression, albeit slightly late in the 
day, in 1933, when some limited short-term cuts in personnel were 
implemented.82 
With the strengthening of protectionism and the introduction of 
new national tariffs and other restrictions on free trade by many of 
Finland's trading partners, the government was forced to take on a 
larger role commensurate with the trend towards regulating and 
controlling the level of foreign trade through official commercial 
agreements. Industry alone was no longer in a position to dictate 
the pattern of exports as it had tried to before, but now had to work 
hand in hand, however reluctantly, with government. The 
maintenance of commercial ties with Finland's main trading 
partners was of primary importance for the government in seeing 
the economy through the strained economic climate imposed by 
the depression. Regular government-sponsored trade negotiations 
came to assume an important role in the maintenance of the 
country's international relations. Before any formal talks were 
80. N. Meinander 1964, pp. 76, 79. 
81. See Holma's letter of 7.3.1936 to Antti Hackzell (Hackzell collection), and 
Holma's reports to the Foreign Ministry, for ex. dated 29.4. and 15.5.1933 (UM 
5 C 6). 
82. Paasivirta 1968, pp. 198-201; Suomen Ulkomaankauppa 15.11.1933. 
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begun the main aspects of each potential agreement were 
discussed by a joint government and industry committee 
responsible for trade agreement issues, made up of representatives 
culled from the Foreign Ministry, the timber and paper processing 
industries, the Finnish Export Association and the Central 
Association of Agricultural Producers. Representatives from each 
of these groups were also typically present at subsequent official 
discussions. This new approach served to coordinate export 
interests and assist the overall marketing of Finnish goods, and 
helped focus minds in industry and government alike on general 
marketing issues and on the advantages to be gained from cooper-
ation between the public and private sectors in this field.83 Within 
the Foreign Ministry, this increased emphasis on formal trade 
agreements was accompanied by an expansion in the size of its 
trade agreement department and the setting up in 1933 of a new 
department to handle economic policy affairs and coordinate the 
exchange of commercial information. The former of these two 
departments became especially powerful, acting as a link between 
the government of the day, export industries and those involved in 
the actual business of hammering out the details of each 
agreement.84 
The increasing reliance of government and industry on bilateral 
trade agreements and related arrangements in regulating the 
country's commercial relations inevitably led to Finland's coming 
to suffer, in increasing measure, the negative effects of the slump 
affecting the Western world's industrialised countries. Economic 
difficulties and dislocations in Finland's export markets in 
Western and Central Europe came to have a dominant role in 
shaping Finland's economic prospects, as Finland steadily found 
herself forced to adapt her economic planning to take increasing 
account of the state of the economies in her major trading partners. 
The chill wind of recession was most keenly felt in trade with 
Finland's two dominant partners, Britain and Germany. Main-
taining long-term trading ties with Britain, the country's single 
largest export market for timber and related products and 
agricultural produce, was of central importance. Discussions were 
83. Paasivirta 1968, p. 216. 
84. Ibid., pp. 216-8. 
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put in hand by the Central Association of Finnish Forest Industries 
with similar organisations in Scandinavia in a bid to work out joint 
pricing agreements and ways of limiting production.85 The 
holding of the Ottawa conference in the summer of 1932 between 
Britain and the Commonwealth and Empire countries on ways of 
protecting their joint trade, together with Britain's decision shortly 
previously to begin trade negotiations with the three other major 
Scandinavian countries, only underlined the need for Finland to 
make some move towards securing future Anglo-Finnish trade and 
to prevent Finland's possibly finding herself economically isolated 
and shut out from her important markets. The Sunila-led govern-
ment responded to this by increasing contacts with the British 
authorities and introducing a policy of directing an increasing 
number of state contracts and official borrowing towards Britain 
and British industry.86 Direct trade discussions between the two 
countries, however, were only begun in earnest in the summer of 
1933, after the other Anglo-Scandinavian trade agreements had 
already been finalised. 
Agreement was reached between the two sides on a new Anglo-
Finnish trade agreement relatively quickly, and an agreement 
signed on 29 September. Under this, Finland was granted the 
status of most favoured nation, in line with Sweden, Norway and 
Denmark, thus effectively maintaining Finland's overall competi-
tiveness in relation to her closest major competitors, an issue 
which had been uppermost in the minds of the Finnish 
negotiators. As a result of the previous imbalance in trade between 
the two countries in Finland's favour, however, Finland was 
forced to make some concessions in response to Britain's desire to 
see increased British exports to Finland. Finland agreed to reduce 
her tariffs on imports of British cotton and woollen products, and 
to various compensation purchases, and to give priority to pur-
chases of British coal.87 Having already signed trade agreements 
with the three Scandinavian countries, Britain was well-placed to 
bring pressure to bear on a Finland keen not to undermine her 
substantial exports to her most important trading partner. While 
85. Kertomukset Suomen Puunjalostusteollisuuden Keskusliiton toiminnasta v. 
1931 ja 1932 (SMKL archive). 
86. Hbl 24.7.1932; Mylly 1978, p. 239. 
87. On the Finnish-British trade agreement, see VP 1933 ak, n. 40. 
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Finland had every cause to be satisfied with the eventual 
agreement arrived at, some figures within the business 
community, among them Axel Solitander, head of the powerful 
Central Association of Finnish Forest Industries, nevertheless 
remained critical of what was seen as the high price that had had to 
be paid.88 
Following the ratification of the Anglo-Finnish agreement, 
attention turned towards the question of trade relations with 
Germany. A central role in German policy from the outset of the 
depression had been played by efforts aimed at encouraging an 
increase in economic self-sufficiency and reducing Germany's 
dependency on imports. Among other victims of this policy had 
been the outline Finnish-German trade agreement negotiated in 
1930, implementation of which was halted at Germany's insist-
ence. German calls for a revision of the agreement were particu-
larly concentrated on reducing the levels of Finnish agricultural 
exports to Germany.89 Hitler's rise to power marked a further 
intensification in this overall German policy and a hardening of 
attitudes towards the country's trading partners. This new German 
policy on trade issues came as an unpleasant surprise for many 
within conservative circles in Finland, otherwise well-disposed 
towards the political changes that had taken place in Germany. A 
foretaste of Germany's new policy and of the difficulties likely to 
confront Finnish exporters in trying to safeguard their position on 
the German market was given by the agreement on agricultural 
imports signed between Germany and Holland in the autumn of 
1933, which significantly reduced German import quotas on a 
number of Dutch goods, in some cases by as much as 60% on. 
previous figures.90 
Much of the German case for a revised trade agreement with 
Finland, aimed at securing what were seen as Germany's justified 
export interests, put forward by German negotiators during the 
course of talks with their Finnish counterparts, focused on the 
concessions Finland had made to British exporters under the 
88. US 4.10.1933. Also see Axel Solitander's memorandum dated 26.9.1933 
(SMKL archive). 
89. Suomen Puunjalostusteollisuuden Keskusliiton toimintakertomus v. 1930 
(SMKL archive). 
90. Kauppalehti 6.10.1933. 
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Anglo-Finnish trade agreement signed shortly previously. 
Demands were made for the inclusion of similar provisions for 
German industry, even though trade between Germany and 
Finland had been running in Germany's favour for over a decade. 
The disquiet and irritation this awoke in Helsinki deepened in the 
wake of the unfavourable comment on Finnish-German trade 
prospects which appeared in a number of German papers, 
including the respected Berliner Börsen Courier, emphasising 
Finland's status as a source of agricultural products and raw 
materials. It was argued, in fact, that Finland should agree to 
purchase large quantities of German industrial products.91 The 
inability of either side in the negotiations to compromise led to a 
virtual breakdown in trade relations at the beginning of 1934, with 
bilateral trade reduced to operating without the backup of any 
official regulatory agreement and hampered by a spate of hastily-
imposed import bans introduced by both governments. Finland 
was nevertheless far from being an exceptional case in this respect, 
as none of the other Scandinavian countries enjoyed significantly 
better trading relations with Germany at this time. Through the 
introduction of a system of protective tariffs, Germany attempted 
to limit her purchases from Finland to only those products either 
not available from domestic producers or not in sufficient 
quantities, such as sulfate pulp, birch and plywood products and 
unsawn timber. This was in line with general German policy 
aimed at reducing imports of industrial products and finished 
goods from abroad to a minimum and encouraging imports of raw 
materials and semi-finished goods, and limiting agricultural 
imports to bolster domestic farming. 
The eventual trade agreement concluded between Germany and 
Finland in March 1934 saw Finland having to bow to a number of 
the German demands that had been put forward during the 
chequered course of the preceding trade negotiations. More 
importantly, however, Finland was able to maintain her sizeable 
export trade in timber and agricultural products, albeit only under 
a strict quota system. Little attempt was made to hide the 
compromise nature of the agreement from the Finnish point of 





view, with the difficult circumstances surrounding the negoti-
ations being particularly emphasised in its defence. Given these 
difficulties, however, F. M. Pitkäniemi, head of Valio, the State 
Dairy Authority, and one of those who had taken part in the 
discussions, probably reflected something of a more general 
feeling that Finland had acquitted herself relatively well when he 
described the agreement as guaranteeing a much higher level of 
agricultural and timber product exports than had been generally 
thought possible prior to the talks.92 The new agreement, however, 
was to remain in force only until the end of 1934. 
The difficulties encountered by Finnish exporters in the wake of 
the depression forced an extensive reassessment within industry 
of the country's export effort and export markets, as part of an 
attempt to find new ways of expanding, diversifying and 
developing the country's exports. Within the timber processing 
industry, attention was directed towards developing new export 
markets in South America, with Argentina and Brazil being seen as 
favourable possibilities, to supplement the United States market, 
which had been developed during the 1920s. Paper exports to 
South America as a whole, in fact, began to show signs of modest 
growth from the early 1930s onwards, a development reflected in 
the visit made by Hjalmar Procope in 1935, in his role as director of 
the Finnish Paper Producers' Association (Finnpap), to a number 
of South American countries.93  
Efforts were also made outside the traditional timber and paper 
industries to diversify exports and make Finland less reliant on 
only one or two key industries. This was particularly reflected in 
the activities of the reorganised Finnish Export Association, which 
took as its focal aim improving the level of cooperation between 
industry, agriculture and exporters. By sponsoring a wide range of 
market studies, including a number on non-European markets, and 
a selection of foreign-language publications directed at possible 
92. HS 29.3.1934; Hbl 29.3.1934; Mercator 13.4.1934; Suomen Puunjalostusteolli-
suuden Keskusliiton toimintakertomus v. 1934 (SMKL archive); US 28.4.1934. 
93. See Bror Serlachius' travel report for the spring of 1938 (Suomen Paperitehtait-
ten Yhdistyksen kiertokirje 54/1938, SMKL archive) and Hjalmar Procope's 
report for the autumn of 1935 (SPTY:n kiertokirje 96/ and 114/1935 SMKL 
archive). 
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purchasers of Finnish exports abroad, the Association hoped to 
help broaden exporters' horizons and be able to provide up-to-date 
information on new marketing opportunities, as well as keep 
industry abroad aware of developments within Finland.94 Results 
in terms of increased exports and new markets for Finnish 
products would, it was nevertheless recognised, take time to come 
to fruition. 
Timber and timber-related exports began to show signs of recovery 
in the wake of the mark's devaluation at the end of 1931, and by 
the autumn of the following year clear indications of a wider 
upswing began to be visible in the economy as a whole. Once 
under way, this recovery soon gained momentum, to such an 
extent that by 1933 overall national income exceeded the peak 
which it had reached just prior to the depression in 1928.95 The 
general improvement which took part in export prospects and the 
growth in export income were to have a powerful influence on the 
pattern of the country's economic development and growth. The 
increased profitability of the country's export industries was also 
aided by the extensive rationalisation which took place within 
these industries and the low relative levels of pay enjoyed by their 
workforces. The country's improved export performance, how-
ever, was only slow to have an effect on the overall economy, 
largely as a result of government decisions between 1931 and 1935 
to use a large proportion of the healthy balance of trade surpluses 
built up over these years, in all amounting to some 6,000 million 
marks, in reducing the national debt. Thanks to this policy, 
virtually all short-term loans were completely paid off by the end 
of 1933, while the bulk of long-term loans were completely paid off 
by the end of the decade.96 Admirable in itself, this siphoning-off 
of capital, however, inevitably slowed the rate of investment, 
which in turn put a brake on economic expansion. While this did 
not prevent industrial production in 1936, for example, rising 
some 40% above the previous peak level achieved in 1929 and 
national income rising around 10% above the 1928 peak, neither 
the forestry industry nor the construction industry proved capable 
94. Paasivirta 1968, pp. 213-4; Toilet 1969, pp. 7-12, 16. 
95. Halme 1955, p. 284. 
96. Ibid., p. 286. 
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of improving on the record figures achieved, in terms of volume of 
output, in the latter years of the 1920s, making it difficult to speak 
of any general or powerful upswing in the Finnish economy during 
this period. 
7. Foreign reaction to the Finland of the early 
193Os 
The picture built up of Finland abroad during the course of the 
1920s was very much one of a peaceful country which had been 
successful in consolidating its new international position and one 
lacking many of the less-admired characteristics of some of the 
other new independent states of post-war Europe. This largely 
positive image owed at least part of its existence to the fact that 
very little dramatic or of significant import for the outside world 
took place in Finland during the 1920s. On the other hand, this 
did little to expand the modest and restricted knowledge which 
existed abroad concerning Finland's political climate and social 
conditions. The only country which formed any real exception to 
this general pattern was Sweden, where events in Finland were 
regularly followed in the press. Finland's geographical position on 
the periphery of Europe, and which by itself often hampered better 
contacts with the rest of Europe, was compounded by the fact that 
few countries possessed any direct interests in the Finnish area. 
Among the new independent European countries, Poland and 
Czechoslovakia were the source of most interest in the West. 
Similarly, in the case of the Soviet Union, interest tended to be 
focused further south on Central Europe. Lapua changed all that. 
The emergence of powerful extra-parliamentary activity in the 
summer of 1930 rapidly drew foreign attention to Finland, which 
suddenly became associated, if only temporarily, with the other 
unsettled newly-independent states. The Lapua movement, with 
its strong and unequivocal anti-communist philosophy, proved the 
subject of a surprisingly varied assortment of interpretations in the 
European press, with events surrounding its activities being linked 
to developments and trends outside Finland in widely different 
ways. 
The movement met with some sympathy from conservative 
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circles in Germany, partly as a result of its identification with the 
struggle against the communist threat, and partly as it came to be 
seen as being backed, or at least inspired, by the same circles 
which had been behind pro-German policies and the introduction 
of a monarchy back in 1918.97 Comment from within more 
moderate sections of German opinion was significantly more 
critical, reflecting many of the political tensions and developments 
existing within Germany itself at the time, and particularly the 
growing strength of opposition to the Weimar regime. The Social 
Democrats, together with the Liberals, did not hide their dislike 
and suspicion of the activities and long-term intentions of the 
Lapua activists, activities which were described by Vorwärts as 
amounting to a campaign of fascist terror.98 The chain of events set 
in motion by the Right was seen as potentially likely to lead to a 
coup d'état in Finland and the establishment of some form of 
dictatorship committed to eliminating parliamentary government. 
Among the major British papers to cover Lapua, The Times 
mainly concerned itself with the anti-communist aspects of events, 
with commentators tending to attempt to relate them to develop-
ments elsewhere. The apparent resurgence of communist activity 
in Finland was seen as clear evidence of Soviet influence in 
Finnish affairs, and all moves aimed at halting further communist 
expansion were seen, in principle, as justified. While the anti-
communist activities focused around the Lapua organisation were 
thus viewed positively, at least initially, by The Times, the paper's 
commentators were decidedly more cautious in expressing any 
sympathy with the violent methods which came to characterise the 
movement. Particularly interesting with regard to the paper's 
coverage of Finnish affairs at the time was the care with which 
Soviet reaction to events in Finland was noted, both in the form of 
the various notes sent to the Finnish government by the Soviet 
authorities and in the editorial comment on developments in 
Finland which appeared in the Soviet press.99 
The coverage given in the liberal Manchester Guardian was a 
complete contrast to that found in The Times. The former 
97. Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung 8.7., 12.7., 23.7.1930; Kölnische Zeitung 5.7., 
7.7., 27.7.1930. 
98. Vorwärts 3.7.1930; Frankfurter Zeitung 8.7.1930. 
99. The Times 13.6., 5.7., 7.7., 18.7., 12.9., 18.9.1930. 
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described the movement as unambiguously fascist in nature and 
intent, and as such a threat to democracy and political freedoms in 
Finland. The peasants' march on Helsinki was described in 
similar vein as fascist-organised, and compared in very general 
terms with the events which had surrounded Mussolini's march 
on Rome in 1922. Fascism's success in Finland was also seen by 
the paper as potentially likely to adversely effect the political 
climate in the border states to the south of Finland. The forming of 
a new government under Svinhufvud in July 1930 was described 
as only likely to bode further ill for Finland. The Guardian's 
identification of the Lapua movement as a quasi-fascist, if not 
wholly fascist organisation was also taken up in the Labour Party 
paper The Daily Herald, which drew its readers' attention to the 
threats made against members of the Finnish Parliament by Lapua 
activists and the various kidnappings of leading political figures 
which took place at the time.10° 
The limited comment on the Lapua movement and the events 
surrounding it which appeared in the leading French papers was 
strongly coloured by anti-Bolshevist sentiments and reflected a 
degree of sympathy with the overall aims of the movement's 
leaders. Events in Finland were also tied into developments 
within the wider international perspective, with Finnish extra-
parliamentary activity being variously interpreted as signifying a 
setback for the Soviet Union, in terms of its attempts to extend its 
sphere of influence, and as part of an international campaign 
against Comintern.101 
Swedish interest in Finnish events, which had always been 
consistently higher than in much of the rest of Europe, reflecting 
Sweden's geographical and geopolitical proximity to Finland, 
reached something of a peak during the summer of 1930. 
Indicative of the wide coverage given to Finnish affairs at this 
point was the fact that, at the time of the peasants' march in July 
1930, the Stockholm papers carried, in addition to their daily 
extensive news stories on developments in Finland, two or three 
major editorials a week devoted to discussion of the situation. 
100. Manchester Guardian 4.7., 5.7., 7.7., 19.7.1930; Daily Herald 7.7.1930. 
101. Journal des Debats 6.7.1930; Le Matin 15.11.1930. See also Holma's letters of 
4.8.1930 to Ingman and Eino Suolahti (Ingman collection III, Eino Suolahti 
collection 2). 
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While developments in Finland had up until then been looked 
upon relatively favourably, the implications of events inspired by 
the Lapua movement led many Swedish commentators to 
conclude that they might have been overly generous in their earlier 
assessments of Finland's political future. 
Comment in the country's leading papers was largely strongly 
critical of the Lapua movement and its activities from the start, 
with only the more conservative press forming a modest exception 
to this. This hostility was particularly prominent across virtually 
the whole spectrum of the socialist and liberal press. Social-
Demokraten linked developments in Finland with the events of 
1918, describing the country as being in the grip of a White terror, 
inspired by forces committed to overthrowing the democratic 
order. 	 Social-Demokraten feared that the latter might be 
successful in completely supplanting the parliamentary form of 
government and that Finland might then fall into the hands of 
what it rhetorically described as a 'Finnish Mussolini'.102 Similar 
attitudes and comments also appeared in other social democrat 
papers. Writing in Ny Tid, Per Albin Hansson expressed his 
conviction that the political upheavals being experienced in 
Finland could undermine and ultimately break the sense of 
solidarity existing between Finland and the other Nordic 
countries. The views expressed in the moderate Dagens Nyheter 
ran along similar lines, with the Lapua movement being described 
as committed to opposing the continuance of parliamentary 
government and to restricting cultural freedoms and, as such, 
representing the threat of a Finnish dictatorship along the lines of 
that existing in Mussolini's Italy.103  Reaction to the Lapua 
movement was decidedly more mixed among the conservative 
press. While Nya Dagligt Allehanda was critical of a number of 
developments in Finland, such as the anti-communist legislation, 
which it considered as undemocratic and as likely to undermine 
foreign confidence in Finland, papers like Svenska Dagbladet, 
Sydsvenska Dagbladet and Aftonbladet proved much more 
understanding of the motives of those involved in the Lapua 
102. Soc-Dem 15.6., 29.6., 1.7., 6.7.1930. 
103. Ny Tid 23.6., 8.7.1930; Arbetet 18.6.1930; DN 8.7.. 16.7., 24.7.1930. 
422 
movement, and defended their actions.1°4 
All in all, Lapua served to refocus the pattern of Swedish press 
interest in Finland. During the 1920s, attention and comment had 
largely concentrated on a relatively narrow range of issues centred 
around the language dispute and related questions, but from 1930 
onwards coverage expanded to embrace virtually the whole range 
of Finnish domestic politics. This was particularly evident in the 
case of the 1931 presidential election, the Mäntsälä incident and 
the 1933 parliamentary elections, which all received wide 
coverage in Sweden.105 
Finnish domestic tensions in the early 1930s were also the 
subject of comment in the Soviet press, reflecting official disquiet 
with developments. The various events of 1930 were given limited 
coverage by both Pravda and Izvestia, mainly in the shape of 
analyses and interpretations of the background factors identified 
as lying behind the troubles. Two aspects were particularly 
highlighted in Moscow: the strong anti-communist aims of the 
Lapua movement and the upswing which took place in the 
activities of the various nationalist organisations committed to 
developing closer links within the Finno-Ugrian cultural 
community. British anti-Soviet machinations were identified by a 
number of Soviet commentators as being at work behind the scenes 
in Finnish politics. Suspicion of British involvement was coupled 
to that directed at everything which was seen as pointing to a 
possible reawakening of closer contacts between Finland and the 
border states.106 
The various kidnappings carried out by Lapua activists of their 
political opponents and their dumping across the Soviet-Finnish 
border particularly riled the Soviet authorities, and resulted in the 
dispatch of an official note of protest to the Finnish government. 
Moscow obviously hoped that the latter would disassociate itself 
104. NDA 17.6., 1.7., 16.10.1930; SvD 3.7., 6.7., 16.7.1930; Sydsvenska Dagbladet 
11.7.1930; Abl 2.7., 5.7.1930. See also Eirik Hornborg's letter of 18.4.1932 to 
Nils Ahnlund (Ahnlund collection) and Herman Gummerus: Dagbok 27.9., 
13.10.1930. 
105. DN 17.2.1931; Soc-Dem 17.2.1931; StT 17.2.1931; Abl 14.1.1931; NDA 
17.2.1931; Soc-Dem 3.3.1932; Ny Tid 1.3.1932; DN 11.7.1933; StT 11.7.1933; 
Soc-Dem 11.7.1933. 
106. Korhonen I 1966, pp. 201-3. 
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from any support for the Lapua movement and its anti-Soviet 
opinions, but this the Finnish authorities refused to do. 
Ultimately, however, the Soviet administration proved more 
concerned over Finnish reaction, particularly prominent on the 
Right, to the events in Ingria associated with collectivisation and 
the forced transfers of the local population which took place in its 
wake. The Finnish government's decision, after some hesitation, 
to bow to internal domestic pressure and send an official note to 
Moscow complaining of the treatment of the Ingrian population 
was a particularly unwelcome development for the Soviet 
authorities. The Soviet reaction was sharp and swift, as there was 
no wish to allow Finland to be seen to be interfering in Soviet 
internal affairs.107 Given the sensitivity of the issue, it would not 
be unreasonable to suppose that Finland's decision to press ahead 
with an official protest over the matter could well have had a long-
term unfavourable influence on Soviet views towards Finland. 
The friction in Soviet-Finnish relations generated by the Lapua 
and Ingrian issues was nevertheless not allowed to get in the way 
when the question of a non-aggression treaty between the two 
countries again came for discussion, allowing a pact to be signed 
after what was only a relatively short period of discussion in 
January 1932. This rapid conclusion of the treaty question owed a 
fair deal to the parallel discussions taking place at the same time 
between the Soviet Union and Poland and the other border states. 
Although the attempts on the part of the Finnish government to 
delay ratification, in the hope of being able to coordinate the 
Soviet-Finnish treaty with the other agreements under discussion 
must have been noted in Moscow, so undoubtedly was Finland's 
essential willingness to see the treaty through. This was indirectly 
reflected in the sudden fall-off which took place in critical Soviet 
press comment on the internal situation in Finland prior to 
Finnish ratification, which eventually took place in July 1932. 
This even extended to the Mäntsälä incident, which received only 
the most minimal coverage in a few short news items.108 
The quickening pace of change in Europe typical of the post-
1933 period, together with the shift which took place in Soviet 
107. Ibid., pp. 213-5. 
108. Ibid., pp. 234-40. 
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diplomacy towards a more active role in promoting proposals for 
guaranteeing security in Eastern Europe, saw Soviet policy 
towards Finland enter on a new stage. Increased Soviet interest 
was matched by a similar upswing in interest in Finland among 
the other major powers. 
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VII Finland and Europe 
Overshadowed by 
Crisis The Second 
Half of the 1930s 
1. Increased tension and deteriorating 
international relations 
The foundations of the post-war European balance of power, in the 
shape of the Versailles Peace and the other treaty agreements 
which had been introduced at the end of the First World War, 
came under growing pressure as the decade progressed and 
particularly from 1933 onwards, following Hitler's rise to power in 
Germany. Parallel to the escalation of these destabilising factors, 
the status of the League of Nations also began to decline 
substantially, as European politics become increasingly dominated 
by deepening ideological disagreements. 
The impact of the change of government in Germany on wider 
developments in Europe was not immediate, however, as the early 
years of the new administration in Germany were largely taken up 
with domestic issues and consolidating the new government's 
hold on power. The latter's commitment to working towards a 
rewriting of the Versailles-based European order was nevertheless 
obvious, and a number of low-key proposals hinting at the 
possibility of negotiations to this end were made early on. 
Germany's departure from the League of Nations and withdrawal 
from the Geneva disarmament talks in the autumn of 1933 could 
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have left no one in any doubt of the shift that had taken place in 
German attitudes, and of the new government's hostility to the 
multilateral approach to handling European problems represented 
by the League. Germany's treaty of friendship signed with Poland 
the following year, serving as it did to unbalance the existing 
network of alliance agreements, only underlined this. Signs of 
German movement towards a new style of foreign policy became 
only really apparent, however, from the spring of 1935 onwards, in 
the wake of the introduction of general conscription and the 
beginning of development work on a new German air force, which 
together marked the virtual end of any German pretence at 
respecting the remaining restrictions imposed by the Versailles 
Peace. Against this show of German determination, the two major 
Western powers, France and Britain, proved unable to find a 
common base for a shared foreign policy strategy capable of 
seriously challenging these developments. France, hampered by 
domestic troubles, found herself faced with the disintegration of 
her security policy and alliance network developed since 1919. 
Britain, for her part, declined to take any firm stand, believing that 
a reduction in tension could be achieved through a policy of 
concessions to German demands, signing a naval agreement with 
Germany in the summer of 1935, under which she virtually agreed 
to give up her interests in the Baltic. 
Developments in the international situation and particularly 
Italy's intervention in Abyssinia, together with the League of 
Nation's decision to introduce economic sanctions against Italy as 
a result, served to divert the focus of international interest away 
from the German question. The League and the Western powers 
suffered a further blow to their prestige and international standing 
when Germany was able to take economic advantage of the 
sanctions and used the opportunity to occupy the Rhineland in the 
spring of 1936, thereby improving her strategic position. The 
strategic potential of the Continent's two fascist powers was only 
further consolidated following the establishment of a close 
alliance relationship between Rome and Berlin, largely as a result 
of Italy's desire to reduce her increasing international isolation. 
France, in a bid to underpin her shaky position, and against the 
opposition of a significant section of conservative and moderate 
opinion, and in spite of the doubts about the Red Army's 
combative capabilities felt within the French Army, signed a 
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military agreement with the Soviet Union in 1935.1 The practical 
value of this Franco-Soviet treaty, however, was put into question 
from its very inception following Poland's refusal to grant the Red 
Army any right of transit across Polish territory in the event of an 
international crisis. 
Uppermost in Stalin's interpretation of developments in 1933 
seems to have been the view that Hitler's rise to power represented 
only a transitional stage in German developments, a last-ditch 
attempt to rescue the German capitalist system from collapse, and 
one which would be followed by a communist-inspired 
revolution.2 Events during the course of 1934, however, led Stalin 
to abandon this view, and saw the Soviet Union drop much of its 
earlier hostility towards the League of Nations, becoming a 
member of the organisation during the autumn, and under 
Litvinov adopt a more active stance towards developing a system 
of collective security. The Soviet authorities also accelerated 
reform and modernisation of the country's armed forces. 
Comintern, which as late as 1934 continued to stress the 
importance of national communist parties maintaining their 
distance from competing socialist parties, also moved towards a 
less isolationist policy. At its seventh congress held in the summer 
of 1935, the organisation adopted a new policy calling for the 
formation of popular front alliances, made up of left of centre non-
socialists together with socialists and communists, to spearhead 
the fight against the spread of fascism. The Soviet Union 
underlined the importance of developing collective cooperation 
within the framework provided by the League of Nations, and 
increased its efforts to improve Soviet relations with the Western 
powers. Considerable doubt existed within the Soviet leadership, 
however, as to the extent of the West's determination to commit 
itself to opposing German expansion. There was particular 
uncertainty over how the Western powers might react to possible 
future attempts by Hitler to expand the German sphere of influence 
in the East; the Soviet suspicion being that they would do little to 
halt it. The ideological distance separating the Soviet Union from 
the Western democracies, and the focus of Stalin's policy on 
1. Mauru 1967, pp. 212-3, 220-1; Kennan 1961, p. 303; Holborn 1966, p.141; Re-
nouvin VIII 1958 p. 90; Duroselle 1979, pp. 140-1, 287. 
2. Kennan 1961, p. 228; Deutscher 1978, ppl 347-8. 
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securing Soviet defence interests, inevitably served to hamper the 
development of closer relations and any real measure of 
cooperation between the Soviet Union and the West against the 
general threat to European security posed by an increasingly 
aggressive and self-confident Germany.3 The political trials of old 
Bolshevik leaders and high-ranking military figures held between 
1936 and 1938 to eliminate what remained of internal party 
opposition to Stalin, by virtue of their scale and the harsh 
sentences imposed, only deepened Western hostility. In addition 
to their other aims, the purges can also be seen as having been 
partly motivated by a desire on Stalin's part to increase his room 
for manoeuvre on foreign policy issues.4 
Further realignment took place within Europe in 1936, dictated 
by changing great power interests and various ideological factors. 
The closer ties which developed along the Berlin-Rome axis 
reflected the general dissatisfaction felt in both Germany and Italy 
towards the balance of power in the region, while the development 
of links between Germany and Japan reflected an attempt to 
counterbalance the Soviet-French alliance. The eruption of the 
Spanish Civil War in July 1936, following General Franco's 
decision to challenge the popular front government, on1 served to 
consolidate the deepening division between the Axis ånd non-
Axis countries within Europe. Britain, followed by France, 
adopted a policy of non-involvement in Spanish affairs, while Italy 
and Germany decided to support Franco and began supplying 
arms and other assistance to Franco's forces from October 1936 
onwards. In an attempt to prevent any further growth in the 
influence of the Axis powers or at the least to delay it, the Soviet 
Union stepped into the fray by promising assistance to the 
republican forces. Soviet aid, in the shape of large shipments of 
military equipment, continued at a significant level until the early 
months of 1937, when a more cautionary approach was adopted.5 
The Axis powers were not slow to exploit both the Franco-Soviet 
alliance agreement and the Soviet involvement in Spain in their 
propaganda underlining the communist threat facing Europe. 
3. Kennan 1961, pp. 312-3. 
4. Deutscher 1978, pp. 322-4; Kennan 1961. p. 305. 
5. Carr 1973, pp. 260-1; Kennan 1961. pp. 308-11. 
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Their own active involvement in events in Spain served to 
establish their growing role as a powerful force in international 
politics and as significant military powers. This was only 
underscored when set against the low-key and essentially passive 
role adopted by the Western governments, despite the widespread 
popular sentiment aroused among liberal and socialist circles in 
the latter countries in support of the republican cause. With the 
political influence and military might of the Axis powers clearly in 
the ascendant, the Western powers found themselves increasingly 
forced on the defensive in response to the formers' mounting 
pressure for changes in their favour in the international system. 
This was particularly evident in the change which took place in 
French fortunes and the attendant decline in France's interna-
tional position, with the crumbling of the post-war status quo. 
French influence began to falter badly in Eastern and Central 
Europe, being replaced by the growing economic and political 
influence wielded by Germany. Symptomatic of this development 
was the slow collapse of the Eastern Entente, which began in 1933 
and continued for the rest of the decade.6 
Parallel to these changes taking place in the international 
balance in the West, the Soviet Union was continuing to expand 
and develop into a potent power, but in virtual isolation. Heavy 
industry continued to dominate Soviet economic thinking, as it 
had done from the time of the introduction of the first five-year 
plan, with the emphasis now shifting to Siberia. Light industry 
and the service sector enjoyed a much less central role in economic 
planning. The 1930s in fact marked the emergence of the Soviet 
Union as a modern industrial power, a fact reflected in the growth 
of the proportion of the population employed in industry to some 
35% by 1937. This consolidation of the industrial base also 
provided significant new opportunities for improving and 
expanding the Soviet Union's military capability. Economic 
expansion was accompanied by a new sense of national confi-
dence and a new emphasis on the achievements of past Russian 
figures, such as Alexander Nevsky and Peter the Great. The 
increase sense of confidence felt within government and the party 
was also reflected in the new constitution introduced in 1936 
6. Reichart 1971, pp. 121-3, 125-32. 138: Renouvin VIII 1958. pp. 99. 153. 
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which, departing from previous communist practice, enfranchised 
the entire population, irrespective of social status. Political power 
nevertheless continued to be increasingly concentrated at the 
centre and in the person of Stalin, a trend which only intensified 
following the widespread purges instituted around mid-decade.' 
The growing dictatorial nature of Stalin's leadership, together with 
the general ideological gulf dividing the Soviet Union from the 
major powers of Western Europe, aggravated relations between the 
West and the Soviet Union, effectively preventing any revival of 
the alliance relationship which had existed prior to 1918, or the 
development of any comparable agreement designed to contain 
German expansion. 
For the Western powers, developments on the international stage 
were proving increasingly problematical. Finding herself steadily 
more isolated following the failure of her alliance network to 
withstand changing developments and faced with the rapid 
decline of her influence in Europe, France turned her attention to 
securing her immediate defence interests, beginning an extensive 
policy of reinforcing her forces along her eastern border with 
Germany and strengthening the Maginot Line. This policy was 
further reinforced following the forming of a new popular front 
government in 1936 under Léon Blum and Edouard Daladier. 
France's decision to concentrate on interests closer to home and 
avoid overstretching her resources was paralleled by Britain's 
policy of avoiding committing herself to any alliance relationship 
in Europe. It was believed in Britain that, given time and careful 
negotiation, German interest in European cooperation and respect 
for international agreements could be restored. Given her poor 
level of military preparedness on the ground and in the air, Britain 
had every reason to want to prevent the situation in Europe 
deteriorating to the stage where armed conflict would become 
inevitable. Her military weakness prevented the adoption of a 
more determined, active style of foreign policy. A British decision 
to sanction increased defence spending only came in 1937. 
Britain's cautionary foreign policy in Europe was also indirectly 
influenced by her problems and interests outside the area. It was 
7. Deutscher 1978, p. 327. 
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also feared in Britain that a possible major war on the scale of the 
1914-1918 conflict would lead, not only to major economic 
disruption, but also to social disorder.8 
1937 marked something of a pause in developments in Conti-
nental Europe. Pressure continued to build up apace, however, 
while the prospect of being able to effectively defuse it appeared 
increasingly remote. The gulf between the aims and policies 
pursued in the foreign policy field by the Axis powers on the one 
hand and the Western democracies on the other deepened all the 
time. German policy under Hitler had by this stage become 
increasingly strongly nationalistically-coloured and dominated by 
the idea of a Greater Germany, capable of providing Germany with 
adequate national borders. Plans for the annexation of Austria 
and the transference of sovereignty over the German-speaking 
Sudetenland from Czechoslovakia to Germany were put before the 
German military and political leadership by Hitler in November 
1937. These were complemented by policy outlines covering the 
extension of German power and influence beyond the borders of 
German-speaking areas.9 
Domestic opinion within Germany, encouraged by National 
Socialist propaganda and a more general desire to see the wrongs 
wrought by Versailles righted, had increasingly come to accept the 
legitimacy of using military pressure and force of arms as a means 
of achieving Germany's political objectives, and the importance of 
stepping up the ideological struggle against the mixture of threats 
posed by Marxism, the Jewish conspiracy, parliamentary demo-
cracy and liberalism. This shift was reflected in the moves taken 
against those within the political and military establishments who 
had shown themselves less than enthusiastic towards the new and 
openly expansionist policies. At the beginning of 1938, a number 
of more moderate figures, including Generals von Blomberg and 
von Fritsch, both of whom had expressed the view that Germany 
was not sufficiently militarily prepared for large-scale military 
campaigns, were removed from office. The director of the 
State Bank, Hjalmar Schacht, and the Foreign Minister, K. von 
8. Rock 1977, pp. 45-51. 
9. Bracher VI 1975, pp. 178-9. 
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Neurath, were also replaced; the latter's place being taken by von 
Ribbentrop.10 
The German occupation of Austria in March 1938, while in line 
with general German intentions to shake off the unwelcome 
impedimenta of the post-war status quo, also marked the begin-
ning of a process of German expansion eastward. Czechoslovakia, 
which found itself dangerously exposed following the Anschluss 
and now represented the last remaining pillar in the French system 
of alliance in Eastern Europe, was soon subjected to German 
pressure, in the shape of German demands, nominally based on 
calls by the German-speaking population of the area for its 
unification with Germany, for transference of the Sudetenland to 
German jurisdiction. Britain's attempts to achieve a compromise 
solution, under which Czechoslovakia would have agreed to grant 
extensive local autonomy to the Sudetenland in return for 
Germany dropping her demands, eventually came to nothing. 
Lacking any real promise of Western backing, the Prague 
government came to the conclusion that it had little option but to 
accede to the German proposal. Against the backdrop of con-
tinuing German threats of military action, the Munich agreement 
finalising the division of Czechoslovakia was signed on 29 
September 1938 between Germany, Italy, France and Britain. This 
agreement effectively confirmed Germany's dominant position in 
Central Europe, while at the same time underlining the continuing 
inability of the West, the Soviet Union having been excluded from 
the Munich talks, to coordinate resistance to German expansion 
and to protect the interests of the Continent's smaller states." 
2. The domestic political climate 
The period between 1932 and 1935 represented one of a cautious 
return to something approaching political equilibrium, following 
the successful repulse of the right-wing threat to the parliamentary 
system of government which had emerged around the turn of the 
decade. Although drawing its support in Parliament from a 
10. Ibid., p. 179. 
11. Joll 1973, pp. 370-3; Duroselle 1979. pp. 351-5. 
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narrow centrist base, the Kivimäki-led minority coalition govern-
ment, which took office in December 1932 following the fall of the 
Sunila cabinet, proved a durable one, sitting until October 1936. 
Occasional discussions took place between the Social Democrats 
and the Agrarians over much of the course of this period on the 
possibility of forming a majority government, but both sides were 
forced to conclude that the ideological differences and political 
interests dividing them were too great to allow a compromise at 
this stage. Against this background of a divided opposition, the 
Kivimäki administration was able to enjoy the tacit support of the 
majority, being seen as a means of avoiding alternative, less 
attractive potential coalitions.12 On the Right, the policy stance 
adopted by the new leadership of the National Coalition Party, 
aimed at distancing the party from association with the People's 
Patriotic Movement, gained further support. While warning the 
IKL of the dangers of too slavishly following the example of right-
wing movements abroad, the National Coalition's new party 
leader, J. K. Paasikivi, nevertheless did not also forget to warn both 
his own party and the country as a whole of the continuing dangers 
posed by Marxist ideology and political activity.13 Despite its 
increasing isolation from the other political parties, the IKL 
continued to maintain an active political profile, and remained 
committed to its original political programme and aims. 
Within student circles, the political position and influence of the 
nationalist Academic Karelian Society continued to grow. The 
departure in 1932 of a group of leading moderate members critical 
of the society's attitude to the Mäntsälä incident led to a power 
struggle within the student body at Helsinki University for control 
over the regional student unions, and saw AKS members assume 
control in many of them. This success allowed the organisation to 
secure a powerful role for itself in the leadership of the University 
Student Union and over the student paper Ylioppilaslehti.14 
Many of the supporters of the more extreme brands of nationalist 
sentiment within the country continued to be found within the 
student community and organisations closely linked to it, such as 
12. H. Soikkanen 1975, pp. 558-9; Mylly 1983, pp. 52-6. 
13. Paasikiven linja II, pp. 51-60, 77, 218. 
14. Klinge IV 1968, pp. 155-8; Kuusisto II 1978, pp. 109-10; U. Peltoniemi 
5.6.1980. 
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the Finnish Federation. The activity of these various nationalist 
organisations reached something of a peak between 1934 and 1936, 
during which period the AKS organised an extensive campaign 
directed against the compromise solution, proposed at the begin-
ning of 1935 by the Kivimäki government, to resolve the dispute 
over the role of Swedish at Helsinki University. This campaign, 
directed by Vilho Helanen and Yrjö Vuorjoki, both leading figures 
within the AKS and the wider student community, while 
reflecting the strength of emotions on the language issue, also 
represented a calculated political gamble on the part of its 
organisers to extend the influence of the society, and nationalist 
opinion in general, beyond the university world to embrace a 
wider section of society. Despite some initial success, the 
campaign ultimately failed, however, largely as a result of the 
major changes which had taken place in the political climate since 
the beginning of the decade and which had served to increasingly 
isolate the AKS and its brand of expansionist nationalist ideals 
from the political mainstream.15 
The limited liberalisation of the political climate which accom-
panied the country's recovery from the excesses of the early 1930s, 
together with the country's emergence from the effects of the 
depression by mid-decade, provided the Left with more room for 
political and social manoeuvre. The steady growth in the 
membership of the SAK trade union federation which took place 
from 1934 onwards owed much to this development and to the 
abandonment by the underground Communist Party of its earlier 
uncompromising hostility to the new organisation, which had 
been set up after the banning of the communist-controlled SAJ.16 
The trade union movement began to adopt many policy ideas 
current among trade unions in the Scandinavian countries, among 
them an emphasis on comprehensive pay agreements covering 
working conditions and terms of employment. Attempts by the 
SAK to put this idea into practice, however, met with determined 
resistance from individual employers and the Employers' 
Federation (STK), who were keen to stress the differences between 
the labour markets in Finland and the other Scandinavian 
15. Hyvämäki 1937, p. 16; Partanen 1980, pp. 303-6. 
16. Salomaa 1971, p. 178. 
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countries, and were reluctant to recognise the role of the SAK as a 
negotiating partner. The appointment of Antti Hackzell to replace 
Axel Palmgren as head of the STK in 1936 brought little real 
change in the employers' position. Hackzell's diplomatic manner 
could not obscure his adherence to the conservative, patriarchal 
approach which had been pursued by his predecessor, and his 
opposition to any moves towards introducing Scandinavian-style 
negotiating methods into pay bargaining.17 Like Palmgren before 
him, Hackzell was unwilling to make any voluntary concessions 
likely to undermine the employers' hold on the upper hand in the 
labour market. 
The gradual shift in the political climate also gave the radical 
Left, which had been forced to adopt a low profile for much of the 
early part of the decade, the opportunity for renewed activity. This 
was reflected in an upswing in left-wing interest in literature and 
the arts, and in the publication of various literary journals, 
including Soihtu and Kirjallisuuslehti and a new radical version of 
Tulenkantajat, which began to appear in 1933. The Left was also 
active at the time of the trial of the communist Toivo Antikainen 
for illegal communist activity and murder at the end of 1934, and 
in the founding of the short-lived Federation for Human Rights, set 
up to petition for the removal of the death sentence from the 
statute book. This attempt to rally left-wing support appealed to 
the general antagonism traditionally felt within the labour 
movement towards the judiciary, and also managed to attract 
supporters from the Social Democrats and from among liberal 
opinion.18 This increasing, if modest role exercised by the radical 
Left and the underground Communist Party did not go unnoticed 
by some sections of conservative opinion, where it aroused 
concern that the Left, backed by Comintern, might be attempting to 
engineer an alliance with more moderate elements in society prior 
to attempting to install a popular front-type government, along the 
lines of similar political groupings elsewhere in Europe. Pressure 
against the Left by the authorities was, as a result, stepped up, as 
was police surveillance of leading left-wing figures and 
organisations. 
17. Mansner 1981, pp. 455, 458-60. 
18. Upton 1970, p. 121; Tuomioja II 1982, pp. 215-6; Hyvönen 1971, pp. 259-68, 
272. 
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The 1936 parliamentary elections saw the Social Democrats 
further consolidate their position in Parliament, increasing their 
number of seats from 78 to 83. While not bringing any immediate 
change of government, the result did serve to bring increased 
pressure for some modification to the composition of the coalition 
behind the Kivimäki administration, particularly in the direction 
of a Social Democrat-Agrarian government. President Svin-
hufvud's resistance to countenancing the inclusion of the Social 
Democrats in any coalition, even after the fall of the Kivimäki 
government in the autumn, however, effectively put a temporary 
halt to these plans. Another minority administration, including 
the Agrarians but with National Coalition and Progressive 
partners, under Kyösti Kallio, was formed.19 The Social Democrats 
did not let Svinhufvud's opposition deflect them from their aim, 
however, and continued to work towards freeing the party from 
what the party's leader, Väinö Tanner, described as its 'second 
class citizen' status, and clearing the way towards the party taking 
what it saw as its fair share of government responsibility. To this 
end, the Social Democrats joined forces with the Agrarians at the 
beginning of the following year to secure the defeat of Svin-
hufvud's candidacy in the presidential election, thereby allowing 
Kallio to be elected in his stead. Soon after Kallio's taking up 
office, a new majority administration made up of Social Democrat 
and Agrarian ministers, with a token Progressive Party 
representation, was formed under the prime-ministership of 
the Progressive A. K. Cajander. This quickly became popularly 
known as the 'red earth' government, to symbolise its novel 
alliance of socialist and agrarian interests.20 
The decision by the Agrarians and Progressives to enter into 
governmental alliance with the Social Democrats was looked upon 
by the Right as amounting to little short of a betrayal of the non-
socialist cause and, by extension, a betrayal of the values fought for 
by the Whites in the Civil War. To an extent, the Right was correct, 
in that the formation of the 'red earth' government, by virtue of its 
composition, did mark a clear and historic attempt, after nearly 
twenty years of independence, to finally come to terms with the 
19. E. W. Juva II 1961, pp. 521-2; H. Soikkanen 1975, pp1 585-7. 
20. Mylly 1983, pp. 69-76; T. Soikkanen 1983, pp. 97-109, 116-23. 
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country's troubled recent past. More particularly, it marked a new 
willingness, one not seen before, on the part of the parties 
concerned to put their ideological differences to one side in order 
to strike a political bargain with some potential of bridging the 
very real political and social divisions affecting the country.21 The 
Right found itself abruptly consigned to the role of parliamentary 
opposition, a major blow coming after a long period of political 
security, and only relatively shortly after it had nearly come close 
to introducing a form of government more in line with its own 
ideals. The formation of Cajander's majority coalition also came as 
a sharp blow to the Swedish People's Party, which lost the 
bargaining position it had become accustomed to under previous 
minority administrations and found itself instead isolated within 
the non-socialist opposition. The Swedish-speaking community 
was nevertheless able to gain some consolation from the appoint-
ment of a Swedish-speaking minister, the Social Democrat K. A. 
Fagerholm, to the Cajander cabinet in November 1937. 
Secure in the knowledge of its large parliamentary majority, the 
new government was able to push through a number of pieces of 
difficult legislation, including a compromise solution to the 
language dispute affecting Helsinki University, various social 
reforms, and an expanded defence procurement programme. The 
coalition's commitment to working towards developing a new 
sense of national unity embracing the whole of the population, 
regardless of political affiliation or ideological sympathies, was 
well highlighted, if only symbolically, during the celebrations held 
on Independence Day, 1937 to mark twenty years of indepen-
dence. This was particularly reflected in the range of speakers 
chosen to address the audience at the official celebrations held in 
Helsinki, and which included representatives from the Swedish-
speaking minority and the trade union movement. Not 
unsurprisingly, this move away from traditional practice, which 
had up until then tended to make these sort of events very much 
the property of the conservative élite, met with much indirect 
adverse comment from the right-wing.22 The continuing distrust 
and hostility felt within the Right towards the Social Democrats 
21. Mylly 1983, pp. 78-80. 
22. SS 5.12.1937; HS 6.12., 8.12.1937; US 8.12.1937; AS 8.12., 9.12., 10.12.1937. 
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was reflected in the way the celebrations held soon after in the 
spring of 1938, to mark the White Army's victory twenty years 
previously in 1918, were exploited in an effort to undermine 
support for Cajander's centre-left coalition and to drive a wedge 
between the Agrarians and the Social Democrats. For all the 
attention the celebrations, with Mannerheim at their head, 
received in the media, they nevertheless failed to achieve their 
undeclared aim of destabilising government unity. The success of 
the Cajander government in maintaining its internal cohesion and 
resisting the various attempts made to topple it proved, in fact, a 
source of continual surprise, not only to the coalition parties 
themselves, but also to the conservative opposition and the 
underground Communist Party.23 
Much of the background to this success lay in the growth that 
took place during the latter years of the 1930s of a more widely-
based sense of national unity. Among the factors central to this 
development was the gradual abandonment by the labour 
movement of its traditional hostility towards government, which 
had been born out of its experiences during the earlier years of 
independence when the Left had found itself consistently 
excluded from fully participating in the democratic process, and 
its adoption of a more active role in politics. Tanner's part in this, 
both in his capacity as one of the main architects of the Cajander 
coalition and leader of the Social Democrats, was particularly 
important. In line with his pragmatic brand of socialism, he had 
consistently worked towards steering the Social Democrats away 
from political isolation and towards some form of compromise 
with the Centre which would allow the party to finally take 
advantage of its parliamentary power. 
The increasing sense of a growing, if still modest national 
consensus felt in post-1937 Finnish society was also reflected in 
the decline in influence wielded by the more extreme elements of 
the Finnish-language nationalist movement in the continuing 
debate surrounding the language question. Organisations such as 
the AKS, although initially successful in mobilising opinion 
behind their campaign for the complete fennicisation of Helsinki 
University, ultimately proved unable to retain the support they 
23. Mylly 1983, pp. 225-30; Aili Mäkinen 20.1.1971. 
439 
had built up within society and the political parties, particularly 
the Agrarian Party. Symptomatic of this decline was the poor 
showing of the AKS-sponsored petition on the issue. While 
Swedish-speaking activists had been able to collect a petition 
including some 154,000 names in 1934 in defence of the mainten-
ance of Swedish-language instruction, their Finnish-speaking 
opponents were only able to collect some 267,000 names by the 
summer of 1937 for their counter-petition calling for a more radical 
solution to the problem than that contained in the government's 
compromise legislation on the issue. This was a relatively small 
figure in relation to the size of the Finnish-speaking population, 
and fell well below what had been hoped for.24 
The position of the Swedish People's Party following the change 
of government in the spring of 1937 was particularly precarious. 
Disagreements over possible ways of clawing back a measure of 
political leverage led to some bitter argument at the party congress 
held in Vaasa soon after the Cajander government took office.25 
Similar concerns lay behind the proposal broached by the party in 
the autumn of 1938 for convening a national Finland-Swedish 
conference, embracing representatives from the Swedish People's 
Party itself, the left-wing Svenska Vänstern party, and Swedish-
speaking Social Democrats. Modelled on the meeting called 
during the troubles of 1919, it was argued that such a conference 
would help consolidate and strengthen the Swedish-speaking 
community's potential for presenting a united face to unwelcome 
developments emanating from the Finnish-speaking majority.26 At 
a time when other more important issues than those related to 
Finland-Swedish concerns were increasingly coming to dominate 
political life, however, little real progress was made with these 
plans for a united policy strategy embracing all sections of the 
Swedish-speaking community. 
For all the increased sense of national unity which developed 
during the latter half of the 1930s, a number of deep-going 
24. Hämäläinen 1968, pp. 217, 260; Alapuro 1973; p. 151; Klinge IV 1968, pp. 180, 
188; Hbl 26.10.1934; SS 19.6.1973; Suomen Heimo 10.4.1937, 15.12.1938. 
25. AU 19.5.1937; Ragnar Furuhjelm: Dagbok 15.5.1937 (AA); V. V. Nordström 
8.5.1979. 
26. Protokoll vid gemensamt möte med Svenska Folkpartiets centralstyrelse och 
svenska riksdagsgruppen 27.10.1938 (SvCA); Furuhjelm: Dagbok 20.10.1938, 
14.2.1939. 
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divisions affecting political and social attitudes remained, both at 
the conscious and unconscious levels. The gulf between the 
Finnish and Swedish-speaking communities remained a very real 
one for a large number of the population and continued to act as a 
powerful divisive factor. Support among Swedish-speakers for the 
old Freudenthal view that had looked upon their community as 
belonging, with the mainland Swedish population, to one ethnic 
entity had nevertheless largely fallen away by this stage and been 
replaced by one stressing the independent nature and identity of 
Swedish-language culture and settlement in Finland. A certain 
sense of superiority over the Finnish-speaking majority born out of 
cultural and historical factors, however, continued to persist in 
what might be described as the Swedish-speaking community's 
collective unconscious, as well as in everyday attitudes. 
On the other side of the linguistic fence, within the Finnish 
nationalist movement, ethnic-based arguments continued to loom 
large. A highly idealised view of the underlying ethnic, linguistic, 
physical and intellectual constituents of what was identified as the 
Finnish national identity enjoyed wide support. Marked hostility 
to the Swedish-speaking minority, reinforced by constant 
allusions to the latter's supposed lack of patriotism, remained not 
uncommon among the more extreme elements of the movement. 
There were also a number within the movement who felt some 
interest and sympathy with ideas developed by Nazi thinkers, 
including the National Socialists' emphasis on Aryan values and 
German ethnic superiority. Ironically, Nazi racial theories, had 
they ever been implemented to their full extent, would have had 
little time or respect for a separate Finnish ethnic identity. 
While continuing to have an influence on Finnish society far out 
of proportion to the number of seats held by conservative members 
in Parliament, conservative opinion no longer enjoyed the same 
hold it had had during the first years of independence by the late 
1930s. Pluralist, egalitarian political ideas, stressing the value of 
compromise, continued to remain essentially alien to the 
traditional hard core of conservative opinion, which remained 
dominated by inflexible and largely anachronistic notions of 
government and national interest owing more to the nineteenth 
than the twentieth century. Typical of the attitudes current among 
the conservative élite was its members' continued adherence to a 
distorted belief in the inherent superiority of their political, 
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cultural and social values over those held by their opponents. At 
its most extreme, this was reflected in the attitudes of those 
conservatives who made little or no attempt to come to terms with 
the reality of the labour movement and, as a result, failed to detect 
any differences of emphasis, opinion or philosophy within it, 
preferring instead to dismiss out of hand anything which they saw 
as even slightly smacking of socialism. Such a blind refusal to face 
facts, however, was not widely evident within more moderate 
conservative opinion. The growing strength of the latter was 
evident in the gradual shift which took place in attitudes towards 
the Civil War, away from outright condemnation of the defeated 
Reds. The blame for the uprising came instead to be put on their 
misguided leaders, rather than the rank and file. 
A parallel softening of attitudes also took place on the Left, with 
more attempt being given to seeing the bourgeoisie as a hetero-
geneous social grouping with varying allegiances, rather than a 
single amorphous mass, distinguished only in degree of reac-
tionary opinion. From a wider social perspective, however, the 
machinery of government, together with higher education and 
business, continued to remain distant and alien to the labour 
movement, and seemingly impregnable to the latter's attempts to 
influence their workings. The experience of the Civil War and the 
troubled years of the early 1930s, marked by the rise of the Lapua 
movement and economic recession, continued to play a major part 
in shaping working class political attitudes and view of the world. 
The Civil War, together with its bloody aftermath, in particular, 
retained a powerful hold on the socialist imagination. Regardless 
of the various individual interpretations put on the Red defeat, the 
shadow the latter had cast over the labour movement and left-wing 
politics, and continued to cast, was something that could not be 
ignored by anyone active on the Left. As the economy recovered 
from the worst effects of the recession and as political 
developments began to move, however slowly, towards a more 
open society, and with the acceptance of the Social Democrats into 
government in 1937, however, the general mood within the Left 
during the latter years of the decade was decidedly more opti-
mistic than perhaps it had been at any time since independence. 
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3. Domestic attitudes to international 
developments 
The overall level of interest in events and developments abroad 
had, by the latter half of the 1930s, grown significantly in 
comparison to that evident during the early years of independence, 
a fact reflected in the expanded news coverage and comment on 
foreign issues appearing in the press of the time. This rise in 
interest owed part of its origin to the increasing international 
tension affecting various countries in Europe, and part to the 
general evolution of Finnish society which had taken place over 
the intervening years. For all the broadening of horizons this 
embraced, however, this generally positive development was 
countered by the continuing tendency among commentators and 
political groupings on both the Right and the Left to favour 
simplistic interpretations of events which, instead of fostering a 
critical appreciation of international trends, tended to reinforce 
what often amounted to a very black and white view of the world 
within their readers and supporters. This type of approach was 
nevertheless tempered to a degree, although admittedly to quite a 
restricted degree with regard to the press, by a widening realisation 
of the security policy problems facing the country and the 
increasing need for developing realistic policy ideas capable of 
coming to grips with them. 
Characteristic of this change in attitudes towards the inter-
national situation was the largely cool reception given to attempts 
to revive a more active border states policy. Following the failure 
of the Warsaw agreement to be ratified in 1922, relations between 
the various border states had been mainly limited to purely 
commercial and cultural issues. A body of opinion advocating 
some form of regional alliance had nevertheless remained active 
all the same, even among some elements of moderate opinion and 
the press, although its influence had steadily fallen off. The 
proposal by the Soviet Union of a Locarno-type security system for 
Eastern Europe put forward in 1934, however, finally convinced 
the majority of those still sympathetic to the idea, Helsingin 
Sanomat amongst them, to abandon what hopes they had left.27 
27. T. Soikkanen 1983, pp. 34-5. 
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Subsequent support for a border states-weighted foreign policy, in 
preference to the Scandinavian-oriented one favoured by the 
country's political leadership, came to be restricted to extreme 
nationalist elements and student activists grouped around such 
organisations as the AKS.28 
A similar fate befell the interest in and links with Estonia and 
Hungary, inspired by the sense of shared ethnic and cultural 
inheritance linking the three countries, typical of the early years of 
independence. By the mid-1930s, these had lost much of their 
early strength and attraction, and overall visibility in society. 
Within the influential student community, they nevertheless 
continued to have a powerful role, but even here change was in the 
air. The cooling of relations with Estonia was only accelerated by 
the abrogation of Parliament and the banning of political parties by 
the Estonian Prime Minister, Konstantin Päts, with the backing of 
the army under General Laidoner, in 1934, and the former's 
assumption of the role of acting President ruling by decree. Päts' 
move was roundly criticised by a number of figures within the 
AKS, who did little to hide their disappointment at the failure of 
the attempt by the Estonian League of Liberation War Veterans 
(Vabadussöjalaste Liit) to dislodge Päts from power in December of 
the following year.29 Despite these developments, the AKS 
leadership nevertheless attempted to maintain some measure of 
contact between the two countries' student communities. Vilho 
Helanen, leader of the AKS between 1934 and 1935 and later, 
continued to be particularly prominent in calling for contacts with 
Estonia to be maintained.30 Links with the other Baltic countries 
continued to be maintained by the joint student organisation SELL, 
but although formally remaining intact and with regular con-
gresses being held right up until the outbreak of the Second World 
War, their actual significance fell off sharply from around 1933 
onwards.31  
Germany continued to figure strongly in thinking on the extreme 
Right and also more generally within a substantial section of more 
28. Ylioppilaslehti 25.11.1933, 26.10.1935. 
29. Klinge IV 1968, pp. 191-3; Veikko Loppi 5.10.1979. 
30. Klinge IV 1968, pp. 193-4; Kuusisto II 1978, pp. 72-3. 
31. H. Paslmann: SELL:n ylioppilasliitto kymmenvuotias, p. 4 (SELL collection/ 
VA). Ylioppilaslehti 13.5.1939; Antero Manninen 15.9.1980. 
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moderate conservative opinion, most particularly by virtue of the 
important role she was seen as playing in the Western world's 
common struggle against communist expansion. Little was known 
about the detailed ideas contained in the National Socialist 
political programme, beyond the Nazis' general opposition to the 
labour movement and liberalism, neither close to Finnish 
conservatives' hearts. Ajan Suunta, and to a lesser extent Uusi 
Suomi, both appear to have been satisfied with the general trend of 
political and ideological developments in Central Europe, seeing 
in them much of benefit to Finland. No similar optimism, 
however, was to be found regarding these developments outside 
the Right, least of all within the socialist press. Suomen 
Sosialidemokraatti and Helsingin Sanomat were consistently and 
sharply critical, at least during the early years following Hitler's 
rise to power, of the pattern of developments in Germany, and in 
their condemnation of totalitarianism.32 Comment in the latter of 
these two papers, however, began to become more cautious and 
less absolute as time went on. No such shift was evident in the 
opinions of those writing for Turun Sanomat, who continued to 
openly criticise developments in Germany and the policies of the 
Nazi party. Nevertheless, little room for comment was found in 
any of the Finnish papers on some of the more controversial 
aspects of the Nazis' political programme, such as their increas-
ingly violent anti-semitism. Apart from Ajan Suunta, which 
expressed some guarded sympathy with German policy in this 
area, and Suomen Sosialidemokraatti, which condemned it out of 
hand, no significant comment on the Jewish question proved 
forthcoming from among the other major papers, with many of 
them quietly ignoring the problem altogether.33 
Overall criticism of Hitler and conditions in Germany generally 
fell off and the tone of comment on German affairs became more 
guarded as time went on, particularly after Hitler became head of 
state following Hindenburg's formal step-down from office and as 
Germany's increasing political power in Europe began to be better 
appreciated. It was only from around 1935 and 1936 onwards, 
however, that Germany's growing military capability also became 
32. SS 31.1., 24.3., 3.5., 9.11.1933; HS 30.3., 10.5., 19.5.1933. 
33. Kujala 1970, pp. 146-9. 
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clear to Finnish commentators. The introduction of general 
conscription in Germany in the spring of 1935 and the occupation 
of the Rhineland a year later were the subject of wide coverage and 
comment in the Finnish press. Ajan Suunta and Uusi Suomi, for 
instance, both looked favourably on these moves strengthening the 
German position as serving to eliminate some of the injustices 
imposed on Germany by the Versailles Peace and as contributing 
to a better balance in the international situation. Hufvudstads-
bladet, speaking for the Swedish-speaking community, was much 
less enthusiastic about these developments, adopting a cautious 
line of comment on them, in line with its generally low-key 
approach to all contentious issues. Sosialidemokraatti, despite its 
history of criticism of the Versailles agreement as unbalanced and 
serving purely Allied interests, reacted critically to the German 
moves.34 
Alongside the problem of increasingly strained relations be-
tween Germany and the Western powers, the overall rise in 
international tension characteristic of the period also focused 
Finnish attention on Soviet-German relations. From the time of 
the First World War and the years surrounding independence 
onwards, Soviet and German interests had generally come to be 
seen as inherently irreconcilable. Far from being a cause for 
concern for Finland, however, this friction between Germany and 
the Soviet Union, and which gave every sign of worsening as 
German confidence grew, tended to be seen by the conservative 
establishment as of long-term benefit to Finnish security. A 
powerful Germany, having regained her status as a major political 
and military factor in Europe, would, it was thought, be able to act 
as a counterbalance to any attempt by the Soviet Union to extend 
its influence, both generally and more specifically in the Baltic 
region. This tendency to emphasise Germany's role in security 
questions persisted on the Right, despite the shift which took place 
in the wider political arena towards looking to a closer association 
with Scandinavia as a means of securing Finnish defence interests. 
This was especially evident in the split over the latter policy 
which developed within the National Coalition Party, which saw a 
number of party figures arguing for the rejection of any 
34. Ibid., pp. 85-91, 101-11. 
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Scandinavian association in favour of developing closer ties with 
Germany. Germany's potential to act as a counterbalance to the 
Soviet Union was also recognised within liberal and socialist 
opinion. Rather than the opposition of German and Soviet 
interests necessarily working to Finland's advantage, however, 
liberal and socialist politicians tended to see increasing friction 
between the two powers as only likely to undermine Finland's 
position, and argued in consequence for maintaining a healthy 
distance from both countries.35 
Attitudes towards Germany within the AKS and the People's 
Patriotic Movement differed widely from those typical in the 
Centre. The strength of this pro-German sentiment was well 
revealed in the public pronouncements of leading figures in these 
organisations, such as R. G. Kallia. Kallia's view of Europe was 
simple and at the same time wonderfully uncompromising. 
Europe was, he argued, effectively divided into two camps, those 
powers truly committed to defending their national and political 
identities, which he saw as Germany and Italy, and those which 
either wittingly or unwittingly aided the communist cause, among 
which he included France and the small states of Europe. The 
formation of Cajander's 'red earth' government in the spring of 
1937 was greeted by Kallia as a particularly ill omen and as 
pointing the way to a future which would see Finland irrevocably 
throwing in her lot with the weaker group of European nations 
lacking a strong sense of national purpose.36 Only by allying 
herself with a militarily strong Germany, able and willing to 
extend her influence eastward, Kallia argued, could Finland have 
any real chance of achieving that ideal, cherished by all those on 
the far Right, of a Greater Finland embracing all that territory to the 
east of her 1920 borders considered as by rights belonging to 
Finland. 
The strong ideological hostility towards the Soviet Union typical 
of the extreme Right and which encouraged the idea of a closer 
association with Germany was paralleled by a similar, if less pro-
nounced, hostility towards Sweden and the rest of Scandinavia. 
For a number of pro-German right-wing thinkers such as Esa 
35. Paasivirta 1968, p. 92. 
36. Suomen Heimo 22.3.1937. 
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Kaitila, Scandinavia came to be seen as a region of internally weak 
and dangerously pacifist countries incapable of resisting Commu-
nism. Kaitila ultimately came to argue that Scandinavia con-
stituted as much of a danger in ideological terms to Finland as the 
Soviet Union, and that the growing keenness of the government to 
develop ties with Scandinavia, together with the spectre of the 
'Scandinavian mentality' spreading to Finland this would bring, 
could only be disadvantageous to Finland's long-term interests.37 
Within the AKS as a whole, however, many of the more uncom-
promising and expansionist aspects of nationalist philosophy, 
particularly with regard to East Karelia, began to attract less 
support as the decade wore on, serving to distance the society from 
the more radical IKL, which it openly supported for the last time 
during the parliamentary elections of 1936. Attention increasingly 
came to be turned instead to the matter of Finland's fraught 
international position and to ways of improving national security 
and the country's defence capabilities. This re-evaluation of 
attitudes within the AKS was also reflected in the controversial 
views, in terms of previous AKS thinking, put forward by such 
leading lights as Matti Kuusi, who argued for abandoning the 
hostilities born out of the Civil War, in the interests of developing a 
new sense of common national purpose.38 
Greatest support for government efforts to develop a closer 
association with Scandinavia came predictably from the country's 
Swedish-speaking community. Representatives of the latter 
consistently underlined the importance of the role played by a 
common Scandinavian cultural and historical inheritance in 
providing a sense of linkage between countries in the region and 
an effective base on which to build closer inter-state relations. In 
promoting these links, however, Swedish-speaking politicians 
found themselves hampered by the rise of the Social Democrats 
within Finland and by the powerful position of the Left in Sweden, 
which effectively deprived them of their previous privileged 
relationship with Sweden's decision-makers. 
No such difficulties faced the Social Democrats, in contrast, who 
felt increasingly attracted to Scandinavia by virtue of their 
37. Suomen Heimo 15.3.1936. 
38. Ylioppilaslehti 9.4.1937; Kuusi 1938, pp. 22-39. 
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ideological affinities with the powerful Scandinavian socialist 
parties. Following the inclusion of the Norwegian Labour Party in 
government, these enjoyed governmental responsibility in all three 
of the Scandinavian states by 1935. The notion of a common 
Scandinavian brand of democracy came to be strongly emphasised 
by the Finnish party, and from the mid-1930s onwards annual pan-
Scandinavian socialist congresses, devoted to discussion of 
common political themes, were organised by the various Nordic 
social democrat parties on an alternating basis in each of the 
Scandinavian countries.39 The Social Democrats' enthusiasm for 
building up ties with Scandinavia was also influenced, in addition 
to these more general factors, by a more specific concern with 
national security issues. Closer cooperation between the Nordic 
countries, aimed at developing some form of regional security 
arrangement, was increasingly seen by party leaders as an effective 
way of reducing Finland's dependence on the major European 
powers and power blocs. Much of the inspiration for this 
approach came from the ideas lying behind the League of Nations. 
This increased awareness of security issues was also accompanied 
by a new acceptance of the need for increased defence spending. 
The shift in opinion within the Swedish Social Democrats during 
the 1930s towards support for an increase in the size and strength 
of Swedish defence forces, and reflected in the 1936 defence 
budget, also undoubtedly had an influence on Finnish socialist 
thinking.49  
Closer links between the Scandinavian social democrat and 
labour parties and trade union movements were also fostered 
through the activities of the joint Scandinavian cooperative 
committee founded earlier. Participation in the latter helped to 
keep the Finnish party better informed of developments in the 
other Scandinavian countries, as well as providing it with better 
access to information on wider international issues and to 
Scandinavian discussion on these questions. The usefulness of 
this largely ad hoc arrangement can be gauged from the fact that it 
often proved capable of providing the party with information on 
Scandinavian issues more rapidly than that received by the 
39. SS 26.6., 27.6.1938. 
40. SS 2.10., 17.11.1933, 5.12.1935. 
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government through official diplomatic channels. 
These links naturally served to increase the party's overall 
standing and political influence within the country. The new 
status enjoyed by the Social Democrats was symbolically high-
lighted at the time of the visit made by the prime ministers of 
Sweden, Norway and Denmark to Helsinki at the end of 1935, at 
the joint invitation of the government and the Finnish party.41 The 
increasingly prominent role in Finnish politics assumed by the 
Social Democrats did not meet with universal satisfaction, and the 
prospect of the Social Democrats being included in government in 
Finland, in line with developments in the other Scandinavian 
countries, provoked some sharp comment from the Right. The 
veteran National Coalition politician K. N. Rantakari reflected a 
general view on the Right when he expressed his hope, in the 
autumn of 1935, that closer inter-governmental links with the 
Nordic countries would not also see Finland following the 
Scandinavian example in terms of domestic policy.42 
European developments during the mid-1930s gave the 
Progressives much cause for pessimism. The growing spread of 
fascism in the wake of Hitler's rise to power was seen by liberal 
opinion as posing a grave threat to the continued existence of 
democratic parliamentary values and institutions throughout the 
Continent. The liberal ideal of a peaceful Europe capable of 
settling its disputes without recourse to military might appeared to 
be crumbling as the new political forces at work within Europe 
increasingly cut the ground away from the ideas underpinning the 
League of Nations. Liberal disquiet was particularly evident 
concerning the long-term intentions of the major Baltic powers, 
Germany and the Soviet Union, and their possible plans with 
regard to Finland. Closer cooperation between the smaller coun-
tries of Europe, as a means of countering the threat to collective 
security posed by what were seen as the machinations of the great 
powers, had always been close to the hearts of many liberals, and 
was now reflected in growing liberal support for closer ties with 
Scandinavia.43  
41. SS 8.12.1935. 
42. See K. N. Rantakari's letter to Wäinö Wuolijoki, reproduced in Tanner 1966, 
pp. 174-5. 
43. Vapaa Kansa covered events in Britain widely between 1936-38, but from the 
end of 1938 onwards turned its attention increasingly to Sweden. 
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Scandinavia had also begun to play a growing part in Agrarian 
Party thinking, following the collapse of the party's earlier vision 
of closer ties with the agrarian movements of East and Central 
Europe as a result of the general shift towards the Right which had 
affected the region and led in a number of cases to the establish-
ment of dictatorial governments with no agrarian representation. 
The earlier latent hostility, towards Sweden in particular, which 
had tended to characterise Agrarian attitudes towards Finland's 
western neighbours had gradually faded. The role taken by the 
Swedish Bondeförbundet in the formation of a new government 
coalition in 1936 only served to reinforce calls within the Finnish 
party for a closer working relationship between Sweden and 
Finland. Contact between the two parties, which had previously 
had little if anything to do with each other, was soon established 
and quickly developed.44 
Attitudes within the National Coalition Party towards develop-
ments abroad, and particularly with regard to Germany and 
Sweden, continued to be divided. Germany's re-emergence as a 
major power and her gradual reassertion of her international 
influence had initially been seen as serving to introduce a better 
balance of power into the Baltic area and as justified in righting the 
injustices imposed by the Versailles Peace. Germany's increasingly 
aggressive stance towards her neighbours and other countries, 
however, made a number of conservatives begin to doubt the 
positive benefits of the rise in German strength and to fear its 
potential negative effect on Finnish security. This anxiety over 
Germany's possible future moves, coupled with a growing 
realisation that Finland was not alone among the smaller countries 
of northern Europe in becoming increasingly exposed and isolated, 
helped to encourage support within the party for sounding out the 
possibilities of a closer association with Finland's Scandinavian 
neighbours, despite the continued strength of pro-German 
sentiment within the party. The growing political and military 
interest in fortifying the Aland Islands as a means of increasing 
Finland's security also served to reinforce interest in developing 
ties with Sweden. At no point, however, was there any enthusi-
asm for extending possible closer bilateral cooperation to involve 
44. Mylly 1983, p. 193. 
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Swedish participation in a fortification programme, or to make 
Sweden responsible for the area's defence in the event of an 
international crisis. 
Increasing opposition began to make itself heard within the 
conservative camp towards Germany's new political philosophy. 
The violent demise of Ernst Röhm and his immediate SA 
associates in 1934 had a particularly negative impact on conserva-
tive opinion.45 As National Socialism's intolerance towards any 
form of real political opposition began to be more widely 
appreciated on the Right, and as post-1933 Germany generally 
came to be seen in a more critical light by various elements of 
conservative opinion, so attitudes towards Scandinavia improved. 
Pro-Scandinavian views never, however, attained truly wide 
currency on the Right, as a result of the hostility towards the 
general pattern of social and political developments in the 
Scandinavian countries typically felt among many conservative 
observers, despite their often tacit respect for Scandinavian 
democratic ideals. Indicative of the general moderation in views 
towards the Left which took place on the Right was the 
abandonment after 1934 of attempts by the National Coalition 
aimed at modifying the constitution to curb the power of 
Parliament. Widespread suspicion of Social Democrat intentions 
and of the wisdom of allowing the Social Democrats full reign to 
exploit their parliamentary power nevertheless remained. 
Overall attitudes towards Britain in the latter half of the 1930s 
were relatively favourable, although cool, maintained in part by 
Britain's continuing role as an important export market for Finnish 
industry. Britain's unwillingness to encumber herself with 
European alliance relationships was widely respected, particularly 
around mid-decade. This generally positive attitude, however, 
gave way to a more critical, if not directly hostile one, in the wake 
of the signing of the Munich agreement in the autumn of 1938. 
Much of this new anti-British sentiment, which was most marked 
in those circles otherwise most critical of Hitler and the Nazi 
movement, focused on the person of Chamberlain who, in 
acceding to German pressure over the Sudeten question, was seen 
45. Vares 1983. pp. 15-16. 
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as having betrayed the principles enshrined in the League of 
Nations. 
In contrast to the general, if low-key warmth felt towards Britain 
prior to Munich, opinion across the political spectrum had been 
critical of France for some time. The Franco-Soviet military treaty 
signed in 1935 was seen as effectively marking the end of active 
French interest in the security problems, both of Finland and of the 
other small Baltic states. Right-wing criticism of French policy 
even went so far in some cases as to suggest that, as a result of the 
agreement, France had committed herself, if only indirectly, to 
supporting Soviet expansionism. The victory of the popular front 
coalition in the French elections in 1936 and the formation of a 
new government under Léon Blum only served to deepen the 
Right's growing criticism of developments in France, as well as 
awaken fears within more moderate circles. France came 
increasingly to be seen as a country in decline, dominated by 
internal crises and incapable of maintaining her great power 
status. Anti-French feeling was naturally all the stronger and more 
prominent among pro-German opinion. The growing dissatis-
faction with the Western powers typical on the Right gained added 
impetus following the formers' unwillingness to assist the 
Nationalist forces in the Spanish Civil War, a conflict which 
reawakened memories of Finland's own civil war. Much of the 
moderate press nevertheless aligned itself behind the cautious 
wait and see stance adopted by the Cajander government, which 
avoided giving open support to either side in the struggle. 
On the question of Finland's relations with the Soviet Union, 
opinion in the latter half of the 1930s came to be increasingly 
dominated by a sense of uncertainty about the Soviet Union's 
ultimate attitudes towards Finland, both in international and 
ideological terms. While suspicion of Soviet aims and intentions 
had been deep-rooted within non-socialist opinion from the very 
first years of independence onwards, attitudes within the socialist 
camp had tended to be more divided and generally more positive. 
The Social Democrats, despite the very real ideological differences 
between their ideas and those espoused by orthodox Communism, 
and the argument and hostility between the two groupings these 
differences generated, had retained a certain loyalty towards the 
Bolsheviks, who they believed capable of finally freeing Russia 
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from her nineteenth-century reactionary inheritance. They had 
also been optimistic that, in the course of time, the Soviet political 
system would gradually come closer to the Western model. No 
such hopes had been entertained within the radical Left and least 
of all within the ranks of the underground Communist Party, 
among whom the Soviet Union and the Soviet experiment had 
continued to be looked on as providing a source of inspiration for 
development elsewhere. 
The spread of a more critical attitude within the Left, together 
with the growing convergence of socialist and non-socialist views 
towards Soviet developments it saw towards the end of the 1930s, 
was influenced by a number of factors, among them the Soviet 
Union's growing military might. As the Soviet Union's role as a 
major power and one as capable of defending and advancing its 
own national interests as any other, for all its identification with 
communist ideology and hostility towards the capitalist world, 
began to be more widely appreciated, so it began to be seen as 
potentially posing a parallel challenge to Finnish foreign policy 
and the Finnish position to that posed by its capitalist enemies. 
The political trials prominent between 1936 and 1938 also 
received considerable attention and served to further tarnish the 
Soviet image in Finland in the eyes of the Left; the Soviet Union 
increasingly came to be seen as a country in the grip of political 
terror and under the control of a dictatorial leader determined to 
impose his will, whatever the social or political cost. In contrast to 
the attention given to the trials, relatively little was devoted to 
Soviet economic developments. The extensive growth of heavy 
industry which took place, particularly under the second five-year 
plan, together with Soviet agriculture's gradual emergence from 
the worst of its earlier crises, received little comment in the 
majority of the press, with the exception perhaps of Hufvudstads-
bladet, which regularly carried well-informed commentaries on 
the Soviet economy.46 
Attitudes on the Left, within the Social Democrats as well as the 
more radical elements of the labour movement, were particularly 
shaken by the executions of many prominent old Bolshevik figures 
identified with the founding days of the communist state which 
46. Hbl 19.5.1937. 
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took place as a consequence of the political trials and accom-
panying purges of the party hierarchy.47 The harshness of Stalin's 
methods, together with his apparent disregard for any form of 
compromise approach to problems, bred the suspicion that a 
Soviet Union capable of sanctioning such radical internal 
upheaval could not be relied on not to resort at some time in the 
future to similar heavy-handed policies on the international stage. 
This found expression in the much greater degree of caution and 
suspicion towards the Soviet Union and Soviet intentions which 
began to characterise the labour movement's thinking on security 
policy questions. 
The trials and executions in the Soviet Union also had a negative 
impact on the radical Left's overall political credibility, the 
movement having only shortly previously organised a campaign 
calling for the abandonment of the death sentence within Finland. 
This fall-off in public credibility probably had little influence on 
the underground Communist Party, however, beyond serving to 
hamper its potential for influencing people outside the party. 
Attitudes on the Left as a whole, even within the radical Left, 
towards the Soviet Union were also beginning to show signs of a 
growing wider disenchantment. This trend was only reinforced 
with the return of numbers of those who had clandestinely crossed 
the border in the early years of the decade to seek a new life in the 
Soviet Union, and the spread of reports about the difficulties 
encountered by those who had stayed on.48 Further grist to the 
critics' mill was provided by the change in political fortunes 
experienced by a number of leading Finnish political emigres in 
the Soviet Union, and in Karelia in particular, in the 1930s, and the 
chequered history of the Karelian Commune. Edvard Gylling's 
removal from office in 1935 came as a particularly heavy blow to 
many on the radical Left, for whom the Karelian Commune 
experiment had assumed a special significance from its inception. 
News of the imprisonment of Kullervo Manner, Kustaa Rovio and 
others, which appeared in the Finnish press from the late summer 
of 1936 onwards, and the harsh sentences meted out to them, only 
served to deepen the general sense of disillusionment that was felt, 
47. SS 21.8.1936, 14.6.1937. 
48. See for ex. the ten-part article entitled `Viisi ja puoli vuotta Neuvostoliitossa' 
which appeared in SS between 10.6. — 21.6.1938. 
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and led Suomen Sosialidemokraatti to describe events in Karelia 
as amounting to a 'campaign of persecution' directed against the 
local Finnish communist leadership.49 
4. Foreign policy questions 
Clear signs of a definite move towards adoption of a foreign policy 
strategy based on a commitment to neutrality and a closer associ-
ation with Scandinavia became evident around mid-decade. A 
desire to avoid involving Finland in the security guarantee 
agreements for the Baltic region proposed by the Soviet Union was 
instrumental in directing the attention of foreign policy decision-
makers towards Scandinavia. The possibility of developing an 
effective security arrangement with the Baltic countries could no 
longer be considered a feasible option, while the decline in the 
strength of the League of Nations as a force in international politics 
had seen the undermining of much of the international system on 
which Finnish foreign policy, particularly during the latter half of 
the 1920s, had been constructed. There seems little doubt that 
Finnish confidence in the League and its potential to affect the 
pattern of international developments had dissolved well before it 
was officially admitted in public. 
The government's shift towards aligning itself behind neutrality 
was made plain in a statement declaring Finland's solidarity with 
the Scandinavian neutrals presented to Parliament in December 
1935, which succeeded in winning support from all political 
groupings, even the right-wing IKL. Uppermost in government 
thinking, however, was the desire to prevent Finland's being tied 
into a great power-sponsored Baltic security arrangement, rather 
than any real enthusiasm for closer Scandinavian links as such. 
This sense of consensus was nevertheless soon overshadowed by 
the significant shift in the European military balance which took 
place during the spring of 1936 with the rise of German influence 
following the occupation of the Rhineland, and which saw 
Germany again rise to the forefront of thinking within the People's 
49. Hodgson 1967, pp. 167-9; Upton 1970, pp. 133-6; Ylärakkola 1976, pp. 
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Patriotic Movement and other sections of right-wing opinion. The 
overall direction and content of the government's new foreign 
policy initiative remained, in any case, essentially imprecise and 
ill-defined. Interviewed on his return from a visit to Poland and 
Estonia in May 1936, Foreign Minister Hackzell indicated the 
government's continued interest in maintaining links with the 
Baltic countries, in addition to developing ties with the Nordic 
area, reflecting the general desire existing within government 
circles to maintain a balanced foreign policy profile, rather than an 
explicitly Scandinavian one.5° 
Hackzell was replaced as Foreign Minister by the veteran Rudolf 
Holsti in the short-lived Kallio government which took office in 
the autumn of the same year. Holsti still retained many of the 
sympathies which had been evident during his previous term of 
office as Foreign Minister between 1919 and 1922; prominent 
among these was an interest in close relations with the border 
states and, above all, a desire to maintain good relations with the 
Western powers and Britain in particular. Holsti, who continued 
as Foreign Minister in the subsequent Cajander administration and 
was thus responsible for shaping foreign policy thinking as it 
developed, quickly had to forgo his personal interest in the border 
states, however, and come to terms with the demand for closer 
links with Scandinavia. He nevertheless remained unconvinced 
that the latter policy represented a completely satisfactory solution 
to Finland's foreign policy problems, preferring instead his own 
idea of a two-pronged orientation embracing the Nordic countries 
and the Western powers, working in close cooperation with the 
League of Nations, which he continued to see as a valuable force in 
international politics.51  
The case for closer Scandinavian cooperation in the foreign 
policy field was particularly highlighted throughout the Nordic 
area by developments surrounding the League of Nations fol-
lowing the departure of Germany and Italy. The League's impo-
tence over Mussolini's attack on Abyssinia in 1935 and failure to 
impose sanctions against Italy served to substantially increase 
Scandinavian doubts about the overall credibility of any foreign 
50. HS 27.5., 28.5.1936. 
51. Ragnar Numelin 22.11.1962. See the report of the British envoy in Helsinki da-
ted 28.11.1936 to the Foreign Office (FO 371/20331). Also SvD 22.1.1937. 
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policy based on the type of collective security offered by the 
League. As reliance on the League came to be seen as more likely 
to undermine than underpin the security of the organisation's 
small member states, such as those in Scandinavia, so attention 
turned towards the possible benefits to be gained from developing 
a Nordic-based strategy.52 
As part of this new determination to emphasise Finland's ties 
with Scandinavia, various efforts were made by the government to 
reduce the friction existing between the country's two linguistic 
communities, which had previously played such a part in 
hampering relations with Sweden in particular. The very visible 
profile of nationalist opinion within Finland, together with the 
persistence of Sweden's traditional sympathies with the Swedish-
speaking minority, had served to maintain suspicion towards 
Finland and Finnish intentions in a number of circles in Sweden 
and prevented the evolution of a wider perspective on Finnish 
affairs. An important, if low-key role in Finnish efforts to dispel 
Swedish concern over the language issue and emphasise the 
importance the Finnish government attached to cooling tempers in 
the language dispute, was played by Finland's new envoy in 
Stockholm, J. K. Paasikivi.53  
Finland's relations with the Soviet Union were also the subject 
of some interest and concern in Sweden, as well as the rest of 
Scandinavia. Before committing themselves to any closer linkage, 
Scandinavian policy-makers wanted to be sure that Finland's 
relations with her eastern neighbour were on a sound footing and 
would not be likely to provide any unwelcome surprises for the 
rest of the Nordic community in the future. 
Holsti's visit to Moscow in February 1937, the first by a Finnish 
foreign minister, marked a new attempt to improve the still rather 
strained relations existing between Finland and the Soviet Union, 
and calm Soviet fears with regard to Finland's interest in 
Scandinavian neutrality and the strength of pro-German opinion 
in Finnish society. Holsti's visit was seen at the time as marking 
the beginning of something of a thaw in relations between the two 
countries, and generated a degree of optimism in both Moscow and 
52. Paasivirta 1968, pp. 95-6. 
53. See Paasikivi's communication of 20.9.1937 to A. K. Cajander (Hugo Suolahti 
collection). 
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Helsinki. Whilst little in terms of concrete results was forthcoming 
from the talks, Holsti was nevertheless able to allay some of the 
Soviet government's concerns over what had come to be seen in 
Moscow as Finland's over-close relationship with Germany.54 The 
replacement of the pro-German Svinhufvud by Kyösti Kallio as 
President, together with the formation of the new Cajander-led 
centre-left coalition, both taking place at around the same time, 
also contributed to improving Soviet confidence in Finland. 
Holsti's visit met with some hostility on the Finnish Right, 
marked by angry arguments between the government and the 
opposition on the Foreign Minister's return from Moscow. While 
welcoming, in principle, the government's moves aimed at 
improving the state of Soviet-Finnish relations, many conserva-
tives feared that such a policy could have a damaging effect on the 
country's relations with Germany.55 The increasing tension 
affecting Soviet-German relations did indeed make itself felt in 
both Soviet and German attitudes towards Finland. Following the 
apparent upturn in Soviet-Finnish relations in the wake of Holsti's 
visit, Germany soon moved to try and prevent any further 
improvement displacing her own interests in the region. The visit 
to Finland by a German naval squadron during the summer of 
1937, together with various other signs indicative of an increase in 
German military interest in Finland, including the strengthening 
of the German military mission in Helsinki, effectively served to 
put a halt to what modest improvement had begun to be seen in 
Finnish-Soviet relations, and reawaken Soviet fears of Finland's 
again moving closer to Germany.56 
In advocating the case for increased cooperation with the 
Scandinavian countries, supporters of this policy made wide use 
of arguments stressing the common fate shared by the Nordic 
countries and the commonality of interests binding them together. 
At base, however, these arguments were essentially rather nebu-
lous, appealing more to the emotions than to any clear argu-
mentation of the advantages of such a policy.57 That all four 
54. Suomi 1973, pp. 61-3; Mylly 1983, pp. 110-2; T. Soikkanen 1983, pp. 171, 
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countries nevertheless did possess a number of shared interests 
and political traditions cannot be denied. In order to reinforce 
popular awareness of this fact and make the concept of 
Scandinavian neutrality a more credible one, greater emphasis 
came to be placed on the need to improve the region's defence 
capability. Wider contacts beyond those restricted to the arts and 
individual political parties, which had tended to dominate previ-
ously, began to be established and expanded between Finland and 
the Scandinavian countries. A greater freedom and confidence in 
the exchange of opinion on political issues between the four 
countries also began to be evident. Closer links, both formal and 
informal, began to be forged between the foreign ministers of the 
various Scandinavian countries. 
Also indicative of this overall improvement in relations was the 
increase which took place in the level of contacts between the 
Finnish and Swedish armed forces, which had been at a relatively 
low ebb for most of the 1920s. This was prompted by a general 
desire to share views on the implications of the increased level of 
international tension, and by a more specific desire to clarify 
bilateral relations in the military field and explore the possibilities 
for further developing them. Particularly significant from the 
Finnish point of view were the group of agreements reached at the 
end of 1936 with the Swedish Bofors company, allowing the 
manufacture under licence in Finland of a number of Swedish-
designed and developed weapons.58 This, together with the 
establishment of improved channels of communication between 
the two high commands, appears to have fostered a certain 
optimism within the Finnish military establishment regarding 
Sweden's potential willingness to assist Finland in the event of a 
future crisis. 
Nevertheless, there remained some definite differences of 
opinion and emphasis, as well as enthusiasm, on the question of 
regional cooperation between the four countries. Following 
Stauning's clear rejection of the idea of a Nordic defence union in a 
speech in Lund in Sweden in March 1937, Denmark began to take a 
more passive role, increasingly verging on that of a mere observer, 
in joint discussions. Norway too, where concern about national 
58. Selen 1980, p. 218. 
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security aroused relatively little political debate, tended to favour 
a cautious approach. Interest in the idea of closer ties, particularly 
in the area of joint security, was ultimately most concentrated in 
Sweden and Finland, a fact reflected in the numerous discussions 
held between the two countries' foreign ministers, Richard Sandler 
and Rudolf Holsti, in which bilateral security policy problems 
became a regular feature from the autumn of 1937 onwards. Some 
difficulties were nevertheless created by the fact that contacts 
between the Finnish and Swedish governments and armed forces, 
although covering similar ground in some areas, took place largely 
independently of each other, and thus tended to acquire different 
sets of emphasis. For both the Finnish military establishment and 
government, however, the main source of concern focused around 
their joint uncertainty about how far Finland could realistically 
assume Sweden, with her long history of neutrality, would be 
willing to go in developing closer links and committing herself to 
some sort of alliance relationship, however loose. 
Indicative of the moves that were made towards developing a 
greater measure of Scandinavian cooperation was the joint 
decision taken by the four Nordic countries to drop their support 
for continued sanctions against Italy in July 1936, after they had 
proved mostly ineffective.59 Subsequent discussions at the 
conference of Nordic foreign ministers held in Copenhagen in 
July 1938 led to the issuing of a joint declaration by the four 
Scandinavian countries, together with Holland and Belgium, 
formally revoking all six states' commitment to Article 16 of the 
League's Charter covering the imposition of sanctions.60 This 
decision was undoubtedly unwelcome to Rudolf Holsti, who 
continued to pin his hopes on the various plans being developed 
in a number of West European countries aimed at reinforcing the 
position and influence of the League of Nations and restoring 
international confidence in the organisation. 
An important background factor shaping the ideas of both 
Swedish and Finnish politicians in their joint discussions, and one 
which led to both countries gradually abandoning their commit-
ment to the League of Nations in favour of a more regionally-based 
59. Jakobson 1955, p. 53. 
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approach to their security problems, was the increasing tension 
affecting Soviet-German relations. Should war erupt between 
these two powers, there might be little, it was increasingly recog-
nised, to prevent the conflict spreading to embrace the Scandi-
navian countries as well. Fear of this possibility was central to the 
reassessment of the Nordic region's defence capabilities which 
gathered momentum in both Sweden and Finland, and which led 
to the introduction of significantly increased defence budgets in 
Sweden in 1936 and 1938 and, rather more belatedly, in Finland in 
the spring of 1938, with the approval of an extensive defence 
procurement programme. 
While attention in Sweden tended to focus on the growing threat 
posed by Germany's rapid military expansion, in Finland the 
downturn in international relations served to further fuel the well-
established fears centred on the threat posed by the Soviet Union 
to Finnish security, and increase overall Finnish sensitivity on 
issues related to the Soviet Union. The question mark in Finnish 
minds over the true nature of Soviet attitudes towards Finland had 
gained added weight following the spread of the news in political 
circles that the Soviet envoy in Helsinki, E. Assmus, had informed 
Prime Minister Kivimäki in the summer of 1935 that, in the event 
of an European crisis, the Red Army might well be forced to 
occupy part of Finland in order to protect Soviet interests.61  
Finnish suspicions over possible Soviet plans were similarly 
reinforced by a speech made in Leningrad in November 1936 by 
Andrei Zhdanov, head of the influential Leningrad party organi-
sation, in which he accused Finland of hatching plans for allowing 
her territory to be used by Central European powers in possible 
future attacks against the Soviet Union.62 
The continuing deterioration in the international climate and 
accompanying rise in tension in Europe, highlighted by the 
German occupation of Austria in March 1938, only increased the 
sense of pessimism and uncertainty about the future already 
existing among the small states of Europe. In the Scandinavian 
region, this was reflected in the decision by Finland and Sweden 
to begin discussions on the possible fortification of the Aland 
61. Kivimäki 1965, p. 93. 
62. On the details of Zhdanov's choice of words, see Mylly 1983, p. 104. 
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Islands and initiate a review of the clauses in the 1921 interna-
tional agreement covering the area's demilitarised status. Through 
a joint agreement on the defence of the Islands, both countries 
believed they would be better placed to guarantee their territorial 
security in an international crisis and remain outside any potential 
European conflagration. This new initiative marked a significant 
change of attitude on the Swedish side and, to a lesser extent, on 
the Finnish side as well. The replacement of earlier Swedish 
anxieties about sovereignty and local autonomy with more 
pressing security concerns and the recognition of the Islands' role 
in both countries' security, together with a growth in Finnish 
willingness to consider some form of Swedish participation in the 
defence of the area, saw a new interest in discussions on both 
sides. 
It was generally believed in Finland at the time of the beginning 
of the talks that the overall attitude among the Swedish leadership 
towards cooperation with Finland on the Aland issue was 
essentially positive, and that what opposition that had been 
evident within the Swedish press and elsewhere towards the idea 
was largely insignificant. Paasikivi's reports from Stockholm, for 
instance, gave little indication of the existence of a body of 
opposing opinion within the Swedish government.63 Finnish 
foreign policy-makers remained, as a result, largely unaware of 
those within the Swedish government, led by the Social Democrat 
Minister of Finance, Ernst Wigforss, opposed to the notion of 
embroiling Sweden in any joint security policy moves in 
cooperation with Finland which might be interpreted by the Soviet 
Union as threatening the strategic balance in the northern Baltic. 
The weight of established opinion in Sweden, especially within 
liberal circles, behind the maintenance of Sweden's traditional 
neutrality, unfettered by any alliance-type relationship with 
Finland, seems to have been generally overlooked by Finnish 
negotiators. 
Opinions in Sweden and Finland on the details of what would 
constitute an adequate defence plan for the Islands tended to differ 
somewhat, particularly between the Finnish and Swedish High 
Commands. This difference of opinion focused mainly on the 
63. Carlgren 1977, pp. 161-3. 
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level of fortification envisaged as necessary to guarantee an 
effective defence presence in the area. Finnish military planners 
initially visualised siting permanent defence installations on both 
the southernmost islands within the archipelago and the main 
island, while their Swedish colleagues preferred to see installa-
tions restricted to the southern islands. This did not prove a long-
lasting difference of opinion, however, as subsequent discussions 
in the autumn of 1938 saw both Mannerheim and the Finnish 
government come round to the Swedish view.64 The most critical 
aspect of the talks, and the one which provided the most problems 
for both sides, covered the question of what forces were to be given 
responsibility for the defence of the Islands, and whether units 
from the Finnish mainland and locally-recruited units should be 
supplemented with detachments from the Swedish armed forces. 
Any commitment by Sweden to station forces on the Islands would 
have effectively compromised Sweden's neutral status in a future 
conflict involving Finland, as the Swedish side was well aware. 
The implications of this problem for both countries were soon 
highlighted at the time of the Czechoslovak crisis in the autumn of 
1938, when both countries put their armed forces on alert and 
began preparations for possible further action. Sweden's ultimate 
attitude towards military cooperation with Finland, however, 
never came to be tested at this stage, following the defusing of the 
situation with the signing of the Munich agreement.65 
The Finnish authorities had optimistically expected that the 
local population on the Islands would support the defence plan, 
and be willing to cooperate in its implementation. Not surpri-
singly, the need to respect the local population's special status and 
linguistic position, as part of any new security arrangement, 
received its fair share of emphasis in Sweden. Local support for 
the fortification proposals and for the other arrangements planned 
was initially forthcoming from Carl Björkman, the effective head of 
local government on the Islands, in a speech in June 1938. The 
position of the speaker of the regional assembly, Julius Sundblom, 
on the issue, however, was less clear. Various attempts were made 
64. Jakobson 1955, pp. 72, 114, Ehrensvärd 1966, pp. 111, 114-5; T. Soikkanen 
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by both Finland and Sweden to influence his opinion and win over 
his support for the plan.66 As pressure built up on Sundblom and 
the local population to accede to the proposal, Sundblom, making 
full use of his role as editor of the local paper Aland, decided to go 
on to the counter-offensive against what he saw as a campaign to 
force the local population's hand on the issue. Sundblom was 
successful in coordinating a declaration, made public in August 
1938 and signed by a large majority of the representatives of the 
local assembly, questioning the wisdom of the fortification plans, 
and in organising a mass march in Mariehamn later in the autumn 
calling for a review of the plans and greater local consultation.67 
Further indicative of the strength of feeling which built up against 
any over-hasty implementation of the plans was the vote of no-
confidence received by Björkman in December in the local 
assembly, which led to his resignation soon after. It should be 
said, however, that this latter vote was more motivated by 
dissatisfaction with Björkman in general and the friction existing 
between him and Sundblom, than with his pro-fortification stand 
alone. 
Much of the local resistance to the fortification idea lay in the 
widespread belief prevalent among the Islands' population that the 
Aland area faced no real threat of hostilities, and that the 1921 
international agreement provided sufficient security guarantees. 
There was little recognition of the potential dangers surrounding 
the military vacuum in the area. The prospect of a change in the 
Islands' status, including the construction of permanent defence 
installations, was also automatically seen locally as likely to signal 
a new threat to the area's cultural integrity and independence, and 
to presage an inevitable upswing in the pressures for fennicisation. 
Preservation of the status quo therefore was looked upon as 
important, both politically and culturally. 
During the course of the discussions held between the Finnish 
and Swedish authorities on the question in Helsinki in the autumn 
of 1938, both sides attempted to convince the Sundblom-led 
delegation of the need for local flexibility, but to no real avail. 
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Although refusing to concede to these requests for cooperation, 
Sundblom did not, however, reject them completely, for fear of 
overplaying his hand. Instead, he called for what he described as 
'better proposals'. Sundblom, together with the other members of 
the Åland delegation, was essentially opposed to any form of 
fortification, but nevertheless realised that an agreement might be 
reached between Sweden and Finland regardless, in which case it 
was important to ensure that the Islands' population had some say 
in its shaping and implementation.68 Agreement was, in fact, 
reached towards the end of the year between the two countries, as 
a result of their joint diplomatic and military talks, on the 
framework of a defence agreement covering the Islands. The 
Stockholm plan, as it was referred to, and which was officially 
approved by both governments in January 1939, allowed for the 
fortification of the southernmost islands within the Aland 
archipelago, the stationing of ground forces and anti-aircraft units 
on the main island, and the formation of a number of naval 
squadrons to defend the area. The door was left open, however, on 
the sensitive issue of direct Swedish participation, as the plan 
included no binding commitment on Sweden to provide military 
assistance, should Finland decide to request it; this was made 
purely voluntary and dependent on Sweden's own interpretation 
of the situation.69 
In line with its increasing commitment to Scandinavian neutrality 
and the growing reservations felt towards Germany and German 
intentions, various efforts were made by the Cajander government 
to put a brake on closer links developing between Finland and 
Germany. A number of political groups, military figures, writers 
and artists, however, continued to maintain sometimes quite 
prominent contacts with Germany. This fact, together with the 
steady rise in international tension, hardly helped to calm Soviet 
suspicions over the real extent of Finland's determination to resist 
possible future German advances. Soviet distrust, as a result, did 
not significantly diminish during the course of 1938, a fact which 
led to an increase in behind the scenes Soviet attempts to obtain 
68. Boheman II 1964, pp. 75-6; Hugo Johansson 16.8.1961. 
69. Wasastjerna 1962, p. 206: Killinen 1966, p. 93. 
466 
some rather more concrete Finnish commitment to resisting the 
spread of German influence. Indicative of this was the Soviet 
request, bypassing official diplomatic channels, made in the wake 
of the Austrian Anschluss to the Finnish authorities, and com-
municated through the person of Boris Yartsev, a junior secretary 
at the Soviet embassy in Helsinki, for firm guarantees that, in the 
event of a war in Europe, Finland would not only refuse Germany 
any assistance, but also be prepared to repulse any possible 
German landing in Finland aimed at clearing the way for an attack 
on Leningrad.70 In its reply, the Cajander government stressed 
Finland's continued commitment to a Scandinavian-style form of 
neutrality and readiness to defend both her territory and neutrality 
against any possible aggressor, but proved reluctant to go any 
further than this. The government's determination to pursue a 
policy of friendly relations with Scandinavia and the rest of 
Western Europe, while at the same time avoiding a close 
relationship with Germany, was similarly stressed by Cajander in a 
number of public speeches later the same autumn.71  
These Finnish assurances, however, failed to satisfy the Soviet 
leadership of Finland's good intentions, or calm Soviet defence 
concerns. Soviet hopes focused instead on the possibility of seeing 
Finland disengaged from the Nordic neutrals and linked to an 
alliance arrangement more directly aimed at underpinning Soviet 
security interests.72 It was precisely fear of such a closer linkage 
with the Soviet Union which lay behind the Finnish government's 
reluctance to come any way towards the Soviet Union's proposals. 
No one felt sure of the possible consequences for the country's 
international position and future independence of action should 
Finland agree to any pact of assistance of the type offered by 
Yartsev, allowing for military aid and the transfer of Soviet army 
units to Finland in the event of a German attack. The essential 
difficulty facing Finnish security policy remained how to 
reconcile maintenance of Finnish neutrality with guaranteeing the 
defence of the Soviet Union's north-western border, and Leningrad 
70. Jakobson 1955; pp. 6-10. 
71. Ibid., pp. 77-8; Suomi 1973, pp. 201-3, 211. 
72. On the Yartsev discussions, see Mylly 1983, p. 205; T. Soikkanen 1983 pp. 
216-9. 
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in particular.73 While the notion of a German attack against the 
Soviet Union through southern Finland was not considered 
completely impossible within the Finnish political leadership, it 
was nevertheless looked upon as highly unlikely. This was a 
natural enough conclusion when the whole basis of Finnish 
defence thinking had up until then been predicated on the 
assumption that any possible attack against the country would 
come, not from the West, but from the East. 
The Munich agreement, which saw Czechoslovakia partitioned 
at Germany's behest with the West's blessing, provided significant 
additional food for thought for Finnish politicians, putting a 
number of new perspectives on the German question. Although 
opinions about its long-term implications on the international 
situation were divided, it was widely appreciated, both within the 
government parties and within certain elements of the National 
Coalition opposition, that the agreement would inevitably increase 
the difficulties facing Finland and the other small countries of 
Europe. Particular concern was aroused by the negotiating tactics 
employed by Germany in the Sudetenland dispute and the central 
role of military pressure in them. It was widely feared that the 
future would see a spread of this style of diplomacy. These 
pessimistic conclusions ran strongly counter to the stance adopted 
by the more conservative minority wing of the National Coalition 
Party, as voiced by such figures as the vice-chairman of the party, 
Edvin Linkomies, and aired in the pages of Uusi Suomi. This 
group argued instead that, as Germany's position in Central Europe 
had been significantly strengthened as a result of the Munich 
settlement, Finland would be well advised to concentrate on 
developing closer links with Germany. It was suggested, for 
example, that Finland should follow Germany's lead and 
withdraw from the League of Nations.74 Germany's strengthened 
position was tacitly welcomed by those further to the Right, as 
reflected in the pages of Ajan Suunta, which saw the new situation 
as indirectly serving to advance Finland's own interests in 
preparing the way for a renewed presentation of Finnish territorial 
73. For the reasons behind the rejection of the Yartsev proposals, see Suomi 1973, 
p. 372; Mylly 1983, p. 205; T. Soikkanen 1983 pp. 218-31. 
74. T. Soikkanen 1983, p. 227. 
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demands over East Karelia.75 This rather singular interpretation of 
events, however, failed to win any support outside the narrow 
confines of the extreme Right. 
As a whole, the impact of the Sudetenland question and the 
Munich agreement on opinion both within the government and 
outside it, as well as within the armed forces, led to the emergence 
of an increasing consensus for a policy of further Nordic coop-
eration and closer collaboration in the field of joint regional 
security. The aftermath of the Munich agreement saw a distinct 
downturn in the importance attached to the potential of Britain 
and France to influence European developments and their capabi-
lity of acting as counterbalancing forces to German aggrand-
izement, in the minds of Finnish foreign policy-makers and within 
those sections of opinion which had previously been favourably 
disposed towards the Western powers. Munich also served, 
indirectly, to divert attention away from the thorny question of 
Finland's unresolved relations with the Soviet Union and the need 
to make a determined effort to answer Soviet security anxieties. 
The Soviet Union's exclusion from the Munich negotiations served 
to give further force to the view, which gained ground in Finland 
and elsewhere, that the Soviet Union had little more than a 
marginal role to play in a Europe that seemed to be becoming 
increasingly dominated by Germany. 
Overall, the pattern of international events during the latter half of 
the 1930s and the growth of tension which accompanied it served 
to eliminate many of the differences of views on security issues 
which had characterised and divided Finnish political opinion in 
earlier years, and contributed to the achievement of a new measure 
of consensus on a number of central questions, such as increased 
defence spending. As the problematic nature of Finland's position 
and the fact of the relatively limited means at her disposal to 
influence developments came to be better appreciated, so the need 
to play down narrow partisan interest became increasingly 
apparent. Growing mistrust came to be felt towards all the major 
powers and their political intentions, as witnessed in the gradual 
but definite spread of critical attitudes towards Germany which 
75. AS 4.10., 9.10.1938. 
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took place, embracing even a number of conservative groups 
traditionally identified with pro-German sympathies, and in the 
emergence of a parallel, new critical mood on the Left towards the 
Soviet Union. This development helped reinforce support for 
aligning Finland more closely with the Scandinavian neutrals. 
Despite this shift towards the political middle-ground, and the 
existence of a majority coalition government with wide parlia-
mentary support, Finnish politics nevertheless continued to give 
all the impression, at least to some commentators and foreign 
observers, of being almost as divided as ever, most particularly as a 
result of the continued high political profile enjoyed by the right-
wing opposition. 
5. The armed forces 
The introduction of the new regionally-based mobilisation 
structure which took place between 1932 and 1934, together with 
the increasing sense of concern felt within the military 
establishment over the country's defence capability, focused 
attention on the extent of the equipment problem facing the armed 
forces. Even the High Command itself seems to have been initially 
unaware, at least in part, of the true state of armament stocks. It 
took until around mid-decade for an adequate picture of the armed 
forces' overall requirements, necessary to allow them to be fully 
operational, to be built up. Instead of being based on any overall 
programme designed to cover total requirements, procurement 
plans drawn up during the first half of the decade were, as a result, 
largely comprised of a series of self-contained, smaller-scale pro-
grammes, formulated with an eye more to their chances of securing 
budget approval than anything else. Inevitably, these tended to 
contain only requests for equipment which was considered 
immediately necessary.76 Detailed estimates covering the 
equipment requirements, in terms of weaponry, logistics support 
and other materiel, for the minimum of nine divisions envisaged 
under the new system, were only drawn up in the latter stages of 
its introduction by its main architect, Colonel Grandell. It was 
76. Terä-Tervasmäki 1973, pp. 177-82; Seppälä 1974, pp. 75-7. 
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only then that the full implications of the army's equipment 
shortfall became clear. The scale of the problem, and the fact that 
even by 1935 the armed forces remained severely under-equipped, 
came as something of an unwelcome surprise, even to the General 
Staff. 
A new basic equipment procurement programme based on 
Grandell's revised estimates was drawn up, and the first small 
orders, funded by special budget allocations, were placed in 1936 
and 1937." In an effort to consolidate forward planning for this 
programme and to provide information on future likely equipment 
requirements, a new department to handle supply issues had been 
set up within the Defence Ministry in January 1936, headed by 
General Grandell. Efforts were also put in hand to assess the 
economic aspects of improving the country's defence capability. 
In May 1937, the government appointed a special all-party 
committee to study the whole question of future military needs 
and defence spending in the light of the military's proposed 
procurement programme. The committee's findings, published in 
February 1938, concluded that a total of some 2,911 million marks 
would be required to successfully carry through the programme. A 
revised special defence budget allowing for this expenditure, 
minus a token 200 million marks, was drawn up. This called for 
spreading costs over a period of six years from 1938 to 1944, with 
annual allocations divided more or less equally over the whole 
period, to be funded in part by a package of additional income and 
property taxes. After only brief discussion, it was quickly 
approved in April by a massive majority of 176-6.78 Such a degree 
of unanimity, embracing virtually the entire political spectrum, 
had never previously been reached on defence questions, and 
marked the final acceptance by the Social Democrats and 
Agrarians, in particular, of the need for increased defence 
spending, to which they had both traditionally been resolutely 
opposed. Although this swing was clearly influenced by the 
growing concern felt about the country's defence capability at a 
time of increasing international tension, the length of the 
programme's proposed timetable indicates that no immediate 
77. Terä-Tervasmäki 1973, pp. 187-9; Seppälä 1974, pp. 78-9. 
78. Terä-Tervasmäki 1973, pp. 193-6. 
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military threat was perceived as existing. 
Among those most satisfied with the decision was the chairman 
of the Defence Council, Mannerheim, who from mid-decade 
onwards had become increasingly vocal in his criticism of the way 
political decisions on defence issues were handled, particularly 
the slowness of progress on any new proposals and the fact that 
programmes were typically passed in reduced form, if at a11.7° 
Against this background, Parliament's decision in April 1938 to 
give the go-ahead for a new comprehensive programme was 
therefore all the more satisfying to Mannerheim, as it finally 
provided the armed forces with the resources to allow long-term 
planning aimed at eliminating the worst problems affecting their 
running and credibility. Developments on the international scene, 
and particularly the Czechoslovak crisis in the autumn of 1938, 
however, served to convince Mannerheim that the threat of war, 
and of one possibly likely to involve Finland, was growing rapidly. 
This saw Mannerheim come to the conclusion that, despite its size, 
the approved programme, because of its long timetable, would 
after all be inadequate to guarantee Finland's short-term security. 
Similar sentiments were expressed in a report presented to the 
government by the Defence Council later the same autumn, which 
painted a particularly bleak picture of the pattern of international 
events and their likely future development. This report was 
subsequently followed up with a series of requests for further 
additional military expenditure going significantly beyond 
the figures contained in the already approved procurement pro-
gramme. These were particularly designed to strengthen the 
country's capability in such areas as field artillery and anti-aircraft 
defences, which had previously tended to be given less resources 
than the infantry.80 
A major factor hindering rapid implementation of the new 
procurement plan, as with others before it, lay in the inflexibility 
of the military's decision-making machinery and the difficulties 
typically encountered in gaining any unanimity of opinion within 
79. Väinö Tanner 7.12.1955. See also Tanner's speech in Naantali on 17.7.1938, re-
ported in SS 18.7.1938. For Mannerheim's dissatisfaction during 1936 and 
1937, see Heinrichs II 1959, p. 53; George Gripenberg: Dagbok 29.3., 31.3.1937. 
80. Seppälä 1974, pp. 81-4; Selän 1980, pp. 296-7; Puolustusneuvoston pöytä-
kirja 6.8.1938 ja liite 1 (SA). 
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the armed forces on the choice of suitable new weapons, design 
criteria and operating requirements. This often served to delay the 
decision-making process necessary to allow production to begin or 
orders to be placed. Illustrative of this were the disputes which 
took place over machine gun design, artillery grenade ammunition 
and anti-tank weaponry. Discussions on these equipment issues 
were not helped by the cool relations existing between the High 
Command and the domestic armaments industry from which, for 
political reasons, the army was forced to purchase the majority of 
its requirements. By 1939, it became increasingly difficult to 
direct any equipment orders abroad. Production at the army's own 
manufacturing plants, such as the State Artillery Factory, where 
manufacture began behind schedule in 1938, was also slow to 
come on stream. In the final analysis, however, it would seem that 
the military leadership relied on the assumption that, should 
Finland find herself directly threatened, Sweden would be willing 
to provide military assistance or allow the powerful Swedish arms 
industry to supply Finland to make up for what equipment 
deficiencies existed.$' 
Much discussion was also expended on the question of the need 
to clarify the chain of command in the highest echelons of the 
armed forces, an issue which had been the subject of some dispute 
from the early 1930s onwards. Mannerheim's central role in the 
command hierarchy, in his capacity as chairman of the Defence 
Council, was underpinned early on, at the time of the appointment 
of General Hugo Osterman as commander of the armed forces 
in succession to General Sihvo in 1933, following President 
Svinhufvud's decision that Österman was to be subordinated to 
Mannerheim on operational questions. Mannerheim declined 
nevertheless to formally take on the task of overall commander-in-
chief, with all its attendant responsibilities, preferring instead to 
maintain his distance from the everyday running of the armed 
forces and devote himself to longer-term policy planning and 
coordination. 	 The potential tension existing between the 
Chairman of the Defence Council and the Minister of Defence was 
81. Lauri Harvila 14.12.1982, 12.1.1983; Terä-Tervasmäki 1973, pp. 192, 198. Also 
see the Swedish military attaché's memorandum of his discussion with Man-
nerheim on 19.5.1939 (KrA). 
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highlighted at the time of the appointment of Juho Niukkanen as 
Defence Minister in 1937, when the latter made a bid to extend his 
share of control over military decision-making. This tension was 
alleviated, only partially, however, by the command rational-
isation introduced in 1938, designed to introduce a clearer 
division of responsibilities between the conflicting parties. This 
new structure subordinated the operations section of the General 
Staff, which was responsible for drawing up general defence 
planning on the ground, to the chairman of the Defence Council. 
The commander of the armed forces, General Osterman, together 
with his personal staff and the major part of the General Staff, the 
head of supplies and logistics, General Grandell, and the Defence 
Ministry's administrative department, were for their part 
subordinated to the Minister of Defence.82 This new arrangement 
failed, however, to adequately define the status of the armed 
forces' three main serving generals, General Osterman, overall 
formal commander of the armed forces, General K. L. Oesch, head 
of the General Staff, and General Harald Öhgvist, commander of 
the army, or provide a clear upward chain of command. Sympto-
matic of this was the fact that, although General Österman owed 
first allegiance to the Defence Minister, he was also responsible 
both to the President and to the chairman of the Defence Council. 
General Oesch also found himself faced with a similar conflict of 
responsibilities. 
Problems also remained in the area of the defence establishment's 
continuing uneasy, although somewhat improved relationship 
with the rest of society. Much of this tension had traditionally 
derived from the close identification, in many cases consciously 
cultivated by the officer corps, of the army with the White army of 
the Civil War, and the tendency, particularly evident in the 
paramilitary Civil Guard, to look to the latter as something of an 
ideal. The events surrounding the Mäntsälä incident, however, 
had served to put this attachment to the White tradition into a new 
perspective, by forcing the armed forces and the Civil Guard to 
come to terms with the requirements imposed upon on them in 
82. Jyränki 1967, pp. 34-5; Terä-Tervasmäki 1973, pp. 167-70; Niukkanen 1951, 
pp. 30-5. 
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terms of responsibility and loyalty towards the government of the 
day, whatever its political complexion. In the follow-up to the 
incident, a number of Civil Guard regional commanders were 
replaced and various local commanders relieved of their duties for 
their compliance in events. While the head of the Civil Guard 
General Staff, Colonel Väinö Palojärvi, was replaced by Colonel A. 
E. Martola, at the behest of the regular army, no major command 
reshuffle took place, however. The lack of any thorough purge of 
the Civil Guard in fact saw a number of calls, not only from the 
Left, but also from within the Agrarian Party and the Swedish 
People's Party for more radical changes in personnel.83 Disciplin-
ary action, transfers and warnings were also forthcoming in the 
wake of the incident for a small number of regular army officers.84 
The experience of the Mäntsälä incident came to serve as a 
powerful example to the officer corps within the regular army of 
the dangers inherent in any attempt to influence political develop-
ments and, by extension, to dissuade any such attempts in the 
future. Mäntsälä also had an impact on the development of the 
Civil Guard. The latter's organisation underwent a significant shift 
in emphasis during the rest of the decade, as a result of its 
involvement in the Mäntsälä incident and partly as a result of its 
switch to a regionally-based structure coordinated with the regular 
army, and its gradual shift away from being an organisation with 
clear political ambitions to one fulfilling the role of a neutral 
volunteer reserve. The extent of this move away from political 
involvement was highlighted at the time of the formation of 
Cajander's centre-left coalition in 1937. Although undoubtedly 
seen by many in the Civil Guard as an unwelcome development, 
the latter failed to provoke any form of demonstration or attempt to 
influence the situation from within the organisation. 
Concomitant with this shift towards greater political equilibrium 
within the country's military and paramilitary forces, there was 
also a general move within society as a whole during the latter half 
of the 1930s towards a more favourable attitude towards defence 
issues and the need for a viable defence force to protect Finnish 
interests and security. This was influenced to a significant degree 
83. Mylly 1983, pp. 43-4; Wrede 1933, p. 5. 
84. Kylkirauta 1/1935; Raikkala III 1964, pp. 53-4; Yrjö Hakanen 9.3.1979: Edis-
tyspuolueen eduskuntaryhmän ptk., 5.8.1933 (VA). 
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by developments on the international arena, following the spread 
of a new sense of insecurity deriving from the increasing tension 
existing between the major powers in Europe and the growing 
realisation of the security problems involved in Finland's relations 
with the latter, particularly the Soviet Union and Germany. As 
developments progressed, so both countries began to be increas-
ingly seen as representing comparably dangerous and unpredict-
able destabilising factors. The spread of this general perception 
led to the emergence of a growing measure of consensus on 
international issues across a significant section of the political 
spectrum, and one which remained largely unaffected by the 
differences of opinion which continued to exist on more purely 
domestic questions. Changes were also taking place with regard to 
domestic issues, as the division in society left by the Civil War 
became less dominant and all-consuming and as memories of the 
conflict receded ever further into the past, and, above all, as the 
domestic political climate improved and conservative resistance to 
the Social Democrats diminished. The general improvement in 
social conditions and the rise in the standard of living typical of 
the period also contributed to this. Against this background of 
international and domestic developments therefore, the armed 
forces came increasingly to be looked upon much less as the 
defenders of partisan conservative interests, as previously, 
particularly on the Left, and more as the guarantors of interests and 
values held in common. While there nevertheless remained much 
in the army's official attitudes to its own traditions and past 
history, and particularly with regard to its continued emphasis on 
underlining its inheritance from the White Army of 1918, to 
alienate left-wing opinion, the overall pattern of political and 
social developments, and their tendency towards greater social 
consensus, ultimately dominated in shaping a more positive 
attitude. 
The powerful role of tradition continued to be especially evident 
in the organisation and distribution of resources within the armed 
forces. This was reflected in the continued reliance, both 
conscious and unconscious, in much of military thinking on the 
experience of the Civil War. By virtue of the latter's almost total 
dissimilarity with the type of war which Finland as an inde-
pendent country might expect to face, this served to distort 
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military perspectives. Typical of the conservativism this style of 
thinking encouraged, and drawing on the wider attachment to 
many ideas associated with pre-mechanised warfare which still 
existed, was the continuing prominence given to the infantry at the 
expense of the other arms in strategic and tactical planning. 
General Nenonen was among the relatively few figures within the 
military hierarchy who spoke up for strengthening non-infantry 
forces. The influence exercised by this conservative brand of 
thinking was well illustrated in the debate which developed from 
1936 onwards surrounding the development of modern anti-tank 
defences and which, despite all the time and effort devoted to it, 
produced very little in terms of tangible progress towards deve-
loping a viable equipment or manpower base.85 At the same time, 
no attempt was made to disband the army's cavalry brigade, 
despite the poor showing of similar units in the First World War. 
Although admittedly fulfilling a useful peacetime training role, 
this took up resources which could have been better employed in 
developing more modern units. 
Increasing emphasis was nevertheless put on providing modern 
combat training and tactical skills for conscripts who, after 1932, 
served a standard period of military service of 350 days for other 
ranks and 440 days for those training as officers and non-
commissioned officers. Regular exercises for reserve units were 
also introduced under the 1932 legislation. From 1936 onwards, 
reservists were assembled into regionally-based battalions and 
batteries to provide them with as wide a range of experience as 
possible of the type of operations that they would meet in the event 
of mobilisation. The success of the Jager officers in consolidating 
their position in the higher echelons of the army following the 
disputes around the turn of the decade was reflected in the fact 
that by the latter half of the decade all the army's generalships, 
with the exception of two in the artillery, were in their hands. 
Lower down the hierarchy, the composition of the officer corps, 
however, was widening and by 1939 nearly half of the army's 
regular serving officers were products of Finland's new Officer 
Training Schoo1.86 Many of the problems associated with the 
85. Niukkanen 1951. pp. 175-6. 
86. By mid-1939, officers trained in Finland's own military training schools ac-
counted for approx. 47 % of the officer corps. 
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differing military backgrounds and training experience among 
members of the officer corps in earlier years had also either 
disappeared, or lost much of their former significance by this stage. 
6. Foreign trade in the latter half of the 1930s 
The early years of the decade had seen Finnish exports experience 
a period of rapid and substantial growth in the wake of the 1931 
devaluation of the mark. The effects of this had filtered through 
relatively quickly to the economy as a whole, leading to a general 
economic recovery from 1933 onwards. The balance of trade 
surplus which accumulated as a result, totalling over 6,000 million 
marks over a four year period, was largely used to pay off the 
country's foreign debt. While serving to strengthen the country's 
financial position abroad, this policy, however, effectively 
prevented the country from reaping all the possible benefits the 
country's trade surplus might have brought in terms of encour-
aging an increase in investment. The upward swing in export 
earnings continued into 1936, which witnessed a 15% rise over the 
previous year's export figures for the timber and paper industry. 
The latter continued to dominate the overall export effort with its 
75% share of total export earnings. Exports of paper and pulp 
showed the highest rates of growth. Finnish timber exports 
benefited from the improved world prices which emerged on the 
world market as a result of the 1935 international ETEC agreement 
aimed at limiting over-supply, which had been growing at an 
alarming rate.87 
Towards the end of 1937, however, Finnish export prospects 
began to fall off as a result of growing international insecurity and 
a new sense of caution in international trade, spurred by fears of a 
possible repeat of the 1930 depression. The immediate impact of 
this downturn was felt in a rapid drop in the overall growth in the 
export of timber and paper products, which in turn had a knock-on 
effect on the country's domestic economic development. The 
failure of the timber and paper industry to secure new orders to 
replace those lost led to reductions in production; no moves, 
87. Kertomus SPKL:n toiminnasta v. 1936 (SMKL archive); Hahne 1955, p. 288. 
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however, were made to reduce wages in order to improve the 
industry's competitiveness, as had taken place in the early years of 
the decade. While export earnings for 1937 as a whole showed an 
increase of 29.9% over those for the previous year, they were down 
some 10.5% by 1938. Marketing difficulties were experienced 
across the entire range of timber and paper-based products. The 
continuing downturn in the American economy was seen as likely 
to further weaken export prospects for timber and paper on the 
world market, while growing Soviet price reductions on timber 
only served to further cut the ground away from under the feet of 
both Finnish and Swedish exporters.88 Despite these problems, 
however, some positive, if albeit modest progress was seen in the 
country's state-subsidised dairy exports. This was nevertheless 
not sufficient to alter the overall pattern of development, which 
saw the country's balance of trade, which had been deteriorating 
steadily since 1935, finally go into deficit in 1938. 
Britain continued to remain Finland's most important export 
market, both for the timber and paper industries, as well as for 
agriculture. In the case of timber and paper, Britain also served as 
an important intermediary. British importers played an important 
role in marketing Finnish goods and shipping them onwards to 
non-European markets, such as South Africa and Egypt.89 Penetra-
tion of these new market areas was also made easier as the range of 
Finnish diplomatic representation was extended to cover these 
regions. In the wake of the depression and Hitler's rise to power, 
exports to Finland's other traditional major market, Germany, had 
initially fallen off substantially and only slowly began to show 
signs of rallying. Recovery of Finland's earlier market-share, 
however, was hampered by the German authorities' introduction 
of a trade policy aimed at reinforcing national economic self-
sufficiency and reducing reliance on foreign suppliers. A 
significant rise in timber exports to Germany was nevertheless 
recorded towards the end of 1937 and early 1938, fuelled by 
Germany's expanding rearmament and construction pro-
grammes.90 Early 1939 brought a more general upswing in exports, 
88. Halme 1955, pp. 287-96; Kertomus SPKL:n toiminnasta v. 1938; Kauppalehti 
25.9., 13.11.1937, 14.1., 17.5.1938; Mercator 16.4., 7.5., 28.5.1938. 
89. Jack Hill 17.10.1980. 
90. Halme 1955, p. 292; Hbl 28.10.1937. 
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with better timber sales and a number of encouraging paper 
contracts. 
While the increasing need for a more concerted and coordinated 
export promotion effort abroad was well recognised in the timber 
and paper industry, as well as in government circles and within 
the Finnish Export Association, moves towards developing such a 
programme were hampered by the uneasy relations existing 
between the three sides involved. The role of government and the 
diplomatic corps became particularly highlighted as the import-
ance of the efficient exchange of commercial information and 
official bilateral trade agreements became increasingly empha-
sised. The experience of the depression in reducing Finland's 
traditional export markets had focused attention on the need to 
develop new markets outside Europe. New diplomatic missions 
and consular facilities were established in response to this in Rio 
de Janeiro in 1937, and Pretoria, Cape Town and Alexandria in 
1939, as the foreign ministry, after some fifteen years of finding its 
feet, together with the government as a whole, became more aware 
of the benefits to be gained from a well developed diplomatic 
service in terms of advancing Finnish commercial interests.91 A 
major problem in the way of improving cooperation between the 
various parties involved in promoting Finnish exports, however, 
lay in their very composition. The continuing dominance of 
timber and paper exports, consistently accounting for some three-
quarters of exports, introduced a dangerous bias in Finnish trade, 
effectively making it, and by extension the whole economy, 
susceptible to even relatively small-scale market fluctuations. 
Some progress was nevertheless made in reducing the country's 
dependence on timber, prices for which tended to vary the most, 
and in increasing the proportion of higher value-added products. 
Both timber and paper exports continued, however, to remain 
dogged by their concentration in a few major markets. 
The friction existing between the timber and paper industry, the 
Export Association and government was not eased by the 
unwillingness of export managers in the former, secure in the 
knowledge of their industry's dominance of the country's exports, 
to seriously countenance significant cooperation with other 
91. Paasivirta 1968, pp. 219-23. 
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sectors of the economy, or to back the efforts of the Export 
Association (known from 1938 onwards as the Finnish Foreign 
Trade Association). The latter received most of its backing from 
government, which was keenest to see a wider range of non-timber 
and paper-related goods exported. The timber and paper industry 
was similarly reluctant to recognise the potential benefit to be 
derived from greater governmental involvement in promoting 
exports, seeing the small numbers of diplomats engaged in full-
time commercial work as indicating a lack of real commitment on 
the government's part, and as virtually meaningless in practical 
terms alongside their own efforts. Dissatisfaction within the 
industry was only further aggravated by the fact that a significantly 
larger proportion of government assistance was channelled to the 
Foreign Trade Association for assessing new export markets than 
to the industry's own central federation for its market research 
projects.92 Contacts between the leading timber and paper 
companies and the Cajander government were particularly cool, a 
situation explained in part by the differences in political sym-
pathies separating them. Throughout Cajander's term of office, the 
industry voiced its criticism on everything from the budget to 
labour politics.93 The government's strong parliamentary majority, 
which made it less susceptible to pressure from industry than 
some of its predecessors, only reinforced the sometimes pug-
nacious attitudes towards government typical within the industry. 
Overall foreign trade performance during the 1920s and 1930s, 
as measured in terms of balance of trade and balance of payments, 
both of which had typically been in deficit in the years prior to the 
First World War, was fairly positive, with both indicators showing 
a surplus for the period as a whole. The 1930s also saw Finland 
successfully reduce her dependence on foreign loan capital, 
thereby increasing her economic independence, moving from a 
point in 1931 when foreign loans amounted to 9,200 million marks 
to a stage at the end of the decade when they were virtually 
completely paid off. The same period also saw the composition of 
imports change, with the total share of consumer goods falling 
substantially and being replaced by greater imports of raw 
92. SPKL:n Ulkopoliittinen valiokunta ptk., 8.12.1936 (SMKL archive). 
93. Kertomus SPKL:n toiminnasta v. 1937, v. 1938 (SMKL archive). 
16 — Finland and Europe 	 481 
materials and semi-finished goods to supply Finland's expanding 
industrial base. Little significant, however, was achieved in 
reducing the dominant position of the timber and paper industry 
as the country's major exporter, although the latter did prove able 
to increase the proportion of higher value-added goods in its 
exports. The imbalance in the country's export effort was 
nevertheless to remain a major problem. 
Significant developments had also taken place in modernising 
Finnish industry and improving the level of Finnish technical 
expertise by the 1930s. Substantial room for further modernisation 
and improvements nevertheless remained. The pace of develop-
ments in European and international industry and technological 
research only underlined the challenge facing the country in trying 
to reduce the gap existing between Finnish levels of industrial 
performance and sophistication and those in the major European 
and international industrial powers. The lack of a coordinated 
technical research policy and adequate financial resources, or any 
systematic programme of training abroad, were also factors which 
served to hold back progress in this field. Despite economic and 
political upheavals, Germany remained, as in previous years, the 
main source of new production ideas and techniques for Finnish 
industry, and the focus of Finnish technical and industrial 
interest. Familiarity with developments in America and contacts 
with American industry, as with industry in the rest of the English-
speaking world, continued at a low level. 
7. Cultural relations during the 1930s 
Independence had brought a new opening-up of contacts with 
international developments in the literary and artistic fields. The 
level and degree of contact proved, however, to be closely tied to 
the internal mood of the country, and thus susceptible to wide 
fluctuations and variations. The shift in the domestic climate 
which took place at the end of the 1920s and the beginning of 
the 1930s, and the growth in the influence of radical right-wing 
opinion it witnessed, had a largely negative impact on the 
country's international cultural relations. Right-wing thinkers and 
commentators followed the same simplistic style of argument in 
their attitudes to the arts as they applied to social questions. 
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Figures in the field were divided into two opposing castes: those 
seen as defending and promoting national interests, and those 
standing for marxist and liberal values. Writers, artists and others 
involved in the arts were quickly branded according to their actual 
or assumed political and ideological sympathies. Those deemed 
as being of dubious loyalty were subjected to sometimes aggressive 
criticism from the Right; even the Finnish PEN Club was labelled a 
communist organisation by the right-wing press at one stage, and 
those identified with its activities and other undesirable ideas 
described as 'cultural Bolsheviks'.94 While national and inter-
national ideas were consistently described in nationalist thinking 
as mutually-incompatible opposites, this did not mean never-
theless that nationalist writers and artists were forced to work in 
isolation, nor did it stop them from absorbing international 
influences in their work, or from having sympathies with cultural 
developments abroad. Conservative objections to international 
ideas only really extended, in the final analysis, to those which the 
Right itself deemed undesirable. 
The sharp upswing in the more extreme aspects of nationalist 
sentiment which took place from 1932 and 1933 onwards fueled 
renewed argument on the language issue and reawakened many of 
the old antagonisms which had previously bedevilled relations 
between Finland and Sweden. Accusations and counter-
accusations regarding the rights and position of the two linguistic 
communities in Finland again began to be exchanged with 
depressing regularity between the two countries. Adverse press 
comment in Sweden over what was described as the increasing 
'persecution' of the Swedish-speaking population in Finland was 
often dismissed by Finnish-language commentators as the result of 
disinformation spread by the country's minority community. 
Attempts by various Swedish-speaking university figures to put 
the minority community's case in the Swedish press were 
similarly condemned within nationalist circles.95 Statements 
appearing in Stockholm hinting that the Finnish-speaking commu-
nity represented a more backward section of the population than 
its Swedish-speaking counterpart caused floods of protests from 
94. AS 17.11.1933. 
95. Hämäläinen 1968, pp. 194-6, 204; Klinge IV 1968, pp. 144-9, 174; AU 
18.2.1931. 
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among Finnish-speaking students. 
The worsening of the depression had a number of debilitating 
effects on the arts and cultural life in general, the most obvious 
being the economic stringencies it imposed, which served to 
hamper maintaining contacts abroad. Among the few major events 
in the international literary world during the early part of the 
decade at which Finnish writers were represented, were the third 
Scandinavian literary congress held in Oslo in 1930, and the world 
literary congress held in Paris in 1931.96 The effects of the 
depression were also felt in a reduction in the amount of foreign 
literature translated. Even before this, translation policy had 
become the subject of some debate, as a result of the increasingly 
selective approach adopted by the country's leading publishers. 
The largely conservative management in the two major publishing 
houses of Otava and Werner Söderström, which together ac-
counted for a significant share of the total book market, tended to 
see much of modern Western literature, and English-language 
literature in particular, as too liberal for their tastes. This was 
reflected, for example, in the decision not to translate much of the 
work of such authors as Ernest Hemingway and John Steinbeck.97 
Conservative nationalist thinkers such as Eino Railo were 
particularly vocal in their opposition to the translation of foreign 
literature, and advocated a greater reliance on home-grown talent, 
in preference to what was seen as the intellectually-dubious 
British and American literature of the period. The views of Railo 
and his like did not go completely unchallenged, however. 
Figures such as Lauri Viljanen, literary critic for Helsingin 
Sanomat, consistently argued for a more enlightened publishing 
policy towards quality foreign literature.98 Swedish-language 
publishers, who typically enjoyed good contacts with publishers 
in mainland Sweden, often produced off-runs of works published 
there, including translations of foreign literature, and were thus 
able to offer a wide range of material, thereby keeping their readers 
96. Suomen Kirjailijaliiton johtokunnan ptk., 13.1.1930, 20.3., 19.5.1931 (SKL 
archive). 
97. Tarkka 1980, pp. 282-3; Maijaliisa Auterinen 1.11.1982; Arvi Kivimaa 
17.9.1982. 
98. Suomen Kirjailijaliiton johtokunnan ptk., 30.12.1934; Valvoja 1935, p. 106; L. 
Viljanen: Taisteleva humanismi (1936). 
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abreast of international literary developments. This relatively 
broad coverage of foreign literature in Swedish translation was 
carried over into the Swedish-language press, particularly in the 
case of Hufvudstadsbladet, which regularly carried a wide range of 
reviews of work by foreign writers, and to a lesser extent Svenska 
Pressen. 
This division in attitudes on cultural questions between the two 
linguistic communities, at least the educated sections of those 
communities, was also echoed in their differing reactions to 
Hitler's rise to power in Germany in 1933. Reaction to develop-
ments in Germany came to represent something of a watershed in 
Finnish opinion, dividing it very clearly into those openly 
welcoming or sympathising with Hitler's political programme and 
those more critical of what had happened. While the majority of 
the Finnish-speaking intelligentsia and artistic community proved 
initially largely favourable towards the new Germany, the majority 
of their Swedish-speaking colleagues proved much less 
enthusiastic. 
Nationalist, anti-communist views were typically significantly 
more common within the Finnish-speaking artistic community 
than within its Swedish-speaking counterpart. Mixed in with this 
was the sympathy with Germany deriving from the time of the 
Civil War. Attitudes were also widely shaped by the threat to the 
Finnish position seen as emanating from the Soviet Union. V. A. 
Koskenniemi was a classic example of the strength and persistence 
of this type of pro-German opinion. Seen against his interpretation 
of the Versailles peace as representing a major injustice against 
Germany, and his dislike of the Weimar regime, it was not entirely 
surprising that he should have welcomed Hitler's rise to power as 
the first real step on the road to German recovery. His positive 
attitude towards Hitler's new Germany was only reinforced by the 
latter's loudly-proclaimed commitment to the struggle against 
Communism and liberalism, both anathema to Koskenniemi. His 
admiration of Hitler's role as a national leader did not stop 
Koskenniemi, however, from expressing some criticism of various 
aspects of National Socialist philosophy and its subordination of 
the individual to the collective will.99 
99. US 22.1., 26.1.1936; Göran Stenius 25.5.1979. 
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A similarly sympathetic, if less openly admiring attitude 
towards developments in Germany was evident in the writings of 
the prominent literary critic Rafael Koskimies. The latter had little 
time for the criticism which emerged within British and French 
literary and artistic circles directed against National Socialism. In 
describing Hitler's virtues as a national leader, Koskimies does not 
seem to have been overly concerned by the fact that his rise to 
power had taken place at the expense of the overthrow of 
parliamentary democracy.100 Koskimies nevertheless did not shut 
his eyes to the growing wave of anti-semitism in Germany, the 
burning of discredited books and the various purges of academic 
staff at German universities, all of which he condemned. A 
number of leading young writers also expressed satisfaction with 
the change of government in Germany. Mika Waltari, known for 
his conservative sympathies, writing in 1933, for instance, gave 
every impression of welcoming developments in Germany. Arvi 
Kivimaa's attitude to post-Nazi Germany was also generally 
positive, in contrast to his more critical view of France.101  
Overall, there was relatively little sign of a critical or openly 
negative attitude towards post-1933 Germany among the bulk of 
the Finnish-speaking literary and artistic community, which 
clearly felt greater concern at the prospect of the further spread of 
Communism and the threat it posed for Western society. The 
Tulenkantajat group of young writers, which had burst on the 
literary scene with such effect in the latter 1920s and which might 
have been expected to act as a focus for anti-Nazi opinion, had lost 
most of its early dynamism by the early 1930s, eventually breaking 
up as a result of internal disagreements between its members. 
Among those who had been most prominently associated with the 
movement, Olavi Paavolainen initially adopted what appeared to 
be an uncommitted attitude to events, until the publication of his 
book Kolmannen valtakunnan vieraana (A guest of the Third 
Reich) in 1936, based on his personal observations of German 
society. The subject of heated debate on its appearance, this part 
travelogue, part political and cultural analysis contained an un-
easy mixture of positive and critical comment. With its underlying 
100. Koskimies 1933, pp. 303-19. 
101. Maaseudun Tulevaisuus 19.9.1933; Kivimaa 1933, pp. 72-7. 
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questioning of the ultimate wisdom of subordinating the individ-
ual so absolutely to the system, and its emphasis on the dominance 
of propaganda and other manipulative techniques in Nazi politics, 
it was nevertheless ultimately intended, and seen, as a criticism of 
the National Socialist system of government.102 Elli Tompuri, the 
actress, made her opposition to Hitler plain from an early stage, 
organising poetry readings of work by German poets whose books 
had been among those burnt by the Nazis for their unacceptable 
views.103 The group of liberals and more radical left-wing figures 
focused around the new Tulenkantajat magazine, which had been 
revived by Erkki Vala in 1932, was also highly critical of develop-
ments in Germany. Among the country's front-rank authors, 
perhaps F. E. Sillanpää was the most forthright in stating his 
commitment to Scandinavian democratic values and opposition to 
all forms of dictatorship, including fascism.1°4 
The more critical tone of attitudes towards Germany within the 
Swedish-speaking artistic and literary community owed a lot to 
the latter's differing perspective on Finland's own history and 
social development. The rise and fall of the Lapua movement, 
together with the continuing forward march of radical national 
opinion within the Finnish-speaking majority, had seen increased 
value attached to the ideals of democracy and legitimacy and to 
Scandinavian political traditions among Swedish-speakers. The 
prominence of anti-Nazi opinion in Sweden, as reflected in the 
views of such leading Swedish writers as Per Lagerqvist and 
Eyvind Johnson, also had an influence on attitudes. Typical of the 
general tone of the mainstream of liberal-minded literary opinion 
within Swedish-speaking Finland, grouped around the magazine 
Nya Argus, was the critical review of Hitler, describing him as a 
dangerous demagogue committed to the rule of force, written by 
the writer and academic Hans Ruin, which appeared in the 
magazine soon after Hitler's takeover.105 Eirik Hornborg and the 
102. See Olavi Paavolainen's letter of 7.5.1933 to Hellä Wuolijoki (Hellä Wuolijoki 
collection) and Pynnä 1975, pp. 61-5. 
103. Tompuri 1944, pp.212-3. 
104. See Sillanpää's letter of 20.11.1934 to Ragnar Holmström. Also SvD 
23.11.1934; DN 23.2.1934; AS 23.11.1934. 
105. Nya Argus 16.4.1933; Ruin: Gycklare och apostlar (1934). On the fate of the 
German translation of the latter, see Hbl 16.1.1938. 
487 
literary scholar Gunnar Castrén were also openly critical of Hitler. 
The liberal academic Yrjö Hirn, usually known for his cautious 
public comments, also came out with a strong condemnation of 
German anti-semitic policy.106 Those sympathetic to the National 
Socialist cause were in a clear minority. Among the most promi-
nent of these were Tito Colliander, Bertel Gripenberg and Örnulf 
Tigerstedt.107 
The new post-1933 German administration showed some 
interest in developing closer cultural relations with Finland to 
supplement and expand already existing links and put them on a 
more formal, institutionalised footing. The Nordische Gesellschaft 
association, which had been founded in the early 1920s and 
latterly become powerfully imbued with Nazi ideology, assumed a 
significant role in this effort to promote closer relations, intro-
ducing an annual Nordic Cultural Festival in Lubeck, to which 
participants from Finland were regularly invited. Scandinavian 
writers were also regular visitors at the special writers' retreat 
(Deutsche-Nordisches Schriftstellerhaus) set up in 1933 in 
Travemunde on the Baltic coast; among the various Finnish 
writers who stayed there from 1934 onwards were Tito Colliander, 
Lauri Viljanen, Göran Stenius and Olavi Paavolainen, the flow 
continuing even after the unfavourable publicity generated by the 
publication of the latter's critical A guest of the Third Reich.108 
Following the refusal of Hugo Suolahti, the Chancellor of Helsinki 
University, otherwise known for his sympathetic attitudes towards 
Germany, to accede to German overtures to act as an unofficial 
intermediary in the cultural and academic field, Germany turned 
to the writer V. A. Koskenniemi, who quickly became a prominent 
figure during the following years in promoting closer bilateral 
cultural relations.109 Koskenniemi's decision to take up this 
challenge was influenced both by his overall positive feelings 
towards Germany, but also undoubtedly by his awareness of the 
significant personal role he would acquire as a result in shaping 
the pattern of the country's international cultural relations. 
106. Nya Argus 1.7.1933; Hbl 20.8.1938. 
107. T. Colliander 1934, pp. 20-3, 50-2; Barck 1973 p. 68. 
108. SKL:n ptk., 23.5., 2.6.1934, 18.5.1935; FSvF prot., 18.5.1934, 19.5.1935, 
30.4.1936. 
109. Information provided by Anto Leikola, 11.8.1981. 
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Koskenniemi made numerous visits to Germany over the years that 
followed, regularly participating in the Lubeck Cultural Festival 
and attending the notorious Nuremberg party rally held in the 
summer of 1936.710 Koskenniemi's role in Finnish-German cul-
tural relations was complemented by the lesser, but also important 
part played by the leading conservative literary doyenne, Maila 
Talvio.111 
Increased cultural contacts were not restricted to the literary 
world alone, however, but also embraced the other arts, as well as 
the world of entertainment. A major exhibition of German art 
assembled by the Nordische Gesellschaft association and the 
Nationalsozialistische Kulturgemeinde, and including some 400 
works by many of Germany's foremost artists, was staged in 
Helsinki in March 1936 and in Turku a little later. The works on 
show included a number of pieces by artists of the new Nazi school 
dedicated to celebrating the achievements of post-1933 Germany, 
achievements which were otherwise strongly to the fore in the 
overall tone of the exhibition's presentation. Two large, somewhat 
less ambitious surveys of Italian art were staged in 1937.112 
Germany was also active in marketing and promoting the products 
of the new German cinema in Finland during the 1930s. Despite 
their efforts, however, German studios were unable to seriously 
undermine the dominant hold on the Finnish film-going public 
which had been gained, through a combination of efficient 
marketing and close cooperation with local distributors, by 
American film producers during the previous decade.113 
Nevertheless, during the first half of the decade at least, German 
films were able to achieve a healthy second-place in screenings, 
but remained some way behind the American share, which ran as 
high at one point as two-thirds of total film imports before falling 
off to around half towards the latter half of the decade.114 The 
increasing harnessing of the German cinema to serve ideological 
110. Hiedanniemi 1980, pp. 90-7. 
111. Ibid., pp. 101, 124-6; Tuulio 1965, pp. 391-7, 403-7. 
112. HS 8.3.1936; Hbl 8.3.1936; US 8.3.1936; AS 9.3., 1.4.1936. The exhibition of 
German painting entitled `100 years of German Art' was held 7.3.-29.3.1936, 
that of Italian landscape painting in January 1937, and that of work by Italian 
women artists 21.9.-10.10.1937. 
113. Uusitalo 1972, pp. 31-2. 
114. Elokuvamiehen Kalenteri 1944 pp. 214-5. 
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ends, however, created its own difficulties for those involved in 
marketing German films abroad and in Finland. The banning by 
the Finnish censor of screenings of 'Horst Wessel', for example, 
served to convince German distributors of the hopelessness of 
offering politically-coloured creations such as 'Hitlerjunge Quex' 
and Leni Riefenstahl's celebration of the 1934 Nuremburg rally, 
'Triumf des Willens', for public showing in Finland; they were 
shown instead to invited audiences at the German Legation in 
Helsinki. Leni Riefenstahl's impressive documentary of the Berlin 
Olympics of 1936 was nevertheless allowed general distribution.115 
The popularity and influence of German popular music grew sub-
stantially during the 1930s. In the theatre world, in contrast, 
German influence fell off considerably as Paris began to replace 
Berlin as a centre of theatrical innovation and interest. Vienna and 
Prague also emerged as new centres of interest for Finnish 
directors and critics.116 
Academic ties between Finland and Germany, which had 
traditionally been important, remained strongly in evidence. 
German influence was particularly prominent in the natural 
sciences, engineering and medicine, with the majority of research 
papers in these subjects published in Finnish academic journals 
for the international audience typically appearing in German, and 
only a few in English or French. Linguistic studies were also 
characterised by a concentration on Germanic-related subjects. 
Significantly less research was done on the Romance languages 
and even less on the relatively new subject for Finland of English 
studies. In the social sciences, contacts tended to be concentrated 
on Sweden and Britain and the rest of Western Europe. 
Sociological research continued to draw its main inspiration from 
the British school, as previously. Generally speaking, however, 
Germany continued to serve as the major link to the wider 
international academic and scientific community for Finnish 
researchers, and, as a by-product of this role, continued therefore 
to play a significant role in directing and shaping academic ideas 
and opinions in Finland. 
115. Suomen Kinolehti 1/1935, 2/1936, 1/1938; Aito Mäkinen 21.11.1981. 
116. Kalima II 1968, pp. 303-5, 342-4, 373, 387-8. 
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Cultural links along the Finno-Ugrian axis with Estonia and 
Hungary continued to be well maintained. The fourth Finno-
Ugrian congress held in Helsinki in 1931 was well attended, 
particularly by Finnish academics, and embraced an extensive 
series of lectures and discussions. Subsequent congresses were 
held in Tallinn in 1936 and Helsinki in 1939.11' Contacts between 
student organisations in the three countries were also relatively 
close. Although the latter half of the decade witnessed something 
of a decline in the general level of ties compared with previous 
years, moves were made at governmental level to consolidate 
links, both in wider cultural terms and at the academic level. 
Various student exchange programmes and more comprehensive 
language teaching were introduced, for instance, following the 
signing in 1938 of Finnish-Estonian and Finnish-Hungarian 
cultural agreements."$ A number of societies devoted to pro-
moting relations with Estonia and Hungary were also set up on a 
less official basis throughout the decade by professional 
federations representing doctors, architects and teachers.119 
Progress was also made in a number of fields in developing and 
deepening links between Finland and Sweden, although a number 
of language and politically-related difficulties continued to 
hamper relations. Finnish feelings of inferiority towards Sweden, 
together with parallel Swedish feelings of superiority towards 
Finland, had yet to be completely eliminated. Particular problems 
continued to be caused by linguistic issues. The ease with which 
the Swedish-speaking community was able to maintain links with 
mainland Sweden, together with the extent of these links, proved 
an inevitable source of tension between Finland's two linguistic 
communities. Disputes also continued between the two countries 
as to the real nature and magnitude of the language problem in 
Finland, and the status of the Swedish-speaking minority. The 
general course of international developments and domestic events 
117. Suomalais-ugrilaisen Kulttuuritoimikunnan suomalaisen osaston ptk. 
29.3.1934; Paavo Siro 21.5.1980; Martti Ruutu 10.8.1981. 
118. Suomalais-ugrilaisen Kulttuuritoimikunnan suomalaisen osaston ptk. 
4.2.1937, 9.2.1938. 
119. Suomalais-ugrilaisen Kulttuuritoimikunnan suomalaisen osaston ptk. 
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within Finland as the decade progressed nevertheless served to 
create an atmosphere increasingly favourably disposed towards 
closer links with Sweden and the rest of Scandinavia. Greater 
emphasis came to be put on both country's common historical 
inheritance and the similarities in cultural and social develop-
ments existing between the Scandinavian countries as a whole. 
These shared traditions were identified by liberal opinion as 
marking the region off from the totalitarianism of Central Europe, 
and serving to reinforce the essential unity of the Nordic area. 
While contacts with Germany were often very visible and thus 
attracted much public attention and comment, contacts with 
Scandinavia tended to assume a much lower profile, but were 
often much more extensive than surface impressions perhaps 
sometimes indicated. 
The Finnish authorities were keen to see closer links with 
Sweden and to assist this a special committee was set up, with 
members drawn mainly from the academic world, to consider 
ways of improving the situation, particularly with regard to the 
Finnish-speaking community.120 Efforts were also made by 
government to help restore official links between the Finnish 
Student Federation (SYL) and its Swedish sister organisation, 
which had broken down in 1928. Following this break, a parallel 
organisation of Swedish-speaking students (FSS), formed at the 
turn of the decade and pursuing its own independent approach, 
had virtually taken over maintaining student links with 
Scandinavia.121  Moves to remedy the situation were, however, 
largely frustrated, not only by the strained relations existing 
between the Finnish-speaking and Swedish-speaking student 
bodies, but also by the strength of radical nationalist opinion 
current among Finnish-speaking student leaders and their 
resistance to allying the student community with what they saw as 
a dangerously socialist Scandinavia, as well as to cooperating with 
Cajander's centre-left government. Efforts by Kaarlo Linkola, the 
Rector of Helsinki University, to remove some of the obstacles to 
improving relations were also unsuccessful, leading amongst other 
120. Helsingin yliopiston konsistorin ptk. 6.5.1936; Norden-yhdistyksen kirjelmä 
23.4.1936 (HYA). 
121. Studentbladet 1.12.1930, 4.12.1935, 16.4.1936; Harmo 1971, pp. 31-3, 56-
7. 
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things to the abandonment of plans to hold a joint Scandinavian 
student conference, originally scheduled to be held in Helsinki, in 
1939 and its move to Oslo.122  
In terms of Finland's international contacts in the academic 
field, Scandinavia continued to serve as the area with which it 
proved easiest both to establish and maintain ties. Joint Nordic 
conferences in a wide variety of disciplines had become a regular 
feature of academic exchange within the region by the 1930s. 
Links between legal faculties in Finland and the other Scandina-
vian countries had always been active, a fact helped by the large 
number of Swedish-speaking legal scholars in Finland. Linguistic 
factors also contributed to the relative closeness of ties between 
Swedish-speaking historians in Finland and their colleagues in the 
rest of Scandinavia, compared with the paucity of those of 
Finnish-speaking historians, whose work largely appeared in 
Finnish and thus remained mainly little known outside Finland. 
The 1931 Scandinavian congress of historians held in Helsinki, 
which saw a special emphasis put on publicising the latest results 
of Finnish research and recent Finnish-language publications, 
marked one of the few serious attempts to break with this 
pattern.123  A number of links existed between Finnish economists 
and those associated with the Stockholm school, prominent for its 
work on economic trends and the theoretical background of 
economic policy. With the exception of a few Swedish-speaking 
scholars, there was only a bare minimum of contact with Sweden, 
however, in the field of political science, with the result that much 
of the work of the likes of K. R. Brotherus and Yrjö Ruutu was little 
known in Sweden.124  
The Scandinavian writers' congress held in Helsinki in May 
1935, despite being marred by various displays of friction between 
the two Finnish and Swedish-language writers' federations, 
exacerbated by the tense atmosphere surrounding the language 
122. Ylioppilaslehti 26.10., 21.11.1935, 13.2.1937, 9.4., 3.12.1938; Suomen Heimo 
10.4., 31.10., 15.12.1937. On the role of K. Linkola, see SvPr 19.10.1938. Klin-
ge IV 1968, pp. 199-201; Harmo 1971, pp. 60-2. 
123. Nordiska historikermötet i Helsingfors den 7-10 Juli 1931, pp. 10-56; Mart-
ti Kerkkonen 6.11.1981. 
124. K. R. Brotherus, Yrjö Ruutu and Jussi Teljo all published exclusively in Fin-
nish. See Contemporary Political Science 1950, p. 150. 
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question at the time, marked an important step forward in 
consolidating literary links between Finland and the rest of 
Scandinavia, at a time when Finland was generally moving closer 
towards the idea of a greater measure of Nordic cooperation.125 
Links were also developed between the Finnish and Swedish 
socialist movements through improved contacts between both 
countries' workers' education associations and through the acti-
vities of the jointly-run Geneva school, sponsored by the 
Scandinavian trade union movement and workers education 
associations, which ran courses on the work of the League of 
Nations and international issues.126 
Contacts in the literary and artistic fields between Finland and 
Britain and France remained modest throughout the 1930s. In the 
case of Britain, the generally poor knowledge of English typical of 
the period, and which extended to the literary and academic 
communities, only served as a further brake on building up and 
maintaining personal contacts and keeping abreast of develop-
ments in Britain. It has been estimated that even by the end of the 
decade there were only as few as half a dozen professors at 
Helsinki University with a reasonable knowledge of English.127 
Many leading writers, such as Koskenniemi and Waltari, were 
largely unfamiliar with British and American literature, relying for 
what they did know mainly on translations.128 Teaching of English 
in secondary schools remained minimal, with the subject usually 
being available only in the higher grades as an optional or 
voluntary subject, with the exception of a few Finnish-language 
girls schools, where it was taught from an earlier age, and three 
Swedish-language secondary schools in Helsinki, where English 
was taught as pupils' first foreign language. The number of 
students reading English at Helsinki University continued, as a 
result, to remain small. English was not taught at all at the new 
Finnish-language university in Turku.129 
125. FSvF styr. prot. 26.1., 2.3.1935; SKL:n johtokunnan ptk. 16.2.1935. 
126. Työväen omaehtoisen sivistystyö, p. 182; Föreningen Nordisk Folkhögskola i 
Geneve. Verksamhetsberättelse 1935-38, pp. 28-9; Työlöisopiskelija 6/ 
1939. 
127. Ole Reuter 21.4.1980. 
128. Mika Waltari 12.1.1977; Vieno Koskenniemi 26.11.1979. 
129. Ole Reuter 21.4.1980. 
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Academic contacts with Britain were restricted and concentrated 
in a few fields such as sociology, which had some tradition of links 
with British scholarship, and economics, in which new contacts 
were established by figures such as Bruno Suviranta and some of 
his younger colleagues interested in British work being produced 
on the dynamics of market forces and Keynsian theories.130 In the 
humanities, the group of literary scholars focused around 
Professor Yrjö Hirn formed something of an exception to the 
general lack of familiarity with British work otherwise typical, but 
was too small to have any real influence on improving Finnish 
awareness of cultural developments in Britain. Very little interest 
was felt towards British drama within the Finnish theatre world; 
the head of the National Theatre in Helsinki, Eino Kalima, visited 
Britain for the first time only in 1935.131  Also symptomatic of the 
low level of contact was the fact that no Finnish lectors taught at 
British universities. British Council scholarships only began to be 
taken up by Finns in the very last years of the decade. The major 
reason behind the very fragmentary nature of cultural and 
academic links between the two countries lay, in the Finnish case, 
in the general lack of interest in and knowledge of British culture 
and academic research, and in the dominance of cultural influence 
from elsewhere. This lack of interest in British and American 
culture, compared for example to that in German culture, was also 
reflected outside the cultural and academic worlds in the 
continuing lack of popularity of Rotary club activity, and in the 
upswing in hostility, typical of the latter half of the decade, 
towards Freemasonry, which was condemned on the Right for its 
cosmopolitan nature. 
Despite the long tradition of Finnish interest in French culture, 
the level of actual contact between the two countries remained low 
during the 1930s. French influence was most evident in the visual 
arts, with French art continuing to have a significant impact, but 
even here the trend towards national themes was strong. Few 
writers, in contrast, had links with France. Theatrical interest 
nevertheless remained focused on the Parisian stage, the National 
130. In addition to Bruno Suviranta, the economist Lauri 0. af Heurlin also studied 
in London. 
131. Tapiolinna 1946, p.7; Kalima II 1968, pp. 354-6. 
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Theatre in particular maintaining an active interest in French 
drama. The latter half of the decade also saw a significant increase 
in the number of French films screened in Finnish cinemas, the 
majority, historical pieces and comedies.132 
A chair of Finno-Ugrian linguistics was set up in Paris in 1930, 
its first holder being Aurelieu Sauvageot, together with a 
lectorship to cover practical language instruction. The idea of a 
special office, known as Franco-Fennia, based in Paris and 
designed to promote and coordinate increased cultural exchange, 
proved short-lived, ultimately functioning for only a few years 
during the mid-1930s. Various exhibitions of work by leading 
Finnish artists were nevertheless held in Paris, and a number of 
visits made by Finnish choirs and other performers. Finland also 
took part in the 1937 Paris World Fair, the Finnish pavilion being 
designed by Alvar Aalto.133  The scale of Finland's overall cultural 
profile in Paris, for all the relative importance attached within 
Finland to having some kind of presence, was nevertheless 
undeniably low, as perhaps was inevitable in a city so full of 
competing attractions. Within Finland, interest in things French 
tended to be concentrated more among the older generation than 
the young, and more within Swedish-speaking than Finnish-
speaking circles, a fact clearly reflected in the membership and 
style of activities favoured by the Societe Franco-Finlandais. This 
largely upper-class association, which proved itself incapable of 
developing its programme to appeal to a wider section of society, 
nevertheless continued to fulfil a useful, if limited role in 
maintaining interest in French culture. 
After the very modest movement made in the latter half of the 
1920s towards some measure of cultural contact between Finland 
and the Soviet Union, the early years of the 1930s saw a virtual halt 
to any further progress. Within Finland, this deterioration owed 
its origins to the growing hostile mood towards developments in 
the Soviet Union, and the five-year plan policy and its negative 
effects on rural society, in particular; within the Soviet Union, to 
the continuing suspicion of the outside world and isolationism 
132. Elokuvamiehen Kalenteri 1944, p. 215. 
133. Irja Spira 9.10.1981. 
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typical of Soviet society of the period. From about 1933 onwards, 
however, signs of a mild thaw in relations and some opening-up of 
cultural contacts began to be evident. This was reflected, for 
example, in an increase in Finnish interest in Soviet drama and the 
modern experimental theatre of the Soviet directors Tairov and 
Meyerhold. The work of the latter had particularly impressed the 
director Eino Salmelainen when he had had a chance to see it at 
first hand in Paris in 1931, and he was among a group of Finnish 
directors and actors which visited Moscow in the autumn of 1936 
to sample the latest Soviet ideas.134  The significance of this visit 
can be judged from the fact that contact had previously been 
restricted to individual trips made by actresses such as Elli 
Tompuri, who visited Moscow a number of times between 1933 
and 1935.135 This fledgling interest in Soviet drama failed, 
however, to embrace the Soviet cinema. Few Soviet films reached 
Finland during the 1930s, a handful at most being screened 
annually.136 
While many of the classics of Russian literature continued to be 
popular, little was known of modern Soviet writing. What was 
known tended to be concentrated, not unsurprisingly, among left-
wing literary circles and writers such as Elvi Sinervo and Jarno 
Pennanen, both members of the 'Kiila' group. The latter, a loose 
association of left-leaning modernist literary and intellectual 
figures, was founded in mid-decade, in reaction to what was seen 
as the growing reactionary atmosphere within Finland, to promote 
modern working class literature such as that being produced in 
Sweden and France, and to campaign against the spread of 
fascism.137 The left-wing literary magazine Kirjallisuuslehti and, to 
a lesser extent, Soihtu, published by the Academic Socialist 
Society (ASS), also played their part in drawing Finnish readers' 
attention to Soviet literature. 
There was very little contact between the two countries in the 
academic field, even in the area of Finno-Ugrian studies. Few 
permits for Finnish academics to do linguistic fieldwork across the 
border proved forthcoming from the Soviet authorities and those 
134. Salmelainen 1955, pp. 111-2. 
135. Maija Savutie 13.1.1982; Tompuri 1944, pp. 156-69. 
136. Elokuvamiehen Kalenteri 1944, p. 215. 
137. Palmgren 1977, pp. 1-6; Suomen Kirjallisuus VI, pp. 441-2. 
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that were, were typically only granted to scholars working with the 
more distant of the language groups, none being obtainable for 
those wanting to work in Soviet Karelia. Short trips to Leningrad 
and Moscow were nevertheless occasionally arranged. The 
strained relations existing between the two countries, which only 
deteriorated during the latter part of the decade in the wake of the 
publicity surrounding the Soviet purges, together with the strength 
of Finnish reaction to them, served to limit cultural exchange and 
prevent its expansion. 
In terms of overall attitudes towards cultural questions within 
Finland, the latter half of the 1930s marked a gradual displacement 
of the intensely inward-looking nationalism which had dominated 
during much of the early period of independence. Conservative 
nationalist opinion, which had been so much in evident at the 
beginning of the decade, while remaining a potent force in shaping 
the face of Finnish cultural expression, was forced to loosen its 
hold as other strands of more liberal and cosmopolitan-inclined 
opinion began to make themselves felt. The country's successful 
recovery from the Mäntsälä incident and the threat of an outright 
right-wing takeover, in signalling the preservation of the estab-
lished form of representative government, had provided an 
important sense of reassurance to a large section of society, and 
acted as an influential, if indirect source of optimism. The 
resulting rejuvenation and expansion of cultural activity and the 
arts in general which this development inspired, as it eventually 
filtered through, was paralleled by a general increase in interest in 
developments abroad, in Western Europe in particular, and in 
incorporating them into domestic work. Earlier insular and 
intolerant attitudes towards foreign ideas increasingly began to be 
replaced, as social stability increased, the threat of social tension 
receded and material well-being improved, by a more self-
confident outlook, open to new ideas and approaches. This was 
typified in the work of the dynamic young generation of writers, 
poets and literary critics, including Mika Waltari, P. Mustapää, 
Olavi Paavolainen, Tatu Vaaskivi, Raoul Palmgren and Pentti 
Haanpää. 
Foreign awareness of Finnish culture was influenced by a varying 
combination of factors, dependent on the fluctuating general level 
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of interest in Finland and Finnish affairs existing abroad, the 
problems caused by Finland's isolated linguistic position, and 
Finland's own enthusiasm for promoting Finnish culture abroad. 
The one hundredth anniversary of the first publication of the 
national epic, the Kalevala, one of the most visible symbols of 
Finnish culture abroad, falling in February 1935, presented an 
ideal opportunity for those involved in organising efforts to 
increase the extent of international familiarity with Finnish 
culture to focus interest on Finnish literature and folk poetry, as 
well as other aspects of the arts in Finland. A large number of 
foreign guests were invited to the festive celebrations in Helsinki, 
and Finnish legations in a number of foreign capitals organised 
small-scale local celebrations to mark the event.138 Assistance was 
also provided for further translations of the epic to improve the 
work's accessibility for foreign audiences. New emphasis was 
given to folk poetry research, a field in which Finland already had 
a leading international reputation, and to disseminating informa-
tion about the country's extensive and well-documented folk 
poetry traditions. 
With the exception of the Finno-Ugrian congress held in 
Helsinki in 1939, no major academic gatherings were organised in 
Finland during the latter half of the 1930s. Visits by Finnish 
academics abroad appear to have mildly increased as a whole over 
the period, although the quantity of money available for scholar-
ships remained largely at its previous level. Of the other 
international congresses of the period, the Scandinavian writers' 
congress, held in Helsinki in 1935, was without doubt the most 
prominent. 
Although Swedish-language literature continued to be better 
known outside Finland than its Finnish-language counterpart, an 
increasing number of authors writing in Finnish, Sillanpää still 
very much at their head, managed to get their books translated.139 
In the theatrical field, the National Theatre visited Tallinn in 
Estonia twice during the decade, in 1931 and 1937, and also 
appeared at the Moliere festival in Paris in mid-decade. The very 
localised nature of many of the themes which had been favoured 
138. US 1.3.1935; HS 28.2.1935; SS 28.2.1935. 
139. Haltsonen-Puranen 1979. 
499 
by Finnish dramatists from the early days of Aleksis Kivi onwards, 
typically closely tied to Finnish history and the Finnish ex-
perience, severely hampered their transition to the international 
repertoire and their gaining easy acceptance abroad.140 Nothing 
really changed during the 1930s to alter the fact that those aspects 
of Finnish culture not tied to language uniformly found it easiest to 
make a mark in the world. This had traditionally been the case 
with music, Sibelius becoming particularly popular in Britain 
although much less so in Germany, and was now reflected in the 
success of modern Finnish architecture, in the shape of the work of 
such figures as Alvar Aalto, in making an international name for 
itself. Here as elsewhere, however, international interest tended to 
be focused on particular individuals and their achievements, 
rather than Finnish culture as a whole, which continued to remain 
very much an unknown quantity for the international audience. 
8. Developments in Finland's sporting links 
abroad 
Compared to the Finnish teams competing at earlier Olympics, the 
size of the Finnish contingent at the Los Angeles Olympics in 1932 
was particularly small, numbering only some 24 competitors. The 
distance involved in travelling to California and the financial 
stringencies imposed by the depression also affected the size of a 
number of other European national teams. 
Popular interest in the fortunes of the Finnish team was 
overshadowed, however, by the disagreements surrounding the 
amateur status and eligibility of its most prominent member, Paavo 
Nurmi, who had been entered for the first time in the marathon. 
Nurmi's participation in the Games had been the focus of an 
international dispute, centred around accusations of his having 
broken the regulations covering his amateur status and received 
payments for competitions. A start on settling the case had been 
made in the autumn of 1931 through the efforts of the Swedish 
President of the International Amateur Athletics Federation 
(IAAF), J. Sigfrid Edström, together with a fellow Swedish sports 
140. Information provided by David Barnett. 29.10.1981. 
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administrator, Bo Ekelund; both of these figures had been 
prominently active in ensuring strict observance of the code of 
conduct covering amateur competition in their native Sweden. 
The dispute surrounding Nurmi's amateur position and thereby 
his right to compete in further Olympics had quickly awoken a 
flurry of international attention and speculation, and had caused a 
wave of protest within Finland, much of it inspired by a sense of 
hurt national pride. Edström was singled out for particularly angry 
comment by Finnish critics of the case. Finnish anger was also 
directed more widely at Sweden as a whole, which was portrayed 
as a country consumed by envy of Finland's past sporting 
achievements and claim to sporting fame, envy which had pushed 
Sweden's sporting authorities to try and sabotage Finland's 
chances at the Los Angeles Olympics. Opinion on the issue was 
virtually united and equally strong across both Finnish and 
Swedish-speaking sporting communities, as well as amongst the 
public at large.141 
The depth of the country's commitment to Nurmi and the Nurmi 
legend, and the importance attached to his part in consolidating 
Finland's place on the international sporting map, was well 
reflected in the attitude of the leadership of the Finnish Athletics 
Federation (SVUL), responsible for organising the Finnish team, 
towards the dispute over his amateur status. While undoubtedly 
aware of Nurmi's infringements of amateur rules, the Federation 
nevertheless put its full weight behind Nurmi's case.142 The 
Finnish Federation called for the IAAF to provide substantiated 
proof of Nurmi's professional status before it would be willing to 
consider dropping him from the Finnish team, in the belief that 
acquiring such proof would be difficult, if not impossible. This 
tactic failed, however, to halt proceedings within the IAAF, which 
declared Nurmi a professional shortly prior to the Los Angeles 
Games, thereby effectively banning him from taking part.143 
 Even 
despite Nurmi's absence and the small size of their team, however, 
Finnish athletes enjoyed considerable success in Los Angeles, 
paralleling that won by previous Finnish teams at earlier compe- 
141. Idrottsbladet 14.4., 1.8.1932. 
142. Karikko-Koski 1975, pp. 224-40; Kekkonen 1981, pp. 239-46. 
143. See Sigfrid Edström's letters of 6.5. and 20.5.1932 to Ernst Krogius (Edström 
collection/RA). Bo Ekelund 9.3.1981; Karikko-Koski 1975, pp. 226, 229-31. 
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titions. Finland was placed eighth overall in the final medal table. 
The new generation of Finnish runners convincingly proved 
themselves equal to the challenge of maintaining Finland's 
established dominance in long-distance track events.144  
Nurmi's disqualification from amateur competition and the role 
played in that decision by Swedish sports officials had an 
important influence on the development of sporting links between 
Finland and Sweden. The strength of Finnish hostility towards 
what were seen as the Swedish-inspired moves against Nurmi was 
made plain as early as 1931 by Urho Kekkonen, president of the 
Finnish Sports Federation (SUL), during the closing ceremony of 
the fourth joint Swedish-Finnish Games, when he told his 
surprised Swedish colleagues that Finland would be withdrawing 
from all future annual joint games between the two countries.145 
Following the Los Angeles Games, Kekkonen went even further, 
advocating breaking off virtually all Finland's sporting ties with 
Sweden. In the autumn of 1932, the Federation was instrumental 
in refusing to sanction any Finnish participation in Swedish 
competitions)" Kekkonen made extensive efforts to get public 
opinion behind him on the issue, and was not afraid to use 
emotional language and appeals to national pride and patriotic 
values to advance his case, as is evident in the series of articles on 
the subject he wrote for Helsingin Sanomat during the autumn of 
1932.14' 
It is difficult, all the same, to see what Kekkonen and his 
supporters really thought, or hoped could be gained by such an 
uncompromisingly hostile attitude towards Sweden. Part of the 
aim was undoubtedly purely retaliatory, to undermine Sweden's 
own international sporting links and put a question mark over 
Swedish sporting credibility and, in the longer term, to help push 
Swedish sporting opinion against the type of policies advocated by 
Edström. Bypassing Sweden altogether, Kekkonen and his 
supporters envisaged opening up a network of sporting links with 
144. Nygren-Siukonen 1978, p. 218. 
145. Kekkonen 1981, pp. 236-9. 
146. See the corespondence during the autumn of 1932 between the SUL and 
Svenska Fri-idrottsförbundent (Svenska Fri-idrottsförbundet archive E 1/RA). 
147. HS 8.-10.9.1932; HS 31.8., 19.9.1932; Suomen Urheilulehti 1.8., 22.8.1932; 
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the rest of Europe to allow Finnish sportsmen to take part in joint 
competitions and athletics meetings with sportsmen from coun-
tries such as Poland, Hungary, Germany and France. Although 
Kekkonen's policy received strong and vocal backing from a large 
section of the sporting community, some discordant voices were 
nevertheless heard. Prominent among these was that of the 
Swedish-language sports paper Idrottsbladet, backed by the 
Finland-Swedish Sports Federation (SFI). While broadly agreeing 
with the general criticism of Edström's role in the Nurmi affair, 
Idrottsbladet could not accept that it was necessary to break off 
sporting ties with Sweden in consequence. It described this as a 
retaliatory style of reaction influenced by wider nationalist, anti-
Swedish sentiments, which had little or nothing to do with sport. 
To clear the air on the issue, it was suggested that both Kekkonen 
and Ekelund be replaced.148 This and other criticism, however, 
had little immediate impact on the position adopted by the SUL 
over the issue. Kekkonen's approach was confirmed at a special 
Federation conference held in March 1933, and Nurmi allowed to 
continue competing in domestic amateur competitions.149 
It was not until the spring of 1935 that more wide-ranging 
opposition to the Kekkonen-sponsored policy emerged, when the 
Swedish-language sports clubs, which had previously been 
identified with criticism of Kekkonen's uncompromising stance, 
were joined by a number of clubs from the larger towns, including 
Helsinki, in calling for a relaxation of the ban on competition with 
Sweden. This had become something of a financial burden for 
clubs wanting to organise international meetings, in forcing them 
to invite an increasing number of competitors from outside 
Scandinavia. Harald Nordblad, a leading light in Helsinki sporting 
circles, played a central role in unofficial negotiations with the 
Swedish Sports Federation in efforts to reactivate competition be-
tween the two countries.l5o The strength of this growing 
groundswell of opposition was reflected at the spring conference 
of the Finnish Federation in 1935 which, by a slim majority, 
148. Idrottsbladet 22.9., 6.10.1932. 
149. Suomen Urheilulehti 27.3., 7.8.1933; Idrottsbladet 29.6., 20.7.1933. 
150. See Harald Nordblad's memorandum of 26.4.1935 to Svenska Fri-idrottsför-
bundet and Bo Ekelund's reply of 2.5.1935 (Svenska Fri-idrottsförbundet ar-
chive). 
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decided to overturn the ban imposed on competition with Sweden 
and begin official discussions with the Swedish authorities on the 
normalisation of sporting relations. This decision was a clear blow 
to Kekkonen, who had continued to advocate a more cautious line 
to reopening ties, calling for a greater conciliatory effort on 
Sweden's part.151 Although Kekkonen was nevertheless able to 
recover something of his position after successfully gaining a vote 
of confidence for his administrative committee at the Federation's 
conference held shortly afterwards in June, developments had 
already started to get under way, in the shape of the signing of a 
number of preliminary agreements covering the participation of 
various Swedish athletes in upcoming Finnish competitions.152 
Formal discussions aimed at restoring normal relations were also 
begun between the Finnish and Swedish Sports Federations, with 
an agreement being signed on 11 July. As well as freeing the 
Finnish Federation from a policy which had outgrown any 
usefulness it might once have been seen as having, this agreement 
also served to defuse Swedish resentment and provided a use-
ful framework for developing future links. Joint competitions 
between the two countries were resumed, but residual difficulties 
saw to it that competitions at national team level were not restarted 
again until 1939.153 
The level of Finnish sporting achievement in relation to the 
improving results being produced elsewhere became the subject of 
increasing concern among Finnish sporting authorities during the 
course of the lead-up to the 1936 Berlin Olympics. Up until the 
mid-1930s, Finland had enjoyed consistent and considerable 
success at the Olympics, a fact which had led to the development 
of an element of complacency regarding Finland's hold on a 
number of key events. The fact of the situation was, however, that 
over the intervening years extensive efforts had been made in a 
151. US 6.5.1935; Suomen Urheilulehti 6.5.1935; Idrottsbladet 9.5.1935; AS 
6.5.1935. 
152. US 17.6.1935. See also the memorandum from Svenska Fri-idrottsförbundet 
dated 6.7.1935 to the SUL (Svenska Fri-idrottsförbundet archive). 
153. See Bo Lindman's telegram of 17.6.1935 and memorandum of 6.7.1935 to 
Lauri Pihkala. Also Kekkonen's letter of 26.7.1935 to Lindman (Svenska Fri-
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number of countries, Germany being a particular example, to 
improve sporting performance and the level of competition. 
Compared to the run-up to previous Olympics, therefore, that to 
the 1936 Games was marked by a new caution among Finnish 
competitors and organisers. The final results of the Games, how-
ever, met with considerable satisfaction, a number of comment-
ators being pleasantly surprised by the number of Finnish 
successes scored, which saw Finland ranked fifth overall in the 
final medal table. All the same, this did not prevent some of them 
from observing that a similar level of success was unlikely to be 
repeated in the future, and that Finland would probably have to 
accept a more modest level of achievement in international 
competition. 
The Berlin Games were also the cause of wider, more general 
speculation outside the sporting community, as a result of their 
size and the Nazi movement's efforts to exploit the event for 
political and propaganda purposes. While Helsingin Sanomat and 
Uusi Suomi preferred to cover the event from a purely sporting 
point of view, restricting their other comments to such things as 
praising the Games' well-oiled organisation, Ajan Suunta on the 
Right, and Sosialidemokraatti on the Left, concentrated much 
more on the event's political repercussions and implications.154 
Ajan Suunta was particularly lavish in its praise of German 
athletes and the Games' organisers, and not shy to implicitly 
interpret Germany's sporting successes as a further positive 
consequence of the change which had taken in Germany's system 
of government. Sosialidemokraatti, in sharp contrast, was much 
more critical, drawing its readers' attention to the extent to which 
the Games had been manipulated to serve nationalist and 
propaganda ends.'55 
International developments had brought a number of problems for 
the expanding Workers' Athletic Union (TUL). The disappearance 
of independent socialist sports movements in Germany and 
Austria between 1933 and 1934 in the wake of the political 
154. HS 11.8.1936; US 1.8.1936. 
155. AS 10.8., 17.8.1936; SS 2.8.1936 and the paper's general coverage of the Ga-
mes 8.8.-12.8.1936. Also Nygren-Siukonen 1978, p. 232. 
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upheavals affecting those countries was a bitter blow to the 
international socialist sporting community. This loss was felt all 
the more keenly as both countries had played host to international 
workers' athletics competitions in 1925 (Frankfurt am Main) and 
1931 (Vienna). In redirecting the thrust of its sporting links 
abroad, the TUL decided to concentrate its efforts on developing 
closer ties with parallel organisations in the Scandinavian 
countries, particularly the prominent Norwegian workers' sports 
federation, and with the Soviet Union, links with which had been 
in virtual abeyance since the dispute over participation in the 
Spartakiad competition in 1928. The Federation already enjoyed 
links with the Baltic countries and a number of Western European 
countries, such as Belgium.156 Discussions were held with the 
Soviet Sports Federation in Moscow in January 1935, resulting in 
the signing of a framework agreement, under which joint skating 
and wrestling competitions were held the same winter, and an 
athletics competition the following summer.157  After this initial 
burst of competition, however, sporting ties between the two 
countries again fell off, partly as a result of a shift in Soviet interest 
towards establishing new sporting links with Norway and Spain.158 
Closer contact was established with the TUL's Norwegian sister 
organisation, but this failed to generate any significant movement 
towards developing a more extensive pan-Scandinavian network 
of competition. The weakness of the Swedish workers' sports 
organisation did little to help the situation.159 
While making a consistent effort to emphasise the Union's 
independent status, the leadership of the TUL tried to avoid open 
confrontation between itself and the non-socialist Finnish 
Athletics Federation (SVUL). This was reflected in the Union's 
decision to allow TUL representatives to take part in the work of a 
government-sponsored committee, established in 1935, to 
consider the possibility of setting up a single national sports 
federation, even though the idea of such a body evoked little real 
156. Hentilä I 1982, pp. 392-4. 
157. TUL:n liittotoimikunnan ptk., 14.1., 28.1.1935: Arvi Heiskanen 15.12.1980. 
158. TUL:n liittotoimikunnan ptk., 4.2.1935; TUL 28.2.1935; Arvi Heiskanen 
15.12.1980; Hentikä I 1982, pp. 417-8. 
159. TUL:n liittotoimikunnan ptk., 11.3., 15.4., 13.5., 16.12.1935; Hentilä I 1982, 
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enthusiasm within the organisation.160 Friction continued to exist 
between the two federations, however. Although refusing to sign 
the declaration issued by the socialist and communist-controlled 
sporting internationals directed against the holding of the 
Olympics in Berlin, the TUL declined to take part in the activities 
of the Finnish Olympic Committee in selecting the Finnish 
national team for Berlin.161 Attention within the organisation was 
instead concentrated on the third Workers' Olympics held in 
Antwerp in the summer of 1937, which acquired a particularly 
symbolic significance with the continued banning of socialist 
sports movements in a number of countries. It was also the first in 
which the Soviet Union competed. The success of the Finnish 
team in Antwerp was a natural source of satisfaction to the Union 
and Sosialidemokraatti, providing as it did something of a counter 
to the success at Berlin the previous year. This satisfaction was 
diluted, however, by the generally poor standard of organisation of 
the Antwerp Games, and by the minimal level of coverage given to 
them and the Finnish successes there in the majority of the non-
socialist press.162 
The polarisation of Finnish sport and the existence of two 
separate, ideologically-opposed sporting communities, although 
far from being unparalleled elsewhere, served by its very contin-
uance to fuel old quarrels and create an element of unnecessary 
tension. Various voices had been heard from the early 1920s 
onwards in support of calls for burying old disputes and for a 
return to a single umbrella organisation. The position of the TUL 
with regard to reunification, however, was especially difficult. 
Originally formed out of the various clubs expelled from the then 
central sports federation, the TUL found itself quickly labelled as a 
divisive, uncompromising organisation, as a result of its refusal to 
welcome the various attempts by the SVUL leadership aimed at 
developing closer links between the two organisations. The 
Union's position was not improved by the defection from its ranks 
during the 1920s and early 1930s of a number of top athletics, 
boxing, wrestling and football stars to the rival SVUL. 
160. TUL:n liittotoimikunnan ptk., 9.1.1935. 
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The latter half of the 1930s, however, presented both federations 
with a new challenge and a significantly greater incentive for 
pooling their resources, following the decision by the International 
Olympic Committee (IOC) in the summer of 1938 to abandon its 
plans to hold the 1940 Olympics in Japan, in the wake of the 
Japanese assault on China begun the previous year. With the 
blessing of J. S. Edström, the vice-president of the IOC, keen to 
finally eliminate the tensions still colouring sporting links 
between Finland and Sweden, they were instead offered to 
Finland.163 A particular factor serving to concentrate minds on 
improving cooperation between the two federations, following 
Finland's acceptance of the IOC offer, was the need to ensure that 
Finland was able to field her best possible team to defend the 
country's sporting record on her home ground. 
Although still overshadowed by past animosity, the efforts of the 
two organisations to come to some form of workable compromise 
were made easier by the shift which had been signalled by the 
forming of Cajander's centre-left coalition in 1937. Unlike 
previous administrations which had typically unashamedly fa-
voured the SVUL, Cajander's tended to take a more neutral stance 
on sporting issues. A draft agreement covering future cooperation 
between the two federations emerged from a series of joint 
discussions held during 1938. Despite the increasingly positive 
attitude towards closer inter-federation cooperation which had 
been evident in the socialist press, many of the TUL's individual 
member clubs remained cautious towards the idea, pointing to the 
difficulties encountered by many of them at the beginning of the 
decade, the traditionally poor levels of government assistance they 
had enjoyed, and the history of hostility towards socialist-
organised sporting activities typical of the rest of the sporting 
community.164 The strength of this mood resulted in the rejection 
of the proposal by a slim majority at an extraordinary general 
meeting of the Union held in February 1939. Alarmed at this 
development, Väinö Tanner, the Social Democrat leader, inter-
vened in the issue. The latter's arguments, stressing the political 
importance of a positive vote, finally convinced enough represent- 
163. Nygren-Siukonen 1978, pp. 235-6; HS 15.7., 16.7., 17.7.1938. 
164. Hentilä I 1982, pp. 472-3; Vilho Lehtonen 5.3.1982; SS 16.7.1938. 
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atives at the meeting to secure the proposal's final acceptance, 
albeit in something of a watered-down form. This covered cooper-
ation on a more limited scale than initially proposed, and was 
essentially restricted to the upcoming Olympics and future 
international and inter-federation competitions, but excluded 
smaller events staged at the club level.165 
The TUL-approved outline agreement came up for discussion by 
the Finnish Athletics Federation in April, and awoke some bitter 
argument within the organisation. Acceptance of the agreement, 
even in its reduced form, was advocated by a group led by J. W. 
Rangell and Urho Kekkonen, both of whom argued that it would 
allow Finnish sport to present a united face to the world and 
simplify Finnish participation in international competitions and, 
more specifically, ease the organisation of the Helsinki Olympics. 
Those opposed to the agreement, such as K. E. Levälahti and Toivo 
Aro, concentrated instead on the need to defend the SVUL's role in 
managing Finland's international sporting links, which they were 
reluctant to sacrifice or share with the TUL. The proposal's 
opponents won the vote on the issue, which put a temporary halt 
to any further progress on the question.166 The issue refused to go 
away, however. The SVUL decision provoked a wave of critical 
comment, both at home and abroad. Rather than the TUL, which 
had typically been identified previously as the major obstacle to 
improved sporting conditions within Finland, it was now the 
SVUL which was subjected to attack.167 Government pressure and 
the threat of the loss of official financial assistance forced a rapid 
reassessment of the decision, resulting in the drafting of a new 
agreement, approved by both bodies at the end of April. In a last-
ditch move, the SVUL leadership was nevertheless able to restrict 
it solely to cooperation covering preparations for the 1940 
Olympics.168 
165. Hentilä I 1982, pp. 474-6; TUL 7.2., 14.2.1939. 
166. SVUL:n ylim. kokouksen ptk., 15.4.1939 (SVUL archive); Suomen Urheilu-
lehti 17.4.1939. 
167. StT 20.4.1939; HS 22.4.1939. 
168. SVUL:n liittohallituksen kokouksen ptk., 21.4.1939 (SVUL archive); Suomen 
Urheilulehti 24.4.1939. 
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Throughout the 1930s, sport continued to maintain the 
exceptionally pronounced role in the public imagination which it 
had acquired during the previous decade. There was a great sense 
of national pride in the achievements of Finnish sportsmen in 
international competitions, as well as widespread recognition of 
the role they played in improving international awareness of 
Finland. Interest in sport also indirectly served, in a modest way, 
to broaden popular attitudes to world affairs within Finland. 
International sporting competitions, besides contributing to 
strengthening a sense of national identity and opening up wider 
international perspectives, also nevertheless served to engender 
and reinforce some less welcome aspects of nationalist sentiment, 
such as the jingoist outbursts which accompanied the Finnish-
Swedish athletics games held in the summer of 1939 in Stockholm 
and Helsinki. 
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VIII Finland's Future in the 
Balance 	 The Spring 
and Summer of 1939 
The period following the Munich agreement signed in the autumn 
of 1938 saw the scale of the growth of German military and 
political strength in Europe increasingly and more widely 
appreciated within Finland, particularly on the Right. Munich 
came to be seen within conservative opinion as potentially 
marking the beginning of a new period of stability and peaceful 
development for Europe.' Scepticism towards the Western powers, 
which were seen as having effectively capitulated to Hitler at 
Munich, also gained ground within moderate and socialist 
opinion, which had previously been favourably disposed towards 
the West. Within government circles, the major impact of the 
Munich agreement, when set against the secret discussions held 
with Yartsev, was to strengthen the administration's resolve to 
continue developing Finland's links with Scandinavia. These, it 
was hoped, would insulate the country from potentially dangerous 
developments in the rest of Europe and provide it with an 
increased measure of security against any possible Soviet moves. 
Hopes were also high that implementation of the plans for the 
fortification of the 'land Islands could be accelerated. 
Attitudes towards the Soviet Union were changing, as the belief 
in the latter's increasing isolation and limited potential to exert its 
1. Uola 1982, pp. 77-8; IKL 5/1938, 6-7/1938, 8-9/1938, 10/1938; Ajan Suunta 
8.10., 9.10.1938. 
511 
influence in shaping international developments steadily gained 
ground in various parts of Europe, and within certain sections of 
Finnish opinion. The extent of this latter development was 
indirectly reflected in the shift which took place in the Soviet 
stance towards Finland at the beginning of 1939, during the course 
of secret discussions held with the Finnish authorities. During 
these, the Soviet Union adopted a new set of less ambitious 
proposals, thought more likely to be acceptable to the Finnish side 
and of having a chance of reducing the growing attraction felt in 
Finland towards closer Scandinavian links and a Nordic style of 
neutrality.2 
Germany's occupation of what was left of Czechoslovakia in 
mid-March 1939 marked a further step in German expansion and 
an increased challenge to the international community. In oc-
cupying Czechoslovakia, German aggrandizement had reached a 
point beyond which further territorial expansion could no longer 
be credibly justified on the basis of recovering Germany's natural 
national and ethnic borders. Further demands would have to be 
made on the basis of purely regional political arguments and the 
need for adequate 'Lebensraum' for the German state. The question 
of whether Germany could be stopped from making such further 
territorial demands on her neighbours, and what the long-term fate 
of those states in the German sphere of influence would be, 
inevitably became the subject of increasing international concern. 
Within Finland, the German occupation of Czechoslovakia trig-
gered a substantial decline in pro-German sympathy on the Right, 
where it had traditionally been strongest. Although evident within 
the ranks of the National Coalition Party, this development was 
perhaps most clearly reflected in the change of fortunes 
experienced by the People's Patriotic Movement, the political 
grouping most clearly identified in the public mind with pro-
German sentiments. The parliamentary elections held in July 1939 
witnessed a halving of the party's number of seats, from 14 to 8. 
The arrival of a number of anti-Nazi refugees from the Sudetenland 
and German Jews in Finland, which had begun the previous 
autumn, bringing with them the first real contact much of the 
Finnish population had had with the realities of the Nazi system 
2. Mylly II 1983, pp. 205, 207. 
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and the impact of German expansion in Central Europe, also no 
doubt contributed in part to this shift in mood. Prior to this, the 
flow of refugees to Scandinavia, which had been growing since 
1933, had not affected Finland, and it was only now that various 
aid organisations to coordinate refugee assistance were set up in 
Finland, by the labour movement in particular.3 
The German occupation of Czechoslovakia caused widespread 
concern and unease throughout the Western community, as well as 
in the Soviet Union. The position of Chamberlain, who had played 
such a central part in arranging the Munich agreement and who, 
after its signing, had expressed his satisfaction that it would secure 
what he had liked to call 'peace in our time', was particularly 
highlighted. Convinced now of the ineffectiveness of trying to hold 
Germany in check by direct agreements, Chamberlain introduced a 
new British foreign policy initiative, which resulted in guarantees 
being given to Poland and Rumania in March 1939, covering their 
territorial integrity. Later the same spring, Britain, together with 
France, began preparations for discussions aimed at negotiating an 
alliance agreement with the Soviet Union to contain possible 
future German expansion. 
The effects of the German move also made themselves felt in 
Soviet policy thinking, which had been under review from the 
time of the Austrian Anschluss onwards, a fact also indicated by 
the timing of the Yartsev proposals put to Finland. The sense of 
deepening isolation felt by the Soviet leadership in the wake of the 
initial Munich agreement had only accelerated this reassessment 
of the Soviet Union's foreign policy and network of international 
relations. As faith evaporated in the notion of collective security 
and in the potential of the League of Nations as a tool for resolving 
security issues, so Soviet attention became increasingly refocused 
on a regionally-based security strategy as a means of guaranteeing 
the Soviet Union's borders. This shift saw a renewal of Soviet 
interest in the countries along its western border seen as posing 
security problems, Poland, the Baltic republics and Finland. 
This increased Soviet focus on national security issues, and the 
resurgence of Russian nationalist sentiment it brought with it, was 
also reflected in an upswing in political suspicion directed to- 
3. Torvinen 1984, pp. 127-33; Edgard Hegenbart 18.11.1982. 
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wards minority nationalities living close to the Soviet Union's 
western border, and in the forced removal in 1938 of Finnish-
speaking population groups living in East Karelia to areas further 
eastward. The popular front policy was also abandoned and the 
powerful role previously given to Comintern substantially 
reduced. Linked to the latter was the decision taken in the late 
autumn of 1938 to close the Moscow-based Finnish section of 
Comintern. Increased suspicion also grew towards the various 
emigre communists living in the Soviet Union. Among these, the 
Polish and Finnish communist communities, both identified with 
sensitive areas along the western border, were subject to particular 
scrutiny and their members purged of what were seen as unreliable 
elements. 
These latter developments had a debilitating effect on the 
already difficult position of the underground communist move-
ment operating within Finland, which was further hampered by 
the imprisonment of a number of its leading figures in Helsinki at 
the end of 1938. Efforts to revive the movement's independent 
underground activities also received short shrift from Arvo 
Tuominen, who had moved from Moscow to Stockholm at the end 
of 1937 to act as a secret contact for the Finnish movement. This 
weakening of the movement was paralleled by a decline in the 
fortunes of various radical socialist groupings close to the party, 
such as the Academic Socialist Society (ASS).4 Further towards the 
political centre, the Social Democrats' star was still very much in 
the ascendant. The parliamentary elections of July 1939 confirmed 
the party's position alongside the Agrarians in the Cajander 
administration; both parties' share of seats showed a modest rise, 
against losses by the opposition conservatives and the Swedish 
People's Party. 
The British continued to show a very limited degree of interest at 
governmental level in Finland and Finnish affairs, a logical 
consequence of the fact that Britain possessed few direct interests 
4. On the background to Arvo Tuominen's position after arriving in Sweden some 
time at the end of 1937, see Aili Mäkinen 20.1.1971, Toivo Karvonen 4.10.1979, 
Irja Strand 23.11.1979. For the reaction of the Swedish authorities to Tuomi-
nen's request for asylum made in May 1938, see the report on his case dated 
1.6.1938 produced by Rikspolisstyrelsen, Säkerhetsavdelningen. 
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in the area. There was similarly little coverage of Finland in the 
major British newspapers of the time, with the presidential 
election of 1937 and the forming of Cajander's centre-left coalition, 
for example, referred to only very briefly. Some effort was made 
nevertheless to maintain at least a measure of contact, a fact 
reflected in the visit to Helsinki made by the British Assistant 
Secretary of State, on a tour of the Baltic, in the early summer of 
1937 to discuss Anglo-Finnish trade relations and establish links 
with the new administration and, more generally, to gauge the 
situation in the Baltic area as a whole. Britain's overall concern 
was for continued stability in the Baltic. The emergence of Finnish 
and, to a lesser extent, Swedish interest in fortifying the Aland 
Islands was seen in London as a particularly dangerous develop-
ment introducing fresh tension into the region, and as likely to 
significantly worsen both countries' relations with the Soviet 
Union, unless the latter was not also brought into talks on the 
issue. Finland's relations with Germany were also a source of 
anxiety for Britain and were the object of particular interest on the 
part of British diplomats in Helsinki from 1936 onwards, as part of 
the Foreign Office's overall attempt to map the growing spread of 
German influence in Europe.' 
From the German standpoint, Sweden represented the main 
focus of interest in the Nordic area, above all because of the 
German desire to maintain continuity of supplies of Swedish iron 
ore to German heavy industry. Compared to her western neigh-
bour, Finland was very much of secondary interest to Germany, 
although her role as a protective barrier against the Soviet Union 
for the rest of Scandinavia was recognised. Fearing possible future 
Soviet moves to secure a role for the Soviet Union in the Aland 
Islands area, Germany was keen to see the Islands remain firmly in 
Finnish hands, and therefore saw no reason to oppose closer 
cooperation between Finland and Sweden over their defence. The 
composition of the Cajander government, however, drawing as it 
5. See the report of the British envoy in Helsinki dated 25.1.1938 sent to the Fo-
reign Office and the memorandum sent by the latter to the British Legation in 
Helsinki dated 28.2.1938 (FO 371/22265). Also Annual Report for Finland for 
1937 (FO 371/22270) and Annual Report, economic for 1938 (FO 371/23642). 
Also see the general coverage given by the British Legation during 1937 and 
1938 to Finland's foreign trade relations (FO 371/22265). 
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did on parties with minimal sympathies with Germany, served to 
limit the degree of influence open to Germany on Finnish 
decision-making. Those in Berlin were also well aware that pro-
German circles within Finland, although prominent in partici-
pating in cultural exchange between the two countries, such as the 
Lubeck Nordic Festival, did not represent a politically influential 
body of opinion.6 
The continuing German interest in not seeing Finland move any 
closer to the Soviet Union was also paralleled by a desire to 
prevent the development of closer Finnish links with the Western 
powers. A particular focus of German annoyance was Cajander's 
anglophile Foreign Minister, Rudolf Holsti, who the Germans were 
keen to see replaced, as in fact finally happened.' The German 
move taken in May 1939, proposing non-aggression treaties to all 
four Scandinavian countries, Finland included, together with 
Estonia and Latvia, was undoubtedly influenced by the fact that 
shortly previously, in March of the same year, Britain had given 
security guarantees to Poland and Rumania. Germany clearly 
hoped that, if the Scandinavian and Baltic countries could be 
persuaded to accept, they would also be indirectly agreeing to 
reject any possible subsequent British offer of a regional security 
guarantee arrangement, thereby securing Germany's northern 
flank. 
Sweden had traditionally been suspicious of Finnish foreign 
policy and from the mid-1930s onwards this suspicion increas-
ingly concentrated on the possibility of Finland's moving towards 
a more pro-German foreign policy. Drawing Finland closer into 
the Nordic orbit and into a closer relationship with Sweden in 
particular, therefore, was seen as a logical means of preventing 
this. The problem for Sweden, however, was how far it was 
possible to go in developing foreign policy and military links 
between the two countries without undermining Sweden's other 
security concerns. This remained an unresolved issue and was 
never tested at the time of the Czechoslovak crisis. Overall 
Swedish attitudes towards Finland continued, as a result, to be 
6. Blucher: Tagebuch 13.1., 31.1., 13.2., 16.12., 22.2.1939. Also information provi-
ded by Martti Julkunen. 
7. T. Soikkanen 1983, pp. 233-8. 
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quite deeply divided throughout this period and through the 
course of the various discussions held with Finland on defence 
questions. Resistance to Sweden committing herself to any binding 
agreement with Finland remained widespread. 
From the Soviet standpoint, the Finnish position, caught be-
tween Germany and Scandinavia, appeared an uneasy compro-
mise. As Soviet suspicions of Germany's ultimate foreign policy 
intentions in the Baltic and Scandinavia deepened, so the Soviet 
leadership grew increasingly distrustful of the Scandinavian 
countries' foreign policies. The idea of a united Nordic bloc had 
little to recommend it in Soviet eyes and aroused a variety of 
Soviet misgivings, most particularly on the question of the 
potential of a united Scandinavia, in the event of an international 
crisis, to pursue joint policies without succumbing to German 
interference. An increasingly integrated Scandinavian bloc was 
also seen as potentially posing an hindrance to the Soviet Union's 
own policies. Soviet thinking was, in any case, essentially 
sceptical of all forms of neutrality wherever they appeared, but 
particularly when it raised its head in states bordering on the 
Soviet Union itself. In terms of its military thinking regarding 
defence in the Baltic area during 1938 and 1939, the Soviet Union 
fell back on many of the ideas typical of pre-revolutionary defence 
planning, a development particularly highlighted in the resur-
gence of the 'portcullis' system idea for the defence of the Gulf of 
Finland and Leningrad.8 To be effective, this system, based on a 
single defensive zone embracing the Baltic republics and the 
southern Finnish coastal area, required military bases in the 
countries concerned. 
The inevitably significantly less important place played by the 
Baltic area in Western interests, when compared to those of the 
Soviet Union, became clear during discussions held between the 
latter and the Western powers on a possible joint alliance 
agreement during the late summer of 1939. This was particularly 
evident in the case of France. French thinking, reduced to its 
essentials, focused on two major aims: preventing war altogether, 
or, if that proved impossible, ensuring that any conflict took place 
as far away from French territory as possible and preferably 
8. Paasivirta 1969, p. 23. 
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remained limited to a Soviet-German confrontation. Concen-
trating on these overall aims, little room was left in French 
planning for such things as the question of Baltic security, raised 
by the Soviet government at the talks, and the need, in the Soviet 
view, of guaranteeing the stability of the countries along the Soviet 
Union's north-western border. British policy similarly tended to 
be more concerned with securing British interests and influence 
further south. Britain's aim in giving security guarantees to Poland 
and Rumania, and subsequently to Greece and Turkey, was to 
create a durable and reliable barrier, and one which could be 
strengthened by closer cooperation between the countries in 
question, against continuing German expansion in Eastern Europe. 
Although there was some Soviet recognition of the value of 
Britain's attempt, through her network of security guarantees, to 
put a brake on German expansion in Eastern and Central Europe, it 
was nevertheless assumed in Moscow that, if this policy were to 
fail, there would be little to prevent a major war in the East 
involving the Soviet Union as a principal combatant. This view 
would appear to have been further reinforced in the minds of 
Soviet thinkers when Western military specialists were brought 
into the talks on a possible East-West alliance. If, on the other 
hand, the British-inspired policy proved successful in putting a 
halt to German aggrandizement, it would also have every chance, 
so it was thought in Moscow, of bringing Britain significant 
political and commercial benefits in Eastern Europe, in much the 
same way that Britain had managed to strengthen her position and 
influence in the Middle East during 1937 and 1938. 
Stalin's foreign policy ideas, as they developed during 1939, 
came increasingly close, in terms of their order of priorities and 
aims, with those current in the pre-revolutionary period. Stalin's 
ultimate concern, as that of the autocracy had been, was to secure 
Russia's position as a great power. Set against this background, 
Britain's guarantees to Poland and Rumania came to be seen 
mainly in terms of the restrictions they imposed on the extent of 
the Soviet Union's own sphere of influence and potential to 
exercise its power. It was only to be expected then that the various 
Soviet demands put forward from May 1939 onwards for the 
Soviet Union's right to serve as security guarantor for the Baltic 
states and Finland, and for its need to be able to defend its interests 
against what was termed 'indirect aggression' in the shape of 
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untoward shifts in Germany's favour in the internal balance of 
power in the region, became the cause of increasingly intractable 
differences of opinion between Britain and the Soviet Union. 
It was at this stage that Stalin began to consider the possibility of 
an alternative agreement, not with the West, but with Germany. 
Contact was established between Soviet and German negotiators in 
the early summer of 1939. Extra room for manoeuvre and for a 
change of policy of this type had been provided shortly previously 
in May by the replacement of Litvinov with Molotov as Foreign 
Minister. By August, it became clear that an agreement was 
possible with Germany which, in terms of guaranteeing the Soviet 
Union's great power interests, appeared much more attractive than 
what had been outlined in the discussions held with Britain and 
France. A direct agreement with Germany also appeared to offer a 
better possibility than one with the Western powers, of postponing 
any future conflict, as well as providing the Soviet Union with the 
potential opportunity to gain territorial improvements along its 
western border. 
The resurgence of traditional great power politics in the forging of 
the Munich agreement and subsequent developments, and which 
saw the small states of Europe, Finland included, increasingly 
bypassed or simply ignored in decision-making on major political 
questions in Europe, played a significant part in refocusing interest 
within Finland on defence and security questions and the need to 
improve the country's defence capability. Following approval of 
the 1938 procurement programme, discussion in the Defence 
Council and the government soon moved to a number of new 
separate defence projects. Attempts were also made to speed up 
the re-equipment programme, with a large loan being negotiated 
with Sweden in March 1939. One very visible sign of the new 
interest in defence issues were the fortifications, backed by the 
Civil Guard and the AKS, begun on the Karelian Isthmus in the 
spring of 1939 and designed to deter possible military incursions 
by the Soviet Union. 
Defence planning, as well as the country's overall international 
position, received a major setback, however, after Molotov, the 
new Soviet Foreign Minister, made plain the Soviet Union's 
opposition to the joint Finnish and Swedish plans for fortifying the 
Aland Islands on 31 May. This saw the Swedish government 
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withdraw the bill it had put before Parliament covering Swedish 
participation in the Stockholm plan. The continuance in office of 
Richard Sandler as Swedish Foreign Minister nevertheless served 
to prevent the Finnish authorities from abandoning all hopes of 
achieving some form of closer relationship between the two 
countries. In reality, however, events were leading Finland into an 
increasingly isolated and exposed position, a fact which served to 
deepen the growing sense of insecurity which began to develop 
among the country's political leaders as their traditional points of 
reference disappeared. Efforts to find a way out of this growing 
impasse tended to be frustrated nevertheless by the inability of 
those in charge of foreign policy-making to develop a new policy 
strategy unhampered by the narrow, uncompromising and inflex-
ible approach to national security which had come to dominate 
thinking in the field, and which failed to give adequate weight to 
the wider security aspects of the Finnish area and the northern 
Baltic as a whole. Above all, there was no real movement in 
reassessing Finland's relations with the Soviet Union, which 
remained bedevilled by the traditional sense of suspicion over the 
nature of the Soviet Union's ultimate political and ideological 
intentions towards Finland, which had afflicted them for much of 
independence. 
Despite the worsening international situation and the country's 
increasingly precarious position, Finnish society and public 
opinion as a whole remained, if not unaware of, then largely 
unaffected by these developments. The general mood was one of 
optimism and confidence about the future, rooted in a belief that 
peace would somehow be preserved in spite of everything. The 
overall standard of living was probably higher than it had been at 
any time previously, and developments, when viewed from a 
purely domestic viewpoint, gave every indication of this upward 
swing continuing. Unemployment was low and social and 
economic reform progressing apace. The atmosphere generated by 
the preparations for the Helsinki Olympics planned for 1940 also 
played its part in reinforcing this sense of optimism. 
The storm clouds gathering on the European horizon could not 
be ignored indefinitely, however. While the international crises of 
1938 had seemed distant and unconnected with Finland, the 
shadow of increasing great power tension increasingly fell over 
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Finland as 1939 progressed. It gradually began to be more widely 
appreciated that, despite having been able in the past to avoid 
involvement in many European disputes and despite her geo-
graphical location isolated, Finland might ultimately be unable to 
avoid becoming drawn into wider European developments. 
This growing awareness of the worsening situation, both in 
Europe as a whole and more directly in the Baltic area, was most 
obvious within political circles. Opinions as to the gravity of the 
situation and to the possibility of its deteriorating to such an extent 
as to lead to the start of a major war, however, continued to vary. 
Speaking to the British envoy in Helsinki in June 1939, Manner-
heim expressed the view that, of the potential great power alliance 
alternatives then existing, Finland would find it easiest to come to 
terms with an alliance linking the Western powers and the Soviet 
Union. In his role as chairman of the Defence Council, Manner-
heim presented the government in July 1939 with a new and 
expanded defence equipment procurement plan, with a budget 
rising to over a 1,000 million marks and based mainly on arms 
purchases from Sweden, to improve the country's defence 
capability to a level which he considered adequate to resist any 
serious attack. This called for expanding the fully-mobilised size 
of the army to thirteen divisions, instead of the previous figure of 
nine.9 The major military exercises held on the Karelian Isthmus 
at the beginning of August appear to have only confirmed Man-
nerheim's fears concerning the inadequacies of the defence forces, 
as they revealed numerous weaknesses in the army's operational 
command structure, overall organisation and logistics. 
The importance of maintaining national unity at a time of 
deepening international tension, and expanding on the positive 
development which had taken place towards eliminating internal 
social tensions over the previous two decades, was increasingly 
stressed in political comments over the course of the late summer. 
Typical of these was the speech made by Prime Minister Cajander 
on 12 August, in which he also underlined the need to 
accommodate the increased requirements of the armed forces 
9. See the report of the British envoy in Helsinki to the Foreign Office dated 
20.6.1939 (Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919-1939; Series 3, Vol. VI, 
pp. 120-1). Also Seppälä 1974, p. 83. 
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within overall government spending.10 The increasingly and 
unprecedentedly dangerous level of tension in Europe, and the 
possibility of war it contained, were highlighted in a speech made 
shortly after Cajander's by the Social Democrat Minister of 
Finance, Väinö Tanner, who had previously tended to argue that 
there was little real danger of any country seriously contemplating 
starting another war in Europe. Tanner showed no enthusiasm for 
the great power guarantees proposed for the smaller states of 
Europe as discussed at the talks between Britain, France and the 
Soviet Union, preferring to see Finland unrestricted by any 
agreements not of her own making. On the question of the 
proposed fortification of the Aland Islands, however, he coun-
selled caution, arguing that without sufficient care the question 
could cause unnecessary difficulties with the Soviet Union. 
Agreeing the necessity of strengthening the armed forces, he 
nevertheless also argued that defence spending should be kept 
within what he termed 'reasonable' bounds.11  
Both Cajander's and Tanner's speeches concentrated on the 
importance of internal domestic unity and the government's 
commitment to strengthening the country's armed forces, 
comments on the latter point being directly addressed to the 
defence establishment, unhappy at the government's rejection of a 
number of its requests for increased defence spending. Taking a 
somewhat different and more openly optimistic tack, and one 
more obviously designed to calm public disquiet, the Foreign 
Minister, Eljas Erkko, speaking shortly after Cajander and Tanner, 
suggested that, despite the undeniably high level of tension in 
Europe, there were also increasing indications that peace would be 
preserved. Pointing to the discussions then under way between 
the Western powers and the Soviet Union, Erkko saw the 
possibility of the establishment of a new balance of power, and one 
favourable to the small nations of Europe, as relatively feasible. 
Erkko appears, however, to have conceded that little in the way of 
positive change could be hoped for in reducing Soviet-German 
hostility. Erkko looked to Britain to provide some form of security 
10. See Cajander's speech made on 12.8.1939 and reported in HS on 13.8.1939. 
11. See Tanner's speech made on 13.8.1939 and reported in SS on 14.8.1939. 
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back-up for Finland, although not in the form of any security 
guarantee agreement with the Soviet Union.12 
A major new and unsettling factor was brought into the 
international equation, however, with the news that the Soviet 
Union and Germany, despite their many differences and historic 
opposition, had signed a non-aggression pact on 23 August. This 
agreement, and the unpublished secret accords assumed possibly 
to have been appended to it, forced politicians across Europe to 
enter on a radical reassessment of their policy strategies. Most 
particularly, the agreement came as a blow to Britain and France, 
one for which they had been largely unprepared. 
It was hoped in Berlin that, through the pact with the Soviet 
Union, Germany would be able to avoid war with Poland and, in 
the event of a war in Europe, avoid the prospect of finding herself 
faced with enemies on two fronts. From the Soviet viewpoint, the 
pact eliminated any immediate danger of the Soviet Union being 
drawn into a European war, but, beyond that, it remained to be 
seen whether the Soviet Union would be able to exploit this 
breathing-space by extending its sphere of influence or national 
borders. Various information on the secret protocol attached to the 
treaty soon began to leak out. This only added to the fears, which 
had been growing within Finland since the announcement of the 
pact, that Finland too had been included as part of the bargain 
arrived at in Moscow. These fears were well-founded, as it was 
subsequently revealed that, on the basis of the division of spheres 
of influence agreed between the two powers, the Baltic republics, 
including Finland, together with parts of eastern Poland and 
Bessarabia, had been declared as lying within the Soviet sphere of 
influence, and western Poland within the German sphere.13 The 
signing of the pact left the Polish leadership with few illusions 
about the precariousness of their country's position, a fact which 
only hastened their readiness to sign a treaty of assistance with 
Britain on 25 August, two short days after publication of the 
Soviet-German agreement. 
12. See Erkko's speech made on 19.8.1939 and reported in HS and SS on 
22.8.1939. 
13. See Die Beziehungen zwischen Deutschland und die Sowjetunion 1939-
1941, pp. 89-91. 
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For many in Finland, a large question mark appeared to hang 
over the country's future in the wake of the non-aggression treaty. 
The reality of Finland's increasing isolation, particularly 
accentuated following Sweden's unwillingness to commit herself 
to any form of joint defence agreement and her reassertion of her 
traditional neutral position, could no longer be ignored. The 
attitude of the Finnish press to developments was one of in-
creasing disbelief, bewilderment and uncertainty. Two questions 
dominated discussion, the possibility of a new world war and 
Finland's potential part in it. Attitudes towards Germany were 
particularly fraught, across the whole spectrum of the press. Uusi 
Suomi, with its background of pro-German sympathies, argued 
that Germany had not made any concessions to the Soviet Union 
affecting Finland, while Ajan Suunta saw the new situation as 
merely meaning that small states like Finland would now have to 
take a greater measure of initiative in securing their interests. 
Sosialidemokraatti saw the agreement in a less favourable light, as 
only boding ill for the small nations of Europe.14 As a whole, 
overall reaction to the Soviet-German non-aggression pact saw the 
position of the political centre strengthened and that of both the 
extreme Right and the radical Left commensurately weakened. 
Within government circles, the view gradually gained ground in 
the wake of the pact that Europe was probably inevitably heading 
for war. 
The German attack on Poland on September 1, followed by the 
declaration of war on Germany by the Western powers, although 
marking the beginning of a conflict which had been predicted as 
inevitable for some time, came as a major blow to governments 
across Europe. The Second World War had been set in motion. 
14. US 23.8.1939; SS 23.8.1939; AS 23.8.1939. 
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Sources 
Studies of Finland's international relations and foreign policy over 
the period covered by this survey have been concentrated on two 
main areas, the years surrounding the gaining of independence (as 
for example Pakaslahti 1933,1934; Paasivirta 1947, 1949, 1957, 
1961; Nurmio 1957; Lauerma 1966; Polvinen 1967, 1971; Apunen 
1968; Zetterberg 1977; Upton 1980, 1981) and the latter half of the 
1930s (for ex. Jakobson 1955; Suomi 1973; Mylly 1983; T. Soik-
kanen 1983). One consequence of this has been that the years 
falling outside these two main periods, together with the events 
and developments associated with them, have remained less well 
researched and, in a few areas, virtually untouched by scholarship. 
On the question of foreign powers' policies and attitudes 
towards Finland, those of the Soviet Union have received the most 
comprehensive coverage (K. Korhonen 1966,1971). Study of 
Swedish attitudes has tended to be focused on specific periods, 
rather than the period as a whole (Wahlbäck 1968A; Kalela 1971; 
Selen 1974), as has that on German policies (Ilvessalo 1959; 
Julkunen unpubl.). The Aland Islands issue has attracted interest 
in a variety of disciplines, both in Finland and abroad. Finland's 
foreign and security policy has also been studied as a matter of 
party political debate and discussion (Mylly 1978,1983; T. Soik-
kanen 1983). 
A number of works on the armed forces and related subjects 
during the 1920s and 1930s have appeared (Hersalo 1966; Raikkala 
1964; Terä-Tervasmäki 1973; Seppälä 1974, 1974A; Selen 1980; 
Arimo 1981). Generally speaking, however, this relatively large 
literature has been unanalytical and for the most part purely 
descriptive. The development of the Foreign Ministry and the 
diplomatic corps has been only occasionally studied (Paasivirta 
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1968). In the area of cultural relations, little research of a survey-
type nature taking in the general pattern of developments in the 
field, and directly applicable to the present work, has been done. 
An abundance of studies on individual writers and artists does, 
however, exist (Hiedanniemi 1980). Most of the available literature 
on Finnish sport concentrates on documenting the country's past 
sporting achievements and provides only indirect pointers to the 
wider question of the development of Finland's international 
sporting links. 
Of the country's political parties, only the Social Democratic 
Party has so far been the subject of a detailed history, to supple-
ment the large amount of essentially cursory material relating to 
the parties otherwise existing (H. Soikkanen 1975). Extensive 
surveys are, however, in preparation for a number of the other 
parties. On the question of more general ideological trends during 
the inter-war years, interest has been mainly focused on the two 
extremes of the political spectrum, with communism (Hakalehto 
1966; Hodgson 1967; Upton 1970) and right-wing radicalism 
(Hyvämäki 1971; Alapuro 1973; Nygård 1978,1982; Uola 1982) 
both attracting a variety of studies. Labour relations and the trade 
unions have also recently become the subject of increasing 
attention (Mansner 1981; Ala-Kapee et al 1982). Surveys of 
Finnish liberalism and conservatism, in contrast, have been thin 
on the ground. Some work has been done on the language struggle 
during the 1920s and 1930s (Bondsdorff 1950; P. K. Hämäläinen). 
Little has so far been produced in the field of press history studies 
with regard to press coverage of major developments during the 
inter-war years. Press history studies have remained focused on 
the period preceding independence. 
A number of extensive and sometimes exceptionally extensive 
biographies of leading political and military figures have appeared 
over the years (Heinrichs I—II 1957,1961; E. W. Juva II 1961; 
Jägerskiöld III—IV 1969,1973; Blomstedt 1969; J. Paavolainen II 
1979). The scale of these has often allowed their authors to include 
discussion on a number of more general topics as they have related 
to their main subjects, including foreign and security policy 
questions. 
The material available in foreign archives, and particularly the 
reports produced by foreign envoys and legations in Helsinki, 
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provides a useful guide to the foreign policy aims and areas of 
interest concerning Finland and the northern Baltic typical of the 
various countries in question, as well as additional background 
material for drawing more general conclusions about their overall 
policies. This material, together with my own and other scholars' 
previous research in the same field, has played an important part 
in directing and structuring this present work. The significance of 
this foreign material is not therefore restricted solely to the 
instances in which reference to it has been directly made. By their 
very nature, however, interpretations of policy such as those 
offered here must always be, in part, speculative. 
The early difficulties encountered by the fledgling Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs is well reflected in the variable quality of diplo-
matic report material available for the 1920s in particular. Some 
improvements are noticeable, however, during the 1930s. The use 
of material from private collections has, by necessity of the sheer 
amount of documentation existing, been limited. 
Much useful information on the development of political and 
public opinion was gleaned from a careful study of the Finnish 
press and, on the development of attitudes abroad to Finland, from 
a similar study of the foreign press. In the case of the latter, the 
variety of background factors involved in shaping comment 
required a more selective approach than with the Finnish material. 
The value of the large number of memoirs and autobiographies 
covering the 1920s and 1930s in providing useful insights on the 
period is restricted by the fact that many were written after the 
Second World War and against a background of radically different 
political conditions. A similar caveat must be expressed with 
regard to the interview material used, although this should not be 
allowed to detract from its very real value as a source of useful 
information on less tangible aspects of developments and prob-
lems, otherwise unavailable from other sources. 
I would like to take this opportunity to thank the following people, 
all of whom were of assistance at various stages in the writing of 
this present work, pointing me in the direction of new source 
material and offering numerous useful comments on many of the 
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Erämetsä, Matti Favorin, Professor Jouko Hautala, Ritva Heikkilä, 
Pertti Jotuni, Yrjö Kihlberg, Professors Sven Krohn and Matti 
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Pihkala, Elisa Pispala, Professors Onni Rantala, Sixten Ringbom, 
Martti Ruutu and Matti Sainio, Dr. Johannes Salminen, Dr. John 
Screen (London), Lt. Col. Helge Seppälä, Kari Seppänen, J. O. 
Tallqvist, Professor Ilmar Talve, Topi Törmä, Dr. Bernd Wegner 
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